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Preface 
This book is a study of the dynamics of southern urbanization in the 
Gilded Age. It is part of a larger project started well over a decade ago 
designed to analyze the sectional aspects of urban growth. The first 
volume, The Urban West at the End of the Frontier, appeared in 1978. 
Monographs on the Midwest and Northeast are yet to come. The 
decade of the 1880s was of crucial importance in shaping the American 
urban network and forging a national economy. Yet, the country was 
not yet a "nation of cities." Although there were similarities between 
communities in all parts of the land, sectional antecedents continued 
to have important political, economic, and social implications. 
In the February 1950 issue of the Journal of Southern History, the 
Southern Committee of Ten, discussing research possibilities in south-
ern history, singled out the urban South as a fertile field of investiga-
tion. "Urban life and development offer many suggestive topics for 
exploitation," they noted. "Among these are towns as trade centers, as 
cultural centers, and as county seats. The Southern town has an 
important enough history behind it to justify study. It is interesting to 
contemplate results of studies which approach southern urban de-
velopment as it complements agrarian life on the one hand and it 
competes with a staple-crop agrarian system on the other" (p. 59). 
In the years since then, several scholars have answered the call. Of 
special note have been the contributions of Blaine Brownell, Leonard P. 
Curry, David R. Goldfield, and Howard N. Rabinowitz. They and other 
pioneers in the field of southern urban history have contributed to a 
better understanding of the subject. Until recently, however, the main 
thrust of historiography has been in other directions. Of the rich body 
of scholarly material available on the ninetheenth-century South, only 
a relatively small amount deals directly with the urbanization process. 
Despite a few excellent suggestive essays and studies on specific sub-
jects, little in the way of comprehensive analysis exists on the early 
stages of city building in Dixie. The object of this book is to help answer 
that need, and at the same time to stimulate research in southern urban 
history. 
X Preface 
The South, with all its distinctiveness and contrasts, has always 
been a region in slow motion. The southern urban mosaic was not built 
in a short span. Rather, it evolved in relationship to the resources and 
needs of an agrarian and commercial society. Southern leaders pa-
tiently constructed layers of cities. They eschewed the unrestricted 
promotional frenzy that led to the raising up within a few decades of 
cities in the Midwest. Even after national events drastically altered the 
course of American urbanization, southerners continued to pursue an 
orderly policy. The Civil War and Reconstruction disrupted their plans. 
The "New South" movement (as distinguished from wider applica-
tions of the term) raised false hopes at the same time it sought to 
sustain faith in southern traditions. Racial controversy wasted human 
resources. The question of whether to welcome or oppose outside 
developers continued as a constant source of debate. As cities in Dixie 
grew in size, an increasingly uniform response to municipal problems 
threatened their individual characteristics. Agricultural deficiencies 
checked the creation of prosperous urban hinterlands. Through it all, 
the South's city builders persevered, continuing to erect an urban 
network suited to their requirements. 
A serious discourse in thought and action about the need for 
southern cities occurred in the antebellum South. The discussion 
continued through the Civil War, the Reconstruction period, and the 
Gilded Age. The New South visionaries and the arguments they articu-
lated deserve serious attention. The impact of their views is another 
matter. Patterns of urbanization developed in the South that evolved 
over the course of the nineteenth century. The cities differed only in 
degree from those elsewhere in America. Even so, judgments about 
progress in urbanization and industrialization require measurement by 
southern as well as national standards. 
The urbanization of the South has to be considered on its own 
terms. In that context, the story of southern city building in the Gilded 
Age is not one of failure. Rather, against a backdrop of defeat, dis-
couragement, and disillusionment, it is an uplifting account of a lim-
ited victory: a triumph that in many ways contributed to the making of 
the great alabaster cities of the twentieth-century South. 
I started working on this project more than a decade ago. Over the 
years so many people have helped me that it is impossible to acknowl-
edge all of them. Needless to say, I appreciated their concern and aid. 
Fredrick Marcel Spletstoser and Barbara J. Cottrell read and com-
mented with great care on various versions of the manuscript. Splet-
stoser's observations on the New South movement were especially 
valuable. W. Bruce Wheeler also read and commented on several draft 
chapters. Helping in a variety of ways were several of my colleagues at 
Preface xi 
the University of Missouri-Kansas City. They included Stanley B. 
Parsons, Herman M. Hattaway, Richard Elrod, James Falls, Jesse V. 
Clardy, William R. Brazelton, Richard McKinzie, and George Gale. 
Dean Eldon Parizek of the UMKC College of Arts and Science provided 
a scholarly environment. Roger T. Johnson of Milling & Baking News 
fished with me and discussed agricultural economics. Douglas McLen-
non, Sam Wallace, John Finger, and Lawrence Christensen offered 
valuable criticism. Among other contributors were William Petrowski, 
Patrick McLear, William Pratt, and R. Christopher Schnell. James and 
Marian Cottrell provided an island in Canada. Barbara LoCascio and 
Claire Hildebrand typed the manuscript. 
Of course, though both custom and prudence demand it be said, I 
am responsible for errors of fact or interpretation. 
To Ruthie 
l _____ _ 
A Wider Field 
Both for Virtue and Vice 
In 1980 enthusiastic promoters predicted a magnificent future for the 
urban South. Census statistics indicated that many southern towns 
had grown significantly in population through a time when numerous 
old industrial centers in the North had experienced marked declines. 
Publicists claiming that a new age of racial harmony and enterprise had 
dawned below the Mason and Dixon line portrayed Dixie's cities as 
good places in which to live and invest money. At long last, buttressed 
by a network of metropolises, the South would assume its rightful 
place in America. Even the use of the term "South" was passe in some 
circles, replaced by "Sunbelt," which had broader connotations.l 
"Sunbelt" blurred racial considerations by linking the destiny of south-
ern cities with that of entirely different historical traditions in the 
Southwest and on the Pacific coast. It was a public relations triumph of 
the first degree, worthy of the best of Madison Avenue. Fortunately for 
southerners, the claims of a coming urban millennium had more 
substance than was indicated by the promotional froth. Population 
trends, coupled with economic indicators and quality of life studies, 
appeared to give the predictions considerable validity. The problem 
was that it was an old refrain. Equating the interests of the South with 
those of other parts of the country or glossing over racial disharmony 
were not new concepts. 
Was the new South of the 1980s simply another manifestation of 
many past new Souths that had failed to see dramatic progress? Cynics 
noted that after any period of activity and bold talk the South always 
remained several decades behind the rest of the nation. After all, in 
1980, New York City, for all its perceived troubles, had a metropolitan 
area population more than ten times larger than that of Atlanta. Nev-
ertheless, at long last, urbanization in the South seemed to be becom-
ing a reality. 
There is a continuity to southern history, as has often been pointed 
2 The Rise of the Urban South 
out. 2 In the 1980s advocates of a new urban South included such 
diverse groups as Gulf State real estate salesmen, corporate bankers in 
Atlanta, and integrationist politicians all across the region. Although 
differing in many of their views, all agreed that even as the South 
developed considerable urban dimensions, it would remain unique, its 
people and institutions distinguished by geography and tempera-
ment. Whether or not they realize it, these modern visionaries share a 
bond with southern leaders of the distant past. In the early days of the 
republic, when the nation first began to develop into an urban society, 
serious students of life in the South pondered the desirability of cities. 
They recognized the need for commercial and cultural centers but 
feared the consequences of rapid urbanization. A central philosophical 
question was how to build an urban system without upsetting the 
existing agrarian order. 
Thomas Jefferson reflected the conflicting opinions about cities 
held by many plantation owners. His views changed markedly over 
the years, affected by a combination of his own moods and experi-
ences, changes in prevailing scientific theories about the prevention of 
disease, and the exigencies of the international situation. In the 1780s 
he asserted, "The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support 
of pure government as sores do to the strength of the human body,"3 
and warned that abandonment of agrarian principles would corrupt 
the country.4 Jefferson believed that cities provided an unnatural at-
mosphere for human life, an assumption strengthened by the yellow 
fever epidemics that swept through American cities in the 1790s. Yet by 
1805 he concluded that building cities on a "more open plan" would 
alleviate health problems. At this point he decided that it was neces-
sary and practical, in light of threats from overseas, to place "the 
manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist." Shortly before his death 
he again reevaluated his position. In 1824, equating cities with "vice 
and wretchedness," he called New York a "Cloacina of all the de-
pravities of human nature."5 Coming full circle, he was a man of his 
times, mirroring the shifting attitudes of his fellow countrymen toward 
urban institutions. In Jefferson's day "urban" and "rural" were not 
standard categories of thought. People viewed both town and country 
as "normal." They appeared to have the same characteristics, except 
that some problems--disease, vice, and crime-seemed more concen-
trated in cities. 
Rapid urbanization resulted in changing conceptions. Census fig-
ures indicated that between 1820 and 1860 cities grew at a rate of 797 
percent, against 226 percent for the nation as a whole. New statistical 
information on a wide variety of subjects further accentuated dif-
ferences between rural and urban areas. Many promotional writers 
extolled the virtues of cities; conversely, reformers wrote tracts attack-
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ing various aspects of urban life. At the same time, many citizens of the 
South became increasingly concerned about the position of their sec-
tion in the federal union. Once they accepted the proposition that cities 
were more than simply extensions of a rural society, they began to 
question their own values. Most of the new urban growth was occur-
ring outside of the South. The realities of increasing city populations 
and the resulting changes in intellectual conceptions caused white 
southerns to think of their region as a unique agrarian society. 6 
Champions of the Old South used Jefferson's statements in various 
ways to support their own contentions about cities. Some agrarian 
extremists claimed that the absence of many towns augured well for the 
rise of a separate southern civilization. They dismissed existing towns 
as agrarian dependencies, of small consequence beyond their tradi-
tional roles as receiving and distribution points. The rapid building up 
of cities in the North led to charges that cities not only subverted 
Jeffersonian ideals but were evil places that menaced Christian moral 
values. The assaults intensified as the nineteenth century progressed, 
fueled by fears that grubby commerical and manufacturing centers, 
where crude "lords of the loom" would oppress workers and un-
scrupulous merchants would gouge buyers by selling shoddily pro-
duced goods at inflated prices, might rise in Dixie. In 1849 a pro-
agrarian commentator contended, "In a city the temptation to indul-
gence is incessant, because almost every object of desire is in market, 
and desire itself is inflamed not only by opportunity but by rivalry. "7 It 
followed that the South, rural in residence and temperament, did not 
present the temptations, the opportunities for sensual gratification, or 
the ruinous waste of human life that supposedly characterized north-
ern metropolises. 
Many southern statesmen, however, of all philosophical predilec-
tions, became increasingly reconciled to the need for cities. Andrew 
Jackson was an official of the town company that established Memphis. 
Henry Clay worked to advance the fortunes of his home, Lexington, 
Kentucky. John C. Calhoun envisioned a great southern commercial 
empire based on large cities. Jefferson Davis wanted towns and rail-
roads to serve as means of welding the South into a nationalistic entity. 8 
In general, though, conflict continued to characterize thoughtful delib-
erations about the course of urbanization. In 1843 George Tucker, a 
Jeffersonian theoretician and professor of moral philosophy at the 
University of Virginia, said that demographic trends made the future 
growth of cities inevitable and that therefore the positive side of city life 
should be stressed and means found to control potential unsavory 
elements. "In the eyes of the moralist," he said, "cities afford a wider 
field both for virtue and vice; and they are more prone to innovation, 
whether for good or evil. 9 
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Actually, anti urbanism was a national as well as a sectional concept 
supported or rejected in direct relationship to the needs of a given 
situation. Since the early days of settlement in North America, relig-
ious leaders had attacked towns as places where lust, vanity, and 
conspiracy thrived. Novelists portrayed cities as representative of the 
evils that affected all human nature. Popular writers expanded on livid 
themes about the pitfalls of urban life. The editors of agricultural 
journals warned rural youths about the evils of the city. New England 
transcendentalists, including Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, praised nature and questioned whether urban materialism 
actually meant progress. But while a flood of promotional literature 
exhorted people to build cities, the vast majority of citizens, North and 
South, accepted the original Jeffersonian premise that the nation 
should remain agricultural. 10 Faith in the desirability of agrarianism 
grew in direct proportion to the movement of Americans into cities. 
The doctrine of antiurbanism had a practical side. Few outside 
commentators had anything good to say about New York, the nation's 
most successful city. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
Empire City garnered the money power and became the nation's 
primary distribution and receiving center. Its command of credit rates 
and commercial prices caused both admiration and hatred. Especially 
in the South, New York was a symbol of exploitation. An editorial in the 
Vicksburg Daily Whig, written on the eve of the Civil War, summed up 
prevailing attitude: "New York, like a mighty queen of commerce, sits 
proudly upon her island throne sparkling in jewels, and waving an 
undisputed commercial spectre over the South. By means of her rail-
roads and navigable streams, she sends out her long arms to the 
extreme South; and with avidity rarely equalled, grasps our gains and 
transfers them to herself-taxing us at every step and depleting us as 
extensively as possible without destroying us." Similarly, DeBow's 
Review, the leading southern commercial journal of the 1850s, de-
nounced New York and all its works: "Southern toil and labor ... has 
been showering down gold for fifty years into her lap amounting to 
countless millions. The patronage of the South has furnished its full 
quota towards supplying the means to rear that immensely wealthy 
city. Unsuspecting Southern liberality has done its utmost to feed and 
pamper this monster city. "11 On another occasion, a commentator in 
DeBow's accused New York of fostering the slavery system. Such was 
the price of success in antebellum urban America. 
New York's ascendancy was one part of the changes that within a 
few decades threw city building and relations between the sections out 
of kilter. A gradual approach to urbanization came to an abrupt end. 
No actual economic conspiracy against the South existed. The success 
of the urban North resulted from the ability of entrepreneurs to read 
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trends correctly, to make plans, to obtain financing, and to make use of 
technological innovations. In that context, the South was the loser in 
the construction of cities in the pre-Civil War period. But the dif-
ferences resulted from another reality. Using the rules that had gov-
erned urban needs over the previous 150 years, southerners had done 
a fairly good job of creating cities. Antiurban attitudes had little to do 
with the South's failure to develop great cities. Rather, the rush of 
events overwhelmed the builders of a carefully constructed urban 
network. Events outside of the region placed the South at a distinct 
economic disadvantage. On one level, southern urbanization can best 
be approached on its own terms, inside its own history. On another, 
broader level, an understanding of the larger picture is essential. In 
short, urban developments in the South cannot be considered in a 
vacuum, any more than they can be considered within the context of 
hypothetical musings about the nature of cities. 
Urbanization in the colonial South had been a reasonably logical 
and orderly procedure. 12 In the early days natural advantages had 
taken precedence over entrepreneurial considerations. The first set-
tlers sought sites with good harbors, defensive positions, and easy 
access into the interior. Many later attempts by authorities to designate 
town sites, notably in Virginia and the Carolinas, for the most part 
failed miserably. The South required only a few major cities until well 
into colonial times. Tobacco growers in Maryland and Virginia shipped 
from their own docks; Charleston served the needs of the Carolinas. 
Baltimore, which grew as a tobacco port after planters used up coastal 
lands, triumphed over a number of competitors in the upper 
Chesapeake Bay region. From the start, however, southern town-
building activities seldom overreached. Instead, they developed in 
reaction to the needs of the society, thereby establishing important 
precedents. 
The United States entered the nineteenth century as a maritime 
and agrarian nation. A few cities were sufficient to serve the needs of 
the republic. Following the War of 1812 the United States turned 
inward. The breaking of Indian power east of the Mississippi River 
provided an opportunity for the quick settlement and exploitation of 
hundreds of thousands of square miles of potential farm and plantation 
lands. A popular political proposal, the American System, based on 
the hope of developing a self-sufficient economy, spurred interest in 
interior markets. As people poured into the newly opened areas, both 
North and South, New York capitalists responded to the changing 
conditions. On one plain, coastal schooners that carried freight from 
New York to southern ports stopped deadheading on return trips. 
Instead, they carried cotton for transshipment out of New York to 
overseas ports. On a larger plain, New Yorkers strongly supported the 
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building of the Erie Canal. Its success started a race between New York 
and its East Coast rivals for western markets in the old Northwest 
Territory. 13 
The South was unprepared to respond to the sudden dash for 
western markets. In the first place, the section's Atlantic coastal cities 
had to contend with horrendous geographical obstacles-forbidding 
and rugged mountains that separated the ports from the interior. 
North of Georgia, the easiest way through the mountains was the 
Cumberland Gap, but even that route, which was followed by the 
National Road, passed through difficult territory. 14 To the south, the 
great valleys of the Shenandoah, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee 
all ran northeast to southwest, rather than east to west. Given the 
underdeveloped transportation technology, the best way was to go 
around, which meant swinging south through north central Georgia, 
through foothills and hollows. More lines of mountains ran east to west 
across Kentucky and Tennessee. It was easy to project communication 
lines from the Atlantic to the Ohio River; realizing those lines was 
much different. In 1836 leaders of the Tennessee Valley town of Knox-
ville were at first elated when coastal interests projected a railroad from 
Charleston to Cincinnati running through their community. When 
they learned that the line was to go straight over the mountains, they 
knew it would never be built. 15 Critics chided Charleston planters for 
not supporting the project, claiming it would have enabled the city to 
compete on an equal basis with New York. In this instance, the plan-
ters were simply being realistic. 
Until much too late, the southern Atlantic seaboard cities failed to 
obtain transportation lines that could challenge New York. The Nation-
al Road lost importance. It handled less than two hundred thousand 
tons of east-bound commodities annually, at a time when the Erie 
Canal carried several million tons. Despite geographical problems, 
Baltimore interests made a bold move-they undertook construction of 
a four-hundred-mile-long railroad from their city to Wheeling. Build-
ing started in 1828, well in advance of existing railroad engineering. No 
one knew whether tracks could be laid through the mounains beyond 
the Cumberland Gap. Work progressed so slowly that the line did not 
reach Wheeling until 1853. It gave Baltimore access to the Midwest, 
and, after the Civil War, trunk connections to St. Louis and Chicago. 
These routes enabled Baltimore to compete successfully for the grow-
ing Midwest grain trade. 16 Some southern interests claimed that be-
cause it had built tracks outside the section Baltimore was no longer a 
true southern city. 17 But the city's railroad strategy, even though overly 
ambitious, demonstrated that some southern capitalists were ready to 
take calculated risks. At a time when its basic hinterland lay entirely 
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below the Mason and Dixon line, Baltimore had penetrated Yankee 
territory, an achievement of no mean magnitude. 
Places to the south of Baltimore were unable to do as well. Bal-
timore was a wealthy seafaring city, with enough sources of credit to 
spend $15 million on railroad projects in the antebellum period. No 
other town could raise that much money. In an age of gerrymandering, 
urban underrepresentation, and property qualifications for voting, 
promoters had to go hat in hand to rural-dominated state legislatures. 
Although legislators were frequently sympathetic to proposals, they 
were reluctant to make appropriations, award franchises, or authorize 
bond issues. Even partial funding was hard to come by, unless a project 
had demonstrated local significance, in which case planters and mer-
chants frequently supported bond subscriptions. 18 A favored promo-
tional tactic linked railroad proposals to the moving of cotton, which 
was much more attractive to southern elites than nebulous visions of 
midwestern grain markets. 
Limited achievements were the general rule. A Norfolk scheme to 
build a railroad to the Ohio River died almost at its inception, blocked 
by opposition from Richmond in the Virginia legislature. In retaliation, 
Norfolk interests successfully opposed railroad lines and canal exten-
sions desired by Richmond. On another level, Richmond and Norfolk 
combined to stop the internal improvement plans of other cities in the 
Old Dominion, notably Alexandria and Lynchburg. Washington pro-
moters were more successful than many of those inside the state in 
dealing with the Virginia legislature. In the 1820s Washington canal 
builders received money from that body and its counterpart in Mary-
land to dig the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal from the Potomac to the 
Ohio. Congress also contributed funds, convinced that the project 
could be integrated into a national defense plan to assist the movement 
of troops through the Appalachian Mountains. The canal was a total 
failure, never progressing beyond the Cumberland Gap. In North 
Carolina, officials in a number of small ports could only wish for 
money to undertake big schemes. During antebellum times, they did 
well to construct several local railroads, including one that was 125 
miles long. There was no money to accomplish more in an un-
developed agricultural state. Down the coast in South Carolina, 
Charleston interests concentrated upon securing local lines and exten-
sions into Georgia for the primary purpose of carrying cotton. 19 Un-
deterred by Charleston's plans to build rail lines in Georgia, Savannah 
interests had conceived a magnificent integrated ocean and land trans-
portation network. Its capitalists, with money raised in New York, paid 
for the construction of the Savannah, which in 1819 made the first 
partially steam-powered voyage across the Atlantic. 20 The ship was a 
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financial failure, so the Savannahans retrenched. With considerable 
success, they thrust roads and railroads into Georgia, challenging 
Charleston's plans. By the Civil War none of the cities below Baltimore 
had direct connections with the Midwest, but they had built lines to the 
jumping-off points into the underdeveloped southern interior. The 
basis had been laid for a sound policy of future development, well 
suited to the needs of an agrarian order. 
As the trans-Appalachian West opened for settlement, economic 
experts pondered which was more profitable, grain or cotton. Both 
could raise empires, but it was easier to open up grain than cotton fields 
for cultivation. Grain, basically strains of weeds, was a renewable 
resource that could be grown almost anywhere. The crop predomi-
nated along the frontier in the early days of settlement. Until the 
nineteenth century, the chief wheat-growing region in the country was 
in Maryland and Virginia. By the 1830s it had moved to the Genessee 
Valley in upstate New York. During the 1840s it had shifted to the 
Maumee River Valley in Ohio. In the ensuing decade, Illinois emerged 
as the number one wheat state and, ten years later, Wisconsin. 21 The 
upper Great Plains became "America's breadbasket" following the 
Civil War. In the antebellum Midwest grain production rose tremen-
dously because the vast prairies and easily broken soil made agri-
cultural settlement relatively uncomplicated. So many people went to 
the area from New England that some leaders in that section worried 
about depopulation. These developments seemingly harked well for 
the South, given the often-stated belief that the Midwest would forge 
strong economic ties with New Orleans. 
The course of development in the Midwest upset calculations 
about the creation of ties with the South. Promoters carried on a 
frenzied speculation in town sites. Land sharks platted thousands of 
paper villages.22 The Panic of 1837, in part nurtured by overextended 
city building, only temporarily checked the speculative spiral. Most 
towns failed, but the "forced-draft" effect of a combination of suc-
cessful urban promotions and agricultural progress gave the Midwest 
numerous "instant cities" by the Civil War. The settlement of the 
antebellum Midwest demonstrated that people could raise up cities in 
a hurry, a development alien to southern experiences and practices. 
Great regional power changes affected the sectional struggle. Cin-
cinnati and St. Louis leaders, instead of looking south, concentrated on 
garnering new midwestern markets. Louisville authorities, unable to 
comer markets north of the Ohio River, shifted their concerns to 
building railroads in Kentucky and Tennessee. Chicago strategists 
soon developed and carried out a railroad policy that led to further 
alterations of the emerging urban network. Most of Chicago's gains 
came at the expense of its arch rival St. Louis. By the Civil War, Chicago 
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was the rail center of the Midwest. The rapid advance of Chicago-it 
gained a reputation as the "Wonder City of the World"-further 
darkened hopes for a cautious national urban policy. Northeastern 
"plungers" rushed to invest money in Chicago lines. This was all very 
frustrating to southerners used to operating within the constraints of 
an older and more equitable structue that was no longer valid. 23 
In the decade and a half before the Civil War, writers in DeBow's 
carefuly framed their arguments favoring urbanization in terms of 
threatened northern domination, sectional disparities, and the historic 
role of cities. Virginia economist William Burwell contended that rail-
roads could quickly build towns in the South, restoring the section to 
preeminence. The publication's editor, J.D.B. DeBow, agreed, stressing 
the need to counter the achievements of railroad builders in the North 
with "corresponding weapons." To reinforce the point, DeBow pub-
lished an article by Jesup Scott, a wealthy Toledo, Ohio, capitalist with 
a reputation as an authority on railroads and urbanization trends. Scott 
claimed that rail networks would soon create monster cities of ten 
million people. Consequently, he argued that the South would be left 
far behind the rest of the nation if it continued to place faith in an 
outmoded agricultural economy. 24 Other commentators, after study-
ing national patterns, asserted that geographical inevitability dictated 
the rise of towns along the Mississippi and Alabama rivers. Metro-
politanism was equated with progress; cities were said to be beacons in 
mankind's long search for knowledge, humanity, and light. Advocates 
of urbanization insisted that enormous southern communities would 
be unlike those elsewhere, for they would pose no menace to prevail-
ing norms. They discounted fragmentary evidence of the incom-
patibility of slavery and urbanization. As DeBow stated in 1860: "Once 
Baltimore, Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Or-
leans will supply all goods foreign and domestic, how easily we might 
cut off all dependence on the North. "25 
Dixie's antebellum urban centers contained men who perceptively 
recognized that despite cotton prosperity the South was in danger of 
losing its economic position in the American Union. DeBow, Hinton R. 
Helper, William Fitzhugh, and other intellectuals believed that an 
agrarian society could not hope to avoid outside domination. So they 
called for the development of manufacturing, direct trade with Europe, 
promotion of railroads, and programs designed to attract northern 
investment capital. Southerners to the core, these otherwise farsighted 
individuals were white supremacists, who, with the exception of Help-
er, believed that slavery was a necessary labor system and an essential 
agency for the maintenance of racial harmony. DeBow claimed that 
"the negro was created essentially to be a slave, and finds his highest 
development and destiny in that condition."26 But, DeBow and other 
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economic activists achieved only limited success. Although they re-
ceived a wide hearing, they were virtually powerless in a South that 
was under the political and intellectual control of a planter aristocracy. 
Helper and Fitzhugh had strikingly different views about the 
"peculiar institution." Fitzhugh, a widely known Virginia sociologist, 
used human skulls and other evidence to attack the concept of a free 
society and to prove what he considered the innate racial inferiority of 
blacks. Fitzhugh, in equating slavery with high civilization, felt that 
cities further enhanced the human experience. "Cities are but human 
hives and honeycombs," he asserted, "and as much the natural resi-
dence of man as the latter are of bees .... The vitality of cities has been 
as remarkable as their influence on human destiny."27 Helper, a bril-
liant but alienated North Carolinian, believed that slavery retarded 
economic growth. In his controversial1857 book, The Impending Crisis of 
the South: How to Meet It, he demanded the establishment of a gigantic 
southern metropolis. He alleged that sinister manipulations by the 
slavocracy enabled northerners to draw away from the South more 
than $120 million every year, drastically changing the sectional bal-
ance. "Now, instead of carrying all our money to New-York, Phila-
delphia, Boston, and Cincinnati," he speculated, "suppose we had 
kept it on the south side of Mason and Dixon's line-as we would have 
done, had it not been for slavery-and had disbursed it in the up build-
ing of Norfolk, Beaufort, Charleston, or Savannah, how much richer, 
better, greater, would the South have been to-day!"28 He implied that a 
plot prevented the growth of cities in the South. Although his dark 
thoughts about a far-reaching conspiracy seemed improbable, they 
received a wide audience in the North, adding fuel to the fires of 
sectional controversy. 
Southern nationalists had little interest in competing with norther-
ners to see who could build cities in the shortest period of time. As long 
as cotton was king the few voices for urbanization in the South were 
unable to bring about a dramatic change in policy. In 1858 an English 
tourist, Hiram Fuller, caught the prevailing mood of the dominant 
groups when he wrote, "Mobile is a pleasant cotton city of some thirty 
thousand inhabitants-where people live in cotton houses and ride in 
cotton carriages. They buy cotton, sell cotton, think cotton, eat cotton, 
drink cotton, and dream cotton."29 Railroads into unchartered territo-
ry, risky manufacturing ventures, and diversified agriculture had no 
place in the antebellum South. In that context, white southerners 
appeared a shiftless lot of racists, dedicated to supporting a cruel 
system of exploitation based upon human slavery at the expense of 
their own self-interest. Few northerners cared about city building in 
the prewar South. They were interested in New Yorkers creating a 
national urban system and Chicagoans plotting a railroad strategy. 
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These developments, compressed into less than half a century, 
changed the direction of the national experience. By comparison the 
plans of southern urban innovators paled to nothing. 
The Civil War hurt all the southern cities. Even those that sustained 
no military damage had to contend with ravaged hinterlands and 
disrupted commerical connections. As late as 1879 New York Tribune 
reporters who toured the South concluded that "tried by Northern 
standards, there are only a few cities between the Potomac and the Rio 
Grande that can be said to be growing and prospering." They thought 
Mobile "dilapidated and hopeless," Norfolk "asleep by her magnifi-
cent harbor," and life in Wilmington and Savannah "at a standstill."30 
The victors were far from generous. Exploitation of the South con-
tinued as before the war. There was no scheme-such as the Marshall 
Plan after World War II to help Western Europe-to raise up the 
prostrate South. 
During a period of defeat and humiliation, the plight of the South 
was such that urban promoters found a far more receptive audience. 
DeBow used the pages of his revised commercial magazine to call for a 
postwar policy that emphasized industrialization, diversified agri-
culture, immigration, and attemps to obtain outside capital. DeBow 
had served the Confederacy as the chief overseer of the cotton trade, 
adding to his impeccable sectional credentials. He wrote in 1866, "We 
have got to go to manufacturing to save ourselves. We have got to go to it to 
obtain an increase of population. Workmen go to furnaces, mines, and 
factories-they go where labor is brought."31 This was "old wine in 
new bottles," to be sure, but it helped to bridge the gap in the southern 
experience caused by the Civil War. In the 1870s the call for an urban 
and industrial South intensified. By the end of the decade it had been 
codified into the New South creed. 
Some of the most articulate New South spokesmen were news-
papermen: Henry Watterson of the Louisville Courier-Journal, Richard 
Edmonds of the Manufacturers Record, Francis Dawson of the Charleston 
News and Courier, Walter Hines Page of several different journals, and, 
above all, Henry Grady of the Atlanta Constitution. 32 In an era in which 
political leaders were unable to represent the section, either because of 
their past loyalty to the Confederacy or their activities during Recon-
struction, journalists more than at any other time spoke for the South. 
Perhaps under different circumstances, some of these men would have 
become statesmen on a par with John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay, and the 
presidents of the Virginia dynasty. But the older America no longer 
existed at the dawning of the Gilded Age. Southern politicians had 
little national credibility. Prominent journalists, although certainly not 
above politics, could, by the nature of their work, take a higher ground 
on economic matters. They were able to present apparently nonpar-
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tisan, progressive, and rational answers to the problems of the day. 
Southern newspaper editors of such weekly publications as the York-
ville Enquirer, the Sparta Ishmaelite, and the Troy Messenger gave them a 
wide hearing by reprinting their commentaries, as did important 
northern newspapers. Some small southern papers worked out joint 
selling arrangements with larger publications. 33 The subscribers of the 
Alexandria, Louisiana, Town Talk had the option of receiving Grady's 
Atlanta Constitution. When the journalistic advocates of change sallied 
forth on the lecture circuit to preach their doctrines, they went not as 
representatives of the Lost Cause but as skilled communicators who 
articulated programs that they claimed would bind sectional wounds. 
The purveyers of the nostrums were all relatively young men. 
Watterson, born in 1840 and the son of a Tennessee lawyer, had edited 
the Rebel, the most widely read of wartime papers in the Confederacy. 
Following hostilities, he did a quick about-face. Under his editorship, 
the Nashville Banner supported reunion, forgiveness, and drastic 
changes in the southern way of life. He moved to Louisville because he 
claimed it had a more cosmopolitan outlook than Nashville. Edmonds, 
born on a Virginia farm in 1857, became convinced as a youth that 
misguided economic policies kept the South in poverty and prevented 
the exploitation of its natural resources. His regional journal, which he 
founded in 1881 in Baltimore, supported southern industrial progress 
with missionary zeal. Dawson, an Englishman imbued with the right-
eousness of the southern cause, had enlisted in a British port in the 
Confederate navy, going to sea on a commerce raider. Twenty-five 
years of age when the war ended, he settled in Charleston and became 
a newspaperman. Under his editorial direction, the News and Courier 
lashed out at the Republican carpetbag government of South Carolina, 
clouding his role as an advocate of urbanization. His career ended 
tragically in 1889, when he was killed in a quarrel over a woman. Page, 
a North Carolinian, was only four years old at the beginning of the Civil 
War. In 1878, after attending three colleges, including the Johns 
Hopkins University in Baltimore, he drifted into newspaper work. He 
soon became a writer for national magazines, including Harper's Weekly. 
His main role was as a critic who told northern readers about the 
inferior economic condition of the South and called for a redress 
through the building of cities. He eventually became a part owner of 
the Manufacturers Record but then moved on, capping his career by 
serving as Woodrow Wilson's ambassador to the Court of St. James. 
Page was thoughtful in his analysis of the post-Reconstruction South, 
placing problems in a national context. He believed that southerners 
needed to exert more energy to change conditions. Edmonds saw 
factories as a sectional panacea. Dawson and Watterson were zealous 
urban promoters of a classic American mold. Dawson wanted to make 
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Charleston the "Liverpool of America." Watterson called Louisville a 
"Railroad Bismarck. "34 
If Dawson and Watterson had been editors of the Racine Journal-
Times or the Cedar Rapids Gazette they would have been considered 
typical town boosters. At best, they might have been grouped in the 
same class as Robert T. Van Horn of the Kansas City Western Journal of 
Commerce. Believing that Kansas City's future lay to the west, he 
extolled the Kansas hinterlands as the "Garden of the World" rather 
than as the official designation of the "Great American Dessert." Van 
Horn entered public life and served as mayor of Kansas City and as a 
United States congressman.35 Dawson and Watterson, however, were 
editors of southern papers, and they made judgments within a larger 
framework than that of town promotion. Henry Woodfin Grady oper-
ated under the same restraints. 
Grady had perfect credentials. Certainly a friend of this courtly 
and uncommon man did not do him justice when he wrote gushingly, 
"Mr. Grady's love was an organic force, with eyes to see and brains to 
plan and hands to execute. While, like the sun, it shed its cheering 
beams on every side, it was so individualized and focalized that it 
specially touched and inspired everyone within its range, shining alike 
on the evil and on the good, and distilling its beneficent dews upon the 
just and the unjust. "36 Despite such hyperbole, Grady seemed almost 
too good to be true. Born in Athens, Georgia, in 1851, he was the son of 
a successful merchant. In a class-conscious society in which roots 
counted for a great deal, tradesmen were not at the top of the social 
scale. His background could have been a liability to a prophet of urban 
destiny. But, Grady's father joined the Confederate forces and died in 
the field during the last days of the war. The citizens of Athens raised a 
monument in his honor, providing his son with a tangible link to the 
Lost Cause. 
Henry Grady graduated from the University of Georgia. After 
broadening his horizons by spending a year at the University of Vir-
ginia, he became a journalist. He worked for several newspapers, 
serving for a time as the southern correspondent for the New York 
Herald before joining the staff of the Atlanta Constitution in 1876. Four 
years later he bought a quarter interest in the paper with $20,000 
loaned by New York business leader Cyrus Field, who had long culti-
vated southern commercial ties. Grady edited and published the Con-
stitution until his sudden death in 1889.37 At the time he was among the 
best-known southerners in the nation. 
During his short adult life, Grady gave a number of major speeches 
on "enemy soil" in the North. He took great pains to appear moderate 
and a bit apologetic on the race question, assuring his listeners that a 
new era of progress lay ahead. In 1886 he told a New York audience, "I 
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am glad that the omniscient God held the balance of battle in His 
Almighty Hand, and that human slavery was swept forever from 
American soil-the American Union saved from the wreck of war. "38 
With considerable eloquence he talked of the bond between southern 
whites and blacks, describing in moving terms how slaves had 
shielded the bodies of their fallen masters on the battlefield. Grady 
expressed the belief that northerners, who, he said, came from a 
section with a poor record in dealing with Indians, had out of igno-
rance and inexperience blundered badly in handling southern blacks. 
A favorite Grady theme was that once northern humanitarians left the 
South, southern blacks and whites would work together to achieve 
racial harmony. He said, "I want no better friend than the black boy 
who was raised by my side ... I want no sweeter music than the 
crooning of my old 'mammy.' "39 This reasonable view received rein-
forcement in the Constitution through Joel Chandler Harris's "Uncle 
Remus" stories, which stressed blissful black and white relations. 
Through such means, Grady spun myths about slavery acceptable to 
the very northerners who had destroyed the system. 40 
Few northerners, at least those eager to invest in what they accept-
ed as a reformed South, saw, or wanted to see, another side of Grady's 
racial views. He talked much differently on the subject when address-
ing his fellow white southerners. He bluntly told an audience: "But the 
supremacy of the white race in the South must be maintained forever, 
and the domination of the negro race resisted at all points and at all 
hazards, because the white race is the superior race. This is the declara-
tion of no new truth; it has abided forever in the marrow of our bones 
and shall run forever in the blood that feeds Anglo-Saxon hearts. "41 
The words about slaves protecting the bodies of wounded masters or 
about the love of white children for their black nursemaids were strictly 
for northern consumption. 
Watterson and Edmonds displayed similar dualism on the race 
question. Edmonds wrote movingly about the "progressive evolution 
from the darkness of slavery into the fullness of freedom." He saw 
blacks rising toward true manhood by using their physical and moral 
powers. "In all history," he averred, "there has been no similar in-
stance in which the ruling race has so nobly and unremittingly aided its 
former bondsmen to rise to the highest levels of which they were 
naturally capable." Although arguing that the "troublesome race ques-
tion" would vanish in the New South, he accepted the superiority of 
the Anglo-Saxon "race" and claimed that the development plans of the 
"white men" would be executed through the use of the "strong mus-
cles of industrious negroes. "42 Watterson observed that only poor 
judges of human nature would believe that the well-being of blacks did 
not lie in the South, where they would be protected by their former 
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owners. Indeed, he lashed out at the Ku Klux Klan and fought suc-
cessfully in Kentucky to allow blacks the right to testify in court. But he 
said in print that blacks were "barbarians" and "ignorant and de-
graded" people hardly removed from the wilds of Africa. 43 Statements 
by New South leaders on racial matters depended upon the audience 
and the time and place. 
The proponents of an urban renaissance in the South told northern 
investors what they wanted to hear: that the Civil War had mooted 
older attitudes and that white southerners regarded northerners as 
brothers under one flag. As such, the defeat of the Confederacy was a 
blessing for the entire country. Hundreds of thousands of men in blue 
and gray had died gloriously to give birth to a New South that deemed 
Abraham Lincoln a hero. The section offered unparalleled oppor-
tunities to those who would help it became economically integrated. 
Crying out for industrialization, potential metropolises such as Bir-
mingham and Atlanta promised untold fortunes to any capitalist will-
ing to take reasonable risks. Race was no longer an issue in the new 
urban areas. Speaking of blacks, Grady wrote, "The love we feel for that 
race you cannot measure nor comprehend."44 Conversely, New South 
spokesmen had little trouble convincing southerners that they had 
been ruthlessly exploited by northern interests for generations before 
the Civil War. To achieve independence, Southerners needed to build 
factories and develop transportation systems. Abundant raw materials 
and a more than adequate black labor force were at hand. Cities like 
Atlanta and Birmingham needed to attract northern capital and tech-
nical expertise so they could vie with Pittsburgh and Chicago. 45 Every-
one, North and South, had something to gain from the rise of southern 
cities. 
The very concept of the New South moved leaders of the cause to 
offer extravagant praise. When Grady promoted southern economic 
development, he portrayed the entire section as a harmonious and 
stable land abounding with business opportunities. He conjured up 
visions of a South totally integrated into a gigantic nationwide indus-
trial complex. "As I think of it, a vision of surpassing beauty unfolds to 
my eyes," he claimed. "I see a South the home of fifty millions of 
people; her cities vast hives of industry; her country-sides the treasures 
from which their resources are drawn; her streams vocal with whirring 
spindles; her valleys tranquil in the white and gold of the harvest ... 
sunshine everwhere and all the time, and night falling on her gently as 
wings of the unseen dove."46 Edmonds wrote, "Who can picture the 
vast, illuminate future of the glorious sunny South?" After waxing 
eloquent about the advantages of the region, he proclaimed, "The 
more we contemplate these advantages and contrast them with those 
of all other countries, the more deeply will we be impressed with the 
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unquestionable truth that here in this glorious land, 'Creation's Garden 
Spot,' is to be the richest and greatest country upon which the sun ever 
shone."47 Watterson put the situation more bluntly: "The South, hav-
ing had its bellyful of blood, has gotten a taste of money, and it is too 
busy trying to make more of it to quarrel with anybody."48 Surely, the 
arguments went, the South presented northern capitalists with untold 
opportunities not only to make money but to participate altruistically 
in building a land of milk and honey. Glory awaited all who wanted to 
help the South realize its true potential. 
The spokesmen for the New South creed were fairly convincing. 49 
Their efforts attracted northern investments that resulted in industrial 
development, a significant expansion of the rail network, and consid-
erable urban progress. They also uplifted the spirits of southerners at 
the end of a very dismal period in the section's history. Even so, 
because in reality little had changed, the area neither became inte-
grated into the nation as a whole nor acted as a magnet for northern 
dollars. Outsiders quickly learned that for small initial investments 
they could pay low wages, engage in exploitive labor practices, buy 
politicians, charge high interest rates, and realize lucrative profits 
while reinvesting little. For unenlightened and ruthless capitalists 
willing to tolerate lethargic laborers, corrupt politicians, racial segrega-
tion, and hostility toward outsiders, the South was a land of opportuni-
ty. 
The South did not start to rise economically to the level of the rest of 
the nation until a combination of the boll weevil and the cotton-picking 
machine revolutionized its agriculture. World War II and the black 
migration to northern cities helped to undermine segregation. Federal 
policy makers following Franklin D. Roosevelt pledged that in the 
postwar world blacks should have equality in return for supporting the 
war effort. The civil rights movement, led by a black Atlantan, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., received bipartisan support in the North and from the 
federal government. Court decisions and legislation made the South an 
integral part of the American Union, ending a period of alienation 
extending back to April of 1861. The election as president in 1976 of 
James Earl Carter of Plains, Georgia, a former segregationist and son of 
a small-town merchant, indicated the national impact of the changing 
status of the South. In the election of 1980, Ronald Reagan of California 
routed Carter. He did not, however, lose either as a Georgian or a 
southerner. Rather, he lost as an American. His defeat did not signal a 
new exclusion of southerners from national politics. In a sense, the 
election and subsequent defeat of Carter represented a culmination of 
the efforts started by the New South leaders a hundred years earlier to 
bring the South in line with the rest of the nation. 
A New South resembling that extolled by Grady and his colleagues 
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failed to emerge until after the attitudes of the region and its leaders 
had moderated their opinions. Only after significant cultural and 
population interchanges between the major regions of the country had 
occurred did Atlanta and other cities move ahead. A chief reason for 
the delay between the predictions of the 1880s and the progress of the 
1980s was the reality of the nineteeth-century southern urban net-
work. The concept of a New South built on urbanization and indus-
trialization demands revision. Did the South, even with northern help, 
have the capacity to achieve sectional parity quickly? Was there a 
significant urban base upon which to build? Had the antebellum South 
developed a sound policy for constructing cities? To what extent was 
race a factor in city building? These and other questions cry out for 
exploration and analysis. The South in the Gilded Age must be viewed 
from a new perspective, for during that era the doctrine of the new 
urban South was born. 
The Civil War and Reconstruction totally upset southern hopes of 
catching up with the rest of the nation through an orderly system of 
urban growth. Exceptional circumstances required extraordinary ac-
tion. The war prevented the quick rise of the South's interior cities and 
eroded the national position of its old inland and ocean ports. No 
southern city could reach a "takeoff" point from which a New Orleans 
or an Atlanta might have overtaken Chicago and other northern me-
tropolises. The aftermath of hostilities left the South with a fractured 
urban network. All that remained were communities with small and 
dispirited markets. The older, logically built cities were in disarray. 
Dreams of a southern civilization lay in ruins. Advocates of the New 
South claimed to know how to reverse the situation. As Henry Watter-
son proclaimed in the Louisville Courier-Journal: "The South! The South! 
It is no problem at all. The whole story of the South may be summed up 
in a sentence: She was rich, she lost her riches; she was poor and in 
bondage; she was set free, and she had to go to work, she went to work, 
and she is richer than ever before."50 
Watterson and his colleagues preached doctrines designed to move 
the South to prominence within the American Union. They envisioned 
urban jewels named Louisville, Atlanta, Charleston, Baltimore, and 
Birmingham glittering in the afternoon sun. But to succeed, they 
needed to overcome southerners' conflicting feelings about cities that 
extended back to the philosophical musings of Thomas Jefferson. 
Whether such a dream could be achieved remained to be seen. 
2 _____ _ 
A Victory of Plenty 
Part of the antebellum urban South died on 15 November 1864 as 
General William T. Sherman watched his troops burn Atlanta. A mili-
tary band serenaded him with "Miserere" from Il Trovatore. 1 Rebirth 
came a few days after the start of the brutal March to the Sea. Atlantans 
returned to their stricken city and started to rebuild. "From defeat and 
utter poverty were to be wrought victory and plenty," an emotional 
Henry Grady wrote. He told how people used the roofing of destroyed 
buildings to make five hundred shanties and described the revival of 
the downtown. "Four posts," he said, "were driven up--iron sheeting 
tacked about them, a cover laid, a door cut, and in these, with pitiful 
huckstering, was established the commercial system that now boasts 
its palatial stores, its merchant princes, and is known and honored the 
Republic over."2 The destruction of Atlanta and the aftermath melded 
together. Despite the devastation and dislocations caused by the Civil 
War, an essential continuity remained. New structures rose upon the 
ashes of the old. 
Throughout their more than two-hundred-year history, cities in 
the South had survived fires, floods, plagues, and wars. In 1619 
Indians attacked and destroyed several settlements in Jamestown Colo-
ny. A fire burned over much of Charleston in 1796. In 1832 a flood 
inundated Louisville's business district. The terrible yellow fever epi-
demic of 1853 ravaged New Orleans. Calamities were an accepted part 
of urban life. Viewed against this background, the Civil War and 
Reconstruction were simply interruptions similar to those that had 
occurred before. Yet this is hardly to suggest that the era of defeat was 
not a great watershed. No justification exists for a reperiodization of 
southern studies based on the urban experience. Cities throughout 
history-Rome, Athens, Berlin, Hiroshima, and hundreds of others-
have overcome holocausts. A remarkable feature of urbanization has 
been the ability of important cultural, political, and economic sites to 
regain their former status following a disaster. The Civil War did not 
eradicate private property titles. In Atlanta, the land beneath the 
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burned-out buildings in the commercial districts near the railroad 
terminal remained of prime value. People with a strong spirit and 
sense of community had the capacity to rebuild a city quickly. Grady's 
moving words about the rebirth of Atlanta were true. Indeed, cities all 
across the South recovered and advanced, their citizens hardened 
survivors with the will to endure. 
The differences between what happened during the Confederate 
years and at other times of crisis were matters of degree. Surely, 
occupied New Orleans suffered under the military rule imposed by 
Benjamin "Beast" Butler. Yet were conditions worse than during the 
frequent epidemics in the Crescent City? Without question, the Civil 
War and its aftermath were terrible times for the southern people. The 
South was not on the verge of an urban Golden Age, but there was no 
doubt about the ability of southerners to build cities. 
In 1880 the boundaries of the South were somewhat different from 
those of the Confederacy. With few variations, traditional sectional 
lines prevailed. The border states of Kentucky and Maryland were 
integral parts of the region. They held two of the section's major 
metropolitan areas, Baltimore and Louisville. Both localities were ma-
jor ports of entry into Dixie. All goods and produce that passed 
through the two cities by rail needed transshipping, because northern 
and southern railroads had different gauge tracks. 3 The resulting bot-
tlenecks, which slowed the movement of goods, accentuated the roles 
of Baltimore and Louisville as unofficial border crossing points. 
Two other states, Delaware and Missouri, had no important south-
ern cities. Rural Delaware was in Baltimore's immediate hinterland. 
The Blue Hen State's only major city, Wilmington, was an industrial 
center with close ties to Philadelphia that extended back to colonial 
days. Although Delaware had been a slave state, with a very small 
number of human chattels, it had stayed in the Union in 1861. In 
Missouri, however, the rural Boot Heel and Little Dixie supported the 
rebel cause. A prosouthern governor tried unsuccessfully to take 
Missouri out of the Union. Only quick federal military action pre-
vented St. Louis from falling into Confederate hands. All during the 
war, Kansas City, which had many southern sympathizers, was for all 
practical purposes an occupied town. Postwar times were bittersweet 
in Missouri. Unionists tried to deny the civil rights of alleged Con-
federates. The Jesse James gang received widespread support in west-
ern Missouri by claiming to avenge the wrongs done by Yankee 
invaders. There was a distinct rural-urban split in the Show Me State. 
In 1880 the major cities, unlike the countryside, were not southern in 
character. St. Louis, as before the Civil War, saw its destiny in the 
Midwest and in southwestern trade. Kansas City boomed after the 
opening at the city in 1869 of the first permanent railroad bridge over 
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the Missouri River. As the composition of Kansas City's population 
changed, it became a regional metropolis with a western outlook and 
few southern connections. 
A sectional shift had changed the western borders of the South. 
Arkansas, an underdeveloped Confederate state with few railroads, 
maintained its strong southern ties. The Arkansas River was the main 
commercial artery, trying the economy more closely than ever to the 
states bordering the lower Mississippi. Old natural lines still loomed as 
more important than artificial ones. A much different situation existed 
in Texas. Southerners had founded the Republic of Texas. A southern 
president brought Texas into the Union. Texans fought and died under 
the Stars and Bars. Drastic changes followed the Civil War. Texas 
gradually become a predominantly western rather than southern state. 
To complicate matters, the great cattle drives up the trails into the 
Kansas and the building of trunk railroads from the North into Texas 
changed economic ties. By 1880 the growing cities of the Long Horn 
State were western towns. 
The heartland of the urban South was east of the Mississippi River 
and below Kentucky and Maryland, encompassing former Con-
federate states and the District of Columbia. Many southerners had 
mixed feelings about Washington, as did people from other parts of the 
nation. In the early 1870s midwestern congressmen had claimed that 
Washington did not represent the interests of the people and that the 
seat of government should be moved to a central site. Washington had 
been a southern city since the day of its founding. It was older than 
many other southern cities, far more representative of sectional tradi-
tions than the new industrial center of Birmingham, Alabama. 
Washington was not the only southern city called atypical or said to 
belong in a different section. Unreconstructed agrarians viewed cities 
as representative of Yankee values. Like the advocates of the creed of 
the New South, they found it convenient to forget that cities had 
existed and served important purposes in antebellum times. Further-
more, urban boosters emphasized the differences among southern 
communities. New Orleans leaders stressed the cosmopolitan aspects 
of their city. Grady and others carefully tried to demonstrate that 
Atlanta was vastly different and more progressive than its rivals. 
Promoters in Chattanooga went farther, calling for industrialists to 
come south and revitalize the city along northern lines. Charlestonians 
considered their genteel cultural traditions superior to those in interior 
places such as Macon and Montgomery. Virginians took credit for 
building a smoothly functioning system of cities, which served the 
needs of an agrarian civilization. About the only thing most people in 
the former Confederate States of America could agree upon was that 
Baltimore and Louisville had helped northern philistines humble the 
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Southland. Was there a typical southern city? Probably not. Just as all 
around the country, there were American cities. They shared certain 
economic, political, and social values, yet remained different from 
their neighbors, even within the same section. 
The 1880 federal census reports raised important questions about 
southern urban prospects. The data showed a serious erosion of the 
South's urban position in the Union. In the nineteenth century experts 
considered a population of 10,000 or more the determining figure in 
assessing the relative importance of a city. Places below that mark were 
not thought to have attained a true urban dimension. There were 
obvious flaws in this definition. "Town" governments in New England 
frequently consisted of one or more densely populated bodies, along 
with a scattered rural population. Some fairly large cities contiguous to 
larger centers were primarily suburban in nature. The census labeled 
New York City and four neighboring jurisidications as "The Metropo-
lis." In some other parts of the nation relatively small communities, 
Tucson and Bismarck for example, had regional significance dispropor-
tionate to their size. Still, the 10,000 figure was generally accepted and, 
within understood limitations, served as a convenient measure. 
Between 1870 and 1880 cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants 
increased nationally from 165 to 228, but only from 26 to 30 in the 
South. The number in the Northeast rose from 86 to 113, in the 
Midwest from 43 to 62, and in the West from 8 to 23. These figures 
presented a discouraging picture to advocates of a southern urban 
destiny. 
Other 1880 statistics further reflected the South's urban plight. Of 
580 American towns with populations over 4,000 only 63 were in the 
South. Of 99 communities over 20,000, only 17 were in the South. Of 20 
metropolises over 100,000, only 4 were in the South. To phrase it 
another way, the South had 13 percent of the nation's towns over 4,000, 
13 percent of those over 10,000, 17 percent of those over 20,000, and 20 
percent of those over 100,000. The figures reflected developments 
outside the South: the building of a great railroad network, the growth 
of secondary industrial and agricultural centers, and the consolidation 
of markets by regional metropolises. Considering the depressed eco-
nomic conditions that followed the Panic of 1873, national progress had 
been amazing. 
Advocates of the New South creed had a point when they told 
investors about the region's potential. As Grady once asked northern 
capitalists, "Why remain to freeze, and starve, and struggle on the 
bleak prairies of the northwest when the garden spot of the world is 
waiting for people to take possession of it and enjoy it?"4 Potential 
investors not only worried about their welcome-the word carpetbag-
ger carried unfortunate connotations,-but weighed chances of mak-
22 The Rise of the Urban South 
Table 2.1. Southern Cities and Their Populations, 1880 
Total Total 
City Population City Population 
Alabama Maryland 
Mobile 29,132 Baltimore 332,313 
Montgomery 16,713 Cumberland 10,693 
Arkansas Mississippi 
Little Rock 13,138 Vicksburg 11,814 
D1st. of Columbia North Carolina 
Georgetown 12,578 Wilmington 17,350 
Washington 147,293 South Carolina 
Georgia Charleston 49',984 
Atlanta 37,409 Columbia 10,036 
Augusta 21,891 Tennessee 
Columbus 10,123 Chattanooga 12,892 
Macon 12,749 Memphis 33,592 
Savannah 30,709 Nashville 43,350 
Kentucky Virginia 
Covington 29,720 Alexandria 13,659 
Lexington 16,656 Lynchburg 15,959 
Louisville 123,758 Norfolk 21,966 
Newport 20,433 Petersburg 21,656 
Louisiana Portsmouth 11,390 
New Orleans 216,090 Richmond 63,600 
ing more money elsewhere. With profits in the range cattle industry 
said to average over 40 percent per annum and speculative Colorado 
mining stocks seeming to offer unlimited returns, few plungers ex-
pressed more than passing interest in the South. More tangible consid-
erations further clouded possibilities for vast influxes of outside 
money. Atlanta, publicized as the "Chicago of the South," added close 
to 16,000 people in the 1870s, an increase of over a third. By southern 
standards, this was an impressive gain. But Chicago, despite the 
terrible fire of 1871, grew from 299,000 to 503,000 people. Obviously, it 
would take considerable salesmanship to persuade northern interests 
to pour large amounts of money into the South. If the section was to 
avoid permanent colonial status it desperately needed investment 
capital. 
The best product the South had to market was an existing urban 
network of thirty cities with more than 10,000 people (see Table 
2.1 ). The towns were part of an urban system rendered obsolete by the 
city-building methods used in the Northeast and the Midwest in 
antebellum days. At first glance, there was not much to sell. Hence 
overblown, impassioned, and optimistic statements about future pros-
pects hid very practical considerations. A New Orleans editor talked of 
a coming "commercial evolution unparalleled in the annals of Amer-
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ican progress."5 Another writer proclaimed that "wealth and honor are 
in the pathway of the New South."6 Both observations reflected the 
need aggressively to counter arguments about the decadence and slow 
pace of southern life. Fortunately for the region, there was a base upon 
which to build. 
Some experts produced statistics that indicated the urban South 
lagged at least half a century behind the rest of the country. But there 
was an easy reply: in 1830 the emerging Midwest had trailed the settled 
parts of the nation in development by roughly two hundred years. The 
opening of the region led to spectacular progress. Why could not the 
South experience similar growth over the next few decades? "The 
promise of her great destiny," Grady proclaimed, "written in her fields, 
her quarries, her mines, her forests, and her rivers, is no longer blurred 
or indistinct, and the world draws near to read." He spun tales of cities 
"growing as if by magic"7 in every county-the rise of a great southern 
urban system was preordained. 
There were several layers of southern cities. 8 The first included the 
Atlantic coastal towns. The second consisted of the old frontier posts 
roughly along the fall line from Virginia to Georgia. Third came the 
spearheads of settlement in the New West. A fourth stratum consisted 
of the former French and Spanish towns along the Gulf Coast. Fifth 
were the inland river ports and railroad centers that served the cotton 
trade. The future of the South depended upon the cities within these 
five layers. 
The Atlantic coastal towns had histories that reflected faded glories 
and renewed hopes. Baltimore was the South's only large commercial 
and industrial city, a true late-nineteenth-century American metropo-
lis. Since the Civil War, Washington had more than doubled in size, its 
growth related directly to that of the government. The nation's capital 
overwhelmed two older nearby commercial towns, Georgetown and 
Alexandria. Norfolk's prospects seemed bright. As at so many points 
in its history, prosperity appeared just a few years away. Its neighbor, 
Portsmouth, had little hope of ever being more than a satellite city. A 
town without serious rivals, Wilmington faced an age-old problem of 
trying to build a hinterland in an underdeveloped agricultural state. 
Savannah, as since its earliest days, had aggressive leaders but no 
resources to carry out broadly based plans. Charleston, a symbol of 
secession in the North, was a special target of wartime Yankee wrath. It 
had little chance of regaining its former luster. 9 For the Atlantic coastal 
cities in 1880 hopes ranged from very bright to extremely dark. Yet it 
was on the seacoast that southern community building had started in 
1607 when English adventurers had founded Jamestown. Although 
the experiment failed, the cities built at later dates along the coast had 
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helped raise up the South. Whether they could do so again in the 
Gilded Age was certainly a moot point. 
In 1880 the lesser southern Atlantic coastal towns had few immedi-
ate prospects. Only three had more than 4,000 people. Annapolis, 
Maryland, with 6,600 people, had not been important as a port since 
the Revolution. Were it not the state capital and the site of the United 
States Naval Academy, Annapolis would have been little more than a 
fishing village. New Bern, North Carolina, had 6,400 inhabitants. 
Located on the Neuse River near where it emptied into Pirnlico Sound, 
New Bern had never enjoyed more than limited prospects. A visitor in 
1879 thought it "at a standstill."10 Jacksonville, Florida, twenty-five 
miles from the mouth of the St. John's River, was a relatively new town 
and had been a village until after the Civil War. In 1880 the city had a 
population of 7,700, equally divided between whites and blacks. It was 
a lumber shipping point and enjoyed some tourist business. Unlike 
Annapolis and New Bern, Jacksonville appeared to have possibilities. 
"Its relative importance in a state so sparsely settled as Florida is very 
great," an official commented. "It is, and from its favorable position 
will probably long continue to be, the commercial metropolis of the 
state, the lumber and cigar industries taking the lead."11 As northern 
Florida developed, Jacksonville seemed sure to benefit. Until then it 
would remain unimportant. 
During the colonial period, southern pioneers founded many 
backcountry posts. Most had only limited purposes as either transpor-
tation junctions, exploration points, or temporary agricultural settle-
ments. Some survived for only a short period. Waxhaws Settlement, 
along the North and South Carolina line, the birthplace of Andrew 
Jackson, disappeared entirely. A number, however, achieved perma-
nent status. In 1880 fifteen had populations over 4,000, providing a 
second layer of cities, running from Maryland to Georgia. Frederick 
(8,700) and Hagerstown (6,600) were two Maryland commercial and 
railroad towns. Virginia had a network of interior cities that had risen 
in the age of antebellum sectionalism, when numerous observers 
thought that an emphasis on agrarian values had stifled progress in the 
Old Dominion. The most successful was Richmond (63,000), located at 
the head of navigation on the James River, roughly seventy miles from 
Norfolk. Another James River town, Lynchburg (16,000), aspired to be 
a factory center. So did Petersburg (21,700), on the Appomattox River. 
Secondary towns included Danville (7,500), Staunton (6,700), Man-
chester (5,700), Fredericksburg (5,000), and Winchester (5,000). North 
Carolina had two towns with potential as textile centers, Raleigh 
(9,300) and Charlotte (7,100). In South Carolina, Columbia (10,000), at 
the fall line on the Congaree River, had impressive waterpower for 
industrial use. Greenville (6,200) was a road junction near the Great 
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Smoky Mountains. Augusta (21,900), a little over a hundred miles up 
the Savannah River from Savannah, had long been a transportation 
hub, and it appeared on the verge of acquiring a large manufacturing 
dimension. To the leaders of the old interior posts, factories appeared 
to be panaceas that would bring prosperity at a time when agriculture 
seemed on the decline. Mills would take the place of hinterlands. 
Factories required large capital investments. Southern banks, un-
able to fund existing programs, especially in agriculture, lacked the 
large amounts of mortage money necessary to finance industrial estab-
lishments. Nor did potential southern manufacturers have sufficient 
resources to convince northern bankers to loan them hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. Only northern industrial interests with good 
credit lines had the ability to obtain the money needed. Building new 
plants meant accepting further domination by northern banking and 
industrial interests-a high price to pay for limited progress, for it 
meant absentee owners, low wages, and poor working conditions. 
Nevertheless, advocates of the New South creed urged northerners to 
invest in southern factories. Richard Edmonds of the Manufacturers' 
Record wrote, "TheEl Dorado of the next half century is the South. The 
wise recognize it; the dull and timid will ere long regret their sloth and 
their hesitancy."12 Mill towns patterned after those in New England 
were thought to be the wave of the future. Yet none of these ideas were 
new. The horsepower potential of the waterpowers along the fall line 
was widely known. In 1845 William Gregg started an experimental 
textile mill at Graniteville, South Carolina. By the Civil War, even 
though few planters heeded Gregg's advice to put money into man-
ufacturing, South Carolina had mills capitalized at $1 million. 
Throughout the 1850s a number of promoters advocated building 
textile plants in North Carolina. In late antebellum times, leaders in the 
interior towns accepted the contention that industry was the wave of 
the future. They saw no other way of countering the effects of a decline 
in agriculture, caused by soil exhaustion. 13 Places from Richmond to 
Augusta sought to become the "Lowell of the South." 
In the last half of the eighteenth century, southerners had moved 
into the New West, forming a third layer of urban communities. 
Rugged individualists, Daniel Boone, John Donelson, and others, 
fought Indians by day and planned inland empires at night. Neither 
the Proclamation Line of 1763 nor fierce Indian resistance stopped 
American penetration. Kentucky entered the Union in 1792 and Ten-
nessee in 1796. Settlers moved through the Cumberland Gap and over 
the Great Smoky Mountains. They established a number of towns that 
had more than 10,000 people in 1880. Cumberland, Maryland (10,700), 
one of the first settlements on the western side of the Appalachians, 
was a railroad center. Two Kentucky communities, Covington (29,700) 
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and Newport (20,400), had grown because of their proximity to Cincin-
nati. Cumberland, Covington, and Newport grew at a late date and at 
first were relatively unimportant compared to other localities. The 
early centers in the New West were Knoxville and Nashville in Tennes-
see and Lexington and Louisville in Kentucky. 
Being first did not necessarily spell success. Knoxville started fast 
and then faltered badly. It was off the beaten path of east-west com-
munication and never developed more than local markets. In 1880 the 
city had a listed population of 9,700. About half as many people lived in 
the immediate area, along creeks and turnpikes. Nashville took the 
state capital away from Knoxville in 1817 and became a river and 
railroad center. Its population in 1880 was 43,400. In that year, 
Louisville, the only larger southern river port west of the Appala-
chians, boasted 123,800 persons. It had eclipsed its old Kentucky rival, 
Lexington, which had 16,700 inhabitants. 14 
The fourth layer of cities in the South was along the Gulf Coast. In 
1880 four cities had more than 4,000 people. Two of these were in 
Florida. Key West, with an important naval station, had 9,900 people. 
Key West, far removed from the main currents of southern urbaniza-
tion, had a distinct Spanish character. Pensacola in the Florida Panhan-
dle had 6,800 inhabitants. It had a naval yard and was a lumber port. 
Further to the west, Mobile, Alabama, remained, as before the Civil 
War, a cotton-shipping port and potential railroad terminal. The popu-
lation was 29,100. The metropolis of the Gulf region was New Orleans. 
It had 216,100 residents. Although New Orleans had failed to achieve 
predictions that it would be the greatest city in North America, it was 
the nation's number one cotton port. There were those who believed 
that the city's glory was yet to come, but this was a selective judg-
ment.15 Such advocates of the New South as Henry Watterson of 
Louisville, Francis Dawson of Charleston, and Henry Grady of Atlanta 
pointedly ignored New Orleans, which they viewed as a rival of their 
communities. 
The hopes of the postwar South rested with the interior river and 
railroad cities, which had started either as road junctions or as cotton 
shipping points. An integral part of the prewar southern urban sys-
tem, they had served the needs of local plantation owners and of 
merchants in Louisville, Augusta, Mobile, and New Orleans. Busi-
nessmen in those places thought of them as part of their hinterlands. 
Thus Louisville railroaders thought of Atlanta as part of their growing 
systems. Augusta interests believed Macon a satellite. Mobile agents 
took for granted close relations with Montgomery. New Orleans lead-
ers assumed they controlled upriver towns. Many of the interior cities 
had suffered grievously from the war. Because of their role in the cotton 
and plantation economy, they seemed to embody the values of the Old 
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South. Yet they were cities of the mid-nineteenth century, just as were 
their counterparts in the Midwest and West. Most of the southern 
interior cities had just started to grow in the years immediately before 
the war. In 1880 the census definition no longer considered them part 
of the frontier, but because of the vicissitudes of war and the destruc-
tion of the old agricultural system, these cities were frontier commu-
nities. Their prospects had to be evaluated by different standards than 
those used for the older and more settled southern communities, 
many of which had grown conservative and had long given up hopes of 
major urban success. If similar reasoning prevailed in the newer places, 
if their leaders looked only backward to perpetuating the values of the 
Lost Cause, the chances of building a new urban South were bleak. The 
spokesmen of the New South creed would see their hopes dashed as 
badly as those of the Confederate statesmen. The South would suffer 
another defeat. 
In 1880 sixteen cities of 4,000 or more were in or near the cotton 
belt. Athens, Georgia (6,100), was a college and market town. Natchez, 
Mississippi (7,100), was a fading river city. Jackson (5,400) in Tennes-
see, Jackson (5,200) and Meridian (4,000) in Mississippi, and Shreve-
port (8,000) in Louisiana were transportation points. In Alabama, 
Huntsville (5,000) and Selma (7,500) had potential as manufacturing 
centers. Two of the large cities, Columbus (10,000) and Macon (12,800), 
both in Georgia, hoped to expand their roles as cotton centers. 
Vicksburg (11,800) already lived in the past. Little Rock (13,100) was the 
only place of importance in a developing area. Chattanooga (12,900) 
and Montgomery (16,700) hoped to grow as manufacturing centers. 
Memphis (33,600) had been set back by a terrible epidemic. Atlanta 
(37,400) looked ahead to metropolitan status. The odds were long 
against building an urban empire from this group of cities. New 
promotions faced equal difficulties. There was no guarantee that either 
Birmingham or Bessemer, both of which appeared well financed and 
situated, would advance beyond village status. In the eyes of pro-
moters, however, the southern interior towns had as promising 
chances as their counterparts on the far western frontier. After all, in 
1880 Los Angeles had 11,200 people, San Diego had 2,600, and Seattle 
had 3,500. 
Opportunities to build cities continued to exist. The western half of 
the country was just opening for settlement. Promoters sung the 
praises of the North Dakota "banana belt" and the "Rocky Mountain 
Empire." William Gilpin developed elaborate theories based on the 
"axis of intensity" and "isothermal zodiac" in an attempt to prove that 
great cities would rise throughout the West. 16 The advocates of the 
New South creed never developed formal systems, but Grady claimed, 
"Surely the basis of the South's wealth and power is laid by the hand of 
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the Almighty God, and its prosperity has been established by divine 
law."17 Furthermore, he said, "It is an axiom in our new iron region 
that, 'An iron furnace is like godliness. Have that, and all the rest shall 
be added unto you.' From this theory the 'magic cities' of the South 
have sprung. "18 The key, of course, was attracting capital. En-
trepreneurs had to be persuaded to invest in Columbus, Atlanta, or 
Montgomery rather than in Los Angeles, San Diego, or Seattle. Here 
was the bottom line. What did the South have to offer?19 
The band of men who promoted a South of cities and industry 
emphasized the opportunities that awaited outside investors. The 
South Land was "Creation's Garden Spot," one of "Nature's Wonderful 
Blessings. "20 Henry Grady claimed in 1884 that the South had sur-
passed the West. "The time will come," he said, "when there will be an 
amendment to the shibboleth, 'Westward the star of empire holds its 
sway.' "21 Yet conditions in Dixie were not promising. The section had 
a network of cities adequate to the needs of a plantation economy based 
on King Cotton. City builders had avoided the excesses of uncontrolled 
urban speculation. And the past histories of leading southern cities 
provided strong evidence of an entrepreneurial spirit, which could not 
be hidden by northern propagandists hoping to deter investors and 
ridicule southern ways. Of course, there was never a master plan for 
building cities in the Old South, nor did one exist in the New South. 
There was only rhetoric. The postwar southern cities had little to sell 
except dreams. The cities competed against each other in the midst of a 
depressed region. It was no coincidence that the most successful south-
ern cities had commercial ties outside the section. 
The South entered the 1880s with an agricultural system unsuited 
to the needs of a free market. Land barons and country merchants 
presided over a fragmented economy. Sharecropping and crop liens 
stifled individual enterprise. Temporarily inflated cotton prices were a 
snare and a delusion. New sources of supply clouded the world price 
picture, let alone that in the Cotton Belt. 
Many southern cities sought industry to compensate for condi-
tions in the rural South. Southern urban populations had swelled since 
before the war, but much of this growth was unrelated to progress. 
Most of the migrants were blacks who had left plantations, and they 
not only complicated life for white southerners but added to employ-
ment problems. The means were unavailable to transform the southern 
economy overnight. So the urban South that arose from the ashes of 
Atlanta, Richmond, and Columbia was similar to that of antebellum 
days. Civil War and Reconstruction compounded matters. The quest 
for manufacturing brought new problems. More and larger cities were 
not the answers to the waning of the Old South civilization. Cities 
could be calculated to make the South more like the rest of the nation. 22 
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They functioned as a common denominator that overrode sectional 
considerations. Yet there was no need for more of them in the South. 
What needed to be done was to shore up the existing urban network. 
Under the circumstances, that was not going to be an easy task. 
3 _____ _ 
Cogs in the Great Machine 
In the North, the Lost Cause, sacred to generations of southerners, was 
a subject of mockery. Southerners' lack of contrition hardened north-
ern attitudes toward the region. Following Reconstruction, the spirit of 
reconciliation engendered by the "reunion" was threatened by north-
ern politicians, who played on the emotions of their constituents by 
attacking everything about the Confederacy. The "bloody shirt" pre-
vented the South from rejoining the United States on equal terms. The 
continuation of feelings of hostility made it all the more difficult for the 
men of the New South creed to carry out their dreams. 1 
Few northern whites admitted that they had turned their backs on 
southern blacks. Instead, they blamed the dismantling of the gains 
won by blacks during Reconstruction on the Ku Klux Klan and the 
Knights of the White Camellia. In truth, racial equality could not have 
been achieved without the continued presence of northern bayonets. 
The later Supreme Court decisions, notably Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 
which promulgated the "separate but equal" doctrine, formally ratified 
an already accomplished reversal of national policy. 2 
Northerners in all walks of life felt uncomfortable about the South. 
Even the word "redemption," used by white southern orators to signal 
a return to an older order of race relations, carried discomforting 
connotations. Northerners viewed the South as a land of racial hatred 
and violence inhabited by rednecks and blacks, all living in log cabins 
and denied advancement by the oppressive sharecropper and crop-
lien systems. Southern country store owners and city merchants, on 
the other hand, blamed the economic plight of rural southerners on 
continued northern economic exploitation. 3 Above the Mason and 
Dixon line, the South was widely thought to be dispirited and deca-
dent. In short, the South seemed to many outsiders to radiate an aura 
of failure. 
Edward King, a well-known northern journalist, tried to paint a far 
different picture of the South, particularly its urban components, for 
northern readers. During 1873 and 1874 he made an extensive tour, 
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visiting all parts of the region. His "Great South" series appeared in 
Scribner's Monthly, a popular national magazine. 4 King displayed many 
of the characteristics of a typical urban promoter of his day. At times he 
got carried away and waxed eloquent about towns that had limited 
prospects at best, although he found that in Beaufort, South Carolina, a 
"silence as of the grave reigned everywhere," and he described Mobile 
as "tranquil and free from commercial bustle." Yet, on the whole, he 
praised southern cities. His predictions were not always borne out, for 
example, his contention that Wedverton, Maryland, would one day 
flourish as a gigantic manufacturing center and that Strasburg, Vir-
ginia, would become a place of "great importance. "5 Neither town ever 
advanced beyond the village stage. Despite his fallibility, King re-
ported with considerable accuracy on the significance of cities in the 
South. He depicted them as vital economic and social organisms. In 
detailed descriptions he showed how they fitted into a whole, imply-
ing that the future course of southern development depended upon 
urban progress and prosperity. His major theme was that investment 
opportunities abounded in the cities of the South. An advocate of the 
New South creed could hardly have been more positive. 6 
Even though he was writing during Reconstruction and depres-
sion, King accentuated the positive. He said, "Augusta's excellent 
railroad facilities and her advantageous situation, have made her an 
extensive cotton market." The city exhibited a "life and energy worthy 
of the brightest of Northern cities of its size." Savannah's prospects 
appeared even better." As we walked," he wrote, "day by day, through 
the Savannah streets, late in autumn, we were amazed at the masses of 
cotton bales piled everywhere .... The huge black ships swallowed 
bale after bale; the clank of the hoisting-crane was heard from morning 
till night." Central to King's analysis was that the Civil War had not 
permanently impaired southern urban prospects. He predicted that 
Charleston would recover like a "veritable phoenix" because "her 
businessmen have an elastic spirit and a remarkable courage, which 
reflect the highest credit upon them." In addition, "Commercially, 
Wilmington has every reason to hope for great development." He 
thought that Columbus, only recently removed from the frontier, had 
the potential of becoming a great industrial town. "After riding all day 
through regions where the log-cabin was oftener seen than the frame-
house, and where the forest still held possession of nine-tenths of the 
land," he observed, "it was refreshing to come upon a town of such 
energy, activity and prospects as Columbus." Lynchburg, he thought, 
had almost unlimited potential: "Lynchburg's great natural advantages 
of situation will, in a few years, increase it from a city of 12,000 
population to a huge overcrowded railway centre." King believed that 
"Richmond is chief among Virginia cities, no less because of its proud 
32 The Rise of the Urban South 
position as the capital than because of its enterprise and rapid growth." 
Other places had equally promising claims to future achievements. 
Louisville was "springing into vigorous life." In New Orleans a 
"throng of speculators" surrounded the cotton exchange. The "march 
of progress" had started in Chattanooga. 7 A great future lay ahead 
throughout the length and breadth of the urban South. 
King concluded that the same forces that had built northern cities 
were at work in the South: natural advantages and entrepreneurial 
leadership, coupled with commercial progress in the country as a 
whole. He felt that the end of slavery had swept away the old values 
and brought new attitudes. Like Hinton R. Helper at an earlier date, 
King thought slavery an oppressive system that had hurt trade and 
urban development. He attributed Louisville's progress to the end of 
slavery in Kentucky. 8 He was convinced that following the Civil War 
' one of the most remarkable revolutions ever recorded in history"9 had 
transformed the South, making it much like the rest of the nation. He 
sought a spirit of accommodation and reconciliation between the sec-
tions. Northerners, he explained, should look with sympathy on the 
problems faced by white southerners in regard to the race question. He 
called on people outside the South to place the changes going on 
within the section in proper perspective. Few answered. The times 
were not right. King was a voice in the wilderness of sectional divi-
sions. 
In 1886, over a decade after King's tour, Henry Grady went to New 
York to address the prestigious New England Society. Some 360 busi-
nessmen had assembled in the banquet hall at Delmonico's, one of the 
most famous restaurants in America. Grady spoke after William T. 
Sherman had made short remarks and the orchestra had played a 
spirited rendition of "Marching through Georgia." It was an unlikely 
and unusual platform for an Atlanta editor, but Grady rose to the 
occasion. His opening remarks received wide notice throughout the 
nation: " 'There was a South of slavery and secession-that South is 
dead. There is a South of union and freedom-that South, thank God, 
is living, breathing, growing every hour.' These words, delivered from 
the immortal lips of Benjamin H. Hill, at Tammany Hall, in 1866, true 
then and truer now, I shall make my text tonight." Few at Delmonico's 
had heard of or cared about the "immortal lips of Benjamin H. Hill," or 
whether Grady quoted him correctly, which he did not. But they did 
respond to the rest of Grady's speech, alternately cheering and weep-
ing. Grady, always a master orator, played to his audience to perfection. 
He even placed the best possible light on the burning of Atlanta. 
"Somehow or other," he claimed, "we have caught the sunshine in the 
bricks and mortar of our homes, and have builded therein not one 
ignoble prejudice or memory. "10 Perhaps Grady would have found 
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something good to say at his own public hanging. But at Delmonico's 
he had a specific purpose: as in his other speeches, he wanted to attract 
northern resources to the South. Advocates of southern material prog-
ress were hindered by the persistent belief that the South's way of life 
was anachronistic and out of step with the rest of the land. 11 
Grady preached his doctrines of a changed South during a period 
of urban boom in America. The 1880s saw the completion of the basic 
elements in the nation's urban mosaic. Chicago was the fastest-grow-
ing town in the world, within a decade its population increased from 
500,000 to one million. The Windy City's stockyards, packing plants, 
and railroads were visible evidence of its growing power in the Mid-
west.12 On the edge of the Great Plains, Kansas City and Omaha 
emerged as regional metropolises, fueled by huge quantities of outside 
capital. The rapid settlement of the central plains led to countless 
opportunities in agribusiness. Even greater riches could be found on 
the Pacific coast. San Francisco was a dynamic and flourishing city with 
the sobriquet "Monarch of the West." One of the greatest land booms 
of the nineteenth century was under way in Los Angeles where thou-
sands of speculators were throwing money to the wind and some lots 
changed hands several times in a single day. In the Pacific Northwest, 
the arrival of eastern rails touched off a spiral of land speculation. 
Tacoma, Seattle, and Everett vied with one another, igniting a struggle 
for control of Puget Sound. 13 A spirit of progress was abroad from 
Maine to California. Encouraged by a series of probusiness presiden-
tial administrations, the county appeared poised on the brink of be-
coming an urban and industrial society. The ideal of an agrarian 
republic was a faded vision of the past. 
The continual rise of New York had followed almost naturally. The 
city's business community emerged stronger than ever from the de-
pression that followed the Panic of 1873. In a period of consolidation of 
wealth, the money power centralized as never before in the Empire 
City. Great investment banking houses benefited from a wave of 
mergers and stock transactions that made trusts and monopolies an 
integral part of economic life. In many ways, the worst fears of ante-
bellum southern statesmen had materialized. With the South in an 
inferior position and agrarianism vanquished, there was little to check 
the concentration of wealth in New York. The attacks on Wall Street by 
Populist orators in Kansas and Nebraska had a familiar sound. The 
message had been heard before south of the Mason and Dixon line 
from South Carolina to Louisiana. Of course, any attempt to obtain 
outside capital on a vast scale meant going hat in hand to New York 
banking interests. No one else had access to the sums of money 
necessary to determine the course of national development. Thus 
when Grady and others asked for investors to come South, they were 
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in effect trying to promote New York domination. This was a historic 
turn of events in Dixie. 
For understandable reasons, supporters of the New South creed 
glossed over the need for New York capital. Instead, they emhasized 
that southern whites were rebuilding their defeated land. An attractive 
investment climate had been created, Grady claimed: "We have re-
duced the commercial rate of interest from 24 to 6 percent, and are 
floating 4 percent bonds."14 He spoke with pride of the South's recov-
ery from the Civil War: "The South has been rebuilt by Southern brains 
and energy. We regret that our brothers from the North have not taken 
larger part with us in this work. "15 This statement underlined the fact 
that, despite the propaganda, the South held little appeal to outsiders. 
It was not viewed as a land of opportunity. 
Spokesmen for the New South creed wanted what Grady called the 
"better class of immigrants. "16 Grady placed wealthy Anglo-Saxon 
farmers from the North and prosperous immigrants from western 
Europe in the same category. Most of the people attracted to America's 
shores brought hardly any money, however, for they had been peas-
ants in the old country. As for northern farmers, even those who failed 
on the Great Plains showed no desire to migrate to the South to become 
sharecroppers. Rather, if forced to move, they went farther west. New 
South advocates did not welcome everyone. Richard Edmonds of the 
Manufacturers' Record said that he opposed "all schemes looking toward 
the colonization of large numbers of ignorant foreigners." He wrote 
that the South had room "for thousands, even millions of industrious 
people," but not for "socialists and anarchists."17 Given prevailing 
migration and immigration patterns, southerners were going to have to 
continue building their section with very little outside help, and they 
found this prospect discouraging. 
In 1879 Walter Hines Page wrote an article that appeared in the 
Atlantic Monthly in which he used satire to vent his frustration over his 
fellow southerners' failure to adjust to a changing America. His unflat-
tering portrait of" An Old Southern Borough," the piedmont village of 
Hillsboro, North Carolina, contained none of the optimism of Edward 
King. Page found no difference between the Old South and the New 
South. Old-fashioned southern gentlemen continued to dominate the 
ruling class and to maintain the correctness of secession and the values 
of antebellum times. A general atmosphere of indolence prevailed. The 
white villagers relied on the "dar keys" to do the menial and hard work. 
All whites considered blacks members of an inferior race. Paternalism 
characterized race relations. The value structure of the white society 
emphasized faith in old religious forms, loyalty to family, and venera-
tion of women. A major focus of community thought was hatred of 
northerners. A hopelessly unprogressive spirit characterized village 
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life; common sights were whittling loafers at the railroad station, dilapi-
dated houses, and antiquated methods of agriculture. Page concluded 
his sketch by stating that there were so few new ideas and so little 
enterprise that even the dogs looked old-fashioned. 18 
Page saw very little future for such a sorry place. If Hillsboro was 
representative of the hundreds of hamlets throughout the South, the 
land was becoming one that time had passed by. Page believed in the 
New South creed, and if his analysis was right, the future of the South 
was bleak indeed. The decadent villages of Dixie had been of little 
consequence since antebellum times and were no different from the 
thousands of urban failures in the Midwest. Once a place lost out in the 
struggle for urban supremacy, it declined and was lucky to survive, 
even as a crossroads hamlet. Speculators moved on, and business 
gravitated to more favored towns. People with ambition drifted away, 
leaving only a few discouraged people, the old and the unsuccessful. 
Page could just as well have been writing about a village in Ohio as in 
North Carolina. The future of the nation, North and South, did not lie 
in unsuccessful backwaters. Rather, it lay in the growing cities of the 
emerging national urban network. 
The extent to which southern communities integrated into a nation 
of cities was of vital significance for the section's future. As an urban 
society cut sharply across old sectional barriers, economic integration 
was only one aspect of a larger whole. If southern cities were radically 
different in character from those elsewhere, they might not fit into the 
urban system, and the New South creed would die aborning. The 
South might be reduced to permanent colonial status. Therefore, the 
social statistics of southern cities took on new importance. Numbers 
and percentages about a wide variety of subjects, from the incidence of 
immigrants tc school attendance, mirrored the state of urban progress 
in the South. The figures showed what southern cities were like and 
where they stood in relationship to the rest of America. 
Between 1870 and 1880 the population of the United States rose 
from 38.6 million to 50.2 million people, an increase of 26 percent. High 
birth rates and immigration were responsible for this growth. Great 
strides were made in the settlement of the Far West, and population in 
the East continued to move from farms to cities. The southern states 
grew at rates above the national average. In 1880 there were 14.2 million 
southerners, accounting for 28 percent of the people in the country. But 
the character of this population differed sharply from that elsewhere. 
Of the nation's 6.6 million blacks, 6 million or 91 percent lived in the 
South. Conversely, the South contained only 306,000 of the country's 
6.7 million foreign-born for a total of 5 percent. These figures alone set 
the South apart. Of all southerners, 47 percent were black and 2 
percent foreign-born. Three states, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South 
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Carolina, had more blacks than whites. No southern state had a 
foreign-born population of over 10 percent. In the rest of the United 
States, under 1 percent of the people were black and 19 percent foreign-
born. A census official summed up this situation in 1880, when he 
wrote that with slight qualification, "where the colored are found the 
foreign-born are not, and vice versa."19 Southern orators liked to boast 
that the section's population was homogeneous, but such claims ig-
nored the blacks. The population statistics showed that the rest of the 
nation was far more homogeneous racially. 
The population profiles of the thirty southern cities with more than 
10,000 people in 1880 did not fit into any neat category. A total of 1.4 
million people, 10 percent of the southern population, lived in such 
cities. These cities differed from the South as a whole in that blacks 
accounted for 31 percent and foreign-born for 13 percent of the urban 
population. Indeed, 61 percent of all immigrants in the South lived in 
the cities, compared with only 8 percent of the blacks. Oppressive 
legislation made it hard for black sharecroppers to leave the land. Cities 
had attracted most of the foreigners who settled in the South since 
before the Civil War. Yet the South's cities were unlike their counter-
parts throughout the rest of the United States. Most of the 198 cities of 
over 10,000 population in the Northeast, Midwest, and West had 
insignificant numbers of blacks, and roughly 30 percent of their popu-
lation was foreign-born. Southern cities could be said to represent 
potential bridges from the South to the rest of the nation. Naturally, 
being white supremacists, none of the New South supporters empha-
sized the racial mix in southern cities. Yet the figures illustrated that 
change was under way in the urban South. The cities were far from 
being declining places with languid populations of society's losers. For 
better or worse, they represented the South's best hopes for a relatively 
quick recovery. As in the antebellum period, they were the most 
progressive components of the section. 
The social statistics of the southern cities provided a microscopic 
view of southern urban society. The figures supplied basic data for 
helping to answer a wide variety of questions. Were there major 
differences in the composition of the inhabitants of individual cities? 
What were the percentage disparities between blacks and whites? 
What were the numbers and nationalities of the foreign-born? Were 
there significant differences in the numbers of men and women? Were 
many southern city dwellers born outside the section? What groups 
made up the work forces? Was religion a strong factor in holding 
together the fabric of the communities? What influence did educational 
institutions have? As Benjamin H. Hill, a senator from Georgia, whom 
Grady quoted in his Delmonico's speech, had said in 1871, "The 
pressing question, therefore, with every people is, not what they have 
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been, but whether and what they shall determine to be; not what their 
fathers were, but whether and what their children shall be."20 If Hill 
was right, the future of southern civilization rested on the shoulders of 
city people. 
The distribution of blacks and foreign-born in the thirty southern 
cities of more than 10,000 people is shown in Table 3.1. 21 The six cities 
with the largest percentages of immigrants had the lowest percentages 
of blacks; all six were less than 30 percent black and 13 percent or more 
foreign-born. The totals for Newport (2 percent black and 25 percent 
foreign-born) and Covington (6 percent black and 22 percent foreign-
born) reflected their status as suburbs of Cincinnati. Cincinnati was 29 
percent foreign-born and .03 percent black, so it would have been 
wrong to say simply that Newport and Covington had the same racial 
components as their much larger neighbor. It would also have been 
incorrect to say that all cities in the southern border states had similar 
characteristics. For example, Cumberland was 9 percent black and 13 
percent foreign-born; Lexington was 46 percent black and 6 percent 
foreign-born. Cumberland was a railroad town; Lexington was an 
agricultural marketing center with some light industry. The distin-
guishing factor was that American railroad section hands were pre-
dominantly white. Because of such differences in their economics, it is 
difficult to generalize about southern towns in the border states. 
No other cities in the South were less than 30 percent black. They 
had correspondingly small foreign-born populations. Washington's 
sectional antecedents were reflected in its population, which was 33 
percent black and 10 percent foreign-born. The layering that had char-
acterized the building of the southern urban network made little dif-
ference in these cities' racial components outside the border states. 
Wilmington was 60 percent black and 3 percent foreign-born, Pe-
tersburg 54 percent black and 2 percent foreign-born, and Montgom-
ery 59 percent black and 4 percent foreign-born. Eight southen cities 
were more than 50 percent black, and nineteen were less than 10 
percent foreign-born. Atlanta, billed as a showcase of the New South, 
was 44 percent black and 4 percent foreign-born. Grady did not men-
tion those figures when he talked about how the people of Atlanta had 
rebuilt their community after the Civil War. 
Absolute numbers provide another way of looking at the popula-
tions of the southern cities. Fifteen of the thirty cities had more than 
10,000 blacks. The most, 57,700, were in New Orleans. Baltimore had 
53,700 and Washington, 48,400. Only forty cities in the United States 
had in excess of 48,300 inhabitants of all races. Indeed, only three 
northern cities had more than 10,000 blacks. They were Philadelphia 
(31,700), St. Louis (22,300), and New York (20,000). The greatest 
number of black urban dwellers were in the South. Foreign-born were 
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Table 3.1. Foreign-Born and Blacks in Southern Cities, 1880 
Total Number of Percentage Number of Percentage of 
City Population Blacks of Blacks Foreign-born Foreign-born 
Alabama 
Mobile 29,132 12,240 42 2,937 10 
Montgomery 16,713 9,931 59 651 4 
Arkansas 
Little Rock 13,138 4,507 35 1,446 11 
Dist. of Columbia 
Georgetown 12,578 3,758 30 815 7 
Washington 147,293 48,377 33 14,242 10 
Georgia 
Atlanta 37,409 16,330 44 1,416 4 
Augusta 21,891 10,120 46 1,198 5 
Columbus 10,123 4,476 44 294 3 
Macon 12,749 6,584 52 486 4 
Savannah 30,709 15,654 51 2,994 10 
Kentucky 
Covington 29,720 1,790 6 6,487 22 
Lexington 16,656 7,583 46 1,081 6 
Louisville 123,758 20,905 17 23,156 19 
Newport 20,433 315 2 5,011 25 
Louisiana 
New Orleans 216,090 57,723 27 41,157 19 
Maryland 
Baltimore 332,313 53,716 16 56,136 17 
Cumberland 10,693 931 9 1,422 13 
Mississi[![!i 
Vicksburg 11,814 5,836 49 939 8 
North Carolina 
Wilmington 17,350 10,462 60 528 3 
South Carolina 
Charleston 49,984 27,276 55 3,950 8 
Columbia 10,036 5,698 57 338 3 
Tennessee 
Chattanooga 12,892 5,082 39 719 6 
Memphis 33,592 14,896 44 3,971 12 
Nashville 43,350 16,337 38 3,025 7 
Virginia 
Alexandria 13,569 5,380 39 599 4 
Lynchburg 15,959 8,474 53 398 3 
Norfolk 21,966 10,068 46 835 4 
Petersburg 21,656 11,701 54 356 2 
Portsmouth 11,390 3,829 34 526 5 
Richmond 63,600 27,832 44 3,340 5 
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another matter. Thirty-nine places in the nation had in excess of 10,000 
foreign-born. The South had but four of these communities: Baltimore 
(56,100), New Orleans (41,200), Louisville (23,200), and Washington 
(14,200). These numbers represented large concentrations of people. 
Nevertheless, they were not comparable to the numbers in the seven 
cities with over 100,000 immigrants, which included the 593,500 in the 
New York-Brooklyn area. The fewest immigrants in the southern cities 
were the 294 in Columbus and the 338 in Columbia; the lowest black 
totals were the 315 in Newport and the 931 in Cumberland. Obviously, 
in these respects southern cities were different from the rest of urban 
America. 
The large numbers of blacks in southern cities had long been a 
source of concern and embarrassment to whites. Many would have 
agreed with the editor of the Montgomery Daily Ledger, who in 1865, 
claimed that cities were "intended for white people." He asserted, 
"Our advice to them [blacks] is to go into the country and cultivate the 
soil, the employment God designed them for and which they must do 
or starve."22 Antebellum slavocrats had contended that urban life 
undermined the peculiar institution because slaves could not be so 
easily controlled as on remote plantations and clandestine associations 
with free blacks sparked slaves' desires for freedom. Alarmists fre-
quently raised the specter of Denmark Vesey's alleged plot in 
Charleston to foment a slave rebellion in 1822. There were charges that 
urban owners routinely reported fewer slaves than they actually had so 
as to avoid paying municipal head taxes. Some whites feared that large 
numbers of runaway slaves lurked inside town limits in secret hiding 
places. Official statistics did indicate a sharp increase in urban black 
populations between 1830 and 1850, but this was a natural result of 
increased urban activity throughout the section. There was no danger 
that cities would become predominantly black. Large increases in the 
numbers of whites more than counterbalanced the black growth. But 
the concentration of several thousand slaves in small areas caused 
concern in many quarters. The very presence of many blacks was in 
itself a problem that some authorities thought needed a remedy. 23 
In the 1850s several cities attempted to reduce their black popula-
tions through propaganda campaigns that encouraged owners to ship 
their chattels back to the country. The results varied. Savannah cut its 
black population virtually in half from 14,700 to 7,700. The number of 
slaves in Charleston declined from 19,500 to 14,000, but the Free Negro 
population of slightly over 3,000 remained unchanged, and the city's 
total population decreased slightly during the decade. Savannah was a 
growing town, and its white population increased by more than 
14,000. Because a few of the new interior cities were unable to attract 
enough white laborers, their black populations grew correspondingly. 
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The number of blacks in Montgomery rose from 2,200 to 4,500 and in 
Atlanta from 500 to 1,900. New Orleans, a major port of arrival for 
immigrants, was a different matter. Thousands of the foreign-born 
stayed in the city, displacing black workers, taking over most of the day 
labor and service jobs. The number of Free Negroes in New Orleans 
grew only slightly, from 9,900 to 10,700; that of slaves fell from 17,300 to 
14,000. The lesson was clear; where there was competition, foreign 
labor drove out black labor. But New Orleans had been exceptional 
even before the Civil War. It had been a cosmopolitan city since before 
the Louisiana Purchase. For most growing southern cities, slaves were 
the only available source of skilled and unskilled labor, so in the 1850s 
there was no major reversal of black population trends in southern 
communities. 24 
During the immediate aftermath of the Civil War the movement of 
newly freed blacks into cities greatly outran that of whites. Nashville 
and Richmond are cases in point. In the 1860s, and primarily after 1865, 
the black population of Nashville increased from 23 to 38 percent and of 
Richmond from 38 to 45 percent. Blacks flocked to the cities because of 
dislocations in the countryside caused by the end of slavery and for 
other reasons. Just as elsewhere, the lure of the city attracted black 
southerners. More opportunities existed and services were better than 
in rural sections. One white editor noted that the influx resulted from 
"the inherent love of the negro for a crowd, for shows, for amuse-
ments, and for opportunities of making a precarious living by occa-
sional jobs when they may be idle at other times. "25 The other factors 
more than outweighed such judgments. 
The large numbers of blacks attracted to even the most provincial of 
southern cities frightened whites. 26 The odious "Black Codes," aimed 
at reinstituting slavery under a different guise, were their reaction to 
the problem of controlling these people. Southern legislatures enacted 
the codes despite the advice of President Andrew Johnson, who ar-
gued correctly that they would inflame northern opinion. A symbolic 
illustration that accompanied Edward King's "Great South" series 
showed several blacks with whips yelling at a white man. "As at 
Lynchburg," King wrote about Petersburg, "the Northerner is at first 
amazed by the mass of black and yellow faces. The hackmen who 
shriek in your ear as you arrive at the depot, the brakeman on the train, 
the waiter in the hotel, all are African. In the tobacco factories hun-
dreds of dusty forms are toiling, and an equal number are slouching in 
the sunshine. On the day of my visit a colored Masonic excursion had 
arrived from Richmond, and the streets were filled with stout negro-
men, decently clothed, and their wives and sweethearts, attired in 
even louder colors than those affected by Northern servant girls. Each 
was talking vociferously; officials, in flaunting regalia and sweating at 
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every pore, rushed to and fro; bands thundered and urchins 
screamed. "27 Blacks never had direct control of any southern city. By 
the 1880s whites held all the leadership posts. Talented blacks had a 
choice of either remaining in inferior positions or seeking oppor-
tunities elsewhere. 
In antebellum times the South attracted few of the hundreds of 
thousands of foreign-born who came to America's shores. Most were 
from western Europe, and the southern climate was too unlike that in 
their homelands to appeal to them. The existence of the peculiar 
institution also worked against immigration, for many foreign-born 
opposed slavery. And except for a few southern cities, there was no 
demand for white labor. A great many more immigrants passed 
through the South than stayed. Between 1820 and 1860, before through 
railroad connections were built from New York to Chicago, more than 
550,000 foreign-born entered the United States at New Orleans. After 
New York, the Crescent City was the nation's second biggest immi-
grant port. It was easier to travel to the nation's heartland via the 
Mississippi River than to take the Erie Canal and Great Lakes route. 28 
Most of the foreigners who never got beyond New Orleans stayed out 
of necessity-they ran out of money. A large number of the immigrants 
who entered at New Orleans were famine victims or paupers. The port 
had such lax admission regulations that no one was ever turned away. 
Most of the immigrants who went upriver, usually as deck passengers 
on steamboats, settled in the Midwest. 29 Only a small number stayed 
in the South, augmenting the numbers of those who came down from 
the North. Most of the foreign-born settled in the border states. Many 
worked in the fast-growing cities at the portals between North and 
South, especially in the 1850s, when Germans and Irish settled in 
appreciable numbers in Baltimore and Louisville. 30 
There was a white blacklash against immigrants in the urban 
South. 31 As early as 1839 the Louisiana Native American Association 
warned of the dangers posed at New Orleans by "hordes and 
hecatombs of beings in human form, but destitute of any intellectual 
aspiration,-the outcast and offal of society-the pauper, the vagrant 
... reeking with the accumulated crimes of the whole civilized and 
savage world. "32 The nativists sought successfully to promote changes 
in the federal naturalization laws. During the next decade, two inci-
dents in New Orleans inflamed nativists. First, a state judge illegally 
naturalized 1,800 immigrants. Then, in the so-called Plaquemines 
Fraud, immigrants denied the right to vote in New Orleans were 
transported to another point to cast Democratic ballots in the presiden-
tial election of 1844. Throughout the 1850s the nativist American party 
was a potent political force in New Orleans, outliving the national 
organization by more than half a decade. Know-Nothingism was a 
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political force in the other southern cities with immigrant elements. 
The American party had a powerful organization in Baltimore. On 6 
August 1855-"Bloody Monday" -foreigners and nativists battled in 
the streets of Louisville. 33 Protestant opposition to Roman Catholi-
cism, the religion of many immigrants, exacerbated emotions. Clearly, 
the attitudes toward foreign-born urbanites in the Old South created 
difficulties for advocates of programs to promote immigration in the 
postwar era. 
Some halfhearted efforts to encourage immigration had more sub-
stance than the rhetoric about the need for desirable immigrants pro-
moted by New South propagandists. All the southern states 
established immigration boards, copying those already operating in 
the North. As standard procedure, state boards produced foreign-
language tracts extolling opportunities and resources, stationed agents 
at dockside to meet immigrant ships, and sent representatives abroad 
to give promotional speeches. Throughout the South, the efforts of 
private land companies and local societies supplemented the public 
activities. At one point Louisiana boasted more than a hundred immi-
gration societies. Most had little money and lasted but a short time. 34 
There was some talk a about attracting Oriental laborers as a substitute 
for slave labor. In 1880 the most Orientals in any southern city were the 
80 in New Orleans. Baltimore had 8 and Atlanta none. Despite all 
efforts, only a small portion of the millions of immigrants who arrived 
in America in the decades after the Civil War went to the South. It was 
not until near the tum of the century that railroad companies started in 
a major way to encourage immigration into the South. Even then, the 
vast numbers of foreign-born continued to avoid Dixie. 
In 1880 a total of 146,000 of the 182,000 foreign-born in the South 
lived in the eight largest cities in the section. They accounted for 80 
percent of the immigrants in the thirty largest southern cities. The 
most foreign-born in the eight cities were from Germany, Ireland, and 
Great Britain, as illustrated by Table 3.2. 35 These groups constituted the 
chief components of the foreign-born population of the country. 
Most immigrants from Britain in the nation were in New England 
or Michigan, places easily reached from British Canada. Few had come 
to the South since colonial times. Baltimore had the largest number in 
1880, around 3,000. The only other cities with more than a thousand 
British-born residents were New Orleans, Washington, and Louisville. 
Despite the claim that the South personified the best of Anglo-Saxon 
civilization, the region's cities had attracted few Englishmen. Like the 
majority of other immigrants, they found the North better suited to 
their needs. 36 
A floodtide of Hibernians came to America in the wake of the 
potato famine. Most of these people stayed in the North, as did later 
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Table 3.2. Germans, Irish, and British in Eight Southern Cities, 
1880 
Germans Irish British 
City Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Baltimore 34,051 10 14,238 4 2,973 
New Orleans 13,944 6 11,708 5 2,262 
Washington 4,154 3 6,448 4 1,892 1 
Louisville 13,463 11 6,474 5 1,173 1 
Richmond 1,274 2 1,037 2 529 
Charleston 1,537 3 1,611 3 352 
Nashville 664 2 1,349 3 425 
Atlanta 471 1 465 190 0.5 
Irish immigrants. In 1880 between 15 and 20 percent of the inhabitants 
of New York, Boston, and Chicago were from Ireland. Seventeen 
places outside the South had more than 10,000 Irish immigrants. Even 
so, there were considerable congregations in Dixie: 14,200 in Baltimore 
and 11,700 in New Orleans. Two-thirds of the Irish in the country lived 
east of Pittsburgh. 
Two-thirds of the German-born population in the United States 
resided west of Pittsburgh, the largest numbers in the Midwest. 37 The 
great German aggregates that came after the revolution of 1848 in 
Europe spilled over into the South. Their coming coincided with rapid 
urban growth in the border cities and in New Orleans. At the same 
time, there was rising concern over the number of urban slaves, and 
some observers saw Germans as good substitute laborers. A resump-
tion of German immigration after the Civil War continued trends 
already under way. In 1880 the seventh largest concentration of Ger-
mans in the South was in Baltimore, where they numbered 34,100, 
accounting for 10 percent of all the people in the Monumental City. In 
addition, the 13,900 Germans in New Orleans and 13,500 in Louisville 
represented large totals when compared with many other places in the 
nation. Adding in the children of immigrants-what the census office 
referred to as the "so-called 'German family' "38-roughly doubled the 
concentrations of immigrant stock. If success in city building in the 
America of the Gilded Age meant attracting immigrants, a few south-
ern cities had done just that. The increased immigrant population had 
the subtle effect of gradually changing these cities' character and 
making them more like cities outside the section. 
New Orleans had a reputation as the most cosmopolitan city in the 
South. It had 6,900 French-born residents, the most in the United 
States after New York with 9,900. New Orleans had an extensive 
French heritage, which attracted the immigrants. Edward King tried to 
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pture the meaning of the French experience in New Orleans. Like 
other visitors, he was captivated by the Creole women of French 
descent, whom he described as having" an indefinable grace, a savoir in 
dress, and a piquant and alluring charm in person and conversation, 
which makes them universal favorites in society." King's opinion of the 
French Quarter was that its populace was provincial. "The majority of 
the people in the whole quarter seem to have a total disregard of the 
outside world," he claimed, "and when one hears them discussing the 
distracted condition of local politics, one can almost fancy them gossip-
ing on matters entirely foreign to them. . .. They live very much 
among themselves. French by nature and training, they get but a faint 
reflection of the excitements in these United States."39 Many New 
Orleans natives thought the growing Italian element was even more 
insular. In 1880, with 2,000 Italians, New Orleans had proportionally 
the most people of that nationality in the country. 40 Almost all the 
Italians were young men, who had come as contract laborers. Few 
showed an inclination to adopt American ways. Native resentment of 
them was indicated in official Louisiana state documents, which derog-
atorily called them "Dagos." They were classic examples of the immi-
grants white southerners considered undesirable. Their presence 
posed questions skirted by advocates of the New South concept. If the 
South should boom, where would the main components of the addi-
tional population needed to build up the section come from? Indeed, as 
more and more Italians moved into New Orleans, riots directed against 
them followed almost as a matter of course. Would the poor of other 
southern or eastern European nations receive a more cordial welcome? 
In 1880 both the black and white populations of the eight largest 
southern cities had been born close to home. 41 A total of 90 percent of 
the people in Richmond were born in Virginia. Eighty-eight percent of 
all Charlestonians were from South Carolina. Their immediate states 
had contributed between 70 and 80 percent of the populations of 
Atlanta, Nashville, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Some 74 percent of all 
Washingtonians were from the District of Columbia or from neighbor-
ing Virginia and Maryland. Louisville, even though right across the 
Ohio River from Indiana, still counted 67 percent of its inhabitants as 
Kentucky natives. None of the other fifty largest cities in the country 
had such provincial population characteristics. In Boston, one of the 
nation's oldest cities, 54 percent of the populace was from Massachu-
setts. Roughly 51 percent of Chicago's residents were Illinois natives. 
The continual influx of people into the Windy City changed the figures 
daily. Denver, founded in 1854, had a population profile in keeping 
with that of a booming town in a new state. Only 11 percent of its 
inhabitants were from Colorado. The 1880 census noted the "aston-
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ishing readiness" with which Americans moved "under the smallest 
economical or social impulse."42 
The simple truth was that the major southern cities had failed to 
attract many outsiders. Only two cities had more than a thousand 
persons who had been born more than a southern state away. New 
Orleans had 4,300 Virginians, 1,700 Kentuckians, and 1,300 Mary-
landers. Atlanta had 1,000 Virginians. More startling were the statistics 
for migrants from outside the South. Only the four metropolises had 
more than a thousand northerners. Baltimore boasted 7,000 Pennsyl-
vanians and 3,000 New Yorkers. In Louisville there were 4,800 Indi-
anans, 2,600 Ohioans, 1,500 Pennsylvanians, and 1,300 New Yorkers. 
Washington had 5,300 people from New York, 5,000 from Pennsyl-
vania, 1,700 from Ohio, and 1,500 from Massachusetts. New Orleans 
claimed 2,100 residents born in New York. More typical figures were 
the 24 Wisconsinites in Atlanta, the 86 Rhode Islanders in Atlanta, and 
the 3 Nebraskans in Nashville. The figures further reinforced the 
insular nature of southern life. The South remained very different, 
despite the contentions that without blacks it was much like the Mid-
west. In population, as in other areas, there was a direct connection 
between the Old South and the New South. 
Some observers expressed fear that the population mix would 
create a state of bucolic individualism based upon a limited world view 
in southern urban life. Under this theory, rural migrants, intimidated 
by blind and hostile forces beyond their understanding, would lash out 
violently at society. This idea ignored the role of the city as a crucible of 
change. By their nature, the transforming trends of urbanization 
muted agrarian values. The same forces that shaped city life elsewhere 
in the United States were at work in the South, and the birthplace of the 
white native population had very little practical meaning. The presence 
of blacks, on the other hand, added the problem of race. The outcome 
of their presence obviously depended upon the attitudes of the domi-
nant white groups. If integration was promoted, a period of racial 
harmony lay ahead, with black and white urban dwellers working 
together to promote a common destiny. Unfortunately, a policy of 
white supremacy negated that happy vision, promising a great waste of 
talent, efforts, and resources. For instance, blacks from Washington to 
New Orleans were forced to construct their own "hidden commu-
nities." In addition, the denial of social mobility placed serious strains 
on black family life. Immigrants, on the other hand, because they were 
so few, had a good chance of assimilating, despite some local hostility. 
Although neither origins nor race in themselves constituted problems 
to city building, the reaction to them did. 
In 1880, 26 of the 28 southern cities with populations over 10,000 
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Table 3.3. Male and Female Populations in Southern Cities, 1880 
City Males Females %Females 
Alabama 
Mobile 13,189 15,943 55 
Montgomery 7,591 9,122 55 
Arkansas 
Little Rock 6,966 6,172 47 
Dist. of Columbia 
Georgetown 5,847 6,731 55 
Washington 68,310 78,983 54 
Georgia 
Atlanta 17,677 19,732 53 
Augusta 9,827 12,064 55 
Columbus 
Macon 5,709 7,040 55 
Savannah 13,936 16,773 55 
Kentucky 
Covington 14,192 15,528 52 
Lexington 7,721 8,935 54 
Louisville 58,982 64,776 52 
Newport 9,925 10,508 51 
Louisiana 
New Orleans 100,892 115,198 53 
Maryland 
Baltimore 157,393 174,920 53 
Cumberland 
MississiEEi 
Vicksburg 5,575 6,239 53 
North Carolina 
Wilmington 7,910 9,440 54 
South Carolina 
Charleston 22,585 27,399 55 
Columbia 4,639 5,397 54 
Tennessee 
Chattanooga 6,512 6,380 49 
Memphis 16,302 17,290 51 
Nashville 20,912 22,438 52 
Virginia 
Alexandria 6,438 7,221 53 
Lynchburg 7,483 8,476 53 
Norfolk 10,069 11,897 54 
Petersburg 9,779 11,877 55 
Portsmouth 5,489 5,901 52 
Richmond 29,483 34,117 54 
Cogs in the Great Machine 47 
Table 3.4. Working Men and Women in Eight Southern Cities, 1880 
City Total Males Females %Females 
Baltimore 130,364 97,561 32,803 25 
New Orleans 78,336 59,173 19,163 24 
Washington 57,262 39,703 17,559 31 
Louisville 45,244 34,987 10,257 23 
Richmond 24,550 17,007 7,543 31 
Charleston 20,325 13,280 7,045 35 
Nashville 16,738 11,591 5,147 31 
Atlanta 17,078 11,118 5,960 35 
had more females than males (see Table 3.3). 43 The United States had 
900,000 more females than males. The differences were most apparent 
in the cities over 10,000. In the Northeast, 108 out of 133 cities had more 
women than men. Forty-three of 62 Midwest communities had an 
excess of females. Demographers have attributed this situation to mi-
gratory patterns. East of the Mississippi River the number of women 
migrants into cities exceeded men, particularly black women domes-
tics in the South. Only in the West did a majority of the urban centers-
18 out of 23---have more males. In the course of the American frontier 
experience, men were traditionally in the vanguard of settlement. In 
fact, the only two southern cities with more males-Little Rock and 
Chattanooga-were only recently removed from the frontier. The for-
mer was 53 percent male and the latter 51 percent. Fourteen of the 
southern cities were 54 to 55 percent female. These percentages were 
similar to those for many of the older northeastern centers. If anything, 
the southern statistics indicated that the South was not gaining heavy 
industry as fast as advocates of manufacturing might have liked. More-
over, the South was not keeping or attracting ambitious young men. 
Instead, they went West. Of course, these facts were realized by Grady 
and other advocates of the New South creed, who tried to emphasize 
that better opportunities existed within the section. Yet even the most 
realistic of evaluations did not stop the westward movement. 
The work forces of the eight largest southern cities in 1880 con-
tained appreciable female minorities, as shown in Table 3.4. 44 The 
aggregates of working women varied from 35 percent in Charleston 
and Atlanta to 23 percent in Louisville. The figures for the southern 
centers were much higher than those for the fifteen largest cities in the 
Midwest and the West, where totals ranged from a high of 22 percent in 
Cincinnati to a low of 11 percent in Denver. Generally, the figures for 
the Northeast were higher than for either the West or Midwest. The 
lowest were the 14 percent in both the steel center of Pittsburgh and the 
coal town of Scranton. The highest were the 40 percent in the textile 
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manufacturing towns of Lowell and Fall River. Furthermore, women 
made up 24 percent of the gainfully employed in New York, Phila-
delphia, and Boston, the three largest metropolises in the section. The 
vast majority of the working women of the Northeast toiled in low-
paying and unskilled positions. If they were not domestic servants, 
they more than likely worked in the garment or textile industries. 
Baltimore's employment pattern for women was close to that of the 
northeastern centers, with 13,900 domestic servants, 8,000 garment 
workers, and 4,300 laundresses. 45 These three classifications ac-
counted for 79 percent of all employed women in the city. In general, 
the other southern centers had lower percentages of garment workers 
than did Baltimore, but that figure was bound to change as indus-
trialization increased. 
If the South developed a significant manufacturing base, jobs in 
the textile and tobacco industries would open up for many southern 
women. Given the low pay schedules and long hours in northeastern 
mills, it was an unhappy prospect. Of course, southern industrial 
evangelists did not dwell on such mundane concerns as working 
conditions. They took a higher ground, equating industry with civic 
piety. Francis W. Dawson set the tone when he campaigned for cotton 
mills in the South Carolina piedmont. The illustrious Charleston editor 
wrote in 1880 that mills would have an elevating social influence upon 
employees, encouraging them to seek education and improve their 
way of living in "every conceivable respect."46 He suggested that 
investors could expect annual profits of 25 percent but said nothing 
about opportunities for advancement for women mill workers. If the 
experience of Northeast was an indication, job advancement was un-
likely, especially for black and white unskilled women workers. 
Southern employers did not adjust quickly to the use of former 
slaves as employed laborers. Some former slaveowners could not un-
derstand why freedmen quit after watching whippings of fellow work-
ers. Other employers thought blacks shiftless because they did not 
work hard for the very low wages offered. The odious Black Codes 
reflected the lack of understanding about the differences between slave 
and free labor. The Mississippi law contained heavy penal ties for 
anyone who persuaded a black to change jobs. Provisions of the 
Louisiana code called for the punishment of blacks who feigned sick-
ness or swore at their bosses. All the southern codes were repealed at 
the time of the establishment of military governments in 1867, despite 
southern assertions that the laws copied standard northern appren-
ticeship and vagrancy statutes. 47 Gradually, blacks learned the impor-
tance of fulfilling labor contracts and whites came to the realization that 
slavery was over. Looking back on the changes wrought, Henry Wat-
terson wrote in 1903, "Under the old system we paid our debts and 
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walloped our niggers. Under the new we pay our niggers and wallop 
our debts."48 
The gospel of industry extolled in the postwar era by enthusiastic 
advocates of the New South creed gave greater urgency to experiments 
in the use of blacks in industry. In 1874, King visited a Lynchburg 
tobacco factory that employed black men, women, and children. He 
wrote, "These negroes earn good wages, work faithfully, and turn out 
vast quantities of the black, ugly compound known as 'plug.' ... In the 
manufactories the negro is the same cheery, capricious being that one 
finds him in the cotton or sugar-cane fields; he sings quaintly over his 
toil, and seems entirely devoid of the sullen ambition which many of 
our Northern factory laborers exhibit. The men and women working 
around the tables in the basements of the Lynchburg tobacco establish-
ments croon eccentric hymns in concert all day long; and their little 
children, laboring before they are hardly large enough to go along, join 
in the refrains."49 The employment of blacks was a logical outgrowth of 
their use in Richmond iron mills before the Civil War. There were not 
enough native white laborers-either males or females-to build an 
industrial society. And in the South, immigrants, the backbone of the 
unskilled labor force in the factories of the North, were unavailable in 
large enough numbers to fuel an industrial machine. 
In 1880 the work force in the eight largest southern cities was 
overwhelmingly American in origin (see Table 3.5). 50 The low numbers 
of foreign-born immigrants provided further proof that the South was 
different. Atlanta, Richmond, Nashville, and Charleston had smaller 
percentages of immigrant workers than any other of the fifty largest 
cities in the country. Only 4 percent of the 16,300 employed persons in 
Atlanta had been born overseas. Few immigrants had accepted Grady's 
invitation to come to Atlanta. In all eight cities, Germans and Irish 
accounted for more than half the foreign-born workers. Germans 
made up 14 percent of all the employed persons in both Louisville and 
Baltimore. The largest totals for Irish workers were the 7 percent in 
both Louisville and New Orleans. These percentages appear low when 
compared with those in some northern towns. Milwaukee's work force 
was 39 percent German and Jersey City's 25 percent Irish. As through-
out the nation, the percentages of foreign-born workers in seven of the 
southern cities were greater than the percentages of foreign-born. 
Thus Baltimore, which was 19 percent foreign-born, had a work force 
that was 22 percent foreign-born. Washington's ratio was seven to 
twelve and Nashville's seven to eight. Atlanta was the only exception. 
It had the same proportion of foreign-born residents and workers. Just 
as in the North, most immigrants in the South held unskilled jobs that 
required heavy labor. For example, there were many German ste-
vedores in New Orleans. Of course, immigrant workers faced much 
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Table 3.5. Nativity of Workers in Eight Southern Cities, 1880 
United States Ireland Germany 
City Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Baltimore 101,484 78 7,306 6 17,769 14 
New Orleans 58,771 75 5,543 7 6,968 9 
Washington 50,309 88 3,146 5 2,100 4 
Louisville 34,012 75 3,099 7 6,412 14 
Richmond 23,013 94 454 2 620 3 
Charleston 18,379 90 758 4 796 4 
Nashville 15,232 91 643 4 356 2 
Atlanta 16,339 96 237 1 280 2 
Great Britain Sweden/Norway, British America Other 
City Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Baltimore 1,442 1 169 0.1 258 0.2 1,936 1 
New Orleans 1,218 2 137 0.2 210 0.3 5,489 7 
Washington 865 2 42 0.07 141 0.2 659 1 
Louisville 578 1 21 0.05 205 0.5 917 2 
Richmond 220 0.9 9 0.04 31 0.1 203 0.8 
Charleston 138 0.7 14 0.07 12 0.06 228 1 
Nashville 206 1 35 0.2 18 0.1 248 1 
Atlanta 108 0.6 16 0.09 26 0.2 72 0.4 
greater challenges in the South than in the North. They not only had to 
compete against each other and native Americans for jobs but against 
blacks as well. This competition meant that wages were low and immi-
grants were discouraged from coming to the southern interior cities 
that had large black populations. Southern leaders were right when 
they told northern industrialists that labor costs were lower in the 
South than elsewhere. But for workers this bleak situation showed 
little sign of changing. 
In an effort to make the South appear attractive for industry, the 
spokesmen for the New South creed embraced their own version of 
Social Darwinism. This concept, expounded by the English economist 
Herbert Spencer, applied naturalist Charles Darwin's theory of evolu-
tion by natural selection to human affairs. In his more extreme mo-
ments, Spencer even opposed extending sewer lines into poor districts 
on the grounds that improved sanitation would affect the selection 
process. The southern Social Darwinists rejected a straight survival-of-
the-fittest approach. Rather, they held that successful businessmen 
would end poverty by sponsoring programs that would bring material 
progress. Richard Edmonds wrote in his Manufacturers' Record that he 
found it difficult to understand why people were "prone to sermonize 
against the spirit of 'commercialism.'" He insisted, "We are all cogs in 
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the great machine." Another New South proponent, newspaper pub-
lisher and industrialist Daniel Augustus Tompkins, expressed the 
belief that "the survival of the fittest is, has been, and will always be the 
law of progress." Grady did his part by consistently praising bankers, 
industrialists, and railroad owners. Another New South supporter, the 
Reverend John C. Calhoun Newton, felt that the future of the South lay 
with "wealthy capitalists, and prince merchants, and lordly bankers," 
who acted as "stewards of God." Material progress was to be stressed 
above all else. A thoroughly modern South was not only in step with 
the rest of the nation but out in front in industrial philosophy. Cap-
italists were community benefactors beloved by lesser citizens, who 
accepted the gospel of work as the formula for success. Only a few 
social degenerates opposed the inevitable capitalistic thrust of Anglo-
Saxon civilization. Above all, southern religious institutions stood as 
bulwarks in the defense of the new industrial order. Edmonds said that 
carriers of the New South aspects of Social Darwinism were more than 
mere men. "Yea," he announced, "they are really messengers prepar-
ing the way for religious advancement itself. "51 
The New South advocates used religion to buttress their creed. 
Grady claimed "The South is American and religious"; "God-fearing 
people" supported the "old fashion" by according equal honor to God 
and the United States Constitution. They practiced "the straight and 
simple faith of our fathers, untainted by heresy and unweakened by 
speculation." It was as if the Civil War had never happened. "The spirit 
of Americanism-of popular liberty, of love for democratic principles 
and institutions-burns steadily and unobstructedly here." Grady 
intoned, "Anarchy, socialism-that leveling spirit that defies govern-
ment and denies God-has no hold in the South. Here the old church-
es are the best churches, and the old creeds still living and saving. Here 
law and order reign. Here government is supreme, and if we love well 
that government which touches us most closely, we love none the less 
that government which, above all, blesses all. "52 Mythmaking always 
was an integral part of the New South creed. Grady and his colleagues 
were not dogmatists; they were promoters trying to sell proposals that 
would quickly change the course of southern life. 
In 1890 the United States census office took what officials claimed 
was the nation's first scientifically conducted religious census. It indi-
cated that the 17 southern out of the nation's 124 cities over 25,000 
population had many religious organizations, numerous houses of 
worship, much valuable property, and substantial membership counts 
(see Table 3.6). 53 Of special significance were the percentages of church 
members. There was a marked difference between rural and urban 
areas. The national average for urban communicants was 38 percent;54 
the national percentage was 45 percent. Membership statistics, of 
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Table 3.6. Religious Statistics for Seventeen Southern Cities of More 
than 25,000 Inhabitants, 1890 
Organa- Church Value of Number of %of 
City Population izations Edifices Property Members Population 
Baltimore 434,439 371 371 $9,528,838 175,995 41 
New Orleans 242,039 165 154 2,553,107 95,716 40 
Washington 230,392 195 186 6,370,575 94,572 41 
Louisville 161,129 129 144 3,332,750 73,355 46 
Richmond 81,388 79 83 1,476,150 38,114 47 
Nashville 76,168 101 105 1,292,796 30,195 40 
Atlanta 65,533 92 81 1,073,050 27,237 42 
Memphis 64,495 51 51 1,011,200 17,333 27 
Charleston 54,955 73 90 1,502,592 24,117 44 
Savannah 43,189 73 71 705,300 18,905 44 
Covington 37,371 28 28 574,600 15,575 42 
Norfolk 34,871 42 43 623,443 13,611 39 
Augusta 33,300 65 71 711,775 16,936 51 
Mobile 31,076 54 54 806,119 21,729 70 
Chattanooga 29,100 51 46 713,830 9,830 34 
Birmingham 26,178 55 45 664,525 12,214 47 
Little Rock 25,874 40 39 497,600 8,298 32 
course, are not exact measurements. Some organizations counted 
babies as members. Others did not admit children to full membership 
status until they were in their early teens. Moreover, the federal gov-
ernment obtained the data by asking clergymen to fill out reports. Still, 
taking the faults into consideration, the membership totals indicated 
the strong strain of religiosity in the late-nineteenth-century urban 
South. Only three of the southern cities had lower percentages of 
communicants than the nation as a whole. There appeared little doubt 
that religion played an important role in the lives of many southern 
urban dwellers. Less than half of the city people belonged to religious 
bodies, however, countering the extravagant claims of southern lead-
ers about the importance of religion. The number of urban church 
members was not appreciably higher than in urban areas outside the 
South. 
The 1890 totals for the major religous bodies in the seventeen 
largest southern cities reflected the diversity of religion in America (see 
Table 3.7).55 The most surprising figures were those showing the 
numerical strength of the Roman Catholic church. In eight cities, 
Roman Catholics accounted for 10 percent or more of the total popula-
tion. Three cities were more than 20 percent Roman Catholic: New 
Orleans (28 percent), Covington (27 percent), and Louisville (21 per-
cent). The totals for Protestant groups followed sectional trends. Reg-
ular Baptists accounted for more than 10 percent of the urban dwellers 
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in six cities. Six places were between 5 and 10 percent Southern Meth-
odist. Colored Methodists made up 30 percent of Mobile and 12 per-
cent of Charleston residents. The largest percentages of Methodist 
Episcopals were the 6 percent in Charleston, of Episcopalians the 5 
percent in Mobile, and of Southern Presbyterians the 3 percent in 
Mobile. One to 4 percent of the people in nine of the towns had a 
Jewish affiliation. In these localities, the fewest Jews were the 258 in 
Atlanta; the most were the 3,500 in Baltimore. 56 In addition to the main 
line denominations, a variety of Pentecostal and other groups contrib-
uted to the richness of southern urban religion. Such variety does little 
to suggest that the primary goals of religion were to support either the 
Lost Cause or the building of an industrial and urban New South. The 
reality was far different from the propaganda used to promote secular 
causes. 
Education was another source of contention in the postwar South. 
Many northern educational leaders thought the Old South had a 
dismal record. Few of the changes pioneered by Horace Mann and 
other reformers, such as formal teacher training and standardized 
curricula, found favor in the section. Several states rejected the concept 
of public education. The children of the wealthy classes studied under 
private tutors or attended northern schools. Poor whites, if they at-
tended at all, matriculated in church schools open only a few months of 
the year. The teachers were usually untrained. Many white adults 
could write little more than their name. Authorities estimated that in 
1840 one-fourth of the population of Tennessee was illiterate. 57 Only a 
minimal number of slaves could read. Statutes prohibited teaching 
them even the bare rudiments of education. Southern spokesmen did 
not apologize for any educational deficiencies. Instead, they claimed 
that the South had no need for universal education. The southern way 
of life did not require the vast number of people to have book learning; 
rather, practical skills learned in the "school of hard knocks" suited 
their needs. There was a gradual reversal of this viewpoint, and in the 
1850s a few states passed public education acts. Unfortunately, the Civil 
War negated any progress that had been made. 
During Reconstruction officials struggled to rekindle interest in 
education. 58 Jabez Lamar Monroe Curry, an ordained Baptist minister 
and former president of the University of Alabama, spoke widely on 
the "universal right" of all citizens to state-supported education. He 
argued on practical grounds that educated citizens would further the 
interests of the state. "Poverty is the inevitable result of ignorance," he 
preached. "Capital follows the school house. Thrift accompanies gov-
ernment action in behalf of schools. "59 A basic problem was that hardly 
any money was available. In the 1870s Georgia, Alabama, and South 
Carolina all temporarily closed their public school systems. On the 
Table 3.7. Membership of Eight Religious Bodies for Seventeen Southern Cities of More Than 25,000 Inhabitants, 1890 
Regular Roman Methodist Southern Colored Southern 
City Baptists Catholics Jewish Episcopal Methodist Methodist Presbyterian Episcopalian 
Baltimore 18,759 ( 4%) 77,047 (16%) 3,500 (0.8%) 5,963( 1%) 790 (0.2%) 5,610 ( 1%) 1,028 (0.2%) 12,193 ( 3%) 
New Orleans 2,681 ( 1%) 67,156 (28%) 2,750 ( 1%) 3,938 ( 2%) 2,301 ( 1%) 2,375 ( 1%) 2,953 ( 1%) 2,910 ( 1%) 
Washington 21,781 (19%) 36,488 (16%) 976 (0.4%) 9,144( 4%) 872 (0.4%) 4,781 ( 2%) 246 (0.1%) 7,315 ( 3%) 
Louisville 13,753 ( 9%) 33,740 (21%) 515 (0.3%) 1,613 ( 1%) 3,154( 2%) 3,117 ( 2%) 2,001 ( 1%) 3,654 ( 2%) 
Richmond 24,003 (29%) 3,570( 4%) 493 (0.6%) 201 (0.2%) 1,871 ( 2%) 300 (0.4%) 2,017 ( 2%) 3,045 ( 3%) 
Nashville 5,722 ( 8%) 6,000 ( 8%) 290 (0.4%) 1,143 ( 2%) 7,094( 9%) 1,926 ( 3%) 2,496 ( 3%) 953 ( 1%) 
Atlanta 9,999 (15%) 2,050 ( 3%) 258 (0.3%) 1,493 ( 2%) 4,886( 7%) 4,411 ( 7%) 1,880 ( 3%) 863 ( 1%) 
Memphis 2,018 ( 3%) 6,400 (10%) 905( 1%) 575 (0.9%) 4,559 ( 7%) 4,984 ( 8%) 1,320 ( 2%) 1,245 ( 2%) 
Charleston 1,758 ( 3%) 3,756( 7%) 890 ( 2%) 3,301 ( 6%) 1,593 ( 3%) 6,359 ( 12%) 1,008 ( 2%) 2,156( 4%) 
Savannah 8,226 (19%) 3,585 ( 8%) 505( 1%) 265 (0.6%) 1,570 ( 4%) 2,096 ( 5%) 325 (0.8%) 1,397 ( 3%) 
Covington 943( 2%) 10,192 (27%) - (-%) 1,424 ( 4%) 563( 2%) 188 (0.5%) 426 ( 1%) 550( 1%) 
Norfolk 4,091 (12%) 1,400 ( 4%) 150 (0.4%) 40 (0.1%) 2,412 ( 7%) 2,784 ( 8%) 809 ( 2%) 1,692 ( 5%) 
Augusta 6,228 (19%) 2,725 ( 8%) 393 ( 1%) 100 (0.3%) 2,739( 8%) 2,236 ( 7%) 665 ( 2%) 729( 2%) 
Mobile 2,540 ( 8%) 5,400 (17%) 375 ( 1 %) 319 ( 1%) 1,160( 4%) 9,219 ( 30%) 787 ( 3%) 1,576 ( 5%) 
Chattanooga 1,854 ( 6%) 1,700 ( 6%) 300 ( 1%) 1,529 ( 5%) 1,145 ( 4%) 504 ( 2%) 500 ( 2%) 900 ( 3%) 
Birmingham 2,429 ( 9%) 2,500 (10%) 1,075 ( 4%) 1,017 ( 4%) 1,575( 6%) 1,543 ( 6%) 827 ( 3%) 698 ( 3%) 
Little Rock 1,644 ( 6%) 1,000 ( 4%) 400 ( 2%) 579 ( 2%) 955( 4%) 1,447 ( 6%) 451 ( 2%) 760 ( 3%) 
Note: Figures within parentheses are percentages of population. 
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local level, religious and political disputes interfered with the building 
of public schools. It was frequently difficult even in the best of times to 
persuade wealthy citizens to support increases in school levies. After 
the end of Reconstruction, financial retrenchment at all levels of gov-
ernment further handicapped educational progress. The establish-
ment of separate systems for black and white children caused further 
fiscal problems. No federal money was forthcoming. Most northern 
white reformers chose to help other concerns than black education. 
Some influential reformers actually opposed desegregating schools on 
the practical grounds that it would give legislatures an excuse to abolish 
public schools. The efforts of northern philanthropists John F. Slater 
and George Peabody to improve southern schools, particularly for 
blacks, only touched the surface. 60 In the end, both white and black 
children paid an educational price for the application of accepted racial 
norms, and all students suffered from the South's slow acceptance of 
general education. This is not to minimize the progress that had been 
made, particularly in a time of dislocation and financial instability. 
Surveys of southern public education seldom mentioned that condi-
tions were little better elsewhere in the country. Few school districts 
anywhere had the funds or the inclination to fulfill the dreams of the 
educational reformers. 
The southern urban school systems suffered from many of the 
same wants as those in rural areas. The 1880 school statistics for the 
thirty largest southern towns told a depressing story, as indicated in 
Table 3.8. 61 Only the four largest cities spent in excess of $100,000 
during the year. Thirteen towns spent less than $30,000. Generally, 
student-teacher ratios in the city schools were sixty to one. For blacks 
the rates frequently went as high as one hundred to one. 62 Inadequate 
facilities added to a depressing situation. Many schoolhouses were 
poorly maintained converted sheds or private homes. Overcrowding 
was a frequent problem. Atlanta authorities tried to alleviate matters by 
giving white students priority over blacks. Savannah officials in-
stituted an automatic promotion policy. The course of instruction in the 
urban schools minimized so-called "frills." Mobile students, for in-
stance, studied basics: orthography, reading, writing, grammar, geog-
raphy, and arithmetic.63 Few places had foreign language, music, or 
physical education courses. The educational system challenged only a 
small number of students. Daily attendance was poor everywhere, 
usually under 50 percent. Edward Alderman, an advocate of public 
education in the New South, summed up the situation in 1889 when he 
stated, "Improvement in schools generally comes last. "64 
Developments in higher education appeared much more promis-
ing. Considerable attention had been devoted to college education in 
the antebellum period. Supposedly, the various institutions, most 
56 The Rise of the Urban South 
Table 3.8. School Statistics for Southern Cities of More than 10,000 
Inhabitants, 1880 
Average 
School Estimated Daily 
Age Private Public Public Public Public 
City Youth Enrollment Enrollment Attendance Teachers Expenditures 
Alabama 
Mobile 4,659 4,014 125 $40,607 
Montgomery 3,793 849 645 14 
Arkansas 
Little Rock 6,169 400 2,503 1,655 33 28,264 
Dist. of Columbiaa 
Georgetown & 
Washington 27,142 5,481 15,728 12,508 259 391,294 
Georgia 
Atlanta 10,500 1,000 4,100 2,609 68 51,073 
Augusta 9,366 1,236 4,027 32 24,977 
Columbus 2,863 200 1,359 1J086 23 11,704 
Macon 7,909 300 3,349 2,001 59 20,136 
Savannah 10,917 2,110 2,290 56 
Kentucky 
Covington 10,094 3,000 3,286 2,485 60 56,317 
Lexington 5,299 600 2,262 1,615 31 18,319 
Louisville 46,587 19,990 13,498 325 197,699 
Newport 6,780 2,692 2,032 44 27,898 
Louisiana 
New Orleans 56,947 12,000 17,886 15,190 407 250,444 
Maryland 
Baltimore 86,961 14,000 48,066 29,961 822 617,152 
Cumberland 
MississiEEi 
Vicksburg 3,000 1,196 21 9,845 
North Carolina 
Wilmington 4,921 936 866 11,486 
South Carolina 
Charleston 12,727 7,284 91 62,840 
Columbia 
Tennessee 
Chattanooga 3,061 350 2,185 1,382 30 25,621 
Memphis 9,011 4,105 2,389 63 49,000 
Nashville 12,460 400 6,098 4,299 96 89,343 
Virginia 
Alexandria 4,582 1,094 1,048 804 17 11,131 
Lynchburg 4,907 590 1,815 1,070 31 19,525 
Norfolk 6,695 550 1,613 1,117 26 16,214 
Petersburg 7,417 1,000 1,985 1,494 28 14,568 
Portsmouth 3,210 819 1,010 611 14 9,640 
Richmond 21,536 3,500 5,821 4,778 129 83,802 
aThe District of Columbia had a single school system. 
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Table 3.9. Major Colleges and Universities in Southern Cities of 
More than 10,000 Inhabitants, 1880 
Books in 
Institution Location Faculty Students Library 
Arkansas 
St. Johns College of Arkansas Little Rock 8 108 200 
District of Columbia 
Georgetown University Georgetown 23 62 30,000 
Columbian University Washington 10 47 7,000 
Howard University Washington 4 15 7,000 
National Deaf-Mute College Washington 7 30 1,411 
Georgia 
Atlanta University Atlanta 12 26 5,000 
Mercer University Macon 6 96 6,000 
Pio Nono College Macon 4 45 1,100 
Kentucky 
Kentucky University Lexington 3 66 12,221 
Louisiana 
New Orleans University New Orleans 4 23 500 
Straight University New Orleans 7 16 300 
Maryland 
Baltimore City College Baltimore 13 524 
Johns Hopkins University Baltimore 33 159 9,000 
Loyola College Baltimore 14 70 11,000 
South Carolina 
College of Charleston Charleston 7 30 7,000 
Tennessee 
Christian Brothers' College Memphis 12 60 2,600 
Central Tennessee College Nashville 5 18 1,525 
Fisk University Nashville 6 24 2,037 
Vanderbilt University Nashville 15 191 8,000 
Virginia 
Richmond College Richmond 8 121 6,000 
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founded by church organizations, prepared scholars for southern liv-
ing. In 1860 statistics indicated that some 25,000 students attended 
southern universities. This was more than in the rest of the nation 
combined. The Civil War disarranged southern schools, and many 
closed during the hostilities. When Louisiana State University re-
opened after the war it initially had four students. Other schools from 
Virginia to South Carolina had only limited student populations. Re-
covery was fairly rapid. 65 A new development was the establishment of 
several small black universities by northern philanthropic and benev-
olent organizations. These schools were not innovative. Their courses 
of study and aims were the same as those of the older white univer-
sities. By the end of Reconstruction, southern higher education was on 
almost as firm a ground as before the Civil War. 
In 1880 many of the leading southern colleges were in cities. These 
institutions had few students, faculty members, and books (see Table 
3.9).66 Yet this did not diminish their intellectual importance. Enroll-
ments varied from 524 at Baltimore City College to 15 at Howard 
University. Baltimore City had a large normal school that concentrated 
on teacher training. Howard University was typical of the emerging 
black schools. An observer claimed that its professors taught students a 
"different kind of religion from mere shouting and confusion."67 All 
the schools, black and white, had preparatory departments. Teacher-
student ratios, roughly one to ten, were very good. Library holdings 
left much room for improvement. The libraries of several institutions 
contained less than 2,000 books. The Johns Hopkins University in 
Baltimore was the most prestigious school in the South. It had 159 
students and a faculty of 33. The library contained 9,000 volumes. 
Many of the teachers had ties with the university's pioneer graduate 
school, which boasted 59 students. Overall, the urban colleges of the 
South compared favorably with institutions of higher learning outside 
the section. Boston College had 186 students and 12,600 books. Purdue 
University had 76 students and 2,000 books. The University of Kansas 
had 114 students and 3,800 books.68 Southern urban higher education 
represented an important sectional asset. But the question remained as 
to how much influence a few small elitist institutions had in changing 
the course of community policy in the South. There was no evidence 
that colleges, with their predominantly classical curricula, would lead 
the way in building an urban and industrial society. They appeared to 
be bastions of conservative thought, rather than harbingers of change. 
The advocates of the New South creed had to overcome the reality 
that their section did not appear ready or capable of a great shift in 
policy. Moreover, there was no reason to believe that interests outside 
the South wanted the section to change. Indeed, the evidence seemed 
the opposite. Otherwise, northerners would not have acquiesced to 
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the end of Reconstruction. The argument that the carpetbaggers pulled 
out only after finding "scalawags" to do their bidding made little sense 
within the larger framework of national progress. State governments 
had always been probusiness. The Bourbon regimes were in step with 
the traditions of the country. Indeed, none of the state governments 
under the Confederate States of America were antibusiness. Grady 
wrote, "The new South is simply the old South under new condi-
tions. "69 He was right, but unlike the Old South governments, those of 
the New South professed to welcome Yankee capital. The problem was 
that the South, as before the Civil War, remained a sideshow for 
northern money men. If profits could be made, so much the better, but 
the main thrust of financial and material development was in other 
directions. 
There were population differences that appeared to set most south-
ern cities apart from those in the rest of the land. The southern cities 
tended to have more blacks and fewer foreign-born than their counter-
parts in the North. Most of the native-born in the southern cities were 
from the South. The work forces in the cities of the South contained 
high proportions of native Americans. There were no other major 
differences. Like many other places, almost all the southern cities had 
more females than males. In the urban South, as throughout the land, 
organized religion was an important institution. And, as elsewhere, 
the educational systems were generally neglected and of questionable 
quality. In short, except as interpreted by rabid racists, the social 
statistics suggested that southern cities were not much different from 
their counterparts above the Mason and Dixon line. This did not mean 
that all the southern cities were ready to compete on a national level. 
The problems involved resources and attitudes. Money was in short 
supply. Lingering animosities spawned by the Civil War and Recon-
struction continued to divide the sections. The race question was a 
further barrier to understanding. Despite the fine talk about progress 
by Grady and other New South spokesmen, the urban South did not 
appear poised for a great forward movement. An urban ethos was 
several decades away. It was not enough simply to have the material 
from which cities are made. 
4 _____ _ 
Railroads Are 
Talismanic Winds 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, students of an emerging 
American empire envisioned the South as part of a smoothly operating 
national transportation network. A favorite postulate was that un-
alterable "natural laws of commerce" shaped the character and level of 
commercial activity. Experts concluded that the United States had two 
distinct economic systems, each dictated by geography, with the con-
sequence that commerce tended to move along North and South lines. 
The Allegheny Mountains served as a natural barrier between the two 
divisions. On the eastern side of the mountains, one system embraced 
the entire Atlantic coast and adjoining commercial waters. On and 
beyond the western slope, the second system spanned the Mississippi 
River Valley. The Mississippi River, which divided the valley into two 
parts, functioned as what one observer called a "great natural high-
way." Although the two systems were separate, they could be linked 
by "tributaries." Externally, coastal shipping would operate between 
the Atlantic and Gulf ports. Internal links would take the form of 
roads, canals, or railways. Natural laws of exchange would govern the 
commercial relations between the two parts. The end result would be a 
great interdependent commercial emporium. 1 
The planners of this great commercial empire did not anticipate the 
rise of southern nationalism. Neither King Cotton nor the peculiar 
institution fitted into the scheme. The American System called for a 
division of the nation along agricultural and industrial, rather than 
geographic lines. No one predicted the Northeast's dramatic penetra-
tion and dominance of the Midwest though the building of canals, lake 
shipping, and railroads. The conflicting philosophies and crosscur-
rents that characterized the nation before the disruption of the Union 
did not envision the South as being outside the broader contours of the 
American economic system. True, southern propagandists, in excoriat-
ing New York, urged people to "buy southern." "New York with her 
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rotten bankruptcies permeating and injuring almost every solvent 
community in the Union," were the words used in a routine denuncia-
tion in the New Orleans Crescent in 1857. "New York, the centre of 
reckless speculation, unflinching fraud and downright robbery. New 
York, the prime cause of four-fifths of the insolvencies of the country; 
New York, carrying on an enormous trade with capital mostly fur-
nished by other communities." All but the most fanatical fire-eaters, 
however, assumed that southern independence would terminate eco-
nomic ties. The best most southerners hoped for was relationships on 
what they considered more equitable grounds. As a governor of Vir-
ginia said in 1856, "It is absurd to think of deposing New York from her 
position. New York is irresistibly made, by the law of the trade winds, 
by the law of icebergs, by her position, the first seat of commercial trade 
for the country. "2 . 
Before the war, southern rivers, east and west of the Allegheny 
Mountains, served as natural thoroughfares that governed the move-
ment of cotton bales from river to ocean ports. After that, coastal 
schooners and ocean vessels carried cotton to northern ports or di-
rectly overseas. The method also worked in reverse for distributing 
imported items and northern products throughout Dixie. This system, 
however, furthered the dependency on the North deplored by many 
southerners. The imbalances cut across the "natural lines" as defined 
by the experts. The role of the Mississippi Valley created further and 
larger problems on a geopolitical level, not the least of which was the 
struggle for midwestern commercial supremacy. The Erie Canal was 
never simply a "tributary" line through the mountains serving as a 
connecting link between systems. Rather, it created an "artificial" east-
west link that cut across the Atlantic coastal and Mississippi Valley 
lines. The Erie Canal was a great trunk that altered commercial patterns 
beyond the dreams of its original proponents. In some ways, the canal 
was too successful. It so disturbed emerging business patterns that it 
promoted sectionalism rather than acting as a unifying element. An 
alliance of southern forces on both sides of the Alleghenies emerged in 
direct response to northeastern dominance of the Midwest. 
The advent of railroads introduced a new factor into the national 
transportation scene. In the 1830s and 1840s railroads had supple-
mented natural lines. Only a few bold projects, such as the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad, had large objectives. Most roads, among them the 
cotton lines in the southern states, had limited purposes. As railroad 
technology was perfected in the 1850s, long lines became feasible. 
Many innovations came together at almost the same time. Telegraphy 
linked division points. Air brakes made it possible to stop heavy trains. 
Engineering advances led to more powerful and reliable locomotives. 
Stronger iron rails did not shatter under continual heavy traffic. A 
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gradual evolution of a policy of aid to railroads by all levels of govern-
ment served as growing evidence of their importance. In November of 
1852 the editor of the Western Journal and Civilian provided a thoughtful 
analysis of the import of railroads. "Railroads are talismanic winds," 
he told his readers. "They have a charming power. They do wonders, 
they work miracles. They are better than laws, they are better than 
schools, they are essentially political and religious. They announce to 
the world as the Angel announced on the plains of Judea: 'On earth 
peace, good will toward men.' "He concluded, "The centrifugal force 
of secession is lost, the centripetal force of union is won. "3 Railroads 
had little to do with causing the Civil War, but they overwhelmed 
existing transportation lines and provided the basis for a transconti-
nental network. Unfortunately for the South, the iron rails that were 
pushed into the West in the years immediately after the Civil War 
accrued to the advantage of other parts of the nation. It was small if any 
consolation to southerners that many of the workers who built the 
Union Pacific Railroad west out of Omaha, Nebraska, were Con-
federate veterans. 
Southern railroading had gotten off to a promising start in the 
1850s. 4 The decade saw the completion of the basic outlines of the 
American railroad system east of the Mississippi. National mileage 
increased from 8,500 miles to 30,500 miles. The South shared in this 
growth; it had roughly 2,000 miles of track at the start of the decade and 
9,000 miles at the end. More than one hundred railroad companies, 
many owned by local interests, operated in the South. The average 
length of southern lines was 85 miles. Most had cost less to build than 
lines in the Midwest or Northeast. The use of slave labor, lighter rails, 
and level coastal terrain held costs to around $28,000 a mile, compared 
to $37,000 in the Midwest. The southern roads generally had less 
equipment, however, and it was inferior to that of their northern 
counterparts. The four largest northern lines in 1860 had as much 
locomotive and rolling stock as all the southern states put together. 
Passenger trains in the South were slow. Only a few fast express trains 
on main lines ran at average speeds of twenty-five miles per hour. 
Many cities did not allow trains to run through them, causing aggravat-
ing gaps and necessitating the location of stations in the outskirts. 5 
Only one railroad was more than 300 miles long, meaning that pas-
sengers frequently had to change trains. Seven different lines operated 
between Atlanta and Memphis. It took forty-two hours at best to travel 
from Charleston to Memphis. A further vexation for travelers was that 
few of the short lines ran more than one rickety passenger train a day 
each way over their tracks. The railroads, designed to carry cotton, 
moved only small amounts of other freight. Until shortly before the 
Civil War, most roads took in more revenue from passenger than from 
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noncotton commercial business. Freight volume did not rise markedly 
until open sections were filled in to make long-distance service feasi-
ble. 
Throughout the 1850s, the thrust of southern railroad construction 
was to fill in the missing links in the emerging system. Jefferson Davis 
was a leading southern railroad strategist. One of his objectives, an 
east-west line through the South's midsection, was achieved with the 
opening in 1857 of a trunk route from Charleston to Memphis, via 
several railroads. Davis hoped to persuade Congress to subsidize a 
Pacific railroad from Memphis to California, but the fires of sectional 
conflict dashed his plans. By 1861 there were four other main railroad 
routes that served the southern interior. One ran from just outside 
Washington-there was no railway bridge over the Potomac River-to 
Mobile. This cumbersome route, 1,215 miles in length, embraced sev-
eral roads. It looked better on a map than it functioned. The route zig-
zagged through such points as Charlottesville, Lynchburg, Bristol, 
Knoxville, Atlanta, and Montgomery. Theoretically, it was also possi-
ble to go indirectly from the Potomac to Cedar Keys, Florida. There 
were several gaps, and few people ever attempted the trip. A more 
important railroad thoroughfare ran from Louisville to Atlanta and 
from there to Charleston. The Mobile and Ohio Railroad, 472 miles in 
length, was the South's longest line, running from the Gulf of Mexico 
to the obscure hamlet of Columbus, Kentucky, on the Ohio River. Links 
between the North and South were unsatisfactory. It took over two 
hours by steamboat to travel from Columbus to the Illinois Central 
Railroad's terminal in Cairo, Illinois. No railroad bridge spanned the 
Ohio River at Louisville until1870. 6 At the beginning of the Civil War 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was the only southern railway with 
direct connections outside the South. 7 The war revealed many imper-
fections in the southern railroad system, but the railroads of the South 
were never designed to serve the needs of military forces fighting a 
basically north-south war. For prewar commercial relations, the south-
ern railroad network worked well and served sectional needs. 
During the Civil War many southern railroads went through a 
cycle of prosperity, inflation, deterioration, and destruction. 8 The free 
enterprise system continued to operate. The Mobile and Ohio Railroad 
made large amounts of money carrying freight between the sections 
before Union soldiers occupied northern Kentucky. The Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad profited in much the same way and later handled 
military traffic for both sides. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which 
tried to stay neutral, moved goods for Confederates one week and 
Unionists the next, depending on the fortunes of war. A short line, the 
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, had a large enough income to 
declare a 31 percent dividend in 1863. For most roads, higher prices 
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soon ate up most of the profits. From 1861 to 1864 the price of lubricat-
ing oil rose from $1 to $50 a gallon and car wheels from $15 to $500. Late 
in hostilities, the president of the Georgia Railroad complained about 
his road, "The more business it does, the more money it loses, and the 
greatest favor that could be conferred upon it-if the public permit-
ted-would be the privilege of quitting business until the end of the 
war!"9 The Confederate government turned the South's few railroad 
machine shops and iron rail manufactories to ordnance production. 
Equipment wore out and roadbed repair became very difficult. The 
railroad companies blamed everything from missing seats to broken 
water coolers upon the war. The government seized and tore up the 
tracks on some branch lines to obtain badly needed iron. Confederate 
troops destroyed tracks to prevent their use by Union forces. General 
William T. Sherman's policy of conducting the war led to the destruc-
tion of thousands of miles of track in Georgia, the Carolinas, and 
Virginia. Sherman boasted at a council of war attended by Abraham 
Lincoln, "Why my 'bummers' don't do things by halves. Every rail, 
after having been placed over a hot fire, has been twisted as crooked as 
a ram's horn, and they can never be used again."10 In April of 1865 
much of the southern railroad network lay in shattered ruins. 
Most of the railroads of the South were in southern hands at the 
close of hostilities, but more than half the section's track had been 
destroyed. 11 Conservative estimates placed damage as high as $28 
million. Some short lines had vanished, and all the lines still in opera-
tion were in bad shape. Their roadbeds were rough, burned bridges 
impeded traffic, and station houses had been destroyed. Passenger 
tickets cost much more than a few years earlier. All during the 1870s 
southern roads charged twice as much or more per mile to carry freight 
than did railroads in many other parts of the country. Officials at-
tributed the high differentials to financial problems and a paucity of 
traffic. Restoration of the lines was aided by the return of 3,000 miles of 
track to private owners and the sale on liberal terms of $11 million in 
equipment by the federal government. Despite pleas, little northern 
money was put into southern railroads, largely because of fear about 
financial security in the South. State aid, tinged by the corruption of 
carpetbag regimes, benefited a few lines. In South Carolina a ring 
composed of seven state officials plundered the state treasury in the 
course of railroad machinations. The Georgia legislature gave millions 
of dollars to corrupt railroad interests. State railroad policies in North 
Carolina were marked by bribery, blackmail, and stealing. 12 The cor-
ruption, most of which had either ended or been brought under 
control by the early 1870s, was part of general looting by the victors and 
the moral laxity associated with the Gilded Age. The majority of 
southern lines rebuilt as best they could without much outside help. 
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They sold twisted tracks for scrap at about two-thirds the original cost. 
Much less money was required to put a road back into operation than to 
build it initially. Within five years after the Civil War all but a few 
unimportant railroads were back in operation. 
The railroads entered the first postwar decade in precarious finan-
cial condition. Only 4,000 of the 35,000 miles of railroads built during 
that decade in the United States were in the South, and more than half 
of this new construction was in three states. Railroad trackage in-
creased by 700 miles in Kentucky, where the existing railroads had 
suffered very little from the war. Indeed, the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad turned large profits. In Georgia and Alabama, generous and 
corrupt legislatures liberally financed railroad programs. In other 
states, building activities aimed at filling in gaps. Mississippi added 120 
miles of track, none of which appreciably changed the contours of the 
existing network. 13 Every state, of course, wanted more mileage. Ten-
nessee's efforts were typical. Lavish subsidies provided by the legis-
lature resulted in little construction. The Volunteer State's credit rating 
was so poor that it proved difficult to float the necessary bond issues. 
The aftermath of the Panic of 1873 forced close to half the railroads in 
the South into either receivership or default. Most of the carpetbaggers 
lost control of lines they had acquired, 14 which had been weak and in 
bad financial shape to begin with. Private interests inside the South did 
not have the means to run railroads on a large scale because they lacked 
capital. It was an era of railroad consolidation, and northern interests 
gradually moved in to start the process that would lead to large south-
ern systems patterned after those elsewhere in the nation. 
The movement of northern railroad interests into the South added 
a new and important dimension to the southern economic experience. 
One of the largest and strongest northern lines, the Pennsylvania 
Railroad, led the way. 15 After the war it gained a connection from 
Philadelphia to Washington. In 1871 the Pennsylvania management 
group organized a holding company, the Southern Railway Security 
Company, which gained control of the Richmond and Danville Rail-
road and soon had a direct route from Richmond to Atlanta. Other 
acquisitions followed until soon Southern Railway Security dominated 
eleven major and many more minor southern roads. Its holdings cut 
across the middle of the South from Richmond to Memphis. Then, in 
1875, the holding company abruptly folded, a victim of the depression 
and the unhealthy state of the southern economy. Despite its failures, 
Southern Railway Security had made some gains. Reorganizations and 
mergers had created two important railroads. One was the Atlantic 
Coast Line. The other, started as the powerful Richmond and West 
Point Terminal Railway and Warehouse Company, ultimately became 
the Southern Railway System. 16 
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Other northern railroad interests also ventured south. Collis P. 
Huntington headed a group that gained control of the Chesapeake and 
Ohio Railroad. He extended its tracks from Richmond across the 
mountains of West Virginia to the Ohio River, discovering great coal 
deposits along the way. In 1882, the Illinois Central Railroad acquired a 
New Orleans trunk connection. 17 Even the Louisville and Nashville, 
the most profitable of southern roads throughout the early postwar 
era, fell under the domination of northern stockholders, 18 as did the 
Baltimore and Ohio, the only southern line with major trackage out-
side the section. 19 By the 1890s northern interests controlled southern 
railroads. This trend was bitterly resented in the South. Even lines that 
remained under nominal southern management were poor relatives of 
northern banking houses. There was little solace in knowing that 
railroads all across the land suffered the same fate. New South 
spokesmen played little part in determining what happened to south-
ern lines. The northern railroad barons moved south within the frame-
work of a national policy. Their interest was not in southern restora-
tion, except when to do so would make them more money. It was only 
incidental if they left the region with better rail service. 
By 1880 all the important towns in the South had access to through 
rail service. Local leaders considered such connections of great import 
to their urban plans. Portsmouth authorities reported, "The Seaboard 
and Roanoke railroad, termini Portsmouth, and Weldon, North Car-
olina, connects the city with lines of railroads offering almost direct 
communication with the important cities of the south Atlantic sea-
board." A proud Richmond official claimed that his city had railroad 
ties "with the leading places in the whole country." Six railroads ran 
into Chattanooga. "These lines," a booster said, "give to the city the 
most ample connections with all points in the country." An Atlanta 
spokesman commented, "The city has long had much importance as a 
railroad center."20 These claims only stated the obvious. Almost every 
city in the nation-even the mining town of Leadville, Colorado, high 
and remote in the Rocky Mountains-had railroads. The most minor of 
lines all led somewhere, usually via obscure junctions and division 
points to trunk roads. It was virtually impossible for a town to succeed 
without a railroad. Yet the iron horse did not automatically assure 
success. It was one thing to have railroads and another to take advan-
tage of them. 
The southern cities that benefited most from railroad were 
Louisville, Baltimore, and Atlanta. The success of Louisville in no 
small measure grew out of its defeat by Cincinnati for domination of 
Ohio and Indiana trade. The Louisville and Nashville leaders did not 
plan to control the economy of much of the middle South. Their first 
goal was to work out a mutually beneficial connection with Nashville. 
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During and after the Civil War, the road's directors achieved success by 
taking advantage of opportunities as they arose. 21 As Henry Watterson 
wrote in 1880, the Louisville and Nashville made a" 'United Germany' 
of the Southern railways lying about loose ... instead of leading to 
Louisville as they should."22 Unlike Louisville, Baltimore had a strat-
egy from the earliest days of railroading, although the builders of the 
Baltimore and Ohio did not expect that it would take forty years to 
reach primary midwestern markets. 23 Nonetheless, the railroad ul-
timately gave Baltimore an established intersectional connection and a 
prosperous western Maryland hinterland. Atlanta was a railroad town 
from the beginning. The calculations of outside interests, such as 
Augusta cotton factors, helped make it the railroad center for the 
Southeast. Thus in promoting Atlanta, Henry Grady rode an obvious 
tide. Originally, several Atlantic coastal cities had better railroad plans 
than Atlanta. 24 Savannah, Charleston, and Norfolk, for example, 
could not succeed without the full cooperation of junction points in the 
piedmont. Denied that-Norfolk and Richmond's mutual animosity 
over railroad matters hurt both places-their efforts were unsuccessful 
and in retrospect appeared flawed. Other places, notably New Orleans 
and Mobile, formulated promising railroad strategies in the 1850s. The 
Civil War and the resulting changed economic climate cost both cities 
the chance to build railroad empires. Despite the building of 15,000 
miles of tracks in the South in the 1880s, few if any towns improved 
their positions through railroad connections. There was no change 
until the next decade, when railroad building led to the rise of Miami 
and other Florida towns. 
The magnificent harbors of the South were far more visible assets 
than single railroad tracks leading to shipping platforms in Millstone, 
Horse Cave, Gulf Crest, and thousands of other points. Baltimore had 
one of the South's best anchorages. Ships passed through a narrow 
entrance at the mouth of the Patapasco River that dramatically widened 
to form a broad estuary. Coastal traffic docked in the inner harbor 
called the Basin. Deepwater ships dropped anchor at Fell's Point and 
Canton. These roads were among the most important on the eastern 
seaboard. Other Chesapeake Bay harbors varied considerably in quali-
ty. The Potomac River at Alexandria was a mile wide and had a thirty-
foot-deep channel. Although its harbor was adequate for most ocean 
traffic, the city had few port facilities and was a poor distribution point. 
Washington, where the Potomac River was deep enough to carry large 
ships, was never a major port. The depth over the bar at Georgetown 
was ten feet, and no attempt was ever made to dredge the river or build 
a harbor at the city. Norfolk and Portsmouth remained Virginia's pri-
mary ocean portals. The approaches to some other significant southern 
harbors varied in quality. Shifting sand at the mouth of the Cape Fear 
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River impaired entry into Wilmington. Charleston continued to rely on 
its magnificent harbor, easily reached from the Atlantic Ocean. Savan-
nah had drawbacks because large vessels had to anchor 18 miles away, 
and smaller ones had to battle heavy tides to reach the city's wharves. 
Mobile had even more complicated problems. The Mobile River was so 
shallow opposite the town that all except the smallest of ocean vessels 
had to stop 25 miles away on Mobile Bay. New Orleans was a special 
case. At the mouth of the Mississippi River, ships passed a series of 
jetties intended to keep the channel clear of silt. 25 They then had to 
negotiate 107 miles of winding water before reaching harbor. Despite 
their drawbacks, New Orleans and other southern ports had some of 
the best harbors in North America. Good harbors had been a strength 
of the South since the early days of settlement. 
In 1880 there was great variance in the overseas trade of the prin-
cipal southern ports. Baltimore and New Orleans handled the most 
shipping. Baltimore had exports of $76.2 million and imports of $20 
million. Exports from New Orleans were valued at $90.2 million and 
imports at $10.8 million. Other principal ports showed wide disparities 
between exports and imports: $24 million against $484,000 in Savan-
nah; $19.6 million against $203,000 in Charleston; $14.1 million against 
$47,100 in Norfolk; $7.2 million against $426,000 in Mobile; and $4 
million against $101,000 in Wilmington.26 Except for Baltimore, all the 
southern ports exported large quantities of cotton. Naval stores and 
lumber products remained other export staples. Only Baltimore and 
New Orleans exported many products from outside the South. In 1880 
New Orleans ranked second nationally in exports, and Baltimore fol-
lowed in third place. Even though New York was way ahead of these 
ports, with $400.6 million in exports, the showing of the two largest 
southern cities was impressive. Imports were another matter. By south-
ern measurements the totals for New Orleans and Baltimore were 
imposing. No other ports received as much as $1 million in imports, 
although four cities outside the South had more imports than all the 
southern ports combined. Imports into New York amounted to $543.6 
million. The Empire City's gigantic totals were way ahead of those for 
the other three largest importing cities. Imports into Boston amounted 
to $68.7 million, into San Francisco $41.3 million, and into Philadelphia 
$36 million. 27 The southern ports were so far behind that it was hard to 
see how they could ever challenge northern cities as importing centers. 
Only an unforseen surge of prosperity would create enough business 
opportunities to encourage foreign importers to abandon traditional 
channels and ship goods directly to the South. If that happened, a 
long-cherished southern dream would be realized. 
In the days after the Louisiana Purchase, New Orleans had seemed 
destined to serve as the commercial emporium for what boosters 
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enthusiastically called the "Great Interior Basin of North America." In 
1817 an estimated 1,500 flatboats and 500 barges floated downstream to 
the Crescent City. Four years later, steam power had markedly 
changed the traffic's character (the first steamboat descended the Mis-
sissippi River in 1812, but it took a decade to develop the boiler power 
necessary to make ascents against the strong current). In 1821 287 
steamboats, 174 barges, and 441 flatboats were recorded as arriving at 
the levee. Members of American, French, and Creole business combi-
nations looked with pleasure upon an expanding commerce that 
choked streets and landings. Imports and exports reached $40 million 
in 1834, rising sharply to $53.6 million the next year. Cotton, sugar, and 
tobacco planters borrowed money in the city. Consequently, the Panic 
of 1837 severely affected the banks of New Orleans. At one point, $72 
million in uncollectible mortages caused a temporary suspension of 
specie payments. 28 Although the situation discouraged promoters, it 
was far from fatal. Every other aspiring city underwent an economic 
illness, and the great river continued to run to the sea. 
Unfortunately for the aspirations of New Orleans, the river trade 
failed to develop as fast as expected. Even though it was profitable, it 
was somewhat sluggish-it did not generate enough money to make 
New Orleans the number one city on the continent. In the last half of 
the 1840s annual receipts for all grain products numbered in hundreds 
of thousands of barrels and sacks. The peak years came during the 
Mexican War, when New Orleans served as a major logistics center. But 
with the coming of peace, arrivals seldom approached prewar levels. 
Sharp ups and downs continued to plague trade along the route. More 
disturbing was that a large share of the grain brought down the Missis-
sippi was transshipped to the Northeast-the very section with which 
New Orleans competed for the commerce of the emerging Midwest. 
The export trade was too small to sustain a rapid expansion There was 
little domestic market in Louisiana and Mississippi because of the 
plantation economy and lagging urbanization. Shippers and outside 
receivers could be counted upon to take advantage of any shorter or 
cheaper connections.29 
Given the massive additional acreage annually placed under 
cultivation in newly opened regions of the Midwest in such states as 
Wisconsin, Illinois, and Iowa, the Mississippi River statistics made 
grim and depressing reading. Although shipments of pork and lard 
augmented profits in the downriver trade, and steamboats carried 
large quantities of goods upriver, computations showed that mid-
western shippers were not using the Mississippi River to the extent 
expected. From the mid-1840s onward, more grain flowed northeast 
through the Great Lakes and the Erie Canal than to New Orleans.30 
Some southerners failed to understand what was happening. Until the 
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Civil War they predicted an alliance between the Midwest and the 
South based upon economic necessity. As late as February of 1861, 
Vrrginia economist William M. Burwell, discoursing on the "commercial 
magnetism" designed to bind American localities in the Mississippi 
Valley with European "Market Cities," continued to promote out-
moded theories. "We anticipate," he wrote, "a series of trade zones-
so to speak-which shall lie parallel with each other, along, and within 
which, the commerce between reciprocal interests will be conducted . 
. . . Upon this theory, Chicago, Cincinnati, Louisville, Memphis, and 
New Orleans, would become principal depots for the collection and 
exportation of the trade along the Ohio and Mississippi valley, as well 
as for the importation and distribution of merchandise."31 
The New Orleans route always had enough drawbacks to make it 
surprising that the myth that the route would make the city great 
prevailed for as long as it did. It cost six times as much to operate a 
steamboat on the Mississippi than on the northern lakes, and the 
accident rate was much higher. The Mississippi River system closed in 
the winter. Certain tributary streams opened for traffic only during 
short periods of high water in the spring. Frequent shifts in the channel 
and variations in river stages impaired navigation. So did sandbars in 
South Pass at the gateway to the Gulf of Mexico. The South Pass 
problem became more serious as vessels increased in size. Money 
appropriated by Congress in the 1830s hardly paid for the initial survey 
work. Near the mouth of the Mississippi, Northeast Pass never pro-
vided more than a twelve-foot channel. When silt closed it in 1851, a 
shift to Southeast Pass caused serious navigation problems. In a short 
time in 1852 forty ships ran aground on bars and mud lumps for 
periods ranging from two days to eight weeks. Cargo either had to be 
transshipped or thrown overboard. As if these problems were not 
enough, humid southern temperatures caused extensive damage to 
grain in general and corn in particular. 32 Lack of adequate storage 
facilities, a serious concern from the first, became especially pro-
nounced by the 1850s because of increased production of cotton, sugar, 
and tobacco in the South Central states. In fiscal 1851-52 those com-
modities accounted for roughly 80 percent of the value of all domestic 
commerce reaching New Orleans. These regionally grown products 
were much more immediately important than the upper river trade 
and competed with it for storage space.33 
Throughout the antebellum period, New Orleans had virtually no 
port facilities. The levee, where most ships docked, was a long, narrow 
dike, which the city tried to improve by building a series of wharves set 
on huge wooden piles. As long as the flow of commerce brought 
profits, calls for better facilities never went beyond the talking stage. 
Vessels, sometimes as many as six deep, moored with their bows facing 
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the current. Portable bridge works and wooden stagings connected the 
ships with the shore. There were no cranes, so longshoremen had to 
unload each boat by hand. The levee and wharves had no roofs. 
Tarpaulins were the primary means of protecting shipments from the 
elements. The lack of a belt line railroad caused unnecessarily high 
drayage expenses. On top of all these problems, the port authorities 
took a casual attitude toward their work. They were content to collect 
duties and fees and to see goods and produce move across the levee.34 
The means of distributing goods from New Orleans compared 
unfavorably with those of the larger northeastern ports, making it a 
poor importing center and causing shipping rates on outbound items 
to be comparatively high. Nor could New Orleans compete for over-
seas trade with South Atlantic ports. Detailed computations in 1858 
showed that a seven-hundred-ton vessel sailing between Charleston 
and Liverpool could expect a profit of $2,054.01. The profit for the same 
ship sailing between New Orleans and Liverpool would have only 
$552.90.35 More serious for New Orleans' future as a port was that the 
construction of several midwestern feeder canals helped the Erie Canal 
and the perfection of the railroad threatened to deal a death blow to all 
natural lines of communication. 36 
The impact of the railroads was crucial in hurting New Orleans. In 
1853 a perceptive federal bureaucrat, Israel Andrews, in a lengthy 
report on North American trade prepared for the United States Senate, 
stressed the extent to which railroads had diverted New Orleans' 
Mississippi Valley trade to eastern ports. According to Andrews, 
"natural channels" were "insufficiently matched against those of an 
artificial character." He concluded that New Orleans officials had ig-
nored this reality, avoiding action "till the danger to be averted became 
imminent." He attributed the city's problems to more than blind faith 
in the false security afforded by fifty thousand miles of inland naviga-
tion, noting that three municipalities with separate political jurisdic-
tions inside the city had accumulated heavy debts before their 
consolidation. Consequently, Andrews decided that it took an obvious 
threat to convince Louisianians that large internal improvement proj-
ects such as railroads could not be "executed by private enterprise."37 
The leaders of New Orleans did not need a federal report to inform 
them about the economic facts of life. They had only to read the 
financial compendiums in their commercial publications, DeBow's Re-
view and the Price Current. Better yet, they could check the commodity 
price indexes and their own bills of lading. 38 In 1853 and for the 
remainder of the antebellum period American manufacturing prod-
ucts generally cost more in Louisiana than in other parts of the country. 
The main reason was use of the river route rather than price levels. The 
quantities of products shipped to the city on the river from the upper 
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Mississippi Valley remained more or less constant. But regional trade 
grew rapidly as new land opened in western Louisiana and eastern 
Texas, resulting in an increased demand for northeastern goods. Such 
considerations had an obvious impact on New Orleans, causing a 
reexamination of the city's goals. 39 The river no longer lulled the city's 
leaders into a sense of self-confidence. They desperately wanted rail-
roads, although not to corner the flow of grain from the Midwest. They 
reconciled themselves to the realization that the bulk of the upper river 
trade was permanently lost, despite southern propaganda to the con-
trary. As a result, New Orleans interests began to think regionally 
rather than nationally. They concentrated on projects designed to help 
secure their immediate hinterlands and on obtaining connecting lines 
to the Pacific Coast via either Texas or the Republic of Mexico. 
Although this policy seemed to mark a sudden departure from 
past practices, it had evolved gradually. Even in the great days of the 
river trade, in the 1830s, several promoters had advocated the con-
struction of a railroad to Nashville. 40 A combination of inexperienced 
management, insufficient money, and inflated faith in the river by 
planter-aristocrats doomed the railroad. New Orleans' railroad ac-
tivities languished throughout most of the 1840s, although a few short 
lines were constructed, but revived in the early 1850s when a railroad 
convention sparked renewed interest. 
Three men were prominently associated with the new movement. 
J.D.B. DeBow helped shape a railroad program. He used statistics to 
contrast New Orleans' development with that of other large cities. 
Politician, lawyer, and plantation owner Judah P. Benjamin lent his 
prestige to railroad projects, incorporating them into a broader vision 
of southern greatness. James Robb, a controversial figure whom critics 
claimed engaged in unsavory business practices, called for northern 
connections, handled many of the practical aspects of New Orleans' 
railroad building, and stressed the need for a diversified economy. "We 
should look to something more than sugar and cotton planting," he 
wrote in a prorailroad pamphlet. "We should invite and foster every 
species of industry that tends to make a commonwealth permanently 
great and prosperous."4 1 
The New Orleans railroad builders of the 1850s adhered to a 
rational strategy, but problems of geography and money precluded 
success. It was very difficult to lay tracks through swamps, marshes, 
and bayous. Great amounts of the city's private capital continued to 
flow into plantation properties. 42 Changes in Louisiana law, pushed by 
DeBow, Benjamin, and Robb, which made it easier for the state and 
local units of government to aid railroads, helped some but not 
enough. Outside funds were unavailable in the amounts needed, 
because foreign investors and northeastern financiers poured their 
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surplus assets into the Chicago roads. Federal land grants, a crucial 
element in helping New Orleans interests, ran through uninviting 
territory. A mile of swampland in Louisiana was far different from a 
mile of prarie in Illinois; comparative figures meant nothing, for here 
the general rule that it cost less to build railroads in the South than the 
North did not hold. Slightly over $16 million went into antebellum 
Louisiana railroad enterprises, a very large sum for the day and more 
money than was spent in the pre-Civil War period in any state west of 
the Appalachians except Illinois. The New Orleans leaders deserved 
credit for having raised the money through various public and private 
means. But incredibly high construction costs, such as for the twenty-
six miles in Louisiana between Paceland and Tigerville, used it up in 
short order. 
During the 1850s New Orleans railroad promoters struggled to 
overcome obvious vicissitudes, complicated by the 1853 yellow fever 
epidemic in which more than ten thousand people died. Newspaper 
reporters wrote that the unburied dead were "piled on the ground, 
swollen and bursting their coffins, and enveloped in swarms of flies." 
Several bad epidemic years followed, accentuating the city's health 
difficulties and discouraging outside investors. The hopes of DeBow 
and Benjamin for a great transcontinental system were not to be 
realized. 43 A grandiosely conceived road, the Southern Pacific Rail-
road-not to be confused with the later railroad of the same name-
went bankrupt after the building of approximately two miles of track. 
Controlled by New Yorkers, it was underfinanced and never had any 
hope of success. Another project, in which Judah Benjamin was in-
volved, called for a railroad in Mexico across the Isthmus of Techuan-
tepec. This scheme was tied in with plans for a combined sea and land 
link between New Orleans and the West Coast, but it never proceeded 
past the initial surveying. Dissension within the company, unstable 
political conditions in Mexico, opposition from a rural Louisiana firm 
controlled by New York interests, and covert opposition from Cor-
nelius Vanderbilt, who owned a railroad across Nicaragua, all com-
bined to doom the plan. It became nothing more than empty resolu-
tions passed by the New Orleans city council. 
Two other railroads were to secure hinterlands. Robb's 206-mile-
long New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern Railway ran to Canton, 
Mississippi. There it joined other lines, consolidated the Black Belt 
cotton trade, and helped open up new fields for cultivation. Of the two, 
it was the more successful. 44 DeBow had championed the other, the 
New Orleans, Opelousas and Great Northern Railway. Projected to 
terminate in the Red River Valley of Texas, it fell short of its goal because 
of high construction costs. The road, extending eighty miles from the 
New Orleans suburb of Algiers to Brashear on Berwick Bay, where it 
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made connections with the Morgan Line of steamers, passed through 
snake- and alligator-infested swamps and bayous. It brought little 
additional trade to New Orleans, and places in the sugar regions along 
the main track, such as Des Allemands, Lafourche, and Chacahoula, 
remained miserable backwaters. 45 
Because the New Orleans' railroad program worked out imper-
fectly, critics depicted the organizers as a "bungling generation" of 
promoters and dwelt on the ethnic factionalization within the business 
community. On a broader level the New Orleans leaders seemed to 
prove a favored myth-that southerns by temperament and training 
did poorly in the crass world of business. The field was supposedly 
better suited to a northerner such as Robb, who did not worry about 
behaving like a gentleman. But although mistakes abounded and goals 
overreached realities, the men involved made their decisions within an 
objective framework that recognized the declining importance of the 
Mississippi River. On the basis of hard economic statistical evidence 
they scaled down their hopes and aspirations. They realized that 
regardless of what New Orleans accomplished in improving its trans-
portation net, the bulk of the mounting Midwest trade was not going to 
flow in a southerly direction, either by rail or water. Goods and pro-
duce would move through the portals at Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and 
Oswego on the way to the northeastern seaboard. 
The continual increase in the amount of grain shipped eastward 
from the Great Lakes cities was destined to grow into such a torrent 
that it would result in a fundamental shift in the relationship of the 
Midwest with the other sections. 46 It started in a small way. The first 
shipment-a mere thirty-eight bags of wheat in 1837-went to Grand 
Haven, Michigan, but much of the trade fell to the emerging city of 
Chicago. Implicit in the railroad strategy of the Windy City's leaders 
was the assumption that natural lines had had their day because rail-
roads could operate successfully over long distances. Their counter-
parts in New Orleans, who reached a similar conclusion at about the 
same time, did not have the geographical luxury of flat praries on 
which to lay track. After an early Chicago line, the Galena and Chicago 
Union Railroad, garnered an impressive amount of upper Mississippi 
River trade, the Chicagoans never had trouble, as they had earlier, 
obtaining northeastern capital to build extensive systems. In the 1850s 
several new railroads helped the rapidly growing city obtain grain that 
otherwise would have gone to the river cities of St. Louis and Cincin-
nati and from those points down to New Orleans. In the last full year of 
peace before the Civil War, Chicago elevators moved more than 30 
million bushels of grain and flour. Chicago handled six times more 
grain and flour than St. Louis and eleven times more than Cincinnati. 
The failure of the two river towns to compete with Chicago for the 
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grain and flour trade doomed New Orleans' chances of winning the 
Midwest. As Crescent City businessmen recognized, they had no way 
of charting their own course on the Mississippi. They were dependent 
on what happened upriver, and in fulfilling their hopes, what hap-
pened was not good. Errors, complacency, and miscalculations spelled 
disaster for Cincinnati and St. Louis. 47 Cincinnati leaders, who had the 
first opportunity to control the Midwest, concentrated on the Ohio 
River trade. They failed to realize the extent to which the Erie Canal 
would shift the course of western migration from the river to the Great 
Lakes, and in the end, the Queen City won only a portion of the Ohio 
River Valley trade. First overconfidence and then a recognition that it 
had no way of countering Chicago's railroad strategy ended the hopes 
of St. Louis. To add insult to injury, the two cities did so badly that 
Milwaukee became a grain flow center of greater importance than New 
Orleans. 48 Milwaukee had to build a harbor from virtually nothing, 
and it had far fewer railroad connections than Chicago. Receipts at the 
eastern Great Lakes ports indicated the scope of the massive shift in the 
direction of midwestern trade. Grain and flour shipped east in 1860 
topped 17.3 million bushels at Oswego and 37.1 million bushels at 
Buffalo, in stark contrast to less than 3 million bushels at New Or-
leans.49 
At the close of the Civil War, numerous experts predicted that the 
Mississippi River would regain its former importance. 50 Using dubious 
logic, they assumed that there would be a new relationship between 
foreign and domestic markets. Because cotton prices in the immediate 
postwar era were more than 200 percent above those of antebellum 
times, they foresaw a tremendous increase in cotton production 
throughout the lower South, which would convert the section to a one-
crop economy. Massive grain shipments would have to go down to 
New Orleans simply to fulfill southern regional needs. There was a 
great fallacy in this assumption. The high prices were a direct result of 
the Lancashire cotton famine in the United Kingdom caused by ar-
tificial wartime conditions. Only a tremendous expansion of the textile 
industry, coupled with a sudden drying up of recently opened sources 
of supply in India and Egypt, would have brought about permanently 
high prices. Curiously, what should have been seen immediately as 
sophistry caused renewed optimism in the river cities and some anx-
ious moments in Chicago. 
The Midwest trade of New Orleans did rise above pre-Civil War 
levels. Receipts for 1872 totaled more than 20 million bushels of flour 
and grain, but in the same twelve months more than 178 million 
bushels moved east by rail and boat. 51 By then the fight for the trade 
had entered another phase, with trunk railroads between the Midwest 
and Northeast competing against lake shipping. Even though it was 
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carrying more freight than ever before, the Mississippi River had 
declined in relative importance as a trade route. The prospect of mas-
sive new southern markets proved an empty hope; they never mate-
rialized. New Orleans fell further and further behind in the national 
grain trade. 
At the same time, Baltimore reclaimed a role as a major grain-
shipping center that it had not held since colonial times. As one 
southern town lost out, another advanced. This was unusual because 
in antebellum times intersectional losses by one southern city had 
hardly ever been countered by compensating gains by a rival town. 
When Louisville lost out in competition for Ohio and Indiana trade, no 
other Kentucky city moved in to take its place. Neither Wilmington nor 
Savannah had been able to reclaim for the South markets taken away 
from Charleston by New York. After Memphis failed to obtain the 
eastern terminus of a transcontinental railroad, the possibility of a 
federally subsidized line to the Pacific from a southern point ended. A 
harsh reality of the southern urbanization process was the inability of 
city builders to operate within a wider framework. A logically built 
system that adequately served the needs of a plantation economy did 
not have the strength to respond to outside challenges. The result 
throughout antebellum times was greater and greater outside domina-
tion. Baltimore's efforts to compete directly with New York for western 
trade connections had fared badly initially, but the city gained through 
railroad connections into the heart of the Midwest at precisely the time 
when a great change was going on in the nature of the grain-transport-
ing business. As a consequence, Baltimore was in a position to take 
advantage of and further the economic predicament of New Orleans. 
Again, the oft-repeated charges that Baltimore had embraced Yankee 
values and was no longer a true southern metropolis were heard. 
The Baltimore and Ohio's entry into Chicago in 1874 came at just 
the right time. Grain production throughout the Midwest was on the 
rise. The consolidation of short lines into great rail systems facilitated 
the establishment of fast through freight service between Chicago and 
the eastern seaboard. The erection at Chicago of gigantic elevators for 
railroad use following the fire of 1871 encouraged eastern lines to enter 
the grain-shipping business. For the first time, the eastern railroads 
with Chicago connections could compete favorably with Great Lakes 
grain shippers. By 1872 over 67 percent of all grain and flour that 
moved east went by train. The railroads carried 99 percent of all flour, 
58 percent of all com, and 41 percent of all wheat. Most of the grain and 
flour moved through Chicago. Freight differentials made it cheaper to 
ship flour by rail through Chicago than to send it east by the Great 
Lakes route or directly from another midwestern railroad junction. In 
addition, the midwestern railroad network was built in such a way that 
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numerous regional lines terminated in Chicago. The Windy City was 
the hub in the center of a great wheel. 
Railroad rate practices, especially that of charging by the mile, 
benefited Baltimore. By rail from Chicago it was 912 miles to New York, 
822 miles to Philadelphia, and 802 miles to Baltimore. Baltimore thus 
had an advantage of 110 miles over New York and 20 miles over 
Philadelphia. This advantage was significant because the lines used a 
system of freight differentials. The lack of federal rate regulations was a 
burning question. State attempts to fix rates through the Granger Laws 
became bogged down in the courts. Monopolistic arrangements such 
as this ultimately led to the establishment of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in 1887. The railroads claimed that they engaged in self-
regulation through an equitable system of freight differentials. The-
oretically, the freight differentials were intended to counterbalance 
disadvantages and equalize conditions. In actuality, the railroads de-
termined the differential in relation to the amount of traffic that natural 
and artificial advantages awarded each terminal. The capacity of ele-
vators, for example, affected the rate structure. 
The differentials for carrying grain and flour from Chicago to New 
York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore grew out of the settlement of rail-
road rate wars. The owners or their representatives met privately and 
made deals. At first, the differentials covered short time periods. There 
were frequent violations and withdrawals until an agreement was 
negotiated in the spring of 1877. The rates favored Baltimore, awarding 
the city between 20 and 25 percent of the grain and flour trade. 
Between 1873 and 1880 wheat receipts alone rose from 2.8 to 35.4 
million bushels. During the same period, New York's share of the flour, 
wheat, and corn trade dropped from 61 to 52 percent. Much of this loss 
was a direct result of the diversion of Chicago shipments to Baltimore. 
In 1880 the mighty New York Central Railroad and other Empire City 
lines rejected the 1877 accord. There was no noticeable impact on the 
market, so the New York railroad interests accepted Baltimore's domi-
nance.52 Baltimore's economic victory over New York demonstrated 
that when given the means, southern gentlemen could compete on an 
equal basis with northern capitalists. The problem was that such com-
petition was seldom possible. 
No other southern city was in a position to duplicate Baltimore's 
success. The rebuilding of transportation links restored the commercial 
relationships that had existed before the war. For many places the 
movement of cotton remained the primary activity. Again, the interior 
communities became staging areas. Cotton from Macon went through 
Augusta and on to Charleston. Bales assembled at Montgomery 
passed through Mobile. More than ever, Atlanta acted as a junction for 
cotton shipped north through Louisville to New England mills. Mem-
78 The Rise of the Urban South 
phis remained a great gathering area. The thousands of bales that piled 
up in the streets during the fall and winter shipping seasons eventually 
went down the river to New Orleans. The Crescent City remained the 
world's greatest cotton port. 
When journalist Edward King visited New Orleans in 1873 he 
learned what cotton exporting meant in human terms. Noting the size 
of cotton receipts, he wrote, "Knowing these statistics, one can hardly 
wonder at the vast masses of bales on the levee at the landings of the 
steamers, nor at the numbers of the boats which daily arrive, their sides 
piled high with cotton. About these boats, closely ranged in long rows 
by the levee, and seeming like river monsters which have crawled from 
the ooze to make a little sun, the negroes swarm in crowds, chatting in 
the broken, colored English characteristic of the river-hand. They are 
clad in garments which hang in rags from their tawny and coal black 
limbs. Their huge, naked chests rival in perfection of form the works of 
Praxiteles and his fellows. Their arms are almost constantly bent on the 
task of removing cotton bales, and carrying boxes, barrels, bundles of 
every conceivable shape and size; but whenever there is a lull in the 
work they sink down on the cotton bales, clinging to them like lizards 
to a sunny wall, and croon to themselves, or crack rough and good-
natured jokes with one another. "53 Many outsiders continued to think 
of the South as a land of black labor gangs and cotton. Unfortunately, 
the image was all too true. The New South seemed incapable of 
escaping from a King Cotton economy. 
A basic tenet of the New South creed called for diversified agri-
culture. Its spokesmen denounced what Richard Edmonds called "the 
all-cotton curse."54 Henry Grady wrote about the wonders of coming 
agricultural change in the South. He discussed Tennessee berries, 
Georgia peaches, Mississippi cream, and South Carolina vegetables. 
Believing that urbanization was the key to a new agrarian order, he 
claimed, "With increase in urban population-with shops and factories 
and artisans-with great systems of railroads and consequent reduc-
tion of time and freights-with canning factories and evaporators-
came farm husbandry in its true sense to the South."55 But although 
farmers grew vegetables in South Carolina and workers canned pea-
ches in Georgia, there were not enough of such activities to change the 
face of southern agriculture. 
The section remained weighted down by an increasingly backward 
system based on cotton. Of course, this problem had been recognized 
for a long time. As early as 1852 DeBow had written, "No mind can 
look back upon the history of this region for the last twenty years, and 
not feel convinced that the labor bestowed in cotton growing during 
that period has been a total loss to this part of the country. "56 There 
seemed no way out of the trap as long as cotton remained an easily 
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cultivated cash crop with a marketing system tailored to suit its needs. 
Some of the same frustrating conditions prevailed with tobacco and 
rice, the South's other two staple crops. They were regional crops 
mostly grown on or near the coast and moved to market within the 
confines of a broader system created to handle cotton. 
In the post-Civil War era southern agriculture was controlled by 
sharecrop land barons and crop-lien country store merchants. Fre-
quently, these people were members of the former slaveowning aris-
tocracy. The big land barons sometimes had as many as two to three 
hundred sharecroppers. Some merchants charged interest as high as 
300 percent on stock items. Lien agreements stipulated that farmers 
had to grow primarily cotton. "For years a class of merchants encour-
aged their credit customers to raise cotton exclusively, or very largely," 
critic Charles Otken wrote in 1894. "They reasoned very naturally and 
very logically, that, the more goods sold to farmers, the greater their 
sales and the greater their aggregate profits . . . . The debts of the 
farmer bound him to cotton. He was powerless."57 The land barons 
and merchants needed ready cash to pay their annual debts. They had 
credit lines in rural banks. The corresponding banks for those institu-
tions were in the southern cities. Few of these financial houses had the 
resources to fund vast undertakings. In turn, they dealt through north-
ern banks, many of which were in New York, the only place in the 
country with gigantic amounts of surplus capital. Just as in antebellum 
times, New York financiers continued to make major decisions that 
affected the South's agricultural economy. 
There was no New South in agriculture. The southern interior 
cities, upon which so much depended in building an urban civilization, 
were little commercial capitals located in the middle of depressed 
areas. Southern urban leaders could only look with envy on mid-
western cities surrounded by wealthy farming regions. The cotton 
economy did not generate enough money to promote rapid urban 
progress. In the Old South, some economists had unsucessfully called 
for the joint marketing of cotton through "planters' union depots."58 
Agrarian reformers in the New South placed hope in cooperative 
marketing arrangements. In Populist times, and without much suc-
cess, the Southern Alliance tried cooperative marketing. Only part of 
the failure stemmed from business opposition. Cotton was what econ-
omists called a renewable resource. The new sources of supply in 
Egypt and India made it impossible for American producers to influ-
ence prices. Attempts to break the sharecropping and crop-lien sys-
tems failed. Medium-sized southern cities that wanted to advance had 
to look for alternatives to reliance on farmers trapped in the morass of 
debt peonage. Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that 
Table 4.1. Manufacturing in Sixteen Southern Cities, 1880 
National Rank in Number of 
Popu- Value of Establish- Capital Average Wages Value of Value of 
City lation Products m.ents Invested Hands Paid Materials Products 
Alabama 
Mobile 68 97 91 $ 525,708 704 $ 261,643 $ 830,961 $ 1,335,579 
District of Columbia 
Washington 14 44 971 5,552,526 7,146 3,924,612 5,365,400 11,882,316 
Georgia 
Atlanta 49 79 196 2,468,456 3,680 889,282 3,159,267 4,861,727 
Augusta 86 92 60 2,069,275 1,680 448,825 2,247,665 3,139,020 
Savannah 62 90 120 1,102,970 1,130 447,640 2,457,606 3,396,297 
Kentucky 
Covington 65 71 181 3,182,141 2,925 1,033,463 3,935,727 5,864,530 
Louisville 16 17 1,108 21,767,013 17,448 5,835,545 21,207,110 35,423,203 
Newport 98 88 94 1,700,745 1,748 711,019 2,526,936 3,996,995 
Louisiana 
New Orleans 10 33 915 8,565,303 9,504 3,717,557 10,771,892 18,808,096 
Maryland 
Baltimore 7 8 3,683 38,586,773 56,338 15,117,489 47,974,297 78,417,304 
South Carolina 
Charleston 36 93 194 1,718,300 2,146 639,030 1,468,375 2,732,590 
Tennessee 
Memphis 54 82 138 2,313,975 2,268 845,672 2,419,341 4,413,422 
Nashville 40 57 268 3,892,380 4,791 1,312,765 5,312,527 8,597,278 
Virginia 
Norfolk 83 96 105 570,276 752 317,528 861,026 1,455,987 
Petersburg 89 80 115 1,755,415 4,196 602,749 3,290,116 4,643,015 
Richmond 25 31 598 6,884,386 14,047 3,006,456 12,141,512 20,790,106 
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many places tried to embrace manufacturing as a panacea. But to do so 
was easier said than done. 
The great currents of industrialism that transformed the United 
States missed the South. Sometime between 1850 and 1880 the Amer-
ican economy "took off"-a term used to describe the time at which a 
nation reaches the point of rapid industrial growth. The Civil War may 
or may not have speeded the process in the United States. The econo-
my was flat at best throughout the 1870s. Nevertheless, between 1850 
and 1880 the gross value of products advanced from $1 billion to $5.4 
billion, a gain of 427 percent. Industrial capitalization increased by 423 
percent from $533 million in 1850, to $1 billion in 1860, $2.1 billion in 
1870, and $2.8 billion in 1880. The South's contribution to this tremen-
dous advance was relatively slight. In 1860, Mobile, the largest city in 
Alabama, had factories valued at $1 million that employed 764 per-
sons. 59 During the Civil War decade, with the ravages of military 
operations and a slow recovery, five states experienced declines in 
industrial capitalization. In 1880 there were thirty-eight states in the 
Union. Only three states in the entire South were among the top 
twenty in manufacturing rank. Maryland was fourteenth, Kentucky 
seventeenth, and Virginia twentieth. 
With industry concentrated in a few northeastern and midwestern 
states, the southern states were comparatively very far behind in 
manufacturing. Rapid industrialization was possible. Indeed, in the 
1880s new iron furnaces built Birmingham, Alabama, into an imposing 
industrial city. Near the end of the decade, Grady wrote, "The indus-
trial growth of the South in the past ten years has been without 
precedent or parallel. ... In 1889 the Birmingham district alone will 
produce more iron than the entire South produced in 1887."60 Unfor-
tunately, it would have taken a whole series of Birminghams to build an 
industrial empire in the South. The manufacturing base remained 
weak. Little outside capital was forthcoming. The South had neither 
the industrial know-how nor access to the capital needed to compete 
with the industrial parts of the United States. 
In 1880 the backbone of manufacturing in the South lay in the 
sixteen cities that ranked among the hundred largest in the United 
States. Table 4.1 shows the state of manufacturing in the southern 
centers. 61 The only places in the top twenty in value of products were 
Baltimore and Louisville. New Orleans, Washington, and Richmond 
were the only other cities in the section that ranked forty-fourth or 
higher. The total value of products for the sixteen cities amounted to 
around $200 million. Over half were in Baltimore ($78.4 million) and 
Louisville ($35.4 million). By comparison, the value of products for the 
three largest American industrial centers exceeded $1 billion. The 
value of products for New York was $473 million, for Philadelphia $324 
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million, and for Chicago $249 million. Southern industry had a long 
way to go to reach those production outputs. Of considerable signifi-
cance were the capitalization figures. Of the $130 million invested in 
southern manufacturing, $100 million was in the sixteen largest cities. 
The only southern cities with an industrial capitalization of more than 
$9 million were Baltimore and Louisville. The figures for the former 
were $38.6 million and for the latter $21.8 million. New Orleans had 
915 manufacturing establishments valued at $8.6 million. The 598 
plants in Richmond were capitalized at $6.9 million. Statistics for other 
towns indicated a pattern of many small and undercapitalized firms. 
For instance, Atlanta had 196 factories capitalized at $2.5 million and 
Petersburg 115 establishments with an estimated worth of $1.8 million. 
Although most cities had registered advances since the Civil War, 
Mobile had regressed. It had fewer workers and half the industrial 
capital in 1880 than twenty years earlier. Without a dramatic broaden-
ing of the South's industrial capitalization, there seemed no way that 
the section could ever gain parity on a national level. 
In 1880 southern urban manufacturing mirrored the traditions and 
needs of the section. 62 Agribusiness was the major pursuit. In Bal-
timore more than $8 million was invested in flour milling, fertilizer 
processing, tobacco manufacturing, and meat packing. Capitalization 
figures for Louisville showed $1.6 million in liquor distilling, $2.1 
million in meat packing, and $460,000 in tobacco production. The 
refining of cottonseeds, rice, and sugar was important in New Orleans. 
The capitalization of seventeen establishments totaled $1.5 million. 
Richmond had five flour mills valued at $1.2 million. Petersburg's 
fourteen tobacco plants represented capital investments of $1.7 mil-
lion. Covington had $580,000 in tobacco manufactories. The capital in 
Augusta's six cotton mills amounted to $1.4 million. The South's pri-
mary lack was heavy industry. The only large shipyards were in Bal-
timore. The only concentrations of machine shops and foundries, basic 
to the operation of an industrial economy, were in New Orleans, 
Richmond, Baltimore, and Louisville. The net capitalization of the 
machine shops and foundries in those cities was $6 million. Six steel 
mills in Covington and Newport had a capitalization of $1.4 million. 
The only other large iron and steel mills were ten in Baltimore cap-
italized at $1.6 million. The cities of Atlanta, Charleston, Memphis, 
Mobile, Norfolk, and Savannah had no specified industries with a 
capitalization or value of products over $1 million. Factories in all 
sixteen major cities combined employed an annual average of fewer 
than 150,000 workers. Obviously, opportunities existed for an expan-
sion of manufacturing in the South. The question was not simply 
whether industry was desirable but where the money would come 
from to create it. 63 
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A popular theme in the aftermath of the Civil War was that north-
ern capitalists dominated southern manufacturing. Acquiescent native 
whites acted as managers and received a free hand on the race issue. 
Though true in part, this thesis ignored the South's failure to offer 
investors many real opportunities during Reconstruction. The hostile 
attitude toward carpetbaggers was only one of the reasons. Ambitious 
northern capitalists went where the action was-to Chicago and San 
Francisco rather than Nashville or Atlanta-although some northern 
speculators put money into southern transportation and industry. A 
number of schemes prospered, others failed. But a prostrate South was 
not flooded with outside money. Large-scale projects, such as the 
development of Birmingham or the formation of Southern Railway 
Security, were few in number. The reality was that the region's future 
rested more in modest offices in Memphis and Mobile than in paneled 
board rooms in the North. By the end of Reconstruction the South's 
economy remained in virtual isolation. A way still had to be found to 
integrate the urban South into the emerging national economy. 
5 _____ _ 
Joy Brightens Her Face 
In 1887 M. B. Hillyard wrote a promotional book intended to impress 
potential northern investors with the opportunities available in the 
South. Through the selective use of economic and statistical data, he 
delineated what he considered the region's distinctive and salient 
characteristics. Central to his analysis was the contention that the New 
South philosophy had gained such widespread acceptance that it had 
fundamentally changed the way white southerners thought about 
themselves and their section. "To the writer, no aspect of Southern 
progress is so marked and cheering as the hopeful, erect, self-assertive 
industrial spirit of the South," he explained. "No longer is she supine, 
inert, self-mistrustful, with head bowed down. Hope elevates and joy 
brightens her face, and on her brow sits courage plumed."1 He con-
tended that a new wave of energy had swept over Dixie. Old cities such 
as New Orleans and new ones like Anniston would take the lead in 
providing unparalleled chances for wealth and progress. 
Urban conditions in the post-Reconstruction South were a source 
of pride to advocates of city building. A spirit of optimism prevailed, 
buoyed by developments deplored by critics in and outside the South. 
Supporters of the New South movement, however, saw nothing wrong 
with either northern entrepreneurial values or traditional southern 
concepts of racial relations. Most urban whites were pleased that the 
old dominant groups were firmly in control. Far from being "new 
men" -either carpetbaggers who remained behind or scalawags who 
made quick fortunes-they were representative of the same commer-
cial interests responsible for building cities in antebellum times. Dur-
ing the 1870s the civic leaders had added to their local prestige by 
directly supporting or acquiescing in the persecution and intimidation 
of black voters. White supremacists controlled all the elected municipal 
governments. Operating under stringent fiscal restraints, officials in 
many places had made considerable efforts to improve the already 
pleasing urban environment through beautification schemes. A variety 
of architectural styles, notably Greek and Georgian forms, further 
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enhanced the quality of the landscape. A significant number of the-
aters and lecture halls attested to the South's cultural traditions. Al-
though a great deal remained to be done, the cities seemingly had the 
potential of emerging as showcases for a new southern way of life. With 
some reason, boosters claimed that towns constituted Dixie's best hope 
for the future. 
The plantation leadership of the Old South never recovered from 
the ravages of Civil War and Reconstruction. In the aftermath of defeat, 
southern agrarians attempted to salvage what they could from the 
Confederate debacle, fighting particularly against social change and 
racial equality. They tried to reimpose slavery in effect through the 
Black Codes. They attacked "bayonet rule" and damned "Black Recon-
struction." They denounced carpetbaggers and scalawags, supported 
the Ku Klux Klan and the Knights of the White Camellia, and embraced 
the Lost Cause. At this point the agrarians who looked backward to the 
Old South parted company with their urban New South contempo-
raries. 
The plantation interests were a negative and anachronistic force. 
Their support of Bourbon rule was a reactionary cry. It was probably 
only natural that they related the writings of Sir Walter Scott about the 
plight of Scotland conquered by England to their own situation and 
thus spawned a southern literary school patterned after eighteenth-
century European romanticism. This important strain of intellectual 
thought was a reaction to the perceived trend toward an increasingly 
materialistic and technological civilization. The movement asserted the 
validity of subjectivism as an intellectual means of reemphasizing 
classical values. The southern version romanticized a classical civiliza-
tion that had fallen victim to a brutal military machine. The idealized 
South that never existed was one of contented "darkies" playing banjos 
and singing spirituals, of stately plantations along the banks of the 
Copper and Chattahoochee rivers, of gentlemen and beautiful women 
with aristocratic bloodlines, of enlightened statesmen practicing Greek 
democracy, of duels, of horse races, and of lavish hospitality. Every 
lamp shattered by a Yankee bullet, every wall demolished by a Yankee 
cannonball, and every building blackened by Yankee flames epito-
mized the anguish of defeat. According to the myth, an ideal world had 
been destroyed by cruel barbarians who looted for pleasure, wrecked 
for fun, and killed for lust. The cult of chivalry, the legend of Pickett's 
charge, and the burning of Atlanta provided other symbols for south-
ern romanticism. 2 
Unfortunately, a body of thought that dwelled on the virtues of a 
civilization that never existed had little relationship to the South of the 
Gilded Age. The defenders of the "old order" had retreated into the 
past, underscoring the calamity that befell southern agrarianism. By 
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necessity, leadership had to come from other directions, and the vac-
uum created an opportunity for urban interests. But did the leaders of 
the New South crusade want to change the direction of the South, to 
use cities as a means of making the region more like the rest of the 
nation? After all, the centers of romanticism in the South were in 
Charleston, New Orleans, and Norfolk. Actually, the goals of the New 
South were compatible with those of the Old South. A general program 
had been spelled out at a series of prewar commercial conventions. 
Commercial conventions held between 1837 and 1859 attempted to 
establish economic policies for Dixie. The widely promoted meetings 
attracted as many as a thousand delegates, including John C. Calhoun. 
The conventions first recognized problems, then established goals, 
and finally expressed a general sense of frustration with the course of 
national events. Calhoun hoped that the conventions would transcend 
parochial political prejudices, but unfortunately, even he was unable to 
create unity from the spirited rivalries among cities in the South. All 
the conventions stressed the need for a great commercial city that could 
compete with New York. 3 The reasons why such a center could not be 
built went deeper than nationalistic theory; southern urban leaders 
were reluctant to sacrifice their own ambition for sectional nationalism. 
In the postwar period Robert E. Lee tried to convince southerners 
that they should take the lead in furthering a national spirit of reunion 
to surmount narrow materialistic concerns. Through example and 
moral philosophy, the great Confederate general sought to show his 
countrymen how they should react in the aftermath of the fall of the 
Confederacy. Although he refused to abandon the concept of a sepa-
rate South, he said, "I prefer to struggle for its restoration and share its 
fate, rather than give up all as lost." As president of Washington 
College in Virginia, he believed it incumbent to teach the young to 
submit to authority. He expressed a determination "to educate South-
ern youth into a spirit of loyalty to the new conditions and the trans-
formation of the social fabric which had resulted from the war, and only 
through a peaceful obedience to which could the future peace and 
harmony of the country be restored. "4 Lee dreaded the thought of any 
youth leaving college as anything less than a sincere Christian. The 
new South he envisioned would be characterized by cooperation, 
accommodation, and humanitarianism. These ideas harked back to the 
pristine visions of southern nationalism advocated by Calhoun and 
other statesmen of the Old South in the heyday of the commercial 
conventions. Just as their plans fell prey to economic consequences, so 
did Lee's. Human greed proved a stronger force than dignified appeals 
to old values. 
The leaders of the New South movement were careful to speak in 
broad terms. Rather than appearing divisive, they wanted to establish 
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themselves as southern nationalists, the direct inheritors of the south-
ern convention tradition. "What a pull it has been!" Henry Grady 
proclaimed, "Through the ashes and desolation of war-up the hill, a 
step at a time, nothing certain-not even the way! Hindered, misled, 
and yet always moving up a little better until-shall we say it?-the top 
has been reached, and the rest is easy! ... The ground has been 
prepared-the seed put in-the tiny shoots tended past the danger-
point-and the day of the mighty harvest is here!" Henry Watterson 
told the American Bankers' Association that the South was a land of 
one people who guaranteed "peace and order" and were eager to 
accommodate northern investors. More emphatically, Richard H. Ed-
monds said, "Well may the people of the South rejoice that it is in their 
power to make this section hold a dominating position in this, the 
dominant power of the world."5 Taken by themselves, these state-
ments appeared to have the purest of motives. Yet they had another 
side. 
The New South creed also contained the destructive spirit of urban 
rivalry that was inherent to national development in the nineteenth 
century. The pleasing generalities cloaked restrictive objectives. When 
Grady extolled southern progress in the face of adversity, he only 
thinly veiled his paramount plan, which was to boost Atlanta. Indeed, 
to Grady the New South meant Atlanta. He saw the two as inter-
changeable. Almost all of his speeches and writings referred favorably 
to Atlanta. Under the sub-title "The Creators of the New South," he 
claimed, "The South has been rebuilt by the Southern people. I shall 
also use Atlanta as an example, for it is a typical Southern city." He 
stressed that Atlanta had been built by southern capital and enterprise. 
"This will," he noted, "astound those Northern men who, amazed at 
Atlanta's simple and comprehensive growth, have declared the South 
never had built and never could build such a city, but that it was a 
'Yankee city' in the South."6 Grady cleverly conveyed the idea that 
Atlanta was a bustling and wealthy city, rapidly emerging as the center 
of the New South. Clearly, then, it was a good place to invest money. 
Watterson sought to impart similar impressions about Louisville and 
its marketing region. He informed northerners, "We need the money. 
You can make a profit off the development. "7 Although Edmonds used 
the pages of his Manufacturers Record to convey the idea that a pros-
perous South was good for the nation, he hoped that any influx of 
outside money into Dixie would help Baltimore. Another apostle of the 
New South creed, Francis Dawson, editor of the Charleston News and 
Courier, was more direct. At the same time that he violently attacked 
carpetbag rule, he suggested that Charleston residents would welcome 
Yankee promoters. On 13 June 1885 the editor of the New Orleans Times-
Democrat referred to the chief newspapers in the New South movement 
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as "metropolitan and unprejudiced. "8 He was wrong; although they 
had metropolitan aspirations, their aims were local and promotional. 
No sectional commercial convention was held in the South of the 
Gilded Age to set an urban direction for Dixie. Nor was a serious effort 
made to form a regional economic organization patterned after the 
Knights of the Golden Circle of the 1850s. DeBow had hoped to use the 
Golden Circle, which had chapters throughout the Mississippi Valley, 
as a vehicle to take the lead in creating an inland empire with New 
Orleans as the center of power. New South propagandists contented 
themselves with fatuous statements about the wonders of the South's 
business climate and the riches that awaited in their own cities. Beneath 
the fine words, they were as blatant promoters as their contemporaries 
in Chicago, Kansas City, and Los Angeles. Boosterism was more than 
simply shrilling for a project. It provided an ideology that sustained 
city builders in both good and bad times. Their own statements gave 
them hope in the inevitability of success. Sometimes boosters did bring 
in outside capital. Grady's contribution to Atlanta's economy, for ex-
ample, was clear. The mythmakers of the New South creed spun tales 
of urban greatness that played an important part in rekindling a flame 
of optimism that sustained hope and uplifted the spirits of a defeated 
society. 
The actual task of driving Dixie ahead fell to urban business leaders 
all across the South. 9 In antebellum days they seldom had the power to 
translate their ideas into action. Freed from the restraints imposed by 
the peculiar institution, they intended to dominate affairs and shape 
sectional progress. But with perhaps only one exception, no southern 
businessman of the Gilded Age had the talent of John D. Rockefeller, 
the technological genius of Andrew Carnegie, or the financial ability of 
J. P. Morgan. Some of the most masterful capitalists in the South were 
from the North. Henry Morrison Flagler of Cleveland, Ohio, a former 
Rockefeller partner, played a major role in the settlement of Florida 
through a mix of promotional projects. William D. ("Pig Iron") Kelley of 
Pennsylvania was instrumental in building up the Alabama iron indus-
try. The greatest native southern industrialist was James Buchanan 
Duke of Durham, North Carolina, who turned a small tobacco com-
pany founded by his father into one of the largest trusts of his times, 
the American Tobacco Company. He achieved success through a com-
bination of ability, taking advantage of technological breakthroughs in 
cigarette production, lack of government regulations, and ruthless 
methods. Critics called him a North Carolina version of Rockefeller. 
Duke agreed. Looking back on his career, he recalled, "I had confi-
dence in myself. I said to myself, 'If John D. Rockefeller can do what he 
is doing for oil, why should I not do it in tobacco.' "10 By the dawn of 
the twentieth century Duke's empire was estimated to be worth half a 
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billion dollars. Despite his numerous philanthropic activities, he 
earned a place among those President Theodore Roosevelt called 
"malefactors of great wealth." 
In considering the quality of urban business leadership in the 
South it is easy to fall into the trap of concluding that there were too few 
men like James Buchanan Duke and too many like Basil Wilson Duke. 
The latter was a slightly built, cheerful man, best described as a south-
en gentleman of the old school. Born in 1836 in Scott County, Kentucky, 
he held a law degree from Transylvania College. Before the Civil War 
he practiced before the bar for several years in St. Louis. He took an 
active part in the unsuccessful Missouri secessionist movement. After 
that failure, he became an officer in the Lexington Rifles of the Second 
Kentucky Cavalry, soon distinguishing himself in the field. His book, 
Reminiscences of Basil W. Duke, C.S.A., described many exploits. 
Wounded in action at Shiloh, he recovered only to fall captive during an 
aborted Confederate raid into Ohio. Exchanged, he participated in 
Jefferson Davis's last council of war. After the surrender, Duke settled 
in Louisville, where he resumed the practice of law. Following a short 
public career-he served a term in the Kentucky House of Represen-
tatives--he became the legal counsel of the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad, holding that job for more than twenty years. Widely known 
and respected throughout the South, he had a minor business reputa-
tion and few if any entrepreneurial instincts. Rather, he succeeded by 
playing the role of a "Kentucky colonel," complete with mustache, 
goatee, string tie, cane, and white suit. Accustomed to a leisurely life, 
he spent his happiest days in a retirement position. From 1895 until his 
death in 1916 he held the ceremonial post of a commissiner of Shiloh 
National Park. His attractive personality, dignified demeanor, and 
good war record made him a perfect front man for northern railroad 
interests. 11 In many ways Duke played a role throughout his life. He 
was typical of the men who contributed to the widely held impression 
in the North that only a few southerners had the skill to run vast 
enterprises. 
Actually, there were many businessmen of ability in the South, 
ready to take the risks necessary to achieve a measure of economic 
success. The leaders of the Wilmington, North Carolina, firm of Alex-
ander Sprunt and Son, for example, used innovative methods to trans-
form the overseas cotton-exporting business, undertaking considera-
ble experimentation and enduring hardships that would have deterred 
lesser risk takers. Until near the end of the 1870s the shipping of the 
cotton crops in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia de-
pended upon factors. The middlemen stored the planters' con-
signments of cotton and found buyers in port cities. The buyers then 
shipped the cotton north, where receivers either sold it to New Eng-
90 The Rise of the Urban South 
land mills or exported it overseas. The arrangement was expensive for 
the producers. Alexander Sprunt and Son took the lead in modifying 
the system. In 1908, James Sprunt, one of the firm's partners, explained 
to a congressional committee, "In 1879, after a thorough study of the 
problem of better facilities for the direct cotton trade, we became the 
pioneers of the present system which has brought the producer and 
consumer together without an excessive number of intermediaries! We 
chartered the first steamer that ever sailed from the port of Wilmington 
for a port abroad. The result of this experiment was ... disastrous. We 
repeated the effort again and again and ultimately established upon its 
present foundation, the system which has saved our farmers millions 
of dollars since 1875, and which has been accepted at all cotton ports 
from Norfolk to New Orleans. "12 Central to the change wrought by 
Alexander Sprunt and Son was the installation in Wilmington of effi-
cient cotton presses, warehouses, and wharves. By 1900 a subsidiary 
firm, the Champion Press Company, had six presses and a thousand 
workers. Wilmington gradually evolved into a major cotton port, with 
the Sprunt interests controlling most of the trade. It made little dif-
ference that the partners had to go through a New York banking house, 
Laird and Gray, for financing. Most of the profits remained in North 
Carolina. The Wilmington partners served as a shining example of how 
native southerners could build a large business in the New South. 
There were numerous similar accomplishments. E. H. Summers 
built the New Orleans cotton firm of Hilliard, Summers and Company 
into a major enterprise. In Columbus, a locally owned cotton mill, the 
Columbus Manufacturing Company, employed hundreds of women 
and children. More than two thousand operatives worked in eight 
cotton manufactories in Petersburg. 13 The credit reports collected sys-
tematically by the Mercantile Agency, the predecessor of Dun and 
Bradstreet, gave evidence of the success of a wide variety of busi-
nesses. But more than the efforts of some able businessmen was 
needed to change the economic outlook for the South. The activities of 
Alexander Sprunt and Son did not significantly improve Wilmington's 
position in relation to the other Atlantic coastal ports. New Orleans had 
lost any chance of becoming the great city of the Mississippi Valley. 
Depressed agricultural conditions in surrounding areas tended to can-
cel out the manufacturing advances in Columbus and Petersburg. The 
sorry state of southern farming and the continued dependence on 
outside capital precluded the spectacular gains envisioned by the 
proponents of the New South creed. 
The resourcefulness of urban business combinations made only a 
limited difference in controlling the course of events. Carnegie and 
Rockefeller combined would have been hard-pressed to find ways to 
improve the fortunes of an Alexandria or a Newport. Baltimore and 
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Louisville had prospered as a consequence of carefully conceived 
railroad plans. As economic relationships engendered by the railroads 
solidified, it appeared more and more doubtful that any of the cities in 
the southern interior could find quick formulas for rapid gowth and 
prosperity. Industrial developments generated some ready capital and 
raised morale by providing a sense of growth rather than decline. 
Unfortunately for boosters, the creation of a few new mill towns could 
not transform the South into an urban giant able to compete on equal 
terms with the Northeast. In addition, the long-held hopes for a great 
inland commercial center were far from realization. The yellow fever 
epidemics of the 1870s hurt the development of Memphis. Recurring 
epidemics raised another obstacle to southern urban progress. It was 
simply not enough for Dixie's entrepreneurs to master what Grady 
called "the great commercial chessboard."14 
A comparison of Atlanta with a new western community, Kansas 
City, Missouri, illustrates the sectional economic burdens faced by 
southern city builders. In many towns, the local businessmen attended 
chamber of commerce meetings, gave lip service to community cooper-
ation, and then went their own ways. Atlanta, however, was different. 
The city's leaders determined during the postwar rebuilding process 
that they could not afford the luxury of competing against each other, 
so they banded together to form plans to advance their town's for-
tunes. The same formula well served Kansas City. A unified business 
community working through the Kansas City Chamber of Commerce 
played a major role in making the western Missouri city a national 
railroad center and regional metropolis. Atlanta's businessmen did not 
succeed on the same scale. Their greatest obstacle was that they were in 
the South. Kansas City, which had many southern-born civic leaders, 
benefited from the opening of Kansas and the construction of railroads 
from the city into the Southwest. Millions of cattle roamed the south-
ern plains, and the introduction of Turkey Red wheat made the central 
plains a new breadbasket. By 1880 Kansas City was well on the way to 
becoming a great livestock, packing, and grain center. 15 Atlanta was 
burdened by sharecropper agriculture, which limited the city's 
chances and prevented the progress and prosperity enjoyed by Kansas 
City. The continuing backward status of the South made a mockery of 
the bright predictions of the mythmakers of the New South creed. 
Urban interests had important roles on state levels in the Redemp-
tion movement. 16 Railroad builder John C. Brown was governor of 
Tennessee at the end of Reconstruction. Leaders from Norfolk and 
Richmond strongly supported Gilbert C. Walker's successful bid for 
governor. Walker, who claimed to have moved to the Old Dominion 
from the Northeast for his health in 1865, was a Norfolk banker whom 
his admirers called the "savior of the state." The Redeemer governor of 
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Alabama, George Houston, called the "Bald Eagle of the Mountains," 
favored the promotion of railroads and industries. In Louisiana, the 
powerful and corrupt Louisiana Lottery Company of New Orleans 
reputedly spent $250,000, a huge sum at the time for a political contest, 
to help Francis T. Nicholls obtain the governorship in 1877. Through-
out much of the Gilded Age, Atlanta businessmen acquiesced in con-
trol of the statehouse by the unsavory "Bourbon Triumvirate," because 
of its prorailroad policies. Grady, who denounced the "political filth-
iness" of the organization's leaders, willingly associated with them 
socially to discuss business matters informally. In South Carolina, 
Governor Wade Hampton adroitly linked his political fortunes with 
those of both the New South and the Lost Cause. Most of the Redeemer 
politicians practiced the philosophy of Joseph E. Brown, the war gover-
nor of Georgia, who survived Reconstruction to become a United 
States senator in 1883. He said, "The Statesman like the business man 
should take a practical view of questions as they arise."17 
Astute observers noted that the southern Democrats who engi-
neered the redemption had mixed political antecedents. "A few years 
after the war all lovers of good government in the South concluded to 
celebrate a marriage," the editor of the Jackson Clarion wrote on 19 
September 1883. "The high contracting parties were Whiggism and 
Democracy and the ceremony took place in 1875, though the betrothal 
may antedate that time .... As is usual in such cases the parties have 
now one and the same name, but the Whig party is no more dead than 
is one of our fair damsels, because she has concluded to cast her lot 
with the man of her choice for weal or for woe." In 1875 a writer in the 
Memphis Appeal had noted, "We do not know what a Bourbon Democrat 
means ... unless it implies there is a class of politicians who, ... 
forgetting nothing and learning nothing, do not recognize any issues 
as settled by the war and are ready to inaugurate another rebellion. We 
know of no such Democrats. "18 The twin problems of race and outside 
rule overrode partisanism, bringing about political realignments. 
Along with the vast majority of southern whites the leaders of the 
New South movement had opposed the Reconstruction governments. 
In 1887 M. B. Hillyard scathingly denounced what he claimed had 
occurred. He said, "A troop of gibbering apes tricked in the parapher-
nalia of power, and playing at Kings, would be a mild mockery of state, 
compared to the grotesque and groveling saturnalia of that wild and 
hideous rabble in those dark and direful days. "19 Actually, Hillyard 
and others of like mind supported programs similar to those advocated 
by the Radical Republican governments. It could be argued that the 
Radical Republicans were in the forefront of the New South move-
ment. The new state constitutions lessened the power of the planters, 
creating broader opportunities for city people. They also promoted 
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railroads and manufacturing. The investment climate was favorable, 
and carpetbaggers brought in money that otherwise would have 
flowed into other channels. Birmingham, invariably cited as an exam-
ple of an industrial project that benefited both northerners and south-
erners, was a direct outgrowth of the policies of a Radical government. 
But the frequently wasteful and corrupt Radical administrations were 
products of bayonet rule. They epitomized northern determination to 
change the nature of southern life. Widespread white opposition to 
that goal superseded support for the economic policies that southern 
urban interests had favored since before the Civil War. 
The Gilded Age state administrations in the South continued to 
follow probusiness policies. Northerners who found southern leaders 
eager to accommodate and to embrace "Yankee values" should not 
have been surprised. The Old South, after all, was commercial in 
character. Linkage existed between the prewar administrations, those 
of the Confederate and Reconstruction eras, and the ones that emerged 
following the redemption. Although support of plans to encourage 
commercial development varied greatly in the Old South, the con-
ception that the South needed the means to compete on equal terms 
with the rest of the nation was just as clear to the planter aristocrats of 
antebellum times as it was to their counterparts of the Gilded Age. 
Unfortunately, all the old questions remained unanswered. Where 
would the capital come from? What strings would be attached? How 
would the changes affect agricultural interests? The biggest change in 
the 1880s was that alternatives considered unacceptable in antebellum 
times suddenly became more palatable. Overnight, New York money 
became a blessing rather than a curse. It became acceptable for south-
em whites to manage Yankee-owned properties. In exchange for very 
limited progress when compared with the rest of the country and for 
the right to control racial policies, the Redeemers accepted a status that 
was for all practical purposes colonial. As part of the ongoing tragedy 
of the South, the best southern urban leaders could offer their fellow 
citizens was the economic subordination that agrarian secessionists 
had sought to avoid with blood and treasure. 
A historic connection between urban business interests and muni-
cipal government made the transfer of control easier. 2° From colonial 
times onward, city administrations in the South had responded to the 
needs of businessmen. The owners of the proprietary colonies saw the 
creation of a favorable climate for economic activity as one of their 
primary functions, and accordingly, their administrators formulated 
plans designed to give the vast majority of city residents as little say as 
possible in their own affairs. There were no elections. The chief munici-
pal officers and other high-ranking officials, all appointed by the 
governor, were members of closed corporations. Individuals fre-
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quently served for life, which made it difficult for new blood and ideas 
to come to the fore. This impediment was not as serious as might have 
been expected because of the nature of the system. In keeping with a 
very limited conception of urban government that had roots dating 
back to medieval England, the municipal leaders had few non-
ceremonial functions beyond the control of trade. Of special concern 
was the regulation of weights and measures. If local merchants cheated 
customers, especially visitors, a city could acquire a bad name, so a 
chief function of colonial southern city governments was to protect 
business reputations. 
Local governments in the northern colonies generally supported 
business and were far less restrictive in their formation and functions. 
In New England, the Puritan tradition of collective covenants led to the 
adoption of the town meeting form of government. This had a lasting 
impact. Boston had a town meeting at the end of the colonial period, 
when it was the third largest city in North America. It was no accident 
that following the Revolution the New England states took the lead in 
passing legislation that led to a shift throughout the nation toward 
greater voter participation in municipal affairs. The change toward 
more democratic civic structures came slower in the South. Southern 
state governments were slow to grant home rule; Charleston and 
Baltimore did not receive charters that granted a measure of self-
government until the 1790s. Gradually, just as elsewhere, an elected 
mayor and council became the standard practice in the South. Critics 
claimed that the system was a backward step because it was inefficient, 
led to assorted "rings" and "gangs" that catered to special interests, 
and created a climate of corruption. Even though there was plenty of 
evidence to support these assertions, city governments helped pro-
mote the fortunes of local business communities. In the South political 
support for bond issues and franchises was very important in further-
ing the railroad strategies pursued by many cities, including Baltimore, 
Louisville, and New Orleans. Moreover, politicians in their roles as 
civic spokesmen were important in giving credence and official sanc-
tion to the antebellum commercial conventions. No matter what the 
outward trappings of power, if they wanted to advance community 
economic fortunes and stay in power, elected city officials had little 
choice except to go along with the plans of their business communities. 
Civil War and Reconstruction brought trying times for the south-
ern urban governments. President Abraham Lincoln suspended 
habeas corpus in designated war zones. Throughout most of hos-
tilities, Baltimore was under martial law even though Maryland re-
mained in the Union. Louisville officials had to contend with severe 
trade restrictions. Congress ran the District of Columbia as an armed 
camp. All the Confederate cities experienced occupation governments. 
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Early in the Civil War, Union officials seemed unsure about how to 
govern towns taken by federal troops. Memphis, the first major Con-
federate city that fell, was allowed to retain its elected government for 
several months before the establishment of military rule. At the time of 
the capture of New Orleans, Union forces established military rule as a 
matter of course. Benjemin "Spoon" Butler's reign in the Crescent City 
remained a source of controversy until well after the restoration of the 
Union. 21 New Orleans was a special case among cities that experienced 
long-term occupations; most of the other occupation governments 
were relatively mild. Ultimate control rested with the military, but in 
practice elected officials, bureaucrats, and service employees con-
tinued to do their jobs. The Union had neither the capacity nor the 
inclination to overturn the machinery of city government. As long as 
conditions remained peaceful, the occupied towns operated much as 
they had before the war and in many instances under Confederates in 
all but name. After the return to urban civilian government all across 
the South in the months that followed Appomattox, the politics of 
Reconstruction became a central concern. One theme remained consis-
tent: no matter what the political situation at any given time, the city 
governments as throughout their corporate lives remained steadfastly 
on the side of free enterprise. 
The Gilded Age was generally an unhappy period for American 
city governments. The excesses of the political machine run by William 
Marcy Tweed in New York became a symbol of urban corruption. 
The scandals of the Ulysses S. Grant administration lingered on long 
after their resolution. The urban graft that occurred in the District of 
Columbia became standard fare in denunciations of Grantism. But 
what happened in Washington demonstrated that an urban govern-
ment, if given the means, had the capacity to transform a city and to 
improve the quality of its life. Significantly, the experiment happened 
in the South. 
The Washington example belied the claims of northerners who 
charged that southerners were incapable of progress. In 1880 Albion 
Winegard Tourgee wrote a popular semiautobiographical novel, A 
Fool's Errand. Tourgee, a native Ohioan and Civil War veteran, was a 
carpetbagger in North Carolina. The central character in his book was a 
man named Fool. Like Tourgee, Fool went south to seek his fortune. 
He did well in politics until forced out of office at the end of Reconstruc-
tion and returned to the North empty-handed. Tourgee, analyzing 
Fool's experience, wrote, "He represented another civilization, another 
development, of which they were naturally suspicious, and especially 
so on account of the peculiar restrictions which slavery had put around 
them, and which had acted as an embargo on immigration for so many 
years before the war. "22 Those assertions may have accurately applied 
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to certain parts of the Tar Heel State during Reconstruction, but they 
did not apply to Washington. 
In 1871 Congress significantly modified the government of the 
District of Columbia. 23 The mayor and council forms of government 
were abolished in both Washington and Georgetown, and a district 
administration patterned after those in the territories was created. 
Under the new legislation, the voters elected a lower house and the 
president appointed a governor, upper chamber, and board of public 
works. The five-person board, which became the center of controversy, 
was given the power to plan and construct all public improvement 
projects within the District of Columbia. For such purposes, the board 
had an important say over matters of taxation and the issuing of general 
obligation bonds. It could also assess a third of the cost for public 
improvements upon adjoining property holders. Opponents charged 
that creation of the Territory of the District of Columbia was a means of 
cutting the power of Washington's newly enfranchised blacks. One 
result of the change, however, was boss rule sanctioned by the federal 
government. 
Alexander Shepherd, first as a member of the board of public 
works and then as governor, initiated a massive construction and 
beautification program. The thirty-seven-year-old Shepherd was a boy 
wonder of the Washington construction industry. As a residential 
developer he had used methods considered reckless in his day. Unlike 
most builders, who constructed and sold one house at a time, Shep-
herd went deeply in debt building a large number of homes and then 
hoped for volume sales to turn a profit. His reputation as a plunger 
bothered his more conservative business colleagues, especially when 
he followed similar policies as a public official. His aim was to turn 
Washington into a model seat of government. He later told an inves-
tigating committee that he wanted to make improvements "as rapidly 
as possible ... in order that in this respect the capital of the nation 
might not remain a quarter of a century behind the times."24 
With the approval of President Grant, Shepherd highhandedly 
distributed lavish patronage and construction contracts through the 
board of public works. With reason, the press called him "Boss" 
Shepherd. He began massive projects, ignoring debt ceilings. Appar-
ently he assumed that Congress would make up the deficits. He once 
reported to a congressional committee that the board of public works 
had spent $6.6 million when the actual total was $18.9 million. Such lies 
were too much even in an age of free and easy public morality. In 1874, 
after the size of the debts became known, Congress abolished the 
Territory of the District of Columbia, set up a temporary government, 
and started to untangle the financial mess. Shepherd, his public career 
in shambles and his private real estate business ruined in the Panic of 
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1873, moved to Mexico. He left behind a significant legacy. Upon the 
completion of the physical renovations, Washington emerged as one of 
the country's most beautiful and livable cities. For the first time, it was a 
true national capital. Shepherd's unsavory tactics repelled honest cit-
izens, but he demonstrated that a city government could take positive 
steps to improve the lives of its citizens by changing the physical 
environment. Despite excesses and mistakes, the Territory of the Dis-
trict of Columbia experiment stood out as an innovative bright spot in 
the general morass of urban government in the Gilded Age. Unfor-
tunately, few other cities had the resources to follow the standards for 
beautification set in Washington. 
Statistics for 1880 indicated that almost all of the South's largest 
towns were in poor financial shape (see Table 5.1). 25 The high costs 
associated with Reconstruction and a concurrent reluctance on the part 
of municipal authorities to assess property at its true valuation and to 
establish adequate tax bases were partly responsible. Methods of de-
termining total valuation differed considerably from one place to an-
other, although most cities kept rates as low as possible. The highest tax 
per $100 in total valuation was Vicksburg's $4.45. The lowest was 
Baltimore's $1.22. Nationally, Des Moines's tax rate of $5.18 per $100 
was the highest among all American cities of over 10,000 people in 
1880. At the bottom was the 89-cent rate per $100 in Quincy, Illinois. 26 
The vast number of cities in the nation had rates in the range of $1 to $2 
per $100. Many southern cities fell within the national norms, which 
was small consolation to taxpayers. Per capita debts varied greatly 
among American cities. There was no pattern, North or South. Epi-
demic-ravaged Memphis had a per capita debt of $135.58, the highest 
in the United States. The Memphis government had collapsed, and the 
state legislature had made the municipality part of a county taxation 
district. Washington, as might have been expected, was second with a 
debt of $127.66 per capita. Certainly, residents of both Washington and 
Memphis must have envied Baltimore's per capita debt of only $2.57. 
Average net indebtedness-not to be confused with bonded indebted-
ness--was slightly higher in southern cities than in those elsewhere. 
The state of Dixie's economy made the taxes far harder to bear than in 
the more prosperous portions of urban America. 
Outstanding bonded debts added to the tax burdens in the cities of 
the South.27 The District of Columbia's debt, the nation's largest, 
amounted to $21.7 million. Baltimore's $20.2 million debt and those of 
New Orleans and Louisville, $15.3 million and $8.1 million, respec-
tively, were also discouraging. Twelve other southern towns had bond-
ed debts of more than $1 million. Funding floating debts and refunding 
old debts were the main reasons for outstanding bonded debts. The 
cities had floated bonds for a wide variety of purposes. At least nine-
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Table 5.1. Public Indebtedness in Southern Cities of More Than 
10,000 Inhabitants, 1880 
Valuation Indebtedness Tax Rate 
City Total Per Capita Net Per Capita Per $100 
Alabama 
Mobile $ 12,991,795 $466 $2,609,250 $89.57 $2.60 
Montgomery 5,506,994 330 567,900 33.98 2.41 
Arkansas 
Little Rock 4,465,205 340 335,243 25.52 3.85 
Dist. of Columbia 
Georgetown & 
Washington 99,401,787 560 22,675,459 127.66 1.48 
Georgia 
Atlanta 18,000,000 481 2,180,000 58.27 2.20 
Augusta 13,730,681 627 1,959,519 89.51 1.93 
Columbus 
Macon 6,222,000 488 743,000 55.28 2.05 
Savannah 15,060,445 490 3,425,000 111.53 2.93 
Kentucky 
Covington 14,521,725 489 1,030,000 34.66 2.17 
Lexington 4,964,005 298 112,000 6.72 1.63 
Louisville 65,809,000 532 4,849,935 39.19 2.28 
Newport 6,588,653 322 966,618 47.31 2.36 
Louisiana 
New Orleans 91,794,350 425 17,736,509 82.08 2.63 
Maryland 
Baltimore 244,043,181 734 854,466 2.57 1.22 
Cumberland 
Mississieei 
Vicksburg 3,582,000 303 373,218 31.59 4.45 
North Carolina 
Wilmington 4,759,890 274 539,845 31.11 3.13 
South Carolina 
Charleston 22,543,423 451 4,129,102 82.61 3.10 
Columbia 2,600,000 259 854,850 85.18 2.42 
Tennessee 
Chattanooga 3,600,925 279 116,264 9.02 2.75 
Memphis 16,784,314 500 4,554,355 135.58 1.79 
Nashville 13,336,760 308 1,606,200 37.05 3.00 
Virginia 
Alexandria 3,673,674 269 1,037,088 75.93 2.73 
Lynchburg 8,405,610 527 794,837 49.80 1.97 
Norfolk 11,057,249 503 2,187,371 99.58 3.35 
Petersburg 9,132,330 422 1,136,100 52.46 1.95 
Portsmouth 2,906,324 255 283,014 24.85 2.01 
Richmond 39,522,356 621 4,399,021 69.17 1.85 
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teen cities had yet to pay off bonds issued for railroads or other 
transportation projects. Louisville owed $3.5 million and Baltimore 
$3.3 million for those purposes. As towns grew they had no choice but 
to fund necessary urban services. Baltimore had incurred $7.2 million 
in outstanding waterworks bonds; Louisville's debt was $1.4 million. 
Surely, there were some frivolous expenditures and in more than a few 
instances suspicions of corruption. Yet as cities broadened their func-
tions to cope with the challenge of modern life, urban leaders had to 
resort to bond issues to stay afloat. They hardly needed reformers to 
tell them about the reasons for the rising costs in government at a time 
when even street light fixtures sold for as much as $75 apiece. Few 
southern cities could have afforded the luxury of the $1.1 million in 
bonds floated by San Francisco authorities for the construction of 
public buildings. 28 And there was no way communities in the South 
could finance large, necessary, and expensive projects such as 
sewerages and waterworks without increasing their bonded indebted-
ness. 
In 1880 urban governments throughout the South had yet to as-
sume the additional burden of administering rigid segregation sys-
tems. 29 That would come a decade later following the sharp drawing of 
racial and class lines that accompanied the Populist revolt. The impetus 
for codifying white supremacy came chiefly from rural people. Political 
demagogues skillfully played upon white emotions. The so-called 
rednecks had long been suspicious of cities, which they viewed as 
sinister places where races mingled, challenging conventional morality 
and defying the accepted order. Impassioned orators easily convinced 
them of the need for legislation designed to keep the races apart. De 
facto segregation had started in urban America before the Civil War. In 
Ohio, for instance, custom dictated that blacks sit in the back or upper 
balconies of theaters. Congress delayed Wisconsin's statehood for two 
years by refusing to accept a proposed state constitution that prevented 
blacks from voting. Actually, there was more mingling of the races in 
antebellum New Orleans and Charleston than in New York or Chi-
cago, and it was for that reason that some slavocrats had called for the 
removal of as many slaves as possible from the cities. 
The odious Black Codes enacted at the state level had provided for 
the segregation of a wide variety of facilities, including horsecars and 
restaurants. Because of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
the onset of Reconstruction, the Black Codes either never went into 
effect or were of short duration. Urban race relations, relatively casual 
in the past, became strained. Whites, concerned about the prospect of 
black rule, placed interracial social and business relations on a much 
more formal basis than in the past. For their part, blacks generally 
acquiesced in an unwritten segregation system. David Macrae, an 
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English visitor who toured the South by rail in the late 1860s, observed, 
"There are 'nigger cars' open, of course, to white people, and often 
used as smoking cars, but to which all coloured passengers have to 
confine themselves. "30 Visiting northerners wrote glowingly about 
racial harmony at increasingly infrequent dinners attended by both 
blacks and whites, not realizing that such social gatherings had been 
commonplace in some southern cities before the Civil War. Reconstruc-
tion further polarized the races and only temporarily prevented the 
establishment of a rigid segregation system. 
Conditions during Reconstruction in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 
characterized white racial attitudes. In 1860 Baton Rouge was a town of 
5,400 population,31 68 percent of which was white. Several thousand 
blacks swarmed into town in the last months of the Civil War. One 
resident thought the place on the verge of becoming a black village. He 
wrote in early 1865, "Take the army out and four-fifths of the town 
would be Negroes. They tare down Houses and build for themselves 
upon Confiscated Ground. The Whole flat Down in Catfish is covered 
With Little Negro Shantyes and the Schools are very full of Negroes." 
Soon after the war ended, city government established a night patrol 
and strengthened the police force. Although there was little violence, 
many whites were angered by the freedmens' bad manners. Some 
blacks used insulting language and pushed whites off the sidewalks. 
The editor of the Baton Rouge Advocate expressed a view held by his 
fellow whites when he said he longed for the days when those offenses 
were "settled with a dose of fifteen or twenty lashes."32 
The reestablishment of social control over blacks became a major 
goal of Baton Rouge whites. City officials ordered all black places of 
amusement closed at 9:00P.M., arrested black prostitutes, and carried 
on regular inspections of black households. White spokesmen placed a 
strong emphasis on the doctrines of hard work and social respon-
sibility. "Man was not put on the earth to rove about in idleness," the 
Advocate's editor wrote. "The abolition of slavery by no means lessens 
the obligations of the blacks to toil and labor for support. ... Freed-
men does not mean that one may do as he pleases. "33 Baton Rouge 
approved of the Louisiana Black Codes, even though they were not 
needed in that city. In April1867, at the start of Radical Reconstruction 
in East Baton Rouge Parish, civil authorities already had race matters 
well in hand. The municipality acted as the key institution in re-
establishing control over the "darkies."34 Throughout Reconstruction 
in Louisiana the Baton Rouge city government remained steadfastly 
under white control. It made little difference whether Republicans or 
Democrats exercised power. Politicians of both parties were in agree-
ment about the need to use intimidation, economic blackmail, and 
paternalistic statements to keep blacks in line. In 1880, Baton Rouge, 
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with a population of 7,200, was 59 percent black. Even though they 
were in the majority, the blacks had no real economic or political power. 
Well in advance of a legal system of discrimination, the precedent of 
using the city government as a means of controlling the black popula-
tion had been firmly established. 
By 1880 there was a clear trend in the southern cities in the direc-
tion of residential segregation. 35 In antebellum times, urban slaves 
customarily lived close to their masters. Following the Civil War, al-
though freedmen continued to reside in the major cities, they were no 
longer welcome in the predominantly white parts of town. Besides 
growing white opposition to racial mixing, there was fear of black crime 
and concern about property values. These factors overrode arguments 
that large concentrations of blacks would complicate law enforcement 
problems. Most of the new black districts were in suburban areas, 
where former slaves had gathered in makeshift shantytowns following 
emancipation. Hell's Half Acre and Bone Alley in Atlanta, Black Center 
and Black Bottom in Nashville, Baguehomma and Peacocks Tract in 
Montgomery were built as and remained slums. As these settlements 
gained semipermanence, they became a source of white concern. An 
official report compiled in Tennessee after an 1873 cholera epidemic 
noted, "Nashville, a beautiful and attractive city, is possessed of filthy 
and repulsive suburbs. The small streets and lanes that surround the 
base of Capitol Hill are occupied exclusively by the lower classes. The 
houses are dirty and filthy in the extreme; the streets and gutters are 
filled with filth." In 1881 an Atlanta Constitution reporter wrote about a 
district he claimed was populated "chiefly of niggers, bobtailed dogs 
and babies." He felt that whites knew little about Atlanta's black slum 
dwellers. "They are not employed in private homes nor in the business 
houses," he commented, "but drift off to themselves, and are almost as 
far from the White people, so far as all practicable benefits of associa-
tions are concerned, as if the two races never met."36 Throughout 
Dixie, little was done to arrest the movement toward black slums or to 
make them more desirable places in which to live. 
In 1880 average family sizes were about the same in southern cities 
as in those in the rest of the United States. But the average number of 
persons per dwelling in the South's cities was generally lower than in 
those of the North. Table 5.2 indicates conditions in the sixteen largest 
southern towns. 37 Every city except Memphis, which continued to 
show the effects of its epidemics of a few years earlier, had an average of 
at least 5 persons to a family. The city had the lowest average number of 
persons per dwelling (4.68) and the smallest number of persons per 
family (4.23) of any of the hundred largest cities in the country. 
Charleston contained the highest number of persons per dwelling in 
the South. An average of 7.63 residents lived in 6,552 structures. By 
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Table 5.2. Population Ratios by Dwellings and Families for Sixteen 
Southern Cities, 1880 
Dwellings Families 
Persons Persons 
City Number Per Dwelling Number Per Family 
Alabama 
Mobile 5,276 5.52 6,133 4.75 
District of Columbia 
Washington 24,107 6.11 29,603 4.98 
Georgia 
Atlanta 6,494 5.76 7,799 4.80 
Augusta 3,938 5.56 4,998 4.38 
Savannah 5,572 5.51 6,684 4.59 
Kentucky 
Covington 4,792 6.20 6,076 4.89 
Louisville 18,898 6.55 24,343 5.08 
Newport 3,225 6.34 4,111 4.97 
Louisiana 
New Orleans 36,347 5.95 45,316 4.77 
Maryland 
Baltimore 50,833 6.54 65,356 5.08 
South Carolina 
Charleston 6,552 7.63 11,406 4.38 
Tennessee 
Memphis 7,174 4.68 7,943 4.23 
Nashville 7,072 6.13 8,525 5.09 
Vrrginia 
Norfolk 3,277 6.70 5,098 4.31 
Petersburg 3,426 6.32 4,779 4.53 
Richmond 9,532 6.67 12,180 5.22 
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comparison, New York had an average of 16.37 persons per dwelling. 
The southern cities were "walking cities," meaning that people could 
conveniently get around town and to their places of business on foot. 
In contrast to the hastily built towns in the Midwest, the older southern 
communities showed their antecedents as old country towns. 
With only a few exceptions, most of Dixie's towns had grown in an 
orderly fashion. The vast majority of southerners resided in single-
family units, ranging from the shanties of the black districts to the 
comfortable brick houses in the better white residential neigh-
borhoods. Like growing cities in other parts of the country, the south-
em cities displayed a vitality lacking in stagnant communities. Even 
Atlanta struck an English visitor in 1878 as "a new brick-built town, 
with no trees in the streets, but abundant mud. "38 Northern journalist 
Edward King agreed. Atlanta impressed him as a "new, vigorous, 
awkwardly alert city, very similar in character to the mammoth group-
ings of brick and stone in the North-west." In speaking of Savannah's 
affluent residential sections, however, he said, "There is nothing that 
reminds one of the North in the deliciously enbowered chief city of 
Georgia, surrounded with its romantic moss-hung oaks, its rich 
lowlands, and its luxuriant gardens, where the magnolia, the bay, and 
the palmetto vie with one another in the exquisite inexplicable charm of 
their voluptuous beauty. "39 Southern cities had not built the "three-
decker" family dwellings of Boston and the tenements of New York, 
but they remained studies in contrast, from the row houses of Bal-
timore to the lovely homes in the garden district of New Orleans. 
Praising the character of southern cities either individually or 
collectively was not central to the New South creed. The promoters had 
no desire to laud another city at the expense of their own. Crucial to the 
philosophy of the New South was the contention that cities throughout 
the section had become more and more like those elsewhere. There 
was no positive purpose in trying to illustrate any distinctive charac-
teristics that could be construed in the North as showing that the 
South's cities were different. When Henry Grady pointed out that 
Atlanta was not a "Yankee city," he avoided references to geography 
and concentrated instead upon the pluck of the inhabitants in over-
coming adversity through faith in the entrepreneurial spirit. Nonethe-
less, geography had an impact in shaping Dixie's cities. The section 
had no arid plains, treeless mountains, or monotonous prairies. One 
potential urban site did not look much like another. Nor were there as 
many available. A variety of landscapes coupled with lush vegetation, 
plentiful water, and mild winters contributed to a southern difference 
in city building. 
The Tidewater contained many desirable town sites. When Cap-
tain John Smith had sailed up the James River in the spring of 1607 the 
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forests were alive with color. The sight moved him to write, "Heaven 
and earth never agreed better to frame a place for man's habitation. "40 
No great cities grew along the James River in colonial times, but 
important towns did appear at equally desirable locations. Baltimore 
sprawled over several low hills. The highest rose an imposing 360 feet 
above sea level. Despite detractors who contended that the District of 
Columbia was in a malarial swamp, Washington and Georgetown had 
pleasing locales. The gently undulating surface, with Capitol Hill as the 
highest point, fell away in terraces and gradual slopes to the river-
banks. Adjacent Alexandria, on slightly higher ground in northern 
Virginia, was heavily wooded. Norfolk and Portsmouth were on low, 
level ground with good drainage. The river view at Wilmington im-
pressed visitors. 41 Northern journalist Edward King commented, "The 
Cape Fear river, at Wilmington, is a wide and noble stream, and the 
scene along its banks, in the brilliant sunshine of the autumn morning 
when I saw it, was inspiring. "42 The neck upon which Charleston 
stood was such a good site that it would have been difficult to construct 
an ugly city. Savannah's heavy natural vegetation afforded much natu-
ral beauty. With pride, the citizens called their town the Forest City. 
Some observers argued that the harbors on the South Atlantic coast 
lacked the hilly panoramic beauty of those on the Pacific coast at Seattle, 
Portland, San Francisco, and San Diego. Still, without doubt the south-
em Atlantic cities had considerable natural beauty. 
The important piedmont towns were all in rolling, heavily wooded 
country, enhanced by swift-moving streams and waterfalls. Richmond 
rested upon two undulating plateaus, divided by a creek valley. Pe-
tersburg had a picturesque location in country resembling that around 
Richmond. Lynchburg lay on a relatively flat surface of red clay and 
gravel, nestled between surrounding hills. Columbia and Augusta 
both had heavily wooded, rolling sites.43 Rich foliage and shaded 
streets in the piedmont towns concealed blemishes such as unkept 
yards and dirty surroundings so evident in the new cities of the Great 
Plains. 
The locations selected by pioneers in the New West ranged from 
the sublime to the bland. Cumberland, in the mountains, had a site 
that would have done justice to a Colorado mining town high in the 
Rocky Mountains. Lexington was in the heart of the bluegrass country. 
King tried in prose to convey the perennial beauty of the area: "These 
fair lands are carpeted throughout the year with a brilliant blue grass. 
Even in midwinter a deep green clothes the soil, and, when summer 
comes, the grass sends up slender shafts to the height of several feet, 
crowned with featherly tufts of a bright blue color. "44 It was little 
wonder that Lexington had a reputation as one of Kentucky's most 
beautiful cities. Nashville lay on a broken surface typical of mountain 
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foothills. With reason, residents called Nashville the City of Rocks. On 
the south bank of the Ohio River, Louisville spread across an alluvial 
plain. Covington and Newport had gentle surfaces with underlays of 
blue limestone. Of the three Kentucky river cities, Louisville had 
benefited the most from builders who made the best use of relatively 
undistinguished sites. Most visitors were much more favorably im-
pressed than with Newport or Covington. Indeed, given their prox-
imity to Cincinnati, few travelers bothered mentioning either town. 
Possibly, the decisive factor was success. Because Louisville had at-
tained metropolitan status, visitors usually found something good to 
report. King, for example, whose account of Louisville emphasized 
economics and railroads, alluded to "lovely" lots and "vast plains. "45 
Along the Gulf Coast, military needs had dictated the locations of 
Mobile and New Orleans in inhospitable spots. The first site of Mobile 
was so low and unhealthy that many of the original settlers died of 
yellow fever. The survivors moved to higher ground, which was still 
only slightly above sea level. According to an official report compiled in 
1880, the coarse, loose, sandy soil absorbed the heaviest rain within a 
few hours, and the land along the Mobile River was marshy and 
malarious. 46 Yet Mobile was more than a windswept and unhealthy 
town on a desolate shore. Rich natural vegetation gave the community 
a semitropical appearance. New Orleans was founded in a swamp. 
George W. Cable, the leading Creole historian of the city in the nine-
teenth century, discussed the problems associated with the original 
site. "It was covered," he wrote, "for the most part, with a noisome and 
almost impenetrable cypress swamp, and was visibly subject to fre-
quent if not annual overflow." For decades floods were a constant 
irritant. Only the natural loveliness overcame what Cable called "feeble 
attractions."47 Despite its problems, New Orleans had a good defen-
sive location. A chain of lakes-Maurepas, Pontchartrain, and 
Borgue-as well as the river and several bayous protected the ap-
proaches of the Crescent City. Mississippi Sound provided a coastal 
waterway to Mobile. New Orleans was never moved, but founder M. 
de Bienville would have done well to have considered other than 
military factors. 
The locations of the frontier cities of the interior reflected the 
rugged nature of the South's heartland.48 Columbus and Macon were 
on hilly and thickly wooded land. Atlanta, in the foothills of the Smoky 
Mountains, sat astride a ridge in the Georgia red clay country. A 
multitude of hills and valleys afforded numerous fine building sites. 
The height of Chattanooga's hills varied by more than 300 feet. Lookout 
Mountain and Missionary Ridge towered over the town, providing a 
spectacular scenic panorama. Montgomery, Memphis, Little Rock, and 
Vicksburg were all on river bluffs. Memphis, on the fourth Chickasaw 
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Bluff, was on ground higher than the surrounding countryside. The 
land at Montgomery sloped gradually toward the Alabama River. The 
rural areas around Montgomery had much higher elevations. Little 
Rock was built upon what its founders had considered the first good 
place for a city above the confluence of the Mississippi and Arkansas 
rivers. Arkansas Post, the first territorial capital, located on the Arkan-
sas below Little Rock, washed away. Vicksburg, high on a neck of land 
above the Mississippi River, had a heritage that interested Edward 
King. "Vicksburg," he recorded, "the tried and troubled hill-city, her 
crumbling bluffs still filled with historic memorials of one of the most 
desperate sieges and defences of modern times, rises in quite imposing 
fashion from the Mississippi's banks in a loop in the river, made by a 
long delta, which at high water is nearly submerged."49 The sites of the 
new southern interior communities pointed up an important dif-
ference between nineteenth-century urbanization patterns in Dixie 
and the Midwest. The cities in the South owed their locations to a 
careful selection process, whereas the most successful midwestern 
cities owed their origins to unrestrained speculation. For example, 
unlike the founders of Little Rock, the promoters of the dozens of 
"paper towns" along the Maumee River in Ohio during the land rush of 
the 1830s had no time or inclination for careful planning. Southern 
needs and economic limitations dictated a more logical and com-
prehensive approach. City building in the interior continued the or-
derly process that started at the Tidewater. 
The mechanics of town planning was never a strength of the 
American experience. In normal fashion, the original developers de-
termined the design of cities. Given the small chance of success, few 
speculators engaged in careful planning. With odds of at least a thou-
sand to one, there was little desire to place much time or money into 
planning. 
The high point of early American urban design came in the South 
at Williamsburg, Virginia, and Washington. 50 Williamsburg, founded 
in 1699 as the new capital for the Old Dominion, was the first colonial 
community in which civic design took a proper place beside city 
planning. The scheme featured a unique "goose feet" street pattern, a 
broad green mall, and a series of formal gardens. Williamsburg also 
successfully blended Georgian-style buildings and landscape architec-
ture to create a pleasing planned environment. Washington's less 
successful plan represented the culmination of close to two hundred 
years of colonial urban design. Pierre L'Enfant's ideas, never entirely 
carried out, set high standards for future town planners. Despite its 
rural orientation, the South played an important role in the making of 
an urban planning tradition in America. 
New Orleans and Savannah are two other examples of planned 
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southern colonial cities. Bienville's original plat of New Orleans con-
sidered New France's great inland water transportation system. The 
focal point of his plan was a square, the placed' armes, on the riverbank. 
Away from the river, the principal building on the square was a Roman 
Catholic church. Directly behind that edifice, a wide thoroughfare ran 
straight north. Other streets extended away from the axis in either 
direction as part of a conventional grid. The waterfront, square, 
church, and axial street gave New Orleans a central core. Although 
imperfectly carried out, the plan clearly demonstrated Bienville's in-
tention to build an orderly and functional city suited to the crescent 
curve of the Mississippi River. 51 James Oglethorpe planned Savannah 
with equal care. "Mr. Oglethorpe," a writer for the South-Carolina 
Gazette, stated in 1732, "is indefatigable .... There are four houses 
already up ... and he hopes ... to finish two houses a week. ... He 
was pallisading the town round, including some part of the common . 
. . . In short, he has done a vast deal of work for the time, and I think 
his name justly deserves to be immortalized. "52 Oglethorpe used a 
rectangular design. He divided the community into six parts, each of 
which had a five-acre tract set aside for vegetable and flower gardens. 
In addition, he created a number of wards, each with forty house lots 
that measured 60 by 90 feet. Within each ward, he set aside a 315-
by-270-foot square for religious and commercial purposes. Main 
streets, all75 feet wide, acted as the ward boundaries. The orderly and 
easily expandable plan served Savannah well as it gradually evolved 
from a frontier post into a successful town. Oglethorpe, as had Bien-
ville, demonstrated the soundness of planning in building a city in the 
wilderness. 
By 1880, whether southern towns began as forts, blockhouses, 
stockades, elaborately planned communities, or hastily platted promo-
tions, a distinguishing feature was some form of rectangular street 
plan. The gridiron remained an enduring American legacy to urban 
planning. With a number of variations, the grid became more and more 
popular and pervasive as America moved west. Several California 
mining towns, for example, had square plans, cut through with 
grids. 53 A gridiron design was utilitarian and easy to lay out. Those 
factors overrode aesthetic considerations. Winding lanes may have 
been more pleasing to the eye than straight streets, but they were less 
practical. The only exception came when roads followed lines of least 
resistance. Hills, ravines, and rivers thwarted planners, but not very 
often. Usually, town builders picked a site because it was relatively flat. 
And even if circumstances such as a gold rush dictated an undulating 
spot, the builders generally ignored the topography or undertook 
earth-moving programs, all with the end of creating a gridiron. Indeed, 
building grids came close to being an obsession in the United States. 
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The predominance of the gridiron design tended to obscure the 
contribution of the South to an American urban planning tradition. 
The builders of Baltimore defied the town's hilly topography by follow-
ing a gridiron plan. Georgetown and Alexandria had conventional 
rectangular blocks, in sharp contrast to the planning in Washington. 
Norfolk and Portsmouth featured chopped-up grids that extended 
inland from their waterfronts. Wilmington had a rectangular shape. 
The "Grand Model," replete with many squares, envisioned by the 
proprietors of Charleston, had long since given way to adjacent rec-
tangular blocks. Richmond's design contained hundreds of square 
blocks and straight thoroughfares, as did other towns lining the pied-
mont: Petersburg, Lynchburg, Columbia, and Augusta. The cities of 
the New West started as fortifications or road junctions. After the end 
of the frontier, the pioneers adopted gridiron streets. Louisville's plat 
was almost square. Later subdivisions conformed closely to the orig-
inal design. Modified grids characterized the plans of Covington, 
Newport, and Lexington. Cumberland had a long, narrow grid. A 
combination of developers' decisions and topography afforded an 
uneven quality to Nashville's grid. The promoters who founded the 
South's interior towns routinely accepted the gridiron. Chattanooga's 
city fathers laid out the town as if it was on flat ground rather than in the 
mountains. Because of land titles, Atlantans used the old street plans 
in rebuilding their city. Rectangular blocks predominated in Macon, 
Montgomery, and Columbus. The Memphis grid went up and down 
hills better suited for a different concept. Vicksburg had a grid, and so 
did Little Rock. 54 The consequence in the newer southern cities was 
municipal monotony that characterized planning as the frontier moved 
across the continent. 
By 1880 the new City Beautiful movement already had strong 
southern roots. The idea had gained national attention with the Central 
Park project in New York, designed and directed by Frederick Law 
Olmsted in the years just before the Civil War. Olmsted, who later 
designed many other parks and beautification projects, popularized 
the concept that cities could have pleasing environments. 55 The theo-
ries behind the City Beautiful caught the national mood. On one hand 
it represented a reaction to the nostalgia for rural life in a nation in 
which many urbanites had grown up in the country. On the other hand 
medical authorities argued that green, tree-lined parks acted as the 
lungs of the city, purifying the air. Advocates of the City Beautiful 
wanted more than parks. They called for systematic tree-planting 
programs and for great boulevards patterned after those in Paris. The 
problem was that such projects, no matter how desirable they might 
have seemed, cost large sums of money and required major redevelop-
ment. Proponents claimed that City Beautiful undertakings would 
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automatically raise property values in their immediate vicinity. 56 Few 
people objected to urban beautification. The problem was to raise 
money, particularly in the South. No city in the section had a sys-
tematic tree-planting program. Alexandria, Norfolk, Portsmouth, 
Newport, and Chattanooga had no parks. Yet two other cities planned 
to build parks. Covington authorities expected to spend $3,500 to 
improve a grass plot. Officials at Montgomery had set aside two 
"spaces" as park lands and had changed the city code to provide for the 
election of a six-person board of park commissioners. 57 Moreover, a 
number of cities already had parks. Beautification was on old concept 
in Dixie. 
Several of the existing park systems in the South predated the City 
Beautiful movement. 58 These grounds and others of more recent vin-
tage related to the South's urban planning traditions. Efforts to create 
pleasing urban settings had followed the laying out of streets as a 
matter of course. Savannah's committee on parks spent $20,000 to 
improve parks, twenty-three of which were one-acre squares at inter-
sections. Many of these had initially been part of the original plan. The 
city of Charleston owned 33 acres of public grounds and intended to 
acquire an additional20 acres. The Battery at the harbor's edge featured 
tree-shaded walks and benches. In Atlanta, the 5-acre City Hall Park 
was the centerpiece of the city's 312-acre park system. Macon's Central 
City Park had a total area of 720 acres. Donated to the city by the state 
and designed by a former Macon mayor, it contained a large stand of 
trees, a race track, and a fairgrounds building. At Columbia, 117,000 
persons annually visited 25-acre Sidney Park. Of New Orleans' 660 
acres of public squares, the most famous was the original main square. 
Renamed Jackson Square, its distinguishing attribute was an imposing 
equestrian statue of Andrew Jackson. Throughout much of the South, 
there was a genuine effort to take advantage of the topography to 
promote community betterment. Even in a city with small park sys-
tems, private efforts sometimes resulted in pleasing vistas. A Mobile 
official, in a comment that could have applied to many other cities, 
noted, "Government street, the favorite promenade, is shaded by fine 
oak trees and bordered by handsome houses, surrounded by luxuriant 
gardens."59 
Perhaps the finest park system in the urban South financed by local 
public funds was in Baltimore. The city had many park squares with 
statues of famous people, which was why it had the sobriquet of the 
Monumental City. After the Civil War, Olmsted designed one of Amer-
ica's greatest parks in Baltimore. Called Druid Park, it was 693 acres in 
size. An imposing stone gateway served as the main entrance. Visitors 
could savor the park's many attractions by driving over twenty miles of 
winding roads. Several scenic views afforded impressive vistas of the 
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city and the harbor beyond. One of the park's attractions was a fountain 
in the middle of Druid Lake, actually a water reservoir. The fountain 
sent a jet of water a hundred feet into the air. Nearby, herds of deer and 
flocks of sheep ranged over the grassy hillside. A Baltimore official, 
attempting to sum up Druid Park's quiet beauty, wrote, "Art is not 
needed for embellishment, and the few structures required are gener-
ally well placed, and harmonize with the natural surroundings. "60 
Judicious landscape gardening and engineering combined to make 
Baltimore a nationally recognized showcase. 
The great improvement projects in Washington included the up-
grading and extension of the park system. L'Enfant's plan had set aside 
numerous desirable locations for parks, public buildings, and govern-
mental purposes. Some property was sold or given away; the rest, 
amounting to 513 acres, remained in federal hands. Most of the land 
served as the grounds for public buildings, including the Capitol and 
the White House. Manicured lawns, beautiful flower gardens, and 
winding walks in the federal districts added to the beauty of Wash-
ington. So did the numerous squares and circles that graced different 
parts of the city. Two of the better-known squares were Lafayette 
Square and Franklin Square. The former, directly north of the White 
House, across Pennsylvania Avenue, was a seven-acre park complete 
with gravel walks, benches, trees, and shrubbery. A fifteen-ton eques-
trian statue of Andrew Jackson, bigger than the one in New Orleans, 
added a dramatic touch. The latter, located several blocks west of the 
White House, was a four-acre tract covered by bushes and trees. A 
fountain and several spring-fed drinking fountains caused favorable 
comments. The circles and squares-Scott, McPherson, Farragut, Lin-
coln, Greene, and others-contained statues of famous Americans. 
Outlying intersections contained unimproved spaces designated as 
triangular reservations. Numerous opportunities existed to honor 
American heroes, at the same time further enhancing the beauty of 
Washington. 61 The redesigned city, from the Capitol grounds planned 
by Olmsted to the lowliest circle, represented an important manifesta-
tion of the City Beautiful movement. Parks enhanced the beauty of 
metropolises in Gilded Age America: Fairmont in Philadelphia, Lin-
coln in Chicago, Belle Isle in Detroit, and Golden Gate in San Francisco. 
None assumed the monumental quality or the historical character of 
those in the District of Columbia 
The architectural styles of Washington's public buildings, in keep-
ing with national traditions, was eclectic. The forms combined the 
Georgian, Greek Revival, and Moorish vogues of antebellum times 
with the newer Victorian designs of the 1870s. The White House and 
the Capitol both displayed some of the more attractive attributes of 
traditional southern architecture. The White House, constructed of 
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freestone and painted white, was three stories high, 170 feet long, and 
86 feet wide. The front had a colonnade of eight simple Ionic columns. 
A semicircular portico was in the rear. The Capitol consisted of a central 
building with two great wings. Sixty-eight marble Corinthian columns 
set off the East Front of the massive seat of government. The building 
covered 3.5 acres and was 751 feet long and from 121 to 324 feet wide. 
Virginia freestone was used for the central section and Massachusetts 
marble for the each of the two wings. The huge dome was 287 feet high, 
with a base 136 feet in diameter. The federal government built the 
central building with slave labor between 1818 and 1827 and the wings 
and dome in the 1850s and 1860s. Total construction costs exceeded $13 
million, making it the most expensive building in all of North America. 
The Capitol and White House fulfilled their purpose of signifying the 
dignity, majesty, and power of the United States government.62 
Older forms characterized some of the best of different strains of 
architecture across the South. 63 One of the finest examples of Greek 
Revivalism was the Tennessee state capitol in Nashville. It had classical 
porticoes and a slim tower, all patterned after the Charagic Monument 
of Lysicrates in Athens. Red Georgian row houses in Baltimore demon-
strated how an architectural style could give a city a special character. 
The Baltimore dwellings, with their well-scrubbed white steps, fronted 
directly on the street. Row houses in many Washington and 
Georgetown neighborhoods usually had small gardens before them. 
Alexandria, which escaped damage in the Civil War, had a treasure 
trove of Georgian buildings dating from colonial times. Gadsby's Tav-
ern, erected in 1752, was a plain brick building, reflecting the general 
style of architecture in the older parts of town. Cities south of Alex-
andria had many large Greek Revival buildings such as the capitol of 
Virginia in Richmond, although one of the finest structures in 
Charleston was the Orphan House of modified English Tudor design. 
Built in the 1790s, its towers afforded an impressive view of the port. At 
New Orleans, the cathedral, built along Moorish lines, was an architec-
tural landmark. Along the narrow lanes of the French Quarter, two-
and three-story buildings with ironwork balconies and courtyards 
were almost all done in a Spanish style. Horrible fires that swept 
through New Orleans in 1788 and 1794 had destroyed most of the 
French architectural heritage. Mobile, as other places in the lower 
South, contained eclectic mansions, which showed varied Georgian 
and Greek Revival influences. 64 Throughout the South, the more 
impressive of the older homes and buildings were more than simply 
handsome older buildings. Rather, in many instances they served as 
symbols of an age of past glories. 
The large plantation houses, with their characteristic wide por-
ticoes and white columns, represented one of the Old South's greatest 
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architectural legacies. Yet the adaptation of a culture to a particular 
environment was a long and complicated process. By the Civil War the 
South had no full-blown regional architecture. Of course, construction 
techniques reflected the climate. The trend from north to south called 
for fewer basements, more windows, higher ceilings, and thinner 
walls. Maryland, Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Kentucky 
contained a wide variety of styles, particularly an intermingling of 
eclectic aspects of Greek Revival and Georgian forms. In the lower 
South, Greek Revival was dominant in the latter stages of the ante-
bellum period. The style gained widespread national attention during 
the Greek democratic revolt against Turkish rule. In the South, Greek 
Revival suited perfectly the idealistic democratic view of sectional 
institutions held by the vast majority of upper-class leaders. Even so, 
there was no rigid conformity. Utilitarian structures, such as the raised 
platform houses of the frontier and the "three Ps" (two rooms called 
pens and a connecting passage) of Little Rock, were as characteristic of 
southern architecture as Georgian row houses and Greek Revival 
public buildings. 
Unreconstructed Confederates disapproved of the trend toward 
Victorian and Gothic style buildings, which they considered grotesque 
and ostentatious Yankee products. By earlier standards, some of the 
larger southern projects seemed far from handsome, trimmed with 
much gingerbread and lacking clean lines. The Victorian railroad sta-
tion in Chattanooga repelled many people. It had a huge overhanging 
shed resting on arches of brick masonry and protecting six lines of 
tracks. The structure seemed out of place in a southern city. In Atlanta, 
a carpetbag member of the Bourbon Triumvirate constructed the multi-
storied gingerbread and turreted Kimball House, described as Georgia 
Gothic. The block-square white marble Baltimore City Hall was an-
other large Victorian structure that detractors considered a mon-
strosity. Constructed in the 1870s for $2.3 million, the four-story edifice 
had a French mansard roof topped by a large iron dome. 65 
Few of the critics of what they considered imported northern forms 
stopped to consider that two of America's most influential architects of 
the era were from the South. Henry Hobson Richardson was born on a 
Louisiana plantation in 1838 and John Welborn Root in Lumpkin, 
Georgia, in 1850. Richardson, the greatest American architect of the 
day, had a strong interest in Romanesque styles. His famous student, 
Louis Sullivan, pioneered steel frame construction. Root made impor-
tant contributions in Chicago and Kansas City. Both Root and 
Richardson believed that their buildings were suitable for all parts of 
the land. 66 That idea ran counter to prevailing opinions in the South, 
which ignored why men such as Root and Richardson made their 
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greatest contributions in the North. Money was unavailable for inno-
vative projects in the depressed southern society. 
All southern cities of 10,000 people or more in 1880 had theaters 
and lecture halls. The four largest cities had facilities comparable to the 
best anywhere except for New York, the nation's entertainment center. 
At a time when any theater that held over 1,000 patrons was considered 
large, there were many such in the South. Baltimore had three, two of 
which had more than 2,000 seats. Several Louisville houses sat be-
tween 1,200 and 2,000 spectators-the Macauley's, the Opera House, 
the Knickerbocker, the Metropolitan, and the Masonic Temple. New 
Orleans had lavishly appointed theaters. The largest, the St. Charles, 
held 3,000 people. Better known was the 2,000-seat French Opera 
House on Bourbon Street. Several other southern cities had fine play-
houses in the 1,000-seat category. Memphis boasted Greenlow's Opera 
House and Leabrie's Theater. The principal places of amusement in 
Richmond were the Mozart Hall and the Richmond Theater. Observers 
considered the new Ford's Opera House and the National Theater the 
main Washington theaters. Augusta had an opera house that held 
1,000 persons, plus a 1,800-seat hall. Norfolk, Lynchburg, and Atlanta 
all had large theaters. The Norfolk Opera House seated 1,350 and the 
Academy of Music 1,500. Atlanta had a 1,600-seat facility. The 650-seat 
Academy of Music was the chief entertainment palace in Lynchburg. 
Chattanooga did not have a theater, but a hall, when set up for perform-
ances, had a seating capacity of 800. 67 Throughout the urban South, 
even it its newer towns, places of amusement gave credence to the 
section's rich entertainment traditions. The heritage extended back 
into colonial times when Williamsburg, Annapolis, and Charleston 
were pioneering theatrical centers. 68 Although the legitimate theater 
declined in the Gilded Age, well-attended minstrel and variety shows 
attested to the continued strong attraction to the stage by southerners 
of all ranks. 
In the Gilded Age there was no distinctive American urban style of 
social or artistic expression. In the Northeast, Puritan values found 
acceptance as an expression of public morality. The towns of the 
Midwest were workshops with a cultural heritage that mixed European 
and American ways. Rising new cities of the West copied eastern 
norms. In the South, concepts of romanticism, though in the main-
stream of southern agrarianism, provided no real moorings for city 
dwellers. Nevertheless, southern cities strove to attain cultural identi-
ties. Although not recognized as such at the time, their residents were 
part of a larger American urbanization process that would create a 
nation of "city people," at once different and holding common 
values. 69 
114 The Rise of the Urban South 
The theater was in the vanguard of cultural activities that cut across 
sectional lines, breaking down older traditions associated with an 
agricultural republic, North as well as South. The course was far from 
even, and the means of urban acculturation varied as well. Horse racing 
was one of the threads. The first Kentucky Derby, held in 1875 at 
Louisville's Churchill Downs, quickly gained stature as a national 
event. The race gave Louisville a link to the great northeastern tracks at 
Belmont and Saratoga Springs and to Pimlico in Baltimore. In another 
way, the Washington social whirl and the winter season in Charleston 
provided a common ground with northeastern society in Boston and 
New York. Richmond was another fashionable entertainment center. 
Cosmopolitan New Orleans, throughout the travails of Civil War and 
Reconstruction, maintained its reputation for elaborate dance halls, 
charming Creole women, and excellent cuisine. The Crescent City was 
not only in the mainstream of urban culture, but it set standards that 
cities throughout the nation wanted to emulate. 7° Certainly, the towns 
of the Old Confederacy had a special southern flavor. The images 
brought forth from the French Quarter to Churchill Downs, clear in 
themselves, blurred in the context of a national urban culture. Agrar-
ianism remained the accepted standard. Within that context, cities 
remained anomalies, independent from one another and from their 
sectional antecedents. Yet by the twentieth century it became in-
creasingly apparent that urban refinements had the potential of dras-
tically altering the southern way of life. This subtle process became 
irreversible. 
Throughout the Gilded Age, northern critics continued to judge 
Dixie's cities with prejudiced eyes. From that vantage point, which 
failed to take into account the potential for change, the picture re-
mained dark indeed. The urban leaders were products of the Old 
South, hardly numbering among the best and the brightest. Backward 
business methods and a general aversion to hard work prevented 
southern gentlemen from competing successfully with their Yankee 
counterparts. Government was stagnant. Corrupt courthouse rings 
and gangs dominated politics. Racial bigotry continued unabated. 
Black shantytowns nullified efforts at beautification. Commercial con-
siderations thwarted the aims of planners. Architectural forms were 
monuments to a decadent past. So were the South's cultural preten-
sions. 
To heap criticism on southern cities for their supposed deficiencies 
was to ignore the need to judge southern urbanization on its own 
terms. As before the Civil War, the South's cities continued to develop 
along traditional lines. No quick way existed to modernize urban units 
created to serve the needs of an agrarian society severely weakened by 
sectional controversy. Although an immediate realization of the goals 
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of the more stringent advocates of the New South was impossible, the 
southern cities had underlying strengths that would serve them in 
good stead in the years ahead. To a large extent the course of future 
progress would depend upon the amelioration of race relations and the 
bringing of cities throughout the South into closer harmony with the 
rest of urban America. 
6 _____ _ 
Fearless in Discharge 
of Their Duties 
Spokesmen of the New South creed ignored the housekeeping side of 
city building. Who, after all, could get excited about street surfaces 
when the paramount task was to provide the philosophical founda-
tions for a South of cities? But someone had to fill the potholes and 
make decisions concerning public safety or a city could not function. In 
their newspapers, the New South editors urged the improvement of 
local services, commenting vigorously on conditions they felt needed 
attention and taking sides on questions of public concern. Without 
codifying their actions, the men of the New South used their pages to 
further important aspects of city building. They realized that knowl-
edge and experience in urban problem solving and decision making 
were necessary for successful urbanization. The need for increasingly 
complex services was an important characteristic of emerging cities. No 
need existed for a modern sewerage in Eagle Pond or for a professional 
fire department in Little River. 
Cities in the South as elsewhere in the nation faced common 
concerns regarding urban services; in this area southern urban antece-
dents crossed sectional barriers. Since the colonial period, frequently 
at times of serious intercolonial conflict, municipal offices in all the 
major cities had exchanged information about handling a wide variety 
of routine functions, thereby helping to create a cumulative North 
American response to urban problems. 1 
Urban authorities had to cope with many important and often 
vexing tasks. They needed to maintain streets, construct sewerage 
systems, and regulate waste removal and to solve problems arising 
from the erection of waterworks, gas plants, and horse railroads. They 
wanted to take advantage of innovations such as the telephone and the 
electric light. But the creation and maintenance of fire, police, and 
health departments required funds. The methods and priorities of the 
South's cities varied markedly, even within a single community. A 
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town might expend considerable money to obtain police protection 
and yet do almost nothing to provide health services. There were no 
special regional patterns. Even some of the nation's wealthiest commu-
nities neglected important urban concerns. Services were poorest in 
less affluent places that lacked resources to carry on a wide range of 
activities and that held little attraction to private investors. Unfor-
tunately, a majority of the cities in the Gilded Age South fit that 
description. Their citizens could hardly afford to pay even very low 
taxes, and private companies saw no profit in building expensive 
waterworks. It was little wonder that with few exceptions the southern 
cities had generally lower levels of urban services than places of similar 
size in other parts of the country. 
Street maintenance was a constant source of frustration. No one 
knew what surfaces were best. Cobblestone, which reputedly lasted a 
minimum of fifteen years, was noisy under traffic conditions, difficult 
to clean, and hard to replace. The best sources were quarries in 
Belgium. Many of the old southern maritime cities still had some 
cobblestone streets dating from an earlier period. In 1880 the mayor of 
Baltimore reported, "Baltimore has long suffered from bad pavements; 
the antiquated and elsewhere almost obsolete cobblestones are here a 
characteristic of our reverence for the past. "2 Other surfacing materials 
also presented problems. Granite and sandstone blocks were noisy 
and expensive; wood, cheap and easily installed, wore out quickly and 
lacked absorbency; seashells cracked on impact, creating a surface 
much like broken glass; asphalt, still in the experimental stage, melted 
under the rays of a hot sun; and broken stone and gravel, inexpensive 
and readily available, proved hard to maintain. These were the most 
widely used substances that covered streets in late nineteenth-century 
America. 3 Most city governments were content to throw gravel on the 
main thoroughfares and simply concentrate on keeping the streets 
passable. 
Lack of resources made it impossible to tend all the streets. Even in 
Washington, which had the highest level of urban services in the 
South, 96 miles out of 230 miles of streets remained unimproved. More 
startling were the figures for New Orleans, where 472 out of 566 miles 
of street surfaces had no pavement. Similar conditions prevailed else-
where. Charleston had 36 miles of dirt streets out of a total of 54 miles. 
Only 3 of 100 miles of lanes in Atlanta were surfaced. Of Memphis's 70 
miles of street, 12 miles were paved with either stone or wood. All the 
rest were unsurfaced. Perhaps the worst situation existed in Newport, 
where authorities admitted they did not even know the total mileage of 
the city's streets. 4 
Paving substances varied greatly in cost, quality, and availability 
from city to city. In 1880 the price of cobblestone by the square yard was 
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60 cents in Alexandria, 36 cents in Norfolk, and $2.25 in New Orleans. 
Broken stone sold for 70 cents per square yard in Covington and $1.50 
in Memphis. Savannah paid $2.50 per square yard for stone blocks that 
cost $1.65 in Charleston.5 Although the prie differences exasperated 
street commissioners, they were reduced to a choice of either paying 
the local rate or not paving their streets. Repair costs added to civic 
burdens. Few cities used the method employed in Macon, where the 
chain gang serviced the roads for an estimated $5,000 annually. 6 
Sidewalks were subject to much less wear and tear than streets. In 
commercial districts they were usually made of a fairly permanent 
substance. Louisville, Alexandria, and Augusta had brick sidewalks. 
Lynchburg's were of flat gneiss stone, Petersburg's of granite flagging 
and brick. Those in Charleston were flagstone, brick, shell, or earth. 
Macon's downtown had brick and granite walkways. Savannah used 
flagstone and bricks. New Orleans' better districts featured "ban-
quettes" covered with German flagstone and artificial stone. Walks in 
the residential areas of southern cities were almost always wood planks 
or dirt paths running along drainage ditches. 7 High costs made other 
materials impractical. Most people thought sidewalks were not worth 
expending much money on. If none existed, pedestrians could always 
take their chances walking in the street. 
It was virtually impossible to clean streets adequately in the horse 
age. In a single working day of eight hours a thousand horses deposi-
ted about five hundred gallons of urine and ten tons of dung upon the 
street surface. Most cities had one horse for every four persons. The-
oretically, constant travel worked street dirt into the roadway of gravel 
and unsurfaced streets. Practice was another matter. Concrete or as-
phalt thoroughfares became quagmires under heavy horse traffic, 
unless drained adequately, which they seldom were. Street sanitation 
was low on priority lists for urban services. Because urban dwellers 
took dirt and slime for granted, officials seldom faced public pressure 
to undertake corrective measures. During the first half of the nine-
teenth century few cities employed street-cleaning crews, relying in-
stead on street abutters, able-bodied men selected by lot from the tax 
rolls, and contracted scavengers. None of these arrangements worked 
very well. Householders shirked their duties, taxpayers showed little 
enthusiasm for the work, and scavenger services failed to attract a high 
level of personnel. 8 
Many people believed that certain animals and birds, because of 
their eating habits, were a cheap answer to the problem of garbage 
thrown into the streets. A number of large cities, including Louisville 
and Baltimore, relied on municipal pig herds. The hogs, protected by 
local ordinances, prowled the streets at will. When the herds increased 
too fast or aroused public indignation by attacking little children, 
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authorities sold some of the porkers, commonly called "walking 
sewers," to packing plants, keeping enough to consume the garbage. 
Pigs were taken out of service in the Civil War era because of changing 
conceptions of sanitation and adverse publicity by foreign visitors. The 
use of pigs had long since been abandoned in Europe, except in remote 
parts of Bulgaria and Transylvania. Several cities in the lower South, 
notably Charleston, used indigenous turkey buzzards as scavengers. 
These unattractive vulturous birds of prey performed their duties with 
considerable efficiency. In Charleston, which also had drains to carry 
runoff, visitors wrote glowingly about the cleanliness of the roadways. 
They expressed uneasiness, however, about a feeling when out walk-
ing of being watched from above, and they said that the birds smelled 
bad. 9 One southern city abandoned the use of vultures and tried using 
cows to remove refuse. In the late 1850s, when Frederick Law Olmsted 
visited Norfolk, he said that cows wandered at will, gaining "an un-
healthy subsistence from the cabbage-stalks and other substances 
which lie in heaps on the ground. "1° Cows never carne into wide favor 
because the large "meadow pads" that they left behind sometimes 
caused more serious inconvenience than decaying garbage. Given 
such frustrations, city governments increasingly turned to manpower, 
which gave a semblance of positive action. 
By 1880 street-cleaning methods reflected a low level of tech-
nology. The few firms that produced equipment for municipal cleaning 
did almost no research and development. Early street-sweeping rna-
chines, consisting of primitive revolving brush apparatuses drawn by 
horses, functioned so unreliably and cost so much that few cities 
considered their purchase. In lieu of machinery, sanitary engineers 
advocated that cities maintain a year-round regular force to clean 
streets by hand. Standard procedures called for a series of steps to 
ensure an adequate job. First, a roadway was watered to hold down the 
dust. Next, a crew swept leavings into neat piles in gutters or the center 
of the street. A following gang shoveled the unsavory piles into carts 
for transportation either to dumping areas or fertilizer plants. Al-
though this system might have worked, few places had the funds or 
desire to establish model prograrns. 11 
Performances, results, and expenditures differed across the urban 
South. Lexington and Memphis continued to require householders to 
sweep in front of their dwellings before pick-ups by private crews. 
Alexandria, Norfolk, Covington, and Macon authorities arranged to 
have the streets swept only when it seemed necessary. Columbia's 
budget was so small that manpower was available only to scrub open 
surface drains. A spokesman reported, "The cleaning is efficiently 
done, except on certain streets which require the most attention." 
Charleston sanitation workers, with what an official called "medium" 
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results, cleaned paved streets monthly, unpaved ones three times 
yearly, and designated "low spots" weekly. Atlanta's force did most of 
its cleaning in the commercial parts of town. For such per annum 
budgets as $810 in Alexandria, $15,000 in Savannah, and $105,800 in 
New Orleans, officials fought what many observers considered a los-
ing battle to keep the streets clean. 12 
A wide variety of uses were found for the street sweepings. Street 
departments in Baltimore, Richmond, and Charleston sold high-grade 
manure for fertilizer and dumped the rest into low-lying lots. 
Lynchburg street crews used "inoffensive" piles for fill and threw loads 
considered "offensive" into the river. Wilmington laws required the 
disposal of sweepings at least half a mile beyond the city limits; Colum-
bia ordinances simply called for depositing the dirt outside of town. 
Macon dumped street wastes south of the city. Memphis owned a 
special boat that carried street matter downriver for unloading. New 
Orleans street commissioners found it "decidedly advantageous" to 
dispose of "filth" in the town's "back portions." An unimpressed 
federal bureaucrat, remarking on the practice, said, "This opinion must 
of course be taken to relate to the benefit of raising the grades of the 
streets rather than to the effect of depositing street filth in such prox-
imity to habitations. "13 Unhappily, perceived practical economic con-
siderations frequently overrode the need for better health and 
sanitation. 
The removal of dead animals constituted another exasperating 
urban problem. Horse carcasses left to rot in streets by owners able to 
get away without detection presented a major problem. Moreover, 
persons tossed dead cats and dogs into the streets or onto vacant lots. 
Most southern cities found various ways to dispose of these carcasses, 
acting more out of necessity than desire and usually trying to use the 
cheapest method possible. The quality of the work varied greatly. The 
city of Baltimore spent $3,500 annually to remove deceased beasts to 
local bone-dust factories. Washington contractors hauled away 6,415 
animal remains in 1880; they were used in what an official called 
"various ways." An Alexandria regulation required owners to bury any 
creature larger than a cat beyond the city limits. Charleston attempted a 
cooperative arrangement whereby the municipal scavenger collected 
and dumped small dead beasts into a nearby swamp and local farmers 
carried away decayed horses, mules, and cows for grinding into fertil-
izer. The town contractor in Mobile charged owners 95 cents a head to 
ship approximately 800 animal bodies a year to a fertilizer plant down-
wind from town. 14 Whether by public or private means, there was a 
need throughout the urban South to improve methods of disposing of 
dead animals. It was small consolation that similar conditions existed in 
other parts of the country. 
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In 1880, when pigs and vultures were no longer used, garbage and 
ash disposal added to the cost of urban services in southern cities. 
Householders routinely mixed garbage and ashes. Every city had 
public garbage collectors, with exception of Covington, which hired a 
private contractor. Crews throughout the South removed refuse on 
regular schedules, from daily to twice weekly. Practices differed, de-
pending on the city. In Baltimore the drivers of garbage wagons blew a 
horn at intervals to warn patrons to have their garbage ready. In some 
other places, citizens either had to prepare garbage for collection in 
cans kept in backyards and alleys, or they were responsible for placing 
garbage containers along the street on designated collection days. 
Even if people followed instructions, serious health hazards frequently 
resulted from haphazard disposal methods. Once the garbage wagon 
passed, few people cared about what happened to its contents. In 
Norfolk city officials had only a vague idea of how solid wastes were 
ultimately disposed of. "They are dumped," a bureaucrat said, "out-
side of the city, and are taken by farmers for agricultural purposes." 
Other cities did little better. Columbia garbage men spread their loads 
on vacant lots throughout town. Louisville sanitation workers shov-
eled ashes into old cesspools and hauled garbage to outlying landfills. 
Memphis garbage workers carted away rubbish in wagons, dumping 
the contents into the Mississippi River. Crews at New Orleans, work-
ing in the dead of night, took ashes and garbage to special barges for 
eventual pitching into the river. 15 
In some places, including Washington, large amounts of garbage 
went uncollected. A health officer in the District of Columbia admitted 
in an 1880 report that decayed matter accumulated throughout his 
jurisdiction in alleys, yards, vacant lots, and cellars. With the daily 
addition of putrefying animal waste, potato parings, egg shells, dish 
water, and other refuse, the resulting concoction emitted foul odors 
and noxious gases, especially on hot steamy days. 16 Residents of 
Washington and elsewhere frequently complained about poor service 
and piles of street garbage. To the despair of reformers, there was little 
interest in increasing appropriations by raising taxes. The "garbage 
question" remained unanswered in Gilded Age America, South and 
North. 
Inefficient disposal of sewage caused increasing concern among 
southern sanitary experts and was also a national problem. Au-
thorities, citing studies by English sanitary expert Edwin Chadwick 
and others, claimed that building sewers for waste products would 
increase the average life span of urbanites by as much as ten years. It 
followed that the quick disposal of dangerous forms of filth would 
more than compensate for the obvious long-run problem created by 
polluting watering grounds and river courses. Some observers, how-
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ever, were not convinced by the experts' data. In addition, the tech-
nology for building massive systems of sewerage was new, and the 
costs were very high. The leading American sanitation engineers had 
no formal training. 17 These self-taught experts disagreed on such a 
fundamental point as what kind of sewage should be allowed to run 
through a given line. Officials in the urban South faced the dilemma of 
either building expensive, untested systems or waiting until engineers 
solved construction problems and possibly reduced costs. No easy 
solutions appeared on the immediate horizon. 
In 1880 promoters of the New South ignored another problem 
associated with sewerage needs. At a time when there was a growing 
belief that a connection existed between a lack of sewers and high 
urban death rates, many southern cities had no formally constructed 
sewerage systems. Others had sanitary arrangements that were little 
better than nothing. At Lexington a few eighteen-inch-square lime-
stone sewers emptied into the slow-moving Elkhorn Creek. No new 
lines had been constructed for several years. Augusta relied on old 
sewers once used exclusively for drainage. The few sewers that served 
Macon discharged into a swamp outside the city limits. 18 Montgomery 
had unventilated brick and wooden mains, none of which worked very 
well. "Men frequently have to be sent in to clear obstructions," a source 
reported. "For the past few years this kind of work has become so 
offensive that it is done in the night."19 Baltimore had twelve miles of 
storm sewers but no system for regular sewage. Tidal waters presented 
such serious problems at the outlets on the river front that the city 
remained without sewers until the early twentieth century. Mayor F. C. 
Latrobe said in 1880, "The city of Baltimore requires a system of 
sewerage. The continuance of the plan of digging the cesspools now 
honeycombing the surface of the ground upon which the city is built-
there being on an average about one to each of its eighty thousand 
houses-must be discontinued if the health of the community is to be 
considered. To substitute a general system of sewerage is merely a 
question of time and expense."20 The recognition of needs did not 
automatically lead to the building of new sewers. Too many other 
factors clouded the picture. 
Because New Orleans had a very low water table almost all sewage 
passed through open drainage gutters and canals. A large outlet canal 
ran along Canal Street, the city's main street. The state board of health 
claimed in an 1881 report, "The gutters ... are in foul condition, being 
at various points choked up with garbage, filth and mud, and con-
sequently may be regarded simply as receptacles for putrid matters and 
stagnant waters. "21 The main contribution of the drainage ditches was 
to facilitate the removal of surface water. Three steam "draining ma-
chines," actually paddle-wheel pumps patterned after old Dutch de-
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signs, forced water from the lower to upper levels of the drainage 
canals. This imperfect and antiquated system carried only a small 
amount of the "extremely foul" offal. The need for a sewerage system 
had long vexed those concerned with sanitation in the Crescent City. 
Financial considerations complicated the search for a solution. Politi-
cians claimed it was impossible to raise money through public means. 
The granting of a franchise to the New Orleans Drainage and Sewerage 
Company failed to produce results. Throughout the Gilded Age, New 
Orleans remained without underground sewers, adding to the com-
munity's many health hazards. It remained for another southern city to 
be a pioneer in sewer construction. 
Sewage reform came in Memphis after the devastating 1878 yellow 
fever epidemic that killed 5,015 people. 22 Another epidemic the follow-
ing year that killed 500 people added urgency to the situation. An 
investigation by a new federal agency, the National Board of Health, 
attributed the outbreak to bad sanitary conditions. A matter of special 
interest to the board was the poor state of the sewerage, for the system 
consisted of little more than four miles of public main sewers and a few 
miles of private lines. For all practical purposes, Memphis was un-
sewered outside of the business district at the time of the yellow fever 
epidemics. Surface water flowed through gutters into bayous or the 
river. All the filth from a large black shantytown went into an adjacent 
bayou. The Board recommended that Memphis build a new sewerage 
as the cornerstone of a general effort to clean up the city. "We believe," 
board members wrote in their report, "that by carrying out the above 
recommendations, and by availing itself fully of what is now known as 
to the causes of the disease and the methods of destroying these 
causes, Memphis may soon become one of the healthiest cities in the 
valley of the Mississippi. "23 What remained unsaid was that any pro-
posed solution was speculative because no one knew the cause of 
yellow fever. 
Memphis adopted a sewerage plan formulated by George Waring, 
Jr., a member of the National Board of Health. Waring, a former 
scientific farmer, army recruiter, and author of horse stories for little 
girls, had acquired anational reputation as a sanitary reformer. He was 
a leading "noncontagionist," who rejected the germ theory of disease. 
Despite growing evidence to the contrary, he steadfastly argued that 
"sewer gas" and other noxious odors caused disease. He believed that 
waste from house drains and drainage ditches was a menace to the 
health of urban dwellers. To counter the threat of sewer gas, he pro-
moted the concept of "separate systems" of sewerage. He opposed the 
use of large outlet sewers, which he claimed accumulated lethal va-
pors. Instead, he called for different sewers for ground runoff, house-
hold wastes, and human excreta.24 
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Construction of the Memphis system moved ahead with a sense of 
urgency. Laborers broke ground in January of 1880 and by June had 
laid nineteen miles of sewers. As the work moved forward, members of 
the National Board of Health confidently predicted that the new 
sewerage would solve Memphis's health problems. Waring was more 
cautious. "It is too early to determine with certainty what is to be the 
future of this system of sewerage, and much too early to determine its 
influence upon the sanitary condition of Memphis," he stressed. "In 
itself as it stands, it is to be regarded only as an experiment in 
sewerage."25 When in operation, the system was so successful that it 
helped to touch off a national boom in sewer construction. At the time 
none of those involved realized that a "noncontagionist" approach to 
what was actually a problem of contagion was medically unsound and 
based upon false assumptions. The new system made Memphis a 
cleaner and hence a better city from a health standpoint. But a correct 
solution was based on an incorrect theory. 
Large quantities of excreta in southern cities ran into porous privy 
vaults and cesspools rather than into sewers. In Baltimore, an inves-
tigation in 1879 of well and spring water collected by William Toury, a 
sanitation authority appointed by the city's board of health, produced 
startling results. Samples that he took contained "excrementary mat-
ter," including a mixture of free ammonia and wine. 26 Other cities 
courted similar serious situations. Ninety-eight percent of the dwell-
ings in Columbia used privy vaults or outhouses. Farmers hauled off 
much of the night soil for use as manure for crops. Newport relied 
entirely on privies. When the contents reached eleven inches from the 
top, licensed scavengers were supposed to remove the excreta in water-
tight carts and dump it directly into the Ohio River. All the privies in 
New Orleans leaked. When they were full, workers called "vidang-
eurs" carried the excrement to "nuisance boats" at night. In Savannah, 
where city crews emptied privies, authorities sold night soil to farmers 
for use as fertilizer. At Augusta, city workers cleaned privies, using an 
odorless-excavator process. The superintendent of streets was respon-
sible for seeing that Montgomery's privy vaults were cleaned. Rich-
mond ordinances called for cleaning outhouses when they were "full 
or offensive."27 No matter what methods were used to empty privies, 
serious flaws seemed unavoidable. The hundreds of thousands of 
urban privy vaults and cesspools inevitably befouled the earth despite 
regulations. 
Liquid household wastes-the runoff from laundries and kitch-
ens-were disposed of in a variety of ways. Baltimore's wastes ran into 
the streets, Washington's into sewers, and Lynchburg's into gutters 
and drains. Charleston residents let laundry and kitchen slops flow 
down drains directly into gutters or cesspools. Their counterparts in 
Fearless in Discharge of Duties 125 
Columbia were expected to dispose of all liquid wastes on the prem-
ises, pouring them into cesspools, dry wells, or onto the ground. 2s A 
Petersburg functionary admitted that his town had the same problems 
as most other places. "But a small portion of these wastes are run into 
the sewers," he observed, "as the city has none except on four of the 
principal streets; much is run into street-gutters, especially wash-
water-including some surreptitious chamber-slops; in the thickly 
built-up portions of the city much is run into dry wells, and but 
comparatively little into privy-vaults. "29 As with human wastes, the 
problem remained unsolved until adequate systems of sewerage were 
constructed. 
By 1880, in keeping with national trends, many southern cities had 
waterworks. In the previous twenty years the number of systems had 
increased from two hundred to five hundred. Although the general 
trend was for public ownership, several southern cities did not have 
municipal works. Indeed, neither Portsmouth nor Lexington had wa-
terworks. Even a small system cost more than $100,000 to construct. 
Memphis boasted a private works valued at $650,000. The one at 
Montgomery cost $130,000. Both of these waterworks used machines 
to pump water, as did a new concern in Charleston that pumped water 
from thousand-foot-deep artesian wells. Chattanooga's Lookout Water 
Company, organized in 1866, pumped Tennessee River water through 
twelve miles of lines. A few places had publicly operated works. 
Norfolk spent $500,000 on a pumping station that moved half a million 
gallons of water daily through twenty-five miles of lines. At New 
Orleans, the waterworks had a checkered history. In 1869 the city 
bought an old private works, only to sell it again in 1878 to the New 
Orleans Water Works Company. The facility, which had an estimated 
worth of $1.3 million, pumped Mississippi River water through seven-
ty-one miles of pipes. 30 No one worried much about purification. 
Many systems had large machines that could move water through 
mains under pressure. The ability to increase pressure to help in 
fighting fires was of utmost importance. Because only a few water-
works used filters and almost all either pumped water directly into 
lines or allowed it to settle in reservoirs for less than twenty-four hours, 
few persons drank faucet water, which sometimes contained human 
excreta or dead fish. Southern urban dwellers, in common with other 
city people, boiled tap water before drinking, if they drank it at all. 
Some urbanites drank different beverages in preference to water sent 
through mains. Residents of New Orleans throughout the nineteenth 
century drank claret wine or artesian water brought from north of Lake 
Pontchartrain. "All the water for cooking or drinking purposes is either 
taken out of the Mississippi, which at this point carries such an enor-
mous amount of detritus, that one third of the water is solid matter held 
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in solution, or out of cisterns constructed above ground," a German 
settler wrote. "On examination worms 8 inches long are found in the 
rainwater and a multitude of smaller insects and infusoria. No amount 
of filtering will make such water pure. The sides of those cisterns are 
covered inside with a green slime and a scum of greenish filth mixed 
with insect life is seen on the top of the water. No wonder that hardly 
any water is drunk. "31 
The quality of drinking water steadily deteriorated as the Gilded 
Age progressed. Sewage and industrial waste polluted watering 
grounds so badly that in the twentieth century water needed to be 
chemically treated to make it reasonably safe for human use. This was 
the legacy of building sanitary sewers and of rapid industrialization. 
In common with other places, a startling disregard for the dis-
charges of industrial works added to pollution concerns in southern 
cities. Lynchburg had no regulations because authorities claimed that 
none of the town's factories was a potential "nuisance." Norfolk sup-
posedly had no factory wastes that needed to be disposed of. Rich-
mond provided only for the removal of solid wastes away from the city 
limits. Columbia had no regulations. Industrial by-products at 
Covington and Newport went directly into the Ohio and Licking 
rivers. Workers in Augusta plants threw liquids into the canal and 
disposed of solids along with garbage. A paper mill at Savannah 
pumped tons of polluted water daily through a sewer into the Savan-
nah River. Atlanta officials claimed to have a program to remove 
industrial pollutants outside the city. Chattanooga had no manufactur-
ing waste ordinances, but a local ironmonger sold wastes to railroads 
for roadbed ballast or to the city for street surfacing. 32 No municipal 
government followed such a sensible approach; rather, they took the 
attitude that their factories were not injurious to public health. 
The cost of gas was of more immediate concern to southern urban 
dwellers than sanitary conditions. Few believed the arguments ad-
vanced by gas service companies that coal delivery costs necessitated 
different rate structures from place to place. Cost comparisons among 
cities in the same general areas showed considerable differences. The 
usual practice of granting a franchise to a private corporation created 
opportunities for fraud and automatically raised consumer suspicions 
about the monopolistic aspects of an essential service. Gas companies 
usually received lucrative city contracts to furnish illuminating gas for 
street lights, charging about $30 per lamp annually. Atlanta paid that 
sum for each of 300 street lights, Norfolk for 259lights. 33 Critics found 
those costs inflated, but there appeared to be no recourse. 
A modest municipally owned gas works in Alexandria, which 
assessed the city $30 annually for each of 150 street lights, charged 
private consumers $2 per unit. (A unit is a thousand cubic feet.) That 
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Table 6.1. Statistics on Telephone Companies, 1880 
Miles Net 
City Name of Company of Wire Income 
Arkansas 
Little Rock Little Rock Telephone Exchange 65 $ 541 
Louisiana 
New Orleans Louisiana Telephone Company 478 16,643 
Maryland 
Baltimore Maryland Telephone Company 600 25,257 
Tennessee 
Chattanooga East Tennessee Telephone Company 185 12,724 
Memphis Memphis Telephone Exchange 120 
Nashville Nashville Telephone Exchange 
rate was the lowest in the South and among the lowest in the nation. 
The cost of gas per unit was $2.40 in Norfolk, $2.50 in Portsmouth, and 
$2.85 in Petersburg. Similar variation occurred in other parts of the 
South. A Charleston company sold gas for $3.09 per unit on an average 
daily production of fifty thousand cubic feet. In Columbia a firm that 
manufactured twenty thousand cubic feet daily posted a $4.50 per unit 
rate. With some justification, gas company spokesmen argued that 
costs went down in direct relationship to a rise in the amount of gas 
produced. The Covington gas works, which had an average daily 
production of seventy-five thousand cubic feet, charged the city $1.25 
and private users $2.25 per unit. The same amount of gas cost consum-
ers $2.35 in Louisville, $2.70 in Chattanooga, and $3.50 in Augusta. 
Works in Lexington, Memphis, Atlanta, Macon, New Orleans, and 
Savannah all retailed gas for $3 per unit. 34 The suspiciously high rates 
.brought calls for state regulatory agencies. The gas frequently failed 
during peak evening hours, leading to accusations that gas companies 
often bought cheap damp and low-grade coal. Users were just as vexed 
in Columbia and Atlanta as in Bay City and Stockton. But these 
problems were an accepted part of urban life. 
The telephone, a recently developed service injected an entirely 
new element into the urban scene. Alexander Graham Bell unveiled his 
model of the device to the general public at the 1876 Philadelphia 
Centennial Exposition. The imperfect system-scratching sounds fre-
quently disrupted and distorted transmissions-held great promise. 
Bell began manufacturing telephones in 1877 and soon formed a com-
pany to grant franchises. By 1880 six exchanges operated in the urban 
South (see Table 6.1).35 Another system was under construction in 
Atlanta. The firms already in operation were very speculative. Largest 
among them was the Maryland Telephone Company in Baltimore, 
which had six hundred miles of wire. Early telephone exchanges were 
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evaluated statistically by the number of miles of wire rather than 
number of telephones. Indeed, there were few phones. Hardly any 
residential subscribers could afford to have one. Some of the best 
customers were physicians, who had lines running from their offices to 
drugstores. Net annual income statistics for the phone companies 
reflected usage. The Maryland Telephone Company of Baltimore made 
$25,300, but the Little Rock Telephone Exchange generated only $541 in 
total revenue. Of course, the potential of the telephone was clear. By 
the start of the 1880s a total of 148 telephone companies operated in the 
United States. As with other improvements, southern interests did not 
have the money to risk on an untried innovation that was still in the 
developmental stage. But although speculators at first found more 
lucrative opportunities elsewhere, eventual control of southern tele-
phone communication systems by outside interests seemed inevitable. 
Public transportation was another area that underwent major 
changes in the Gilded Age. Privately owned horse railroads became 
important symbols of urban progress. Every small town wanted a line 
to show how up to date it was. Such desires blunted charges by 
reformers that bribes given to politicians in exchange for franchise 
rights were a source of corruption. Petersburg, Portsmouth, Columbia, 
Macon, Lexington, and Montgomery had no lines, but most southern 
cities did. Private concerns built street railroads in several cities in the 
years immediately after the war. Charleston's and Augusta's opened in 
1866, Atlanta's in 1869, and Norfolk's in 1870. As might have been 
expected, the metropolitan centers had the most extensive horse rail-
roads. Before consolidation, it was not uncommon for a city to have 
more than one line. Washington had five horse railroads with a total 
length of close to thirty-one miles. They all charged the standard 
national fare of five cents a ride. Baltimore boasted four horse railroads, 
plus several others under construction. The completed system was 
calculated to give the entire Baltimore metropolitan area a comprehen-
sive transportation network. Horse lines in Louisville had a total length 
of fifty miles. More than 8 million passengers annually rode on the 
extensive system. The services of 323 men were required to operate 173 
cars pulled by 726 horses and mules. One hundred and forty miles of 
horse railroad tracks permeated the New Orleans area. The railroads 
carried 24 million riders yearly. To run this large transit service there 
were 373 cars, 1,641 horses and mules, and 671 employees. 
In smaller places, the horse railroads frequently ran for only a 
couple of miles down a single street. Sometimes the line ended at a 
pleasure ground or amusement park owned by the traction company. 
Lynchburg's 2-mile-long line had 6 cars pulled by 12 horses and 12 
mules. Eight men operated the single-track line. The horse railroad in 
Norfolk had 4 miles of track. Charleston's 21-mile line hauled 1.5 
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million passengers yearly; it used 57 cars and 125 horses and employed 
89 men. Chattanooga had 3 miles of horse railroads, employing 11 
men, and 7 cars requiring 20 horses. Mobile had six lines, which was far 
too many for a city of its size. One ran from the city to Spring Hill, a 
suburb 6 miles from the city. The horse railroads of Augusta, running 
over 4.5 miles of track, employed 37 men. They used 7 cars and 34 
horses to carry 377,300 passengers annually. In Atlanta, 10.5 miles of 
horse railroads, with 21 cars, 80 horses, and 45 workers, carried 
800,000 riders every year. 36 The horse railroads in the southern cities 
afforded another indication of their increased urban dimension. Just as 
in the North, the cities of the South were quick to adopt a new means of 
transportation. 
Omnibuses, large, cumbersome vehicles with a capacity of about 
40 riders, augmented horse railroads in many places. Those in Wash-
ington ran between depots and hotels. In Richmond and Savannah 
they served hotels, railroad stations, and steamboat landings. Om-
nibuses in Charleston carried 75,000 paying passengers in 1880 at high 
fares of from 50 to 75 cents. A trip in Memphis cost 25 cents, more in 
line with national rates. Augusta had a large system; 5 omnibuses, with 
14 horses and 7 men, carried 12,000 people annually for 25 cents a ride. 
The only public transportation in Montgomery was a single small 
omnibus line. It had 3 vehicles, 6 horses, and 4 employees. The fare 
was a low 5 cents. Atlanta, despite its size, had no omnibuses.37 In 
many places, given the fixed routes of horse railroads and the nature of 
omnibus service, private conveyances, horseback, or walking re-
mained the easiest way of getting around. 
Southern municipalities took on primary responsibility for inter-
nal security. Throughout antebellum days, the fear of slave rebellions 
had hung over the society and was a reason for the reluctance to use 
slaves in industry and the argument that the peculiar institution 
worked best in rural settings. Factory owners feared that their slaves 
might listen to abolitionist dogma and sabotage operations. Rumors of 
clandestine black gatherings conjured up visions of machete- and 
cutlass-wielding blacks chopping up their masters and mistresses in an 
American version of Toussaint L'Ouverture's Santo Domingo. All 
southern cities had special night patrols responsible for checking on 
the activities of blacks out after dark. The emphasis on subjugating the 
black race led to neglect of other aspects of urban protection such as 
stopping crime, fighting fires, or curtailing epidemics. More money 
went for police protection than for other security services. The influx of 
blacks into cities during Reconstruction further reinforced the belief in 
a need for a high level of police protection. In the Gilded Age urban 
leaders continued to stress law and order at the expense of public 
health and fire fighting. 
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In 1880 health services were very weak in all but a few places. 
Medium-sized cities were especially lacking in such services. Gener-
ally, the mayor and council did little more than appoint a board of 
health. These boards, usually but not always including a physician, 
met infrequently except during epidemics and had insufficient re-
sources to carry out programs. The boards in Lexington, Covington, 
and Newport did not have regular budgets. Members of Atlanta's five-
man board received salaries of $100 a year to make recommendations to 
the city council. Columbia had a twelve-person advisory board that 
included only two physicians. The chief health agency in Montgomery 
was a branch of the state board of health. Chattanooga's board had a 
twelve-month budget of approximately $500. During an epidemic the 
board could spend up to an additional $250. It did not have authority to 
quarantine infected areas, but most boards could take emergency 
powers in a crisis. Forward progress frequently came only in the wake 
of catastrophe. In 1879, for instance, Memphis obtained an indepen-
dent board with broad sanitation responsibilities. In its first year the 
board spent $35,000 on a wide variety of activities that related to the 
health of the city. Expenditures for street cleaning and garbage removal 
amounted to $20,000. Most of the rest of the money went to fill in old 
cesspools and privy vaults. 38 Health authorities in cities fortunate 
enough to have remained relatively free of epidemics were unable to 
convince elected officials of the need to give high priority to health 
services because the officials did not want to hurt their chances for 
reelection by implying that their city had a health problem. 
Officials did realize that threats to health increased dramatically as 
a community grew in size. In the upper South, Baltimore had handled 
public health problems competently. Washington had made a good 
start. Louisville had a system but needed better financial backing. 
Baltimore's department, which had a budget of $246,300, had the 
makings of a true sanitary authority. Its areas of jurisdiction included 
the removal of garbage, the cleaning of sewers and streets, the opera-
tion of a public hospital, and the running of vaccination programs. An 
obvious need existed for more funds, professional employees, and 
comprehensive powers. 39 
The story of health in New Orleans was one of unrelenting gloom. 
Officials of the National Board of Health considered the Crescent City 
the nation's number one health hazard. Plans that were never com-
pleted called for cordoning off the New Orleans health district and 
requiring that trains and travelers leaving the city be fumigated. The 
Marine Hospital Service, a government agency, maintained a boat on 
the Mississippi River below Memphis to inspect upward-bound steam-
boats for contamination. Health officials in some northern cities re-
quested that the federal government keep New Orleans under a 
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permanent quarantine. 40 An enraged Louisiana medical authority 
countered that idea by suggesting that northerners be kept out of his 
state because they carried disease. Although discussions on the nation-
al level about sanitary conditions suggested a bias against the South, 
there was little doubt that New Orleans had serious health problems. 
Outbreaks of dengue, often called either" dandy-fever" or "break-bone 
fever," recurred with monotonous regularity. Believed to have origi-
nated in Africa, the disease was one that a person could get over and 
over again. The single consolation for victims of the painful and de-
bilitating ailment was that they usually recovered. Yellow fever, how-
ever, was deadly, killing hundreds of people even in nonepidemic 
years. 41 
The 1878 yellow fever epidemic resulted in an official death toll of 
4,046 men, women, and children. Medical experts did not know that 
mosquitoes carried the disease. Some attributed it to filthy Cuban 
sailors, but the hastily formed federal Havana Yellow Fever Commis-
sion of 1878 made a detailed study of sanitary conditions in Cuba and 
concluded that they were not much different than in the United 
States.42 George Waring, Jr., a member of the commissiort, theorized 
that yellow fever resulted from sewer gas caused by poor sanitation in 
the southern United States. This "noncontagionist" filth theory of 
disease was widely accepted by public health authorities. The national 
American Public Health Association heaped abuse on New Orleans, 
blaming it for $175 million in costs associated with the 1878 epidemic. 
Threatened from within and without, the city authorities acted to 
improve public health conditions. Dr. Samuel Choppin, president of 
the Louisiana Board of Health, noted, "Undoubtedly the most im-
pressive lesson of the great epidemic of 1878, to the people of this city, 
was the importance of improving its sanitary condition. "43 
The continued drain on the Crescent City's population, economy, 
reputation, and spirit led to concerted efforts at reform. In 1880 Dr. 
Choppin said, "The people who have died here of yellow fever would 
have built up a state."44 This admission indicated a sharp shift in 
community policy. As late as the mid-nineteenth century New Orleans 
spokesmen had argued that the city was among the healthiest in the 
nation. They had often contended that most victims were newcomers 
who hastened their demise by consuming too much alcohol. 45 During 
the Union occupation, local citizens opposed General Benjamin 
Butler's cleanup efforts on the grounds that they were unnecessary. But 
by the Gilded Age the specter of the tens of thousands of dead served 
as a rationale to explain why New Orleans had failed to become the 
great city of North America. Even so, Crescent City leaders continued 
to feel victimized by unfair publicity. In 1882 they accused the National 
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Table 6.2. Life Expectancy for Whites in Representative Cities, 1880 
City At Birth At Age 20 At Age 30 At Age40 
South 
Baltimore 38.18 41.50 34.74 28.05 
Charleston 38.34 36.24 30.08 24.60 
New Orleans 38.10 35.80 29.35 23.78 
Dist. of Columbia 42.36 40.42 33.64 27.36 
Other Sections 
Chicago 39.70 43.20 36.02 20.05 
Cincinnati 40.44 40.76 33.81 27.18 
St. Louis 38.96 41.73 34.65 28.08 
New York 35.02 37.64 31.11 25.08 
San Francisco 41.32 37.42 30.88 24.85 
National Board of Health of manufacturing a yellow fever epidemic, a 
charge the board vehemently denied. 46 
The chief public health organization for the city of New Orleans 
was the state board of health, which operated three quarantine stations 
on snake-infested islands in remote bayous, monitored the quality of 
drinking water, and tried to stop the dumping of garbage directly into 
the river. Annual house-by-house inspections required filing reports 
on more than sixty thousand premises. Many people disliked having 
their homes checked by bureaucrats; the practice caused what an 
official euphemistically called a "lack of public sentiment" toward the 
board. 47 Funds from the usually free-spending city council were so 
hard to obtain that the business community funded most of the board's 
$40,000 annual budget through the private Auxiliary Sanitary Associa-
tion. This body, organized in 1879, was a direct response to the eco-
nomic consequences of the previous year's yellow fever epidemic. 
Neighboring communities had blockaded the city and hurt business, 
using what an association leader called "barbarous shot-gun quaran-
tines. "48 Business losses rather than human costs brought the first 
tentative steps in a locally supported sanitary reform program. 
An unpleasant feature of living in southern cities in 1880 was that 
the average urbanite had a short life expectancy. The chances for a long 
life improved with age. After reaching twenty, an individual had a 
good chance of living into the late fifties or early sixties. At thirty years, 
age sixty seemed attainable, and at forty it was almost assured if one 
avoided unexpected pitfalls. Statistics from nine cities for the three 
years ending 30 June 1881 indicated that southern white urbanites 
could expect to live as long as or only slightly less long than their 
northern counterparts (see Table 6.2). 49 Life expectancy for whites at 
birth in Baltimore, Charleston, New Orleans, and the District of Co-
lumbia was higher than in New York. Unfortunately, southern urban 
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Table 6.3. Life Expectancy for Blacks in Four Cities, 1880 
C1ty At Birth At Age 20 At Age 30 At Age 40 
Baltimore 23.26 36.62 30.64 24.68 
Charleston 21.82 31.60 27.14 21.51 
New Orleans 25.56 30.63 26.98 22.49 
Dist. of Columbia 25.25 35.34 30.22 24.63 
blacks did not fare so well. Blacks in four southern cities had far less 
chance than whites of reaching old age-a gap of from twelve to 
seventeen years (see Table 6.3). 50 At birth a black had a life expectancy 
of 25.56 years in New Orleans, 25.25 in the District of Columbia, 23.26 
in Baltimore, and 21.82 in Charleston. A large number of black children 
died before their first birthday. In Charleston infant deaths per thou-
sand in 1880 for black males were 352.1 and for black females 323.2. 
Deaths per thousand in Charleston for white males and females were 
146.8 and 118.8, respectively. By contrast, the death rates per thousand 
for infants of all races in Columbus, Ohio, a city of comparable size to 
Charleston, were 77.9 for males and 50.5 for females. In New York the 
death rate per thousand for all babies was 205.6 for males and 173.9 for 
females. The death rate in Charleston per thousand for whites was 26.2 
for males and 21.7 for females. For black males it was 48.6 and for black 
females 42.2. The general pattern held throughout the South. Urban 
living was far more dangerous for blacks than for whites. 
The threat of destructive fires added to the perils of city life in the 
South. Almost every place claimed to have experienced a great fire, 
resulting either from military action or other causes. The burning of 
Norfolk in the Revolution; of Washington's public buildings in the War 
of 1812; and of Atlanta, Columbia, and Richmond in the Civil War 
could not have been prevented by normal protective measures. The 
same was true of large conflagrations that stemmed from nonmilitary 
causes. In 1815 flames consumed 400 houses in Petersburg. A fire in 
Augusta in 1829 gutted between 400 and 500 buildings, causing $1 
million in damages. The blaze that destroyed Louisville's commercial 
district in 1840 sparked a statewide movement for better fire protec-
tion. The flames that swept Savannah in 1796, 1820, and 1865 gave that 
city one of the South's worst fire-safety records. A fire that authorities 
believed threatened in its most serious stages to reach the magnitude of 
the Chicago fire of 1871 roared through Baltimore on 25 July 1873. The 
inferno ravaged 113 buildings, including schools, churches, and facto-
ries. Damage amounted to $750,000, of which insurance covered only a 
third. 5 1 Despite a string of such distressing occurrences and the ever-
present threat of more disasters, many southern communities con-
tinued to rely on small and poorly funded fire departments. 
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By 1880 most cities had professional fire departments. An excep-
tion was the relatively new city of Chattanooga, which continued to 
depend on volunteers divided into three companies with a total of 102 
men. The first company of 36 men, though, was a reserve unit. These 
volunteers had to make do with obsolete equipment-an old-fash-
ioned fourth-class steamer, three hand-pulled hose carriages, and 950 
feet of what an official referred to as "unreliable hose." The second 
company had a two-wheel hose carrier and 500 feet of "good hose." An 
elite first division of 30 men operated a hook-and-ladder truck. Depart-
mental expenses for 1879 amounted to $5,400. Losses in eight fires 
totaled $15,500. 52 Chattanooga's volunteer department was fairly typ-
ical for a city in its population class. It was not uncommon, especially in 
the Northeast, for cities of around 100,000 to have volunteer depart-
ments. 53 As long as a system worked there seemed no compelling 
reason for change. Professional departments were not usually formed 
until after a disastrous fire that discredited the volunteers or, as fire 
fighting became more complicated, passed beyond the bucket-brigade 
era. 
Several of the professional departments in the South were im-
pressive statistically. Petersburg's force of 33 full-time firemen had at 
their disposal six hose reels, one hook-and-ladder truck, and 1,500 feet 
of "good hose." During 1879 the department responded to 31 alarms, 
only 3 of which were false. Fire losses came to $110,000. The cost of 
running the department for the year was $9,200. The Savannah Fire 
Department, with four steam fire engines, three one-horse hose reels, 
one hook-and-ladder truck, and 4,800 feet of hose, fought 32 fires in 
1880, holding damage to $22,100. Charleston's fourteen steamer and 
three truck companies relied on 11,200 feet of hose; the department's 
budget was $26,000. The funding required to run a first-rate depart-
ment increased markedly as a city expanded in population. The crucial 
need for a rapid response meant that a single central station was not 
adequate. Louisville's department had many line companies, funded 
by a yearly budget of $108,500. The Baltimore force had a $175,000 
annual budget. A chief engineer with a salary of $2,000 a year and two 
assistant engineers receiving $1,400 annually supervised the daily 
activities of 208 firemen. Seventeen companies stayed on line, backed 
by five reserve units. The department had a great deal of apparatus, 
including thirteen steamers, twenty-six four-wheel hose carriages, ten 
steam heaters, four hook-and-ladder trucks, four fuel tenders, one 
supply wagon, twenty-four fire extinguishers, five covered wagons, 
one jagger wagon, 29,000 feet of hose, and a large reserve of four 
steamers and miscellaneous equipment. Seventeen fire horses were 
constantly on call. During 1880 the Baltimore Fire Department an-
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swered 343 alarms. Fire damage for the period was $580,300, with 
$320,500 caused by two large blazes. 54 
Efficient staffing and organization, modern equipment, and trust-
worthy hoses helped to instill public confidence in the new profession-
al departments. Yet little relationship existed between those factors and 
the amount of damage caused by fires. Success in fighting fires de-
pended mainly on luck as well as fire-prevention programs and suffi-
cient available water. The chief of the Washington Fire Department 
spoke for many of his colleagues when he used a specific example to 
plead for reform measures. "A special point in the city ... is the 
Government Printing Office, a building which, in addition to the host 
of persons who are employed there day and night, contains so much 
valuable property," he said. "This building is old, illy constructed and, 
although crowded with inflammable material, was constructed with-
out any regard to safety from fire. In its vicinity there are but few fire 
plugs, and they are small mains." He went on to note that the several 
hundred buildings, all built in rows and many without fire walls 
between them, in the vicinity of the printing office, were "liable to 
rapid destruction in the event of a fire without a full supply of water. "55 
Few people took measures to prevent fires, and owners did not want 
fire inspectors to interfere with their property rights. As long as such 
attitudes prevailed, many blazes that should never have started caused 
serious damage. 
Firemen ran considerable risks on the job in exchange for few 
benefits and privileges. Unlike most departments, the one in Baltimore 
had a benefit program. Men incapacitated on the job remained on full 
salary for up to a year. Families of fire fighters killed in the line of duty 
received $500. To keep qualified personnel the department allowed 
firemen to hold other jobs during off-duty hours. 56 Although this 
practice raised questions about how hard men worked when on duty, it 
was fairly common throughout the nation and was justified on the 
gounds that it saved money. Even with the move toward profession-
alization, there remained a reluctance to think of firemen as full-time 
employees. The old volunteer tradition died hard. Still, fire fighters 
were generally held in high esteem by the public. The mayor of 
Louisville observed, "Our firemen, as they always have been, are active 
and fearless in discharge of their duties."57 The statement would have 
applied equally well to the men in other departments in the South. 
Civic authorities in the southern cities put much more time and 
effort into building police forces than fire departments. By the Gilded 
Age the "police idea" of forces organized along military lines had 
gained wide acceptance in the United States. Central to the concept 
was civilian control exercised through formal constitutional mecha-
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nisms. Usually, the mayor had the power to appoint the chief, subject 
to confirmation by the city council. Under a variation of this method, a 
police board had appointment powers. In actual practice, the boards, 
councils, and mayors left day-by-day administration to high-ranking 
police officers, although they maintained jurisdiction over budgetary 
matters. 
In 1880, the high annual salaries paid high-ranking law enforce-
ment officials demonstrated the importance given to police work. They 
were the highest paid public employees in the South. The superinten-
dent of the metropolitan police in Washington made $2,610, the chief of 
police in New Orleans $3,480, and the marshal of the Baltimore force 
$2,500. The chiefs in Charleston and Atlanta made $1,800 and $1,500 
respectively. The heads of police departments in Montgomery, Au-
gusta, Chattanooga, and Macon received salaries in the $1,000 range. 
These pay rates were in keeping with national norms for towns of their 
size. Two southern cities had unique salary arrangements. In New-
port, the chief had an $800 salary, plus an additional $400 in fees for 
such duties as transporting criminals and testifying in court. Norfolk's 
city marshal, who made $3 a day, had lucrative emoluments. Gener-
ally, southern chiefs of police received salaries comparable to and in 
many cases better than their counterparts in other parts of the country. 
The superintendent of the large Chicago department made $3,780 per 
annum. Chiefs in medium-sized Peoria, Fond du Lac, and Oshkosh 
had compensation rates ranging from $650 to $1,000.58 Southern urban 
leaders were willing, despite continuing money problems, to pay high-
ranking police officials well. A general consensus held that the leaders 
of the police needed large salaries to impress upon the general public 
the importance attached to the preservation of law and order. 
The annual salaries of men in the lower ranks reflected the finan-
cial resources available to pay public employees in southern cities. 
Patrolmen seldom made as much as the national annual average of 
around $900. Police officers in Chattanoga, Augusta, and Macon re-
ceived $600 and in Savannah $720. Charleston paid privates $576, 
Alexandria, $480. Patrolmen in Mobile made $40, in Atlanta $54, in 
Memphis $60, and in Montgomery $65 per month. Baltimore paid men 
on the beat $18 weekly and Norfolk $2 daily. 59 Many of the policemen 
were political appointees, and their efficiency varied greatly. The New 
Orleans police had a yearly base pay of $600. A local leader com-
mented, "The police of New Orleans is well officered; but the entire 
force is ill-paid, and at times not paid; it is therefore deficient in morale, 
and is totally inadequate in point of numbers."60 No cities had formal 
training programs for police officers. They learned on the job. Because 
of the nature of their work, police did not always enjoy high esteem in 
the community and sometimes met hostility. Although these attitudes 
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may have caused psychological problems, police could take heart that 
they received higher salaries than most workers. Their average per 
capita annual wage of $175 in 1880 virtually assured political inter-
ference to win appointments as policemen but also guaranteed a 
constant stream of applicants. 
Police departments in the South required officers to wear modified 
standard blue metropolitan police uniforms and to carry specified 
accouterments. In accordance with national standards, the men had to 
purchase their own uniforms and equipment. Some of the outfits were 
very elaborate. During winter months the Charleston police per-
formed their duties outfitted in dark blue military frock coats adorned 
with black buttons stamped with the city crest and the words 
"Charleston Police." A black helmet added a distinctive touch. In 
summer the officers changed to blue flannel suits with sack coats and 
panama hats. In all seasons the members of the force had to wear white 
kid gloves while on duty. Every man had a rosewood baton, a five-
pointed star, and a service revolver. Patrolmen in Norfolk walked their 
beats in New York-style dark blue uniforms. Their headgear in the 
summer was a white derby and in the winter a black one. This elaborate 
outfit cost $125. Police were armed with clubs, revolvers, nippers, and 
blackjacks. Lexington policemen had to purchase dark blue uniforms 
that cost $30 apiece and to furnish their own revolvers and clubs. The 
stylish Savannah police patrolled attired in dark blue frock coats with 
brass buttons, dark blue trousers, white belts, and regulation cork 
helmets. Less resplendent were the uniforms of the New Orleans and 
Vicksburg police. In hot months, New Orleans officers wore navy blue 
sack coats. In cold weather, double-breasted and single-breasted frock 
coats were the rule. The men carried clubs and whistles but no guns. 
Vicksburg's force was clothed in heavy blue uniforms and black hats in 
the winter, blue flannel garments and panama hats in summer. 61 
Before the Civil War only a few police departments required uniforms 
because many Americans considered uniforms undemocratic. These 
prejudices broke down in the Civil War decade. Throughout the South 
in the Gilded Age, clearly identifiable uniforms and badges of authori-
ty helped to instill pride of office in the men charged with preserving 
the peace. 
Beat and duty hours were long and hard. The police in many 
southern cities worked twelve hours daily, the national average. Nor-
folk policemen patrolled 26 miles of streets and lanes, performing their 
duties on schedules of six hours on and twelve off. Augusta police 
attempted to cover the entire city, walking six-hour beats, with only six 
hours of rest in between shifts. Macon officers toiled twelve hours on 
and twelve off, trying to protect 116 miles of thoroughfares. 62 Police 
everywhere devoted their primary efforts to protecting business prop-
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erty and keeping high crime districts under close surveillance. But the 
value of having police officers walk long hours on the beat provided 
more the semblance of a deterrent than an actual service that stopped 
crime in the streets. 
Southern city dwellers tolerated heavier expenditures for police 
departments than for other urban services. In 1880 Baltimore spent 
$590,000 and Washington $302,000 for police protection. Many smaller 
cities had impressive funding levels. Charleston's budget was $68,600, 
Memphis's $35,000, and Augusta's $30,000. A number of other towns, 
including Atlanta, Norfolk, Mobile, Macon, Lexington, Chattanooga, 
Montgomery, and Vicksburg, spent roughly a dollar per resident on 
their police departments. 63 Expenditures for police services were gen-
erally higher in the South than elsewhere. Fear of what some white 
editors called the "black brute"64 continued to permeate southern life. 
"A single day rarely passes that a case of lynching is not flashed over 
the wires and the cause is almost the same in each instance, the rape of 
a white woman or child by a big, burly negro," the Nashville Banner 
noted on 16 May 1881. "It is rape and hang. As often as it is done, that 
often will a devil swing off into eternity." A decade later, the editor of 
the Alexandria Town Talk, wrote that "whenever a negro or a white man 
rapes a woman that man dies. It is understood by both races that a 
proven case of rape means death. "65 Such inflammatory statements, 
repeated all across the South, added to white racial fears and furthered 
a law-and-order syndrome. By the 1880s, although some black city 
employees could be found in various patronage jobs, including fire-
men, there were few black police officers. 66 
Police blotters in the urban South detailed some of the successes 
and failures in the continuous battle against crime. Washington had a 
highly organized reporting system. In the year ending 30 June 1880 the 
police made 13,558 arrests-11,432 males and 2,126 females. The main 
causes were intoxication (4,391), ordinance violations (1,421), petty 
larceny (1,029), and assault and battery (1,020). 67 During 1880 the vast 
majority of arrests in southern towns were for minor offenses. Rape 
either went unreported or was listed under another category such as 
assault and battery. Although crimes of great violence happened-20 
reported homicides in New Orleans, 10 in Louisville, 5 in Atlanta, 2 in 
Columbia, and 1 in Cumberland-police duty was usually routine. 
Macon patrolmen made 1,600 aprehensions, almost all for drunken-
ness, street fighting, and shooting guns within the city limits. These 
statistics were in line with those in the rest of the nation. 68 
But the statistics failed to show that blacks accounted for a dis-
proportionately high number of total arrests. Some white leaders used 
the police as a means of harassing blacks to keep them aware of their 
place in society. Nashville policemen made regular weekend sweeps in 
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which they automatically arrested all blacks encountered on suspicion. 
The blacks were held for a few days and then released without formal 
charges or a trial. During their short incarceration, they performed 
road work or other menial tasks. 69 The relationship between law en-
forcement and the perceived needs of the white majority in regard to 
the omnipresent race question was never officially admitted, nor was 
much written about it in annual reports. 
Students of crime eschewed racial or sociological theories in ex-
plaining deviant behavior. Lawlessness was generally attributed to 
liquor saloons and houses of prostitution. In 1880 southern towns had 
both (see Table 6.4). 70 The available statistics failed to delineate the 
racial or economic characteristics of the establishments. Although no 
southern city had as many liquor saloons as New York (9,067) or San 
Francisco (8,694), they were present in abundance. Baltimore had one 
saloon for every 150 men, women, and children. Little Rock, only 
recently removed from the frontier, had 63 saloons. New Orleans, 
renowned for its French Quarter, had 429. Houses of prostitution were 
difficult to obtain information about because in most places they were 
illegal and hence unlicensed. New Orleans authorities readily admit-
ted to having 365 houses. Such pleasure palaces were a significant 
factor in bringing visitors to the Crescent City. Large entertainment 
centers offered food, drink, gambling, and theatrical shows in addition 
to sexual attractions. Unlike other places, few persons in New Orleans 
felt guilty about the city's large number of brothels. Because they were 
good business, they were a source of pride. 71 Only Philadelphia, with 
an admitted national high of 517, had more. Four of the thirteen cities 
in the country that reported a hundred or more such houses were in 
the South. Baltimore tallied 300, Louisville 125, and Richmond 100. 
Such statistics-imperfect at best and collected at a time when intensive 
investigation into the reasons for crime was a new social science-
provided further indication that the urban South had concerns similar 
to those in other parts of the country. 
The cities of the New South continued to experience the same 
service and protective problems that plagued the Old South. The only 
real difference was that the problems had increased in magnitude as a 
consequence of growth. Just as before the war, not enough money was 
available to give a high level of support to a wide range of civic 
endeavors. Moreover, public safety took precedence over health and 
fire protection. As in so many other ways, the legacy of the peculiar 
institution continued as a significant factor in detemining policy in the 
cities. Beyond talk of law and order was the fear of black violence 
accentuated by the Reconstruction experience. Providing protection 
against blacks helped to deplete already hard-pressed city treasuries. 
None of the South's thirty largest communities in 1880-with the 
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Table 6.4. Houses of Prostitution and Liquor 
Saloons in Southern Cities, 1880 
Houses of 
City Prostituhon Liquor Saloons 
Alabama 
Mobile 
Montgomery 4 40 
Arkansas 
Little Rock 6 63 





Augusta 15 156 
Columbus 36 




Lexington 20 37 
Louisville 125 718 
Newport 0 93 
Louisiana 
New Orleans 365 429 
Maryland 
Baltimore 300 2,100 




Wilmington 4 65 
South Carolina 
Charleston 291 
Columbia 20 40 
Tennessee 
Chattanooga 




Lynchburg 25 79 
Norfolk 50 108 
Petersburg 3 50 
Portsmouth 
Richmond 100 500 
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possible exception of debt-ridden Washington-had the public or pri-
vate means to furnish residents with uniformly high levels of services. 
Thus Baltimore had a large waterworks but no comprehensive 
sewerage. Alexandria had a model municipal gas plant and a poor 
street-cleaning department. New Orleans expended more money on 
sidewalk repair and extensions than on draining household wastes. 
Lynchburg, which boasted a horse railroad, had few paved streets. 
Richmond did better at disposing of dead animals than removing 
garbage. Chattanooga had fewer telephones than privies. To a greater 
or lesser extent, all the cities tried to set priorities, always influenced by 
politics and immediate needs. The same considerations influenced 
policy all across the country, but in the South, the burdens of a 
depressed economy and race complicated matters. Attempts by south-
ern city leaders to deal with problems ranging from sewerage to a 
harsh racial policy on law and order were further indication of a 
groping toward an urban society. 
7_ ____ _ 
The Promise of Her 
Great Destiny 
Throughout the 1880s southern urban promoters sought to convey the 
impression that their section was progressing. A Birmingham resident, 
catching what he considered the spirit of events, wrote, "Why, men 
would come in at four o'clock in the morning and begin making trades; 
before breakfast. Property changed hands four and five times a day . . . 
Men went crazy two hours after getting here ... A brand-new sensa-
tion was born every day." This exaggerated description, characteristic 
of claims made all across America about the wonders occurring in cities 
in the Gilded Age, contained more than a grain of truth. Birmingham 
was a bona fide "boom town" and a showcase of the New South. 
Chattanooga also had high hopes. The editor of the Chattanooga Trades-
man wrote enthusiastically, as a zealous promoter must, that prospects 
were so good that American and European capitalists vied for the 
honor of investing funds in the area. "The great bulk of capital for the 
projects and people who buy the lots," he said, "come from the East 
and North, some of the money from England." Not to be outdone, a 
Virginian proclaimed that a town in his home state, Roanoke, had 
within a few short years been transformed from a "sleepy country 
village" into a southern version of a typical New England industrial 
town. 1 Roanoke, called Big Lick until 1882, was an old community 
revitalized by industrial progress. 
Boomers claimed that riches lay for the taking all across Dixie. 
Middlesboro, Kentucky, was expected soon to reach metropolitan pro-
portions, fueled by what the Baltimore Manufacturers' Record claimed 
was "fully $10,000,000" in English investment capital. Other promo-
tional projects were the subject of similar extravagant claims. The 
builders of Cardiff, Tennessee, predicted amazing success for their 
"paper city," located in the "Richest and Most Inexhaustible Coal and 
Iron Region in the South."2 Just as confidently, the editor of Town Talkin 
Alexandria, Louisiana, reported, "We have from a reliable source, that 
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Northern capital is now ready to erect at some point on Railroad 
between Loyds Bridge, and Alexandria, a Public Sugar Mill and Refin-
ery, ... All far reaching minds must see at once the importance of this 
enterprise, and how developing it will be to the Parish; and the valu-
able lands now laying idle will thus be made to yield handsome profit 
from cane raised, and sold per ton, to the public mill. "3 Richard 
Edmonds in his book The South's Redemption from Poverty to Prosperity, 
published in 1890, contended that unnamed New England capitalists 
planned to spend several million dollars to develop a gigantic indus-
trial complex at Fort Payne, Alabama. 4 Across the South a new day of 
progress and prosperity appeared on the verge of dawning, or at least 
that was the message. 
Land companies in dozens of southern towns worked hard to 
attract northen capital. These efforts spawned a land boom that did 
bring in some northern currency. The peak years were between 1887 
and 1890,5 when plungers gambled considerable sums by southern 
standards on new town sites touted as potential industrial complexes. 
True believers thought that the millennium was at hand. Right up to the 
close of his life, Henry Grady expressed only optimism about the 
future of the South. He wrote in The New South, "The promise of her 
great destiny, written in her fields, her quarries, her mines, her forests, 
and her rivers is no longer blurred or indistinct, and the world draws 
near to read."6 
Actually, prosperity was spotty and selective. Most of the money 
went into the iron industry in Alabama, the lumbering operations in 
Louisiana, and the land boom in Florida. Enthusiastic promotional talk 
about huge investments in Cardiff and Middlesboro held no truth. 
Those two places like many others never even achieved the status of 
glorified villages. It became increasingly clear that the southern land 
boom was pale compared with those in other parts of the country 
during the same period. The real action was in the new cities of the 
West and in the great timber stands of the upper Midwest. For every 
dollar poured into the South, a thousand more went toward opening 
up the North Woods of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan. 7 On the 
banks of the Missouri River in Kansas City, land worth more than $70 
million changed hands in a single year during a boom that lasted most 
of the 1880s. 8 Great booms in southern California transformed Los 
Angeles and San Diego from unimportant country towns into regional 
centers. Between 1880 and 1890 the population of Los Angeles grew 
from 11,200 to 50,400 and of San Diego from 2,600 to 16,200. In the 
Northwest, on Puget Sound, the arrival of rails from the East touched 
off a flurry of speculative activity. Seattle's population leaped from 
3,500 to 42,800. Tacoma had 1,100 residents at the start of the decade 
and 34,900 at the end. Growth of this dimension was what the southern 
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cities, particularly the newer ones in the interior, needed. But the high 
hopes of the 1880s gave way in the 1890s to a general feeling of despair 
and frustration. The South failed to rise as the New South soothsayers 
had predicted. 
The results of the 1890 census made for very depressing reading in 
most quarters south of the Mason and Dixon line. In the 1880s the 
South actually lost rather than gained ground. During a decade of rapid 
urbanization, the number of places with populations over 2,500, which 
the census considered urban territory, increased from 939 to 1,348. At 
the end of the 1880s only 192 of those communities were in the South. 
Other urban statistics presented an even more depressing picture. 
From 1880 to 1890 the number of places with populations with over 
10,000 rose from 228 to 354, an overall increase of 126. The South added 
only 18 such cities. Many American cities experienced rapid numerical 
advances. A total of 117 cities added more than 10,000 inhabitants. 
Only 16 of these were in the South. 
Of special interest to the South were the large population increases 
enjoyed by a number of medium-sized midwestern industrial cities. 
For instance, Grand Rapids gained 28,300 people, Peoria 11,800, 
Toledo 31,300, and Youngstown 17,800. None of these places achieved 
metropolitan status, but they did develop into manufacturing towns 
such as the men of the New South wanted for their section. As did 
population, industy moved from east to west rather than north to 
south. In the twelve states that the census considered as part of the 
North Central division, the number of cities over 8,000 rose from 95 in 
1880 to 152 in 1890. No comparable growth occurred in the South. The 
number of places of more than 8,000 increased from 35 to 57. According 
to census experts, there was a rough correlation between industrial and 
urban expansion. Summing up the situation in the South, a census 
official stated, "The industries of these states are mainly agricultural, 
and while manufactures and mining are making some progress they 
are still in their infancy . . . In certain of these states that proportion of 
urban population is still trifling; thus, in Mississippi it constitutes but 
2.64, in North Carolina but 3.87, and Arkansas but 4.89 per cent of the 
total population. "9 
The census estimated that in 1890 $6.5 billion was invested in 
American industry, more than double the figure of ten years earlier. 
Total investments in the South reached $585 million, against $2 billion 
for the North Central division alone. In 1890 only Maryland (four-
teenth) and Kentucky (sixteenth) ranked in the leading twenty Amer-
ican manufacturing states in gross value of products. The amount of 
money invested in southern manufacturing had increased markedly 
from $234 million in 1880. In an era of almost no inflation, this increase 
was impressive. Manufacturing capital in Georgia rose from $11 mil-
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lion to $57 million, in Alabama from $11 million to $46 million. Yet 
these gains seemed small by national standards. Industrial invest-
ments outside the South rose by more than $3.5 billion. Manufacturing 
capitalization in the state of New York grew from $500 million to $1.3 
billion. The additional $800 million added to New York's capital base 
was more than the total worth of all Dixie's industries. 10 The "industrial 
revolution" in the North generated so much money so quickly that the 
South could not catch up. 
Only a few bright spots broke an otherwise depressing picture in 
the urban South. The capitalization of manufacturing in Baltimore rose 
from $38.6 million to $92.8 million. New Orleans ($26.3 million), Wash-
ington ($28. 9 million), and Louisville ($36.1 million) all had fairly 
substantial capital bases upon which to build in the future. Yet these 
figures were small compared to Chicago's total of $359.7 million. In all, 
seventeen southern cities were among the top one hundred cities in 
aggregate capital. Richmond's capitalization more than doubled dur-
ing the 1880s from $6.9 million to $16.8 million. In the same span the 
midwestern city of Columbus, Ohio, which had a heavy industrial base 
comparable to that of Richmond, enjoyed an increase in capital invest-
ment of from $5.4 million to $16.2 million. Except for Richmond and 
the South's four largest metropolitan areas, no city in the region had in 
excess of $10 million invested in manufacturing. Manufacturing in the 
piedmont was still in an early stage, although there had been some 
gains. 
The highly publicized new interior manufacturing centers had 
made disappointingly little progress. Chattanooga did not even rank 
among the top one hundred cities. Atlanta had $9.5 million and Mem-
phis $9.4 million in manufacturing capitalization in 1890. These in-
creases were in excess of 300 percent, but so were those of many 
northern industrial centers. By contrast, the capital invested in Peoria, 
Illinois, plants jumped from $4.2 to $15.1 million, and it was only a cog 
in the midwestern manufacturing empire. Birmingham had yet to 
fulfill its promise. In 1890 the aggregate for all industries was $4.6 
million and for iron and steel, $1.6 million. Racine, Wisconsin, a rising 
mill town with 5,000 fewer people than Birmingham, boasted $11.2 
million in manufacturing capital. In Pittsburgh $48.2 million out of an 
industrial capitalization of $108.4 million was in iron and steel. 11 Clear-
ly, the gloriously conceived attempt to raise the South to the level of the 
North had failed. The predictions of Grady and his colleagues turned 
to ashes. 
During the 1890s the South stopped trying to compete with the 
North and turned inward. Widespread opposition developed to any 
policy that sought accommodation with the new northern industrial 
empire, although industrialism itself was not repudiated. Shortly after 
146 The Rise of the Urban South 
his untimely death, Grady came to be considered one of the South's 
fallen heroes. Henry Watterson continued to gain stature as a sectional 
leader. Edmonds's Manufacturers' Record remained the South's foremost 
commercial publication. Rather, the change in emphasis was directly 
related to the realities of sectional economic relations. Of particular 
significance was the growing perception that the North had lost inter-
est in trying to influence the course of southern events. 
The South underwent a period of retrenchment based on the 
recognition that there was continuity in southern history. In the 1850s, 
the delegates active in the southern commercial convention movement 
had reached the conclusion that the South could not compete with the 
North on its own terms. The premise followed that southern civiliza-
tion was unique and should take its own distinctive path. Forty years 
later, after the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the aborted New South, a 
new generation of southern leaders reached much the same con-
clusion, although for somewhat different reasons. In the 1850s the 
main reason for retrenchment was economic. No one gave much 
thought to social problems because they were handled by the institu-
tion of human slavery. During the 1890s the main priority was to retain 
the supremacy of the white race. The result was legislation, including 
the Louisiana separate car act, sustained in 1896 by the United States 
Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson. In later laws the South formulated 
a highly structured segregation system based on the separate but equal 
doctrine. In 1898, the U.S. Supreme Court in Williams v. Mississippi 
accepted the "Mississippi Plan,"12 which called for the disfranchise-
ment of black voters. A common thread between the 1850s and 1890s 
was that in both decades the North did not care about the development 
of an autonomous South. Few northerners had paid much attention to 
the full ramifications of the convention movement until it was too late. 
And no major outcry in the North arose to oppose the trend in the 
South toward white racial domination, even though the Jim Crow laws 
regulated race relations more completely and along the same lines as 
the discredited Black Codes. Northern attitudes were in sharp contrast 
to those of 1861. The circumstances were different-there was no 
Abraham Lincoln, and the peculiar institution was long dead. The rise 
of industry and the development of previously virgin areas had dras-
tically changed northern priorities. 
Agricultural discontent was another indication of the South's grow-
ing isolationism. Support of the Populist movement opposed the New 
South approach to solving economic problems. They wanted to eradi-
cate rather than encourage what they perceived as outside domination 
of southern economic institutions. Although it generally went unre-
cognized at the time, there was a direct connection between the agrar-
ian revolt and the South's historic inability to develop a great 
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commercial and banking center able to control credit so as to offer 
farmers low interest rates, high prices, and other inducements. The 
leaders of the agrarian movement would have been perfectly at home at 
one of the prewar commercial conventions. Indeed, the Civil War was 
only an interlude in the quest of southern agrarians for more equitable 
commercial arrangements. 
During the 1870s distressed farmers throughout the section had 
joined the Patrons of Husbandry. Local chapters numbered more than 
a thousand, but the southern Grangers had little impact beyond edu-
cating farmers about political action. The movement also spawned 
internal disharmony, which New South spokesmen ignored. The 
Grange gave way to a series of state-level farmers' alliances and local 
groups called agricultural wheels. Many of the members were tenant 
farmers and sharecroppers united in opposition to land barons. Out of 
this combination emerged the Southern Alliance, which advocated the 
cooperative marketing of farm products. Business opposition and a 
lack of capital doomed these plans. In response, the Southern Alliance 
went into politics. Rejecting overtures for a great national Populist 
party, Alliance leaders worked through the southern Democratic party, 
a bulwark of white supremacy. The Alliance, which initially claimed to 
have considerable black support, declined after agrarian Democrat 
William Jennings Bryan lost the 1896 presidential election. The bitter 
realities of abject poverty and racial strife bore down on Dixie's inhabi-
tants.13 As long as the rural South remained depressed and divided, 
the promise of southern life envisioned by the architects of the New 
South remained an impossible dream. The failed agrarian crusade was 
not an aberration but another frustrating episode in the South's eco-
nomic inability to build an urban network that could have freed the 
section from outside domination. 14 
In the final analysis, the majority of southern urbanites responded 
negatively to the agrarian efforts, despite urban and rural interdepen-
dence. The prospect of black and white farmers banding together in a 
community of interest to achieve specific political ends frightened 
urban dwellers. The antiurbanism that culminated in Bryan's cam-
paign pointed up divergent urban and rural interests. City people did 
not want to pay more than absolutely necessary for their food prod-
ucts. Rural folk felt gouged by urban businessmen at just about every 
conceivable level. Interest rates and shipping costs were causes of 
continual friction. On the other hand, few southern businessmen were 
willing to listen seriously to the proposals put forward by the Southern 
Alliance. Nor did they formulate counterproposals. More was involved 
than simply the protection of vested interests. Everyone agreed that 
southern agriculture was depressed long before the Panic of 1893. The 
failure of the rural South to recover from the Civil War assured its 
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colonial status within an industrialized United States. Yet the tradi-
tional conservative nature of southern city building also meant that 
because of the South's consistent lack of investment capital, there was 
an unwillingness to take risks. The propagandists of the New South 
portrayed a section whose business leaders were wide awake to 
change. Although this may have been true in a few places, notably the 
rebuilt city of Atlanta and newly industrialized Birmingham, it did not 
extend to the urban South as a whole. The course of city building 
continued to flow along cautious traditional lines. 
The thirty cities that had formed the backbone of the southern 
urban network in 1880 all experienced population gains during the 
following ten years (see Table 7.1). 15 Eight of the towns enjoyed in-
creases in excess of the national average of 56.5 percent for all the 
people in the country living in urban territory. Seven ranked among 
the forty largest metropolises in the United States. Baltimore remained 
the nation's seventh largest city. New Orleans was twelfth, Washington 
fourteenth, and Louisville twentieth. The South's four largest cities 
continued as the section's only true metropolises. Richmond, in thirty-
fourth place, and Nashville, in thirty-eighth, had respectable urban 
dimensions but fell short of metropolitan status. The precarious state of 
the southern economy precluded the building of instant cities such as 
were spinging to life in the West. 16 
The layer of southern cities that made the poorest showing, with 
certain marked exceptions, was that made up of the old Atlantic ports. 
Portsmouth and Alexandria, which grew by only 5 percent, struggled 
to retain their identities. Alexandria was becoming a Washington sub-
urb. Georgetown had no official corporate existence. Since 1871 Con-
gress had gradually stripped the city government of its powers. Yet the 
end for this old colonial village was dictated by progress rather than 
failure. As the country grew, necessitating larger government services, 
Washington continued to enjoy healthy progress. It added 52,800 
inhabitants, and its percentage increase was at the national average. 
Vicissitudes of commerce affected the fortunes of the other key sea-
coast ports. Charleston rose by only 10 percent and Wilmington by 16 
percent. Both cities continued to count the handling of cotton as crucial 
to their economic fortunes. Their leaders had found no way to alter 
their economics, and the depressed conditions in the hinterlands only 
added to the problems. Although Wilmington merchants deserved 
high marks for more than holding their own against increased compe-
tition and shifting marketing patterns, the time was past when the 
cotton trade could result in a swift advance in population. Savannah, 
which also enjoyed an impressive cotton trade, benefited from its 
increasing importance as a regional railroad center. Rapid urban 
growth in Georgia and the opening up of northeastern Florida gener-
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Table 7.1. Population Trends in Thirty Southern Cities, 1880-1890 
Po2ulation Increase 
City 1880 1890 Number Percent 
Alabama 
Mobile 29,132 31,076 1,944 6.67 
Montgomery 16,713 21,883 5,170 30.93 
Arkansas 
Little Rock 13,138 25,874 12,736 96.94 
Dist. of Columbia 
Washington 177,624 230,392 52,768 29.71 
Georgetown 12,578 14,046 1,468 11.67 
Georgia 
Atlanta 37,409 65,533 28,124 75.18 
Augusta 21,891 33,300 11,409 52.12 
Columbus 10,123 17,303 7,180 70.93 
Macon 12,749 22,746 9,997 78.41 
Savannah 30,709 43,189 12,480 40.64 
Kentucky 
Covington 29,720 37,371 7,651 25.74 
Lexington 16,656 21,567 4,911 29.48 
Louisville 123,758 161,129 37,371 30.20 
Newport 20,433 24,918 4,485 21.95 
Louisiana 
New Orleans 216,090 242,039 25,949 12.01 
Maryland 
Baltimore 332,313 434,439 102,126 30.73 
Cumberland 10,693 12,729 2,036 19.04 
Mississi22i 
Vicksburg 11,814 13,373 1,559 13.20 
North Carolina 
Wilmington 17,350 20,056 2,706 15.60 
South Carolina 
Charleston 49,984 54,955 4,971 9.95 
Columbia 10,036 15,353 5,317 52.98 
Tennessee 
Chattanooga 12,892 29,100 16,208 125.72 
Memphis 33,592 64,495 30,903 92.00 
Nashville 43,350 76,168 32,818 75.70 
Virginia 
Alexandria 13,659 14,339 680 4.98 
Lynchburg 15,959 19,709 3,750 23.50 
Norfolk 21,966 34,871 12,905 58.75 
Petersburg 21,656 22,680 1,024 4.73 
Portsmouth 11,390 13,268 1,878 16.49 
Richmond 63,600 81,388 17,788 27.97 
150 The Rise of the Urban South 
ated enough activities in the hinterlands so that Savannah added 
12,500 inhabitants, a rise of 41 percent. In an era of sharper competition 
between cities, Savannah had fared well. Norfolk's success as a coal-
exporting center-a direct consequence of decisions by northern rail-
road interests-sparked a boom. The number of residents jumped by 
12,900, a rise of 59 percent. 
Baltimore was the South's greatest success story. Its midwestern 
connections paid handsome dividends. The port of Baltimore re-
mained prosperous throughout the 1880s. More than ever, the Monu-
mental City dominated life in Maryland and Delaware. An 
augmentation of 31 percent translated into a spectacular population 
rise of 102,000. Only six other American cities added more than 100,000 
persons. The Baltimore story served as an apt demonstration of the 
gradual evolution of city building in the South. Plans made before the 
Civil War led to railroad connections necessary in the nineteenth 
century to construct a national metropolis. The New South philosophy 
espoused in the pages of Richard Edmonds's Baltimore-based Manufac-
turers' Record, although inspirational, actually had little to do with the 
continued advance. The city's business community simply continued 
to follow a proven path to success. 
Only two of the five old piedmont cities that had served as con-
necting links between the coast and the interior in antebellum days had 
growth rates in the 1880s in excess of the national average. Virginia's 
cities experienced disappointing growth. Petersburg added only 1,000 
people, an increase of slightly under 5 percent and the lowest among 
the thirty cities that had formed the backbone of the southern urban 
system at the beginning of the decade. Petersburg's tobacco fims failed 
to keep pace with changing tastes brought about by the new popularity 
of cigarettes. Outside investors showed no interest in building man-
ufacturing plants. So Petersburg languished off the beaten path of 
southern progress. Lynchburg, another Virginia tobacco town, had a 
modest 24 percent growth rate. Just as in Petersburg, the Lynchburg 
tobacco industry had failed to keep abreast with the times. If the New 
South propagandists had been right, both cities would have moved 
ahead rapidly, building upon a solid if modest manufacturing base. 
Instead, the opposite had happened. Because they relied on producing 
outmoded goods, the cities had limited future prospects. Richmond, 
which grew by 28 percent, slightly under the national average, added 
17,800 residents, the largest total for any place in the Old Dominion. 
Richmond further cemented its role as the state's largest city. In addi-
tion to being a manufacturing and government town, Richmond 
emerged as one of the South's top banking centers. In South Carolina 
and Georgia, both Columbia and Augusta profited from increased 
industrialism. Columbia's growth rate was 53 percent and Augusta's 
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only a percentage point lower. These rates were in line with the New 
South advocates' hopes. But although Augusta added 11,400 inhabi-
tants and Columbia 5,300, neither place displayed the attributes of a 
boom town. They continued, as at the start of the decade, to function as 
medium-sized communities with increasingly solid industrial compo-
nents. Taken as a whole, the original successful piedmont towns had 
not generated the speed of growth needed to serve as the heart of a 
southern factory system. 
Of the cities in the South that had spearheaded the advance of 
civilization into the New West, six had more than 10,000 people in 
1880. Two experienced considerable progress during the ensuing de-
cade. Both drew upon the continued prosperity of the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad. Louisville, the South's fourth largest city, had a 
growth rate of 30 percent, adding 37,400 inhabitants. Impressive trans-
portation components had enabled Louisville to claim a place among 
the nation's regional metropolises. Nashville advanced in much the 
same way. A total of more than 32,900 new residents represented an 
increase of 76 percent. The population enlargements made Nashville 
and Louisville harbingers of the New South. Cumberland, Lexington, 
Newport, and Covington did not achieve such success. Cumberland, 
which grew by 19 percent, remained simply another railroad division 
point. Lexington, somewhat off the beaten path of commercial activity, 
grew by 29 percent. Much of the rise related to the agricultural base in 
the Kentucky Bluegrass region, one of the most prosperous in the 
South. Covington grew by 26 percent and Newport by 22 percent, but 
the two Cincinnati suburbs had virtually lost their remaining southern 
identity. 
Unimpressive growth rates for the South's two major Gulf Coast 
ports reflected a combination of depressed regional markets and shift-
ing national transportation patterns. New Orleans added 26,000 peo-
ple, not a strong showing for a large city. The Crescent City's rate of 
increase of 12 percent was less than half that of any of the South's other 
three metropolitan centers. The leaders of New Orleans had given up 
hope of achieving urban greatness through domination of upriver 
trade. And as long as Louisiana and Mississippi remained in a state of 
agricultural stagnation, New Orleans could not advance appreciably by 
capitalizing on traditional regional trading areas. To compound mat-
ters, violent riots directed against Italians and New York's dominance 
as a receiving center for the massive flood of immigrants into the 
United States severely hurt New Orleans' role as a major immigrant 
reception center. In the Crescent City, it was a matter of hoping for the 
best by riding out an economic storm that had no foreseeable end. 
After J.D.B. DeBow died, the New South creed had no influential 
spokesman in New Orleans. Local leaders saw no reason to support a 
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concept cloaked in regional terms that would help rival cities. New 
Orleans had no way of quickly realizing the promise predicted by 
Grady for the urban South. Survival rather than advance was the order 
of the day. The same conditions impaired Mobile's chances. In a period 
of recession, its carefully constructed regional railroad connections 
and its cotton marketing facilities were financial liabilities instead of 
strengths. Mobile added only 1,900 inhabitants, representing a poor 
growth rate of 7 percent. As long as Alabama continued to be domi-
nated by an inefficient sharecropper economy there appeared little 
room for improvement. Mobile, a major part of a carefully constructed 
antebellum commercial urban system that had increasingly lost its 
forward thrust, would languish beside its beautiful bay. 
The emerging interior cities of the South were crucial to the hopes 
of the New South promoters. "Magic cities" were expected to grow 
overnight from small country towns into great regional metropolises. 
Writing about the central South, Grady proclaimed, "The promise of 
her great destiny, written in her fields, her quarries, her mines, her 
forests, and her rivers, is no longer blurred or indistinct, and the world 
draws near to read."17 As with so many statements about a New South 
on the march to greatness, the truth was somewhat different. The 
emerging interior cities had failed to grow at the pace necessary to 
challenge towns outside the South. All eight of the places in the 
southern interior with populations of over 10,000 inhabitants regis-
tered increases, but these gains were not large enough to have a 
national impact. 
By southern norms the interior cities did very well. Only Vicksburg 
(13 percent) had a rate of growth under the national average. Both 
Vicksburg and Columbus (26 percent) were cotton-collecting points on 
natural river lines. Neither had the trunk railroad connections neces-
sary to enlarge their commercial functions. Columbus, with its fine 
waterpower, still entertained hopes of developing into a large manufac-
turing center when the economy improved. But Vicksburg, though it 
remained a dominant city in Mississippi, had uninviting prospects at 
best. Vicksburg's citizens looked backward rather than forward, recall-
ing the past glories of the Old South and the great siege of Civil War 
days. The promise of the New South never reached the town. Its 
inhabitants could only look with envy on a place where that promise 
was fulfilled-Atlanta. 
In 1890 Atlanta had 28,100 more people than ten years earlier. This 
75 percent increase was 46 percent above the national aveage. Atlanta's 
importance as a transportation and commercial hub in the Southeast 
increased over the decade. Grady served his city well, lecturing widely 
about its prospects in the North and filling the pages of his newspaper 
with favorable comments. Many of his promotional pieces were re-
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printed in smaller newspapers. In 1883, for example, the editor of the 
Alexandria Town Talk reported, "The Atlanta Constitution publishes a 
report showing that nearly $6,000,000 are invested in manufacturing 
industries in that city, and over $2,500,000---about half the capital 
invested-is paid out annually in wages. "18 Unlike most booster re-
ports, the Constitution article was essentially correct. Atlanta was a city 
on the move. 
During the 1880s, four other towns across the South's midsection 
registered even higher percentage increases. Population in Chattanoo-
ga advanced at a rate of 126 percent, Little Rock by 97 percent, Mem-
phis by 92 percent, and Macon by 78 percent. Chattanooga added a 
number of new industries. Little Rock grew as plantation lands opened 
in central Arkansas. Memphis began to recover from the terrible epi-
demics of the 1870s. Macon benefited from solidifying its position as a 
subregional commercial hub. The absolute increases in population for 
all four cities were as impressive as the percentage figures. They all 
gained more than 10,000 people; Memphis added 30,900 residents. 
Another interior town, Montgomery, had a population rise of 5, 100, an 
increase of 31 percent. But none of the five cities, upon which so much 
of the South's chances had hinged, achieved metropolitan status. 
The 1890 population statistics for the thirty largest cities of the 
previous decade served as another indication of the continued gradual 
evolution of the southern urban system. Baltimore with 434,000 people 
and Washington with 230,400 kept their relative positions on the 
eastern seaboard. Savannah, which had 43,200 residents, continued to 
gain on Charleston, a city of 55,000. Norfolk, which had 34,900 people, 
was the second largest city and principal port in Virginia. A population 
of 20,000 cemented Wilmington's hold as North Carolina's number one 
port. Alexandria (14,300), Georgetown (14,000), and Portsmouth 
(13,000) were unimportant. Along the piedmont, Richmond's 81,400 
persons continued to make it the largest fall line city. Neither Pe-
tersburg (22,700) nor Lynchburg (19,700) improved its position in 
Virginia. Columbia (15,400) remained the second largest city in South 
Carolina. Augusta (33,300) enhanced its industrial base. Louisville, a 
city of 161,000 inhabitants, moved ahead along expected lines. Lex-
ington (21,600) continued on a downward slide that had started de-
cades earlier. Covington (37,400), Newport (25,000), and Cumberland 
(12, 700) had population figures that belied their significance in relation-
ship to the southern urban network. Nashville, with 76,200 people, 
remained central Tennessee's leading urban center. New Orleans, 
despite a slow rate of increase, had 242,000 residents and was still the 
leading city of the lower South. Even with only the number of inhabi-
tants added in the 1880s, it would still have been the nineteenth largest 
city in the South. Mobile (31,100), which remained in the shadow of 
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New Orleans, was still the second most important Gulf port. Long-
established urban relationships remained unchanged. 
Mixed growth rates in the interior of Dixie did not significantly 
alter the hierarchy of cities that had existed at the start of the decade. 
Atlanta's advanced to 65,500 people Chattanooga (29,100) and Little 
Rock (25,900) advanced as expected. Memphis (64,500) underwent a 
quicker recovery than predicted, mainly because of confidence in the 
sanitary reform program. Macon (22,800) rose along predictable lines; 
Montgomery (21, 900) did not. Both retained their importance as cotton 
markets and added some manufacturing. Columbus boosters had 
expected their city to have more than its recorded 17,303 people in 
1890, but Columbus remained an important subregional cotton center. 
So, at least temporarily, did Vicksburg, which with 13,400 residents 
was the largest city in Mississippi; it remained a connecting link in the 
downriver cotton trade. The interior cities continued to grow as part of 
a process mandated by decisions made many decades earlier. 
Population trends in the eighteen southern cities that passed the 
10,000 mark in the 1880s showed greater continuity than claimed by 
New South spokesmen (see Table 7.2). 19 Yet the statistics encouraged 
these men because they indicated a substantial flow of northern capital 
into some parts of Dixie. All eighteen cities registered growth rates in 
excess of the national average, understandable given their modest 
dimensions at the start of the decade. The pattern of new growth was 
generally predictable. No new seaport cities of importance arose from 
Maryland through South Carolina. In Florida, however, a combination 
of new settlement and the anticipation of a boom in the underdevel-
oped state led to urban growth. Both Jacksonville and Key West 
weathered serious yellow fever visitations and showed population 
growth. Jacksonville increased by 9,500 in population for a growth of 
125 percent. The total number of inhabitants reached 17,200, and 
further increases seemed assured. A new cattle trade showed promise 
of diversifying Florida's agriculture. Key West and Pensacola, old naval 
bases that had prospered as a consequence of increased military and 
civilian efforts, hoped to benefit. A flourishing sponging trade helped 
Key West, which added 9,900 people, attain a population of 18,100. The 
addition of 4,900 residents made Pensacola a town of 11,800. No other 
new cities along the Gulf of Mexico became significant. 
Developments in Florida harked well for the future. Northern 
capitalist Henry Morrison Flagler of the Standard Oil Company was a 
Sunshine State counterpart of empire builder James J. Hill in the 
Northwest. Flagler started land companies, newspapers, cattle ran-
ches, citrus farms, and utilities in Florida. Ahead of his times in seeing 
the potential of tourism as a way to improve Florida's economy, Flagler 
built gigantic Victorian-style resort hotels, which tourists reached over 
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Table 7.2. Population Trends in Eighteen Southern Cities That 
Passed the 10,000 Mark, 1880-1890 
Population Increase 
City 1880 1890 Number Percent 
Alabama 
Birmingham 3,086 26,178 23,092 748.28 
Arkansas 
Fort Smith 3,099 11,311 8,212 264.99 
Florida 
Jacksonville 7,650 17,201 9,551 124.85 
Key West 9,890 18,080 8,190 82.81 
Pensacola 6,845 11,750 4,905 71.66 
Kentucky 
Paducah 8,036 12,797 4,761 59.25 
Louisiana 
Baton Rouge 7,197 10,478 3,281 45.59 
Shreveport 8,009 11,979 3,970 49.57 
Maryland 
Hagerstown 6,627 10,118 3,491 52.68 
Mississi[!Ei 
Meridian 4,008 10,624 6,616 165.07 
Natchez 7,058 10,101 3,043 43.11 
North Carolina 
Asheville 2,616 10,235 7,619 291.25 
Charlotte 7,094 11,557 4,463 62.91 
Raleigh 9,265 12,678 3,413 36.84 
Tennessee 
Jackson 5,377 10,039 4,662 86.70 
Knoxville 9,693 22,535 12,842 132.49 
Virginia 
Danville 7,526 10,305 2,779 36.93 
Roanoke 669 16,159 15,490 2,315.40 
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a network of rails that ultimately extended to Key West via Flagler's 
Florida East Coast Railroad. 20 Grady said that by 1889 Flagler had 
already invested $7 million in Florida hotel properties and superb 
winter homes. "The tide of travel," Grady wrote, "is turning again, and 
Florida is not only confirmed as the winter garden of the Republic, but 
its sanitarium."21 According to the 1890 census, Florida was the last 
frontier in the continental United States. 22 The men of the Old South 
had neither the capital nor the inclination to develop a remote, swampy 
region ill-suited to cotton production. Florida needed the capital re-
sources coupled with a grand design that Flagler brought. A few 
unreconstructed southern nationalists denounced Flagler as another in 
a long line of northern rascals bent on keeping the South in colonial 
bondage. Of course, this evluation missed a fundamental point of the 
New South philosophy, the conception that the section could best be 
raised by attracting such men as Flagler. According to this viewpoint, 
the South desperately needed outside capital to break northern bond-
age. 
In Louisiana and Mississippi many old river towns aspired to 
become great railroad centers. Predictions at the start of the 1880s that 
demands from overseas would generate a great cotton boom had 
proved a myth. Hence aspirations changed. In 1883 Edgar McCormick 
of the Alexandria Town Talk predicted a tremendous future for his village 
as a transportation center. "Here in Alexandria," he wrote, "it is a 
matter of little consequence to the merchants and people whether the 
river is high or low as the railroad facilities are unsurpassed. To-day 
flour is sold cheaper as it is in New Orleans. Alexandria is therefore 
headquarters for flour, and the merchants and people in the surround-
ing parishes ... Our direct railroad connection with St. Louis enables 
us to buy without paying a profit to the middle men at New Orleans."23 
Despite such optimism, Alexandria was little more than a glorified 
village at the close of the decade. As a consequence of the agricultural 
depression, only a few river cities in the deep South achieved popula-
tions over 10,000. In Louisiana, Baton Rouge grew from 7,200 to 10,500 
persons and Shreveport from 8,000 to 12,000. Impressive rates of 
increase-almost 50 percent for Shreveport and 46 percent for Baton 
Rouge-failed to hide lackluster records in other Louisiana towns. 
Results in Mississippi were much the same. Meridian rose by 165 
percent, but it was still a farm marketing and railroad junction of 10,600 
people in 1890. Few local residents entertained hope of major future 
progress. The prospects for Natchez were bleaker. In the ten-year 
span, its number of residents increased form 7,100 to 10,100. A tempo-
rary rise in river traffic had generated false hopes. Only hard times and 
decline appeared on the horizon. The economic environment was 
unpromising for city building. 
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Four cities that moved across the 10,000 mark in the 1880s would 
probably have done so if there had been no New South movement. 
These communities were on the periphery of the South, except for 
Jackson, Tennessee. A railroad division point, it had a growth rate of 87 
percent, reflecting a population increase from 5,400 to 10,000. But an 
impressive percentage rise was not enough to make Jackson a major 
city. It never was prominent in plans for a New South. Nor was Fort 
Smith, Arkansas, on the edge of the Indian Territory in Oklahoma. The 
taming of the lawless area and the furthering of law and order by 
"Hanging Judge" Isaac Parker paved the way for land rushes into 
Oklahoma at the end of the decade. Fort Smith acquired a minor 
hinterland, advancing in the ten years from 3,100 to 11,300 people. The 
town's progress was an unexpected plus to the hopes of advocates of 
rapid southern urbanization. How well Fort Smith would do in the 
future, however, was tied in more with western development than 
with that of the South. Fort Smith was a southern city only because of 
its Arkansas location. So was the Kentucky river city of Paducah. A gain 
of close to 5,000 inhabitants brought its population to 12,800, but 
Paducah's prosperity rested on building a hinterland directly to the 
north in Illinois. Hagerstown, Maryland, was another of many places 
that grew as a railroad junction. It had 10,100 residents, and its prox-
imity to Baltimore and Washington gave it no chance of building a large 
marketing area. Hagerstown and Jackson were important for limited 
transportation reasons. Paducah was a river town with small ambitions 
in the post-steamboat era. Fort Smith was a glorified military post. 
Although these places afforded further evidence of gradual progress, 
they were not crucial to the building of an urban South. 
Industrial progress, significant by southern standards, led to the 
rise of some piedmont mill towns. Big Lick, Virginia, had 669 residents 
at the start of the 1880s. The opening of textile factories financed by 
Yankee capitalists ushered in a boom. Under the new name of 
Roanoke, the place in 1890 had 16,200 inhabitants, making it the fourth 
largest city in Virginia. 24 Roanoke had a 2,315 percent rate of growth. 
Of all the cities in the country over 2,500 population, only three had 
greater growth percentages: the Oregon lumber town of Albina (3,487 
percent) and the two Washington centers of Tacoma (3,179 percent) 
and Spokane (5,592 percent). None of the other new piedmont towns 
came close to duplicating the showing of Roanoke, although four did 
rather well. Danville, Virginia, had a 37 percent rate of increase, going 
from 7,500 to 10,300 persons. In North Carolina, textile and cigarette 
manufacturing led to major advances. Charlotte and Raleigh con-
tinued down paths set earlier. Their New South boosters pointed with 
pride to an increase of 63 percent for Charlotte and 37 percent for 
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Raleigh. In 1890 the former had 11,600 people and the latter 12,700. 
Asheville, a country village of 2,600 in 1880, served as still another 
example of how the coming of industry could lead to a sharp rise in 
population. As a consequence of a 291 percentage increase, the town 
had 10,200 inhabitants in 1890. Along with Roanoke, Danville, 
Charlotte, and Raleigh, it had bright prospects. But despite the dra-
matic changes under way in the tobacco industry, coupled with the 
luring of New England textile manufacturers, none of the cities ap-
peared to have the remotest chance of duplicating the overnight suc-
cess of Chicago or San Francisco. Still, if twenty other cities had done as 
well in the 1880s as Roanoke or even Danville, the section would have 
quickly gained urban parity with the rest of the nation. Perhaps, then, 
the visions of the New South advocates and the agrarian crusaders for 
an independent self-sufficient South might have come true. 
Two cities more than two hundred miles apart, one old and one 
new, personified attributes associated with the rise of a New South. In 
Tennessee, Knoxville, which began as a frontier outpost in the New 
West in the previous century, finally started to display the success 
predicted by its early promoters. During the 1880s, Knoxville, helped 
by an infusion of industry, especially a large trash can factory, more 
than doubled in population from 9,700 to 22,500. Unlike many other 
southern cities, Knoxville had significant suburban characteristics. 
Census statisticians noted that roughly 40,000 persons lived in the 
Knoxville area, most along the pikes and creek valleys that spread out 
from the city in all directions. 25 Despite its success, Knoxville had the 
disadvantage of being a rival of Atlanta. Henry Grady ignored Knox-
ville when he listed cities in the forefront of the New South movement. 
Birmingham was another case. Grady, who envisioned the new 
"Vulcan" as the next Pittsburgh, saw Birmingham as both a fitting 
symbol of the New South and a junior partner of Atlanta. The popula-
tion of Birmingham increased in the 1880s from 3,100 to 26,200, a rise of 
748 percent. Within a few years the Alabama city had acquired promis-
ing demographic dimensions. 
Birmingham hoped to become a regional metropolis. The 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad connected Birmingham with a 
number of neighboring iron and coal-producing towns, including 
Bessemer, Talladega, and Anniston. According to promotional liter-
ature, there were thirty-two iron furnaces in and around Birmingham. 
The editor of the Birmingham Iron Age proclaimed that more outside 
capitalists arrived every week. By 1890 Alabama produced more iron 
and steel than any other southern state. This progress caused Andrew 
Carnegie to remark that the South was the "most formidable industrial 
enemy" that Pennsylvania encountered in the struggle for control of 
the American iron industry. 26 Northern money, some of it supplied by 
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Carnegie, had provided the necessary resources for the start of a boom. 
Unfortunately for its future aspirations, more than outside money and 
a few small towns with furnaces and mines was needed to make 
Birmingham a great city. Hinterland agricultural connections were of 
crucial importance, and as long as the farm lands around Birmingham 
remained depressed, the city was bound to have problems sustaining 
the rapid growth needed to make it an important center. Birmingham 
did not fit neatly into the southern urban system. Dixie's fragile agri-
cultural economy did not require a proliferation of competing cities. 
After the mills were built and staffed, Birmingham, like the new indus-
trial towns in the piedmont, faced competition from already existing 
cities that had long-established local agricultural connections. Despite 
the New South propaganda, the horrendous financial difficulties that 
helped spawn the agrarian revolt meant that there remained as before 
the Civil War an unpromising environment for "instant cities." Even 
with some outside help and a boldly stated program for industrial 
progress, city builders continued to encounter serious challenges. 
Because the South was not immune to national developments, in 
the 1890s urban progress was one of the section's few economic bright 
spots. In 1900 the South contained nine more cities with populations 
over 10,000 than it had ten years earlier, but none of these cities posed 
any immediate threat to the existing orderly southern network of cities. 
The largest of these, Newport News, Virginia, which advanced from 
4,400 to 19,600 inhabitants, was actually a part of the complex of ports 
surrounding Norfolk. A port with an independent existence, Tampa, 
Florida, added 15,800 people and could expect future growth in rela-
tionship to the development of Florida's west coast. Two interior river 
towns enjoyed moderate success. Owensboro, Kentucky, on the Ohio 
River between Paducah and Louisville, reached 13,200. Pine Bluff, 
Arkansas, on the Arkansas River, grew apace with the development of 
the rice industry on the Grand Prairie in east central Arkansas. Pine 
Bluff had 11,500 residents but little immediate hope of being more than 
a farm marketing town. The chances of the agricultural and educational 
community of Athens, Georgia, which reached a population of 10,200 
in 1900, were little better. The four other places that crossed the 10,000 
line were mill towns. In North Carolina, Greensboro and Winston-
Salem both had 10,000 inhabitants. The rise of the South Carolina cities 
of Greenville (11,900) and Spartanburg (11,400) portended further 
industrial advances in the Palmetto State. But the fact that the South 
added only four new industrial towns reflected the general slowdown 
in the national economy that followed the Panic of 1893. The more 
industry the South acquired, the more the section's economy de-
pended on outside forces. 
The urbanization process in the South continued to move forward 
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along well-established lines. The development of Newport News im-
proved Atlantic coast port facilities. Economic enhancement of this 
nature had been under way since the earliest days of settlement. 
Owensboro was another junction point along the South's northern 
rim. Pine Bluff and Athens constituted additions to the layer of interior 
cities. Growth in Greensboro, Winston-Salem, Greenville, and Spar-
tanburg was a logical consequence of the program to bring manufactur-
ing to the piedmont. Tampa was a product of the opening of Florida. 
The Sunshine State contained the last layer of southern cities raised up 
in the nineteenth century. Events in Florida and elsewhere gave moot 
evidence of the strong spirit of urban enterprise that prevailed in the 
South. Critics noted that in the 1890s the rest of the nation added 
seventy-six cities of more than 10,000, clouding the significance of that 
figure as a dividing line between large and small communities. Yet 
what at first glance was a sorry showing in the South missed a funda-
mental point: the necessity to evaluate southern urbanization on its 
own merits. 
The layering process was a logical response to the needs of an 
agrarian society. The layers of cities evolved as new lands, farther away 
from the eastern seaboard, opened for settlement. The procedure was 
a recognition that although the Old South needed commercial cities, it 
did not require nor did it have the strength to construct cities helter-
skelter as long as it continued to operate under the restraints imposed 
by the plantation system. The Civil War brought a temporary halt to 
layering. It began again during Reconstruction and continued into the 
twentieth century in the resort cities of Florida and the mill towns of 
the piedmont. The New South movement, with the clairon call for 
manufacturing and the exhortations about the opportunities that 
awaited investors, clouded the issues. Except for a few triumphs south-
em urbanization continued about as before. This is not to say that 
things could not have been better. Entrepreneurs made bad decisions 
and missed opportunities. The realities of southern economics necessi-
tated a very conservative approach to risk taking. Southern urban 
capitalists could not afford to risk their limited cash balances on a single 
decision. 
The South entered the twentieth century with a clearly defined 
and orderly urban system. The Atlantic and Gulf ports continued to 
serve as the cornerstone of the network. Baltimore had come close to 
becoming the great commercial city dreamed about by the nationalists 
of the Old South. It had the twin advantages of having southern 
marketing areas outside the depressed cotton South and excellent 
connections with midwestern grain markets. Baltimore's success made 
it controversial, and the city's Midwest railroad strategy had hurt trade 
on the Mississippi River. Foes continued to claim that Baltimore was no 
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longer southern, ignoring that it was one of the region's oldest cities. 
Washington, a northern city to southerners and a southern one to 
northerners, had 279,000 people. It was the only seaport of signficant 
size along the Atlantic coast that did not owe its success to maritime 
commerce. Although some observers felt that Washington lacked the 
cultural refinements necessary for a national capital, it had evolved 
into a pleasant town suited to the needs of the government of a nation 
of 90 million people. 
Down the Virginia coast, Norfolk's ascendancy as a coal-exporting 
enter had turned it into an important Atlantic port. Norfolk had 46,600 
inhabitants, and another 21,000 lived in Newport News and Ports-
mouth. In North Carolina, Wilmington (21,000) experienced limited 
progress as a cotton-shipping port. Although Charleston, which had 
56,800 people, remained important, it was no longer a pace setter for 
the South. An old rival, Savannah (54,200), approached Charleston in 
size. The Georgia city's railroads supplied good hinterland connec-
tions. Jacksonville (28,400) owed its growth to the development of 
regional markets in Florida. So did the other chief Florida ports: Key 
West (17,000), Tampa (15,800), and Pensacola (17,700). Mobile (38,500), 
with a weak marketing area, had to contend with increasingly stiff 
opposition from the other Gulf ports. Even in a decade of depression 
and social unrest, New Orleans added 45,100 people. The South's 
second largest city had a population of 287,100, remaining-as it had 
for decades-a great cotton-shipping port. 
With New Orleans and Baltimore as cornerstones, the general 
contours of coastal urbanization in the South were not appreciably 
different than they had been in the Early National period. The only 
exception was the rise of the Florida cities, but even they had been 
important in the fishing village economy that had characterized Florida 
under Spanish rule. 
The 1900 census showed no significant changes in long-standing 
relationships among the old piedmont and New West layers of cities. 
None of the cities built in the Gilded Age yet posed a threat to estab-
lished relationships. Richmond had 85,100 residents, but no other 
interior city in Virginia had as many as 20,000 people. The same was 
true in North Carolina. Charlotte, the largest of the state's new mill 
towns, with 18,100 residents, hardly qualified as an industrial giant. 
South Carolina's primary interior town, Columbia, had 21,000 inhabi-
tants. Augusta, which had a listed population of 39,400, was a suc-
cessful commercial and mill town but far from a metropolis. A 
significant feature of the industrial movement in the piedmont was that 
the old established places with good railroad connections maintained 
their dominate positions, despite the addition of a few more mill 
towns. Railroads had helped cities cement their positions. Louisville 
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entered the twentieth century with 204,700 persons and Nashville with 
80,900. Both centers continued to dominate and further to consolidate 
large marketing areas. Populist orators correctly charged that the 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad was ultimately controlled by eastern 
capital, but so were the main railroad lines that ran out of Chicago. The 
amount of business that a great railroad system generated for a termi-
nal was far more important in the long run than the origin of the 
capital. Certainly, there was a need to formulate an aggressive com-
munity urban railroad policy at the earliest possible date, even when 
future prospects appeared bleak. No city, not even Chicago, had the 
resources to construct its own trunk railroads. From Richmond to 
Augusta and Louisville to Nashville, places that had advanced quickly 
because of decisions made in the Old South continued to be dominant 
into the twentieth century. 
Birmingham was the only "instant city" of major stature spawned 
in the Gilded Age. Birmingham contained 38,400 residents in 1900, 
and 10,000 more lived in its suburbs, especially outlying Bessemer. 
Birmingham had advanced impressively since its founding thirty years 
earlier. In a similar time span, between the 1830s and the 1860s, 
Chicago's population grew from a few people to more than 100,000. In 
the 1890s, when Birmingham grew by close to 12,000 inhabitants, 
Chicago added close to a million. Birmingham and other cities in the 
South's interior had no way of competing directly with a city such as 
Chicago for people. The New South propagandists did the South a 
disservice by claiming that the adoption of an urban and industrial 
program would soon allow Dixie to build a series of monster metropo-
lises. It made substantial achievements appear almost as failures. 
Within southern parameters, many of the interior cities had done 
very well. Memphis, despite the stigma of frequent yellow fever out-
breaks, moved forward in impressive fashion, helped by the creation of 
new markets in eastern Arkansas. The city had 102,300 residents in 
1900, having added 37,800 in ten years. Atlanta increased by 24,000 
people. The jewel of the New South had 89,900 residents at the close of 
the 1890s. Its role as a banking and trading center assured future 
growth. If the Peach State's agricultural economy ever prospered, 
regional dominance seemed in reach. Several places in the cotton 
South entered the twentieth century as medium-sized towns built 
upon solid foundations: Columbus (17,600), Macon (23,300), Mont-
gomery (30,300), and Meridian (14, 100), to name a few. The contours of 
the interior layer of cities were in place. 
The 1900 census demonstrated that at best the South had only 
slightly improved its urban position in the United States during the 
Gilded Age. In 1900 there were 400 cities with more than 10,000 people 
in the United States. Only 57 of those were in the South. Twenty years 
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earlier, 30 out of 228 such cities had been in the South. Other indexes 
nullified that slight gain. Of 82 American cities in 1900 in the 25,000 to 
50,000 population group, only 10 were in the South. Of 40 cities of from 
50,000 to 100,000, the South had but 5. Of 38 cities in excess of 100,000, 
there were 5 in the South. Dixie had added only 1 city in that category 
in twenty years; the rest of the country had 17 more. The South, 
however, did have Baltimore, which kept its hold on sixth place nation-
ally. Moreover, the figures failed to convey a fundamental point about 
the southern urban network: as throughout much of its history, the 
South entered the new century with cities designed to serve sectional 
commercial needs. That was the best the South could do, given its 
inability to build up a city capable of combating New York. The South 
never had the means of controlling its own credit. For that reason and 
because of the nature of the agricultural system, most southerners 
approached city building reasonably and realistically. Dixie's urban 
network has to be considered on its own merits. A statistical lag was 
inevitable, given the circumstances. 
Southern urbanization in the Gilded Age underscored the con-
tinuity of the section's experience. Economic, social, religious, and 
political attitudes all had antebellum roots. Neither the Civil War nor 
Reconstruction had much more than a temporary disruptive impact on 
southern cities. Indeed, there was little need to transform them in 
northern images because they had mirrored national urban values 
since colonial times. The manner of their construction and their at-
tempt to garner markets though transportation systems were all in the 
prevailing direction of American city making. It went without saying 
that there was more sophisticated social life in New Orleans than in 
Scranton, Pennsylvania, and that similar disparities gave life a flavor in 
Columbia distinct from that in Little Rock. Yet, allowing for differences 
in style and taste, tempered by geography and climate, one city was 
much the same as another. Urbanity was basically a matter of degree. 
The realization that the South lacked the resources to achieve urban 
and hence economic parity with the rest of America in a short time 
dulled the spirit of many white southerners. An inferior agricultural 
system militated against a quick recovery. In the wake of the failed 
agrarian crusade, southern leaders concentrated on maintaining segre-
gation and remembering the Lost Cause. A general acceptance of 
second-class status in the Union in exchange for a measure of social 
control over internal affairs gave the South the appearance of a failed 
and conservative bastion. Fundamentalist religious bodies deplored 
modernist values such as evolution. The gradual rise of the Ku Klux 
Klan, along with frequent lynchings, provided further indication to the 
rest of the nation that the South was a place apart. The region's intellec-
tuals defended Dixie by attacking the intrusion of Yankee values and 
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conjuring up visions of an idealized agrarian society. Through it all, the 
cities remained the best hope for a progressive South. Indeed, they 
continued to grow along logical lines-the next urban layer coming in 
Florida. 
The failure of the plans of the New South leaders clouded the 
continuity and the progress made in southern city building. At the 
same time they provided, as for J.D. B. DeBow in antebellum days, a 
rationale for building the very kind of urban society about which 
Jefferson had expressed ambivalence. In the twentieth century, a new 
generation of civic boosters called for advancement of their particular 
towns. It made little difference that northern money fueled the Ala-
bama steel industry, the piedmont textile mills, or the Florida land 
boom; it was all part of a continuing process. A potential remained for 
urban advance on the model of Chicago. The South experienced an 
"urban ethos" in the 1920s, a calamity along with the rest of the 
country in the 1930s, an infusion of federal money in the 1940s, and a 
great boom in the following decades. By 1985 the region had achieved 
many of the goals of the New South. Given the manner in which 
southerners had built their cities, the results represented the comple-
tion of a logical urbanization policy that brought about parity with the 
rest of the nation. Cities enabled the South to regain the status in the 
Union that it had enjoyed early in the nineteenth century. 
The picture of castles in the sky painted by the men of the New 
South creed requires viewing from within rather than from outside the 
South. They were keepers of the faith, honorable heirs to an am-
bivalence on the part of southerners over the nature of the cities they 
wanted. During a time of trial for Dixie, they held out a vision of a 
South of cities built with northern money but under southern direc-
tion. But schemes went sour and goals were overreached. Southerners' 
views on race were distasteful to many of their northern contempo-
raries. Yet once southern attitudes changed, and vast quantities of 
northern and federal money flowed South, the visions of the men of 
the New South came true. A hundred years after the promulgation of 
the creed, numerous ornaments attested to the South's urban condi-
tion: the high-rise buildings of Birmingham, the Metro subway of 
Washington, the condominiums of Fort Lauderdale, and the Super 
Dome of New Orleans. None seemed as appropriate as a monument at 
Marietta and Forsyth streets in downtown Atlanta. It was a statue of 
Henry Grady. 
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Settlement till the Year 1852 (Louisville, 1852); History of Ohio Falls Citzes and Their Counties, 
with Illustratwns and Bibliographical Sketches (Cleveland, 1882); and Josiah Johnston, ed., 
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Memorial History of Louisville from Its First Settlement to the Year 1896, 2 vols. (Chicago, 
1896). Of more recent vintage is Isabella McMeekin, Louisville: The Gateway City (New 
York, 1946). The Louisville story to 1830 is told in a scholarly work, Richard Wade, The 
Urban Frontier: Pioneer Life in Early Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Lexington, Louisville, and St. Louis 
(1959; rpr. Chicago, 1976). See as well Henry McMurtrie, Sketches of Louisville and Its 
Environs: Including, among a Great Variety of Miscellaneous Matter, and Florula Louisvillensis, 
or A Catalogue of Nearly 400 Genera and 600 Species of Plants, That Grow in the Vicinity of the 
Town, Exhibiting Their Generic, Speczftc, and Vulgar English Names (Louisville, 1819). 
Kentucky: A Guide to the Bluegrass State, American Guide Series (New York, 1939), has 
data on Lexington, Newport, and Covington. Wade, Urban Frontier, has much informa-
tion on Lexington. The city's pioneer period is covered in Richard Staples, The History of 
Pioneer Lexington, (Kentucky); 1779-1806 (Lexington, 1939). Civil War times are covered in 
John Coleman, Lexington during the Civil War, rev. ed. (Lexington, 1939). Local histories 
include George Ranck, History of Lexington, Kentucky: Its Early Annals and Recent Progress, 
Including Biographical Sketches and Personal Reminiscences of the Pioneer Settlers, Notices of 
Prominent Citizens, etc., etc. (Cincinnati, 1872), and John D. Wright, Lexington: Heart of the 
Bluegrass (Lexington, 1982). For short historical sketches of Covington and Newport see 
Soczal Statistics of Cities, 2:111-12, 131-32. 
For Maryland, see Maryland: A Guide to the Old Line State, American Guide Series 
(New York, 1940), 263-66. See also William Loudermilk, History of Cumberland from the 
Time of the Indian Town, Caiuctucuc in 1728, up to the Present Day, Embracing an Account of 
Washington's Fzrst Campaign and Battle of Fort Necessity, Together wzth a Hzstory of Braddock's 
Expedition (rpr. Baltimore, 1971 ). 
Among many books on Nashville are John Wooldridge, ed., Hzstory of Nashville, 
Tenn., with Full Outline of the Natural Advantages ... Hzstory of the City Down to the Present 
Time (Nashville, 1890); William McRaven, Nashville: "Athens of the South" (Chapel Hill, 
1949); Jesse Burt, Nashville: Its Life and Times (Nashville, 1959); Alfred Crabbe, Nashville: 
Personality of a City (Indianapolis, 1960); Wilbur Creighton, Building of Nashville (Nash-
ville, 1969); Eleanor Graham, ed., Nashville: A Short History and Selected Buildings (Nash-
ville, 1974); and Carl Zilbart, Yesterday's Nashvzlle (Miami, 1976). 
15. George W. Cable, whose views in favor of racial equality made him a troublesome 
figure in the New South, wrote what census officials called a "careful and elaborate" 
account of the history of New Orleans in Social Statistics of Cities, 2:213-67. His book The 
Creoles of Louisiana (New York, 1884) received a controversial reception; it is discussed in 
Clement Eaton, The Waning of the Old South Civilization, 1860-1880's, Mercer University 
Lamar Memorial Lectures, no. 10 (Athens, 1968), 145-48. The many popular histories of 
New Orleans include Henry Rightor, Standard History of New Orleans, Louisiana (Chicago, 
1900); John Sakendall, History of New Orleans, 3 vols. (New York, 1952); Lyle Saxon, 
Fabulous New Orleans (Chicago, 1928); Harriet Kane, Queen New Orleans: City by the River 
(New York, 1949); Oliver Evans, New Orleans (New York, 1959); Hodding Carter, ed., The 
Past as Prelude: New Orleans, 1718-1968 (New Orleans, 1968). There is material on specific 
periods in Albert Fossier, New Orleans: The Glamour Period, 1800-1840 ... (New Orleans, 
1957); Theodore Clapp, Autobiographical Sketches and Recollections during a Thirty-Five Year's 
Residence in New Orleans (Boston, 1857); Robert C. Reinders, End of an Era: New Orleans, 
1850-1860 (New York, 1964); Gerald M. Capers, Occupied City: New Orleans under the 
Federals, 1862-1865 (Lexington, 1965); and Joy J. Jackson, New Orleans in the Gzlded Age 
(Baton Rouge, 1969). A valuable compilation is New Orleans City Guide, American Guide 
Series (Boston, 1938). 
For Mobile, see Peter Hamilton, Mobile of the Five Flags: The Story of the River Basin and 
Coast about Mobile from the Earliest Times to the Present (Mobile, 1913); Charles Summersell, 
Mobile: History of a Seaport Town (University, Ala., 1949); and Caldwell Delaney, The Story 
of Mobile (Mobile, 1953). An old account is Peter Hamilton, Colonial Mobile: An Historical 
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Study, Largely from Original Sources, of the Alabama-Tombigbee Basin from the Discovery of 
Mobile Bay in 1519 until the Demolition of Fort Charlotte in 1821 (Boston and New York, 1897). 
Information on Mobile can also be found in Weymouth T. Jordan, Ante-Bellum Alabama: 
Town and Country. 
16. See Lawrence H. Larsen, The Urban West at the End of the Frontier (Lawrence, 1978). 
17. Quoted in Gaston, New South Creed, 79. 
18. Quoted in Grady, New South, 195. 
19. Material on the various towns can be found in the appropriate American Guide 
Series compilations: Georgia: A Guide to Its Towns and Countryside (Athens, 1940); Mississip-
pz: A Guide to the Magnolia State (New York, 1938); Arkkansas: A Guide to the State (New York, 
1941). For Columbus see John Martin, Columbus, Geo. from its Selection as a "Trading Town" 
in 1827, to its Partial Destructwn by Wilson's Raid in 1865: Hzstory-Incident-Personality (Co-
lumbus, 1874); Nancy Telfair, A History of Columbus, Georgia, 1828-1928 (Columbus, 1929); 
Etta Blanchard Worsley, Columbus on the Chattahoochee (Columbus, 1951). For Macon see 
James H. Stone, "Economic Conditions in Macon, Georgia, in the 1830's," Georgm 
Historical Quarterly 54 (Summer 1970):209-25; Bowling Gates, "Macon, Georgia, Inland 
Trading Center, 1826-1836," Georgia Historical Quarterly 55 (Fall1971):365-77; John Butler, 
Historical Record of Macon and Central Georgia (1879; rpr. Macon, 1950); Ida Young, History of 
Macon, Georgia (Macon, 1950). For Vicksburg, where the great siege was a central event, 
see Mary Loughborough, My Cave Lzfe zn Vicksburg: With Letters of Trial and Travail (Little 
Rock, 1882); Osborn Oldroyd, A Soldier's Story of the Szege of Vicksburg (Springfield, Ill., 
1885); William Everhart, Vicksburg National Milztary Park, Mississippi, National Park Serv-
ice Historical Handbook Series no. 21 (Washmgton, 1954); Peter Walker, Vicksburg: A 
People at War, 1860-1865 (Chapel Hill, 1960); John Milligan, Gunboats Down the Mzsszsszppi 
(Annapolis, 1965); Adolph Hoehing and the editors of the Army Times Publishing Co., 
Vicksburg: 47 Days of Siege (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969). For Little Rock see Dallas 
Herndon, Why Little Rock Was Born (Little Rock, 1933); Ira Richards, Story of a Rivertown: 
Little Rock in the Nzneteenth Century (Benton, Ark., 1969). For Memphis see Gerald Capers, 
The Biography of a Rivertown: Memphis, Its Heroic Age (Chapel Hill, 1939); James Davis, The 
Hzstory of Memphis (Memphis, 1873); John Keating, History of the City of Memphis and Shelby 
County, Tennessee, wzth Illustratwns and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Cztzzens 
(Syracuse, 1888); Samuel Cole Williams, Begznnzngs of West Tennessee: In the Land of the 
Chickasaws, 1541-1841 (Johnson City, Tenn., 1930). For Atlanta see Atlanta: A City of the 
Modern South, American Guide Senes (1942; St. Clair Shores, Mich., 1973). Some of the 
many books on Atlanta are Edward Clarke, Illustrated History of Atlanta, Containing 
Glances at its Population, Business, Manufactures, Industrzes, Institutions ... and Advantages 
Generally, with Nearly One Hundred Illustrations, and a Lzthographic Map of the Czty (Atlanta, 
1878); Wallace Reed, History of Atlanta, wzth Illustrations and Bibliographzcal Sketches and 
Some of its Prominent Men and Pioneers (Syracuse, 1889); Thomas Martin, Atlanta and its 
Builders: A Comprehensive History of the Gate City of the South (New York, 1902); Pioneer 
Citizens' Hzstory of Atlanta, Pioneer Citizens' Association (Atlanta, 1902); Walter Cooper, 
Officml Hzstory of Fulton County (Atlanta, 1934); and Franklin Garrett, Yesterday's Atlanta, 
Seeman's Historic Cities Series No. 8 (Miami, 1974). For Chattanooga, see such local 
studies as Past, Present, and Future of Chattanooga, Tennessee, "The Industrial Center of the 
South": Its Superior Resources and Advantages, and the Inducements it Offers for Capital and 
Labor in Farming, Manufacturing, Mining, and Commerce (Chattanooga, 1885); Chattanooga: 
Its History and Growth, Chattanooga Community Association (Chattanooga, 1930); Zelia 
Armstrong, The Hzstory of Chattanooga County and Chattanooga, Tennessee, 2 vols. (Chatta-
nooga, 1931-1940); and Gilbert Govan and James Livingood, The Chattanooga Country, 
1540-1915: From Tomahawks to TVA (1952; Chapel Hill, 1967). 
A good starting point for studying Montgomery is Virginia Van der Veer Hamilton, 
Alabama: A Bicentennial Hzstory (New York, 1977), 120-21. An old local history is H. G. 
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McCall, A Sketch, Historical and Statzstical of the City of Montgomery, Outlining Its History, 
Locatwn, Climate, Health ... (Montgomery, 1885). Of more recent vintage is Montgomery, 
City of Progress: Yesterday and Today, Montgomery Chamber of Commerce (Montgomery, 
1937). 
20. Quoted in Gaston, New South Creed, 1, 68. 
21. Quoted in ibid., 43. 
22. E. Merton Coulter, m a pioneering analysis of postbellum southern urbanization, 
noted that although the precentage of urban growth remained very small, the New South 
went far by southern standards toward urbanization. See The South during Reconstruction, 
1865-1877, A History of the South, vol. 8 (Baton Rouge, 1947), 252-74. 
3. Cogs in the Great Machine 
1. The Civil War clouded over the many similarities between whites in both sections. 
They shared such American values as capitalism, economic and social mobility, mate-
rialism, democracy, evangelical religion, patriotic nationalism, consensus politics, racial 
prejudice, and utilitarianism. See Grady McWhiney, Southerners and Other Americans 
(New York, 1973), vii. Adverse accounts by northern antislavery forces in the antebellum 
period had helped condition people in the North to expect the worst of southerners and 
their intentions. William Lloyd Garrison, The New 'Reign of Terror' in the Slaveholding States, 
for 1859-1860 (New York, 1860), is a case in point. See also Edward Ingle, Southern 
Sidelzghts: A Pzcture of Soczal and Economic Life in the South a Generation before the War (New 
York, 1896). 
2. A standard work is C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York, 
1966). 
3. See Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch, One Kznd of Freedom: The Economic 
Consequences of Emancipatwn (Cambridge, Eng., 1977). 
4. King's career and the salient points in his study are analyzed by the editors m 
Edward King, The Great South, ed. W. Magruder Drake and Robert R. Jones (1879; rpr. 
Baton Rouge, 1972), xxi-xxii. 
5. King, Great South, 426 (Beaufort), 322 (Mobile), 739 (Wedverton), 801 (Strasburg). 
6. King was one of several northern journalists who wrote about the South in the 
1870s. Some of the others were James S. Pike, Charles Nordoff, and Robert Somers. 
Along with King, they argued that sectional bitterness was on the wane and would 
vanish as soon as the North reversed its Reconstruction policies (Paul M. Gaston, The New 
South Creed: A Study in Southern Mythmaking [New York, 1970], 39-40). 
7. King, Great South, 347 (Augusta), 363 (Savannah), 438 (Charleston), 472 
(Wilmington), 373 (Columbus), 555 (Lynchburg), 631 (Richmond), 707 (Louisville), 53 
(New Orleans), 530 (Chattanooga). 
8. Ibid., 707. 
9. Ibid., 428. 
10. The repast is described and Grady is quoted in Gaston, New South Creed, 87-90. 
11. For an example of northern views about the South see the novel by Albion 
Winegard Tourgee, A Fool's Errand, by One of the Fools (New York, 1880). 
12. For the rise of Chicago see Bessie L. Pierce, A Hzstory ofChzcago, 3 vols. (New York, 
1937-57). 
13. See the text and bibliography of Lawrence H. Larsen, The Urban West at the End of 
the Frontier (Lawrence, 1978). 
14. Quoted in Gaston, New South Creed, 89. 
15. Henry W. Grady, The New South (New York, 1890), 184-85. 
16. Quoted in Gaston, New South Creed, 76. 
17. Quoted in ibid., 77. 
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18. Eaton, Old South Civilization, 160-61. 
19. "Statistics of the Place of Birth of the Population of the United States," Statistics of 
the Population of the Umted States, Tenth Census of the United States, 1880 (Washington, 1883), 
1:464. 
20. Quoted in Gaston, New South Creed, 16. 
21. Table IX, "Population, as Native and Foreign-born, of Cities and Towns of 4,000 
Inhabitants and Upward: 1880 and 1870," Statistics of the Population, 447 (Alabama and 
Arkansas), 448 (District of Columbia and Georgia), 449 (Kentucky and Louisiana), 450 
(Maryland), 451 (Mississippi), 453 (North Carolina), 455 (South Carolina and Tennessee), 
456 (Virginia); Table VI, "Population, by Race, of Cities and Towns of 4,000 Inhabitants 
and Upward: 1880 and 1870," ibid., 416 (Alabama and Arkansas), 417 (District of Colum-
bia and Georgia), 418 (Kentucky and Louisiana), 419 (Maryland), 421 (Mississippi), 422 
(North Carolina), 424 (South Carolina and Tennessee), 425 (Virginia). 
22. Quoted in Howard N. Rabinowitz, Race Relations in the Urban South, 1865-1890, 
History of Urban America Series (New York, 1978), 24. 
23. The pioneering study of urban slavery is Richard Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The 
South, 1820-1860 (New York, 1964). See also Claudia Dale Golden, Urban Slavery in the 
American South, 1820-1860: A Quantitatzve History (Chicago, 1976); JohnS. Kendall, "New 
Orleans 'Peculiar Institution,' "Louisiana Historical Quarterly 23 (July 1946):864-86; Robert 
S. Starobin, Industrial Slavery in the Old South (New York, 1970); Ira Berlin, Slaves without 
Masters: The Free Negro in the Antebellum South (New York, 1974); Leonard P. Curry, The 
Free Black zn Urban America, 1800-1850: The Shadow of the Dream (Chicago, 1981). 
24. The black and immigrant employment picture in New Orleans is discussed in 
Fredrick Marcel Spletstoser, "Back Door to the Land of Plenty: New Orleans as an 
Immigrant Port, 1820-1860," 2 vols. (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 
1978). See the following articles in the Journal of Negro History: L. P. Jackson, "Free 
Negroes of Petersburg, Virginia," 12 (July 1927):365-88; E. Horace Fitchett, "The Origin 
and Growth of the Free Negro Population of Charleston, South Carolina," 26 (October 
1941):421-37; Dorothy Provine, "The Economic Position of Free Blacks in the District of 
Columbia," 58 (January 1973):61-72. A useful case study is Whittington B. Johnson, "Free 
Blacks in Antebellum Savannah: An Economic Profile," Georgia Historical Quarterly 64 
(Winter 1980):418-31. 
25. Quoted in Rabinowitz, Race Relations, 22. 
26. Free Negroes played important roles in the establishment of stable black commu-
nities in southern cities after the Civil War. See John W. Blassingame, Black New Orleans, 
1860-1880 (Chicago, 1973); Constance M. Green, The Secret Czty: A History of Race Relations 
in the Nation's Capital (Princeton, 1967); Dale Somers, "Black and White in New Orleans: 
A Survey of Urban Race Relations, 1865-1900," journal of Southern History 40 (February 
1974):19-42; Robert E. Perdue, The Negro in Savannah, 1865-1900 (New York, 1973). 
27. King, Great South, 580. 
28. See Spletstoser, "Back Door to the Land of Plenty." 
29. See Stephen Byrne, Irish Emigration to the Umted States: What It Has Been, and What It 
Is (New York, 1873); Albert Faust, The Geman Element in the United States, 2 vols. (New 
York, 1912). A good general summary remains Carl Wittke, We Who Built America: The 
Saga of the Immigrant (Cleveland, 1939). 
30. See Thomas D. Clark, Kentucky: Land of Contrast (New York, 1968). 
31. For general background of the rise of nativist thought in America see Ray Allen 
Billington, The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism 
(New York, 1938). 
32. Quoted in Spletstoser, "Back Door to the Land of Plenty," 1: 240-43. See Darrell 
Overdyke, The Know-Nothing Party zn the South (Baton Rouge, 1950). 
33. Clark, Kentucky, 122. 
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34. C. Vann Woodward, Orzgins of the New South, 1877-1913, A History of the South, 
vol. 9 (Baton Rouge, 1951), 297-99. 
35. Table XVI, "Foreign-born Population of Fifty Principal Cities, Distributed, 
According to Place of Birth, among the Various Foreign Countries: 1880," Statistics of the 
Population, 538-41. Little has been written about southern immigrants. Dieter Cunz, The 
Maryland Germans: A History (1948 rpr. Port Washington, N.Y., 1972), has considerable 
information about the Germans of Baltimore. The Irish experience in New Orleans in 
antebellum times is covered in Earl Niehaus, The Irish in New Orleans, 1800-1860 (Baton 
Rouge, 1965). See also Spletstoser, "Back Door to the Land of Plenty." Two articles on 
Germans are Robert T. Clark, "Reconstruction and the New Orleans German Colony," 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly 23 (April1940):501-24, and Bob Cyrus Rauchle, "The Politi-
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36. See Stanley C. Johnson, A H1story of Emigration from the United Kingdom to North 
Amenca, 1763-1912 (London, 1913). 
37. Statistics of the Population, 460. 
38. Ibid., 467. 
39. King, Great South, 30-31. 
40. See Joy J. Jackson, New Orleans m the Gilded Age (Baton Rouge, 1969). 
41. Table XV, "Native Population of Fifty Principal Cities, Distributed According to 
States and Territories of Birth: 1880," Statistics of the Population, 536-37. 
42. Ibid., 472. 
43. Social Statistics of Cities, 2:191 (Mobile), 199 (Montgomery), 211 (Little Rock), 53 
(Georgetown), 27 (Washington), 157 (Atlanta), 163 (Augusta), 169 (Macon), 173 (Savan-
nah), 111 (Covington), 117 (Lexington), 122 (Louisville), 131 (Newport), 213 (New Or-
leans), 3 (Baltimore), 209 (Vicksburg), 93 (Wilmington), 95 (Charleston), 105 (Columbia), 
135 (Chattanooga), 140 (Memphis), 151 (Nashville), 55 (Alexandria), 60 (Lynchburg), 65 
(Norfolk), 71 (Petersburg), 75 (Portsmouth), 79 (Richmond). The total numbers of males 
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1880 census. Columbus and Cumberland are not included m the Social Statistics of Cities. 
The totals for those cities obtained from the manuscript census schedules are very low-
2,168 women in Cumberland and 1,338 in Columbus--indicating that many sheets are 
missing. (1880 Population Schedules, Georgia, Montgomery, Morgan, Murray, and 
Muscogee counties, Microfilm T-9, Roll No. 159, Kansas City Federal Archives and 
Records Center; 1880 Population Schedules, Maryland, Allegany County, Micrfilm T-9, 
Roll No. 493, ibid.). For conclusions about the excess number of women m most places 
see Adna Ferrin Weber, The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century: A Study in Statistics 
(1899; rpr. Ithaca, N.Y., 1963), 278-84. 
44. Table XXXV, "Number of Persons in Fifty Principal Cities Engaged in Each Class of 
Occupations, with Distinction of Age and Sex and of Nativity: 1880," Statistics of the 
Populatwn, 855. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Quoted in Gaston, New South Creed, 134. 
47. Eaton, Old South Civilization, 128-29. 
48. Quoted in Gaston, New South Creed, 147. 
49. King, Great South, 556-57. 
50. Statistics of the Population, 855. 
51. The quotes are from Gaston, New South Creed, 111-13. 
52. Grady, New South, 184-86. 
53. Table 1, "Summary of Denominations for 124 Cities, by Cities," Report on Statistics 
of Churches in the United States, Eleventh Census of the United States, 1890 (Washington, 
1894), 9:91. 
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54. Introduction, ibid., xx, xxvi. 
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500,000," ibid., 98-99; Table 11, "Communicants or Members in Cities having a Popula-
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uncritical. See such accounts as W. W. Barnes, The Southern Baptist Convention, 1845-1953 
(Nashville, 1954); Paul N. Garber, The Methodists Are One People (Nashville, 1939); Carter 
Woodson, The History of the Negro Church (1921; rpr. Washington, 1945), John W. Crom-
well, "First Negro Churches in the D1strict of Columbia," Journal of Negro History 7 
(January 1922):64-106. 
56. Some of the more comprehensive studies have been done on Jews. See Isaac Fein, 
The Making of an American Jewish Community: The H1story of Baltimore Jewry from 1773 to 1920 
(Philadelphia, 1971); Leonard Dinnerstein and Maury Dale Palsson, Jews in the South 
(Baton Rouge, 1973); Eli N. Evans, The Provincials; A Personal History of Jews in the South 
(New York, 1973); Myron Berman, Richmond's Jewry: Shabbat to Shockoe, 1796-1976 
(Charlottesville, 1979); Steven Hertzberg, Strangers within the Gate City: The Jews of Atlanta, 
1845-1915 (Philadelphia, 1978). 
57. Wilma Dykeman, Tennessee: A Bicentennial History (New York, 1975), 163. 
58. See Woodward, Origins of the New South, 60-64; Monroe Lee Billington, The 
American South: A Brief History (New York, 1971), 277-81; Report of the Comm1sswner of 
Education, 1880: Report of the Secretary of Interior, vo!. 3 (Washington, 1882). 
59. Quoted in Gaston, New South Creed, 104. 
60. Billington, American South, 278-79. See also Edgar Knight, The Influence of Recon-
struction on Education in the South (1913; rpr. New York, 1969). 
61. Table II, "School Statistics of Cities Containing 7,500 Inhabitants and over, from 
Replies to Inquiries by the United States Bureau of Education," Report of the Commissioner 
of Education, 7, 61, 420-62. 
62. See Howard N. Rabinowitz, "Half a Loaf: The Shift from White to Black Teachers 
in the Negro Schools of the Urban South, 1865-1890," Journal of Southern History 40 
(November 1974):565-94. Additional material can be found in Rabinowitz, Race Relatwns, 
152-81. 
63. Report of the Commissioner of Education, 62 (Atlanta), 62 (Savannah), 8 (Mobile). 
64. Quoted in Eaton, Old South Civilization, 163. 
65. Ibid., 107-9; Woodward, Origins of the New South, 436-37; Billington, American 
South, 285. 
66. Table IX, "Statistics of Universities and Colleges for 1880," Report of the Commis-
swner of Educatwn, 640-75. There are numerous college histories, most of which are long, 
detailed, and short on analysis. Many are cited in Cunningham, "The Southern Mind 
since the Civil War," in ArthurS. Link and Rembert W. Patrick, eds., Wnting Southern 
History: Essays in Historiography in Honor of Fletcher M. Green (1965; rpr. Baton Rouge, 
1967), 383-409. They tend to emphas1ze the exploits of educational bureaucrats and to 
downplay the role of students and faculty. 
67. Quoted in King, Great South, 608. 
68. Report of the Commissioner of Education, 640-75. See Frederick Chambers, "Histories 
of the Black Colleges and Universities," Journal of Negro H1story 57 (July 1972):270-75. 
69. Grady, New South, 146. 
4. Railroads Are Talismanic Winds 
1. See "The Natural Laws of Commerce," Western Journal1 (April1848):173-77, for a 
typical statement of the importance of geography in building commercial systems. 
2. Both quotations are from Philip S. Foner, Business and Slavery: The New York 
Merchants and the Irrepressible Conflict (Chapel Hill, 1941), 12, 13. 
3. "Mississippi Valley Railroad," Western Journal and Civrlian 9 (November 1852):14. 
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4. The standard survey on southern railroading in the last half of the nineteenth 
century is John F. Stover, The Railroads of the South, 1865-1900: A Study in Finance and 
Control (Chapel Hill, 1955). The 1850s are covered on pages 3-14. See also Robert S. 
Cotterill, "Southern Railroads, 1850-1860," Mississippi Valley Histoncal Review 10 (March 
1924):396-405. 
5. Eugene Alvarez, Travel on Southern Antebellum Railroads, 1828-1860 (University, 
Ala., 1974), 27-28. 
6. Stover, Railroads of the South, 11. 
7. See the appropriate sections of Edward Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and 
Ohio Razlroad, 1827-1927, 2 vols. (New York, 1928). 
8. See Stover, Railroads of the South, 15-22. 
9. Quoted in ibid., 16-17. 
10. Quoted in ibid., 22. 
11. See ibid., 23-58. 
12. There is good material on the politics of railroading in C. Vann Woodward, Origins 
of the New South, 1877-1913, A History of the South, vol. 9 (Baton Rouge, 1951), 1-22. 
13. Stover, Railroads of the South, 61. See John Doster, "Trade Centers and Railroad 
Rates in Alabama, 1873-1885: The Cases of Greenville, Montgomery, and Opelika," 
Journal of Southern History 18 (May 1952):169-92. 
14. Stover, Railroads of the South, 96. 
15. See ibid., 99-122. 
16. The Richmond Terminal provided proof that New South propagandists could 
organize business activities. See Maury Klein, The Great Richmond Terminal: A Study in 
Businessmen and Razlroad Strategy (Charlottesville, 1970), viii-x. 
17. See John F. Stover, "Southern Ambitions of the Illinois Central Railroad," Journal of 
Southern History 20 (November 1954):499-510, and his History of the Illinois Central Railroad 
(New York, 1975). 
18. The most recent history of the line is Maury Klein, Hzstory of the Louisville and 
Nashvzlle Railroad (New York, 1972). Two other histories of the line are John L. Kers, The 
Louisvzlle and Nashville: An Outline History (New York, 1933); Kincaid Herr, The Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad, 1850-1963 (Louisville, 1963). 
19. See Hungerford, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 
20. Quoted in Soczal Statistics of Cztzes, 2:76 (Portsmouth), 81 (Richmond), 136 (Chatta-
nooga), 159 (Atlanta). 
21. See Leonard P. Curry, Rail Routes South: Louisville's Fight for the Southern Market, 
1865-1872 (Lexington, 1969). 
22. Quoted in Woodward, Origins of the New South, 7. 
23. See Milton Reizenstein, The Economic History of the Baltimore and Ohzo Railroad, 
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Fifteenth Series, 
vols. 7-8 (Baltimore, 1897). 
24. An older book of value is Ulrich P. Phillips, A History of Transportation in the Eastern 
Cotton Belt to 1860 (New York, 1913). Other materials useful in studying southern railroad 
patterns include Jesse C. Burt, Jr., "Four Decades of the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. 
Louis Railway, 1873-1916," Tennessee Histoncal Quarterly 9 (June 1950):99-132; Samuel 
Derrick, Centennial Hzstory of South Carolina Railroad (Columbia, 1930); and Richard Price, 
Georgia Railroads and the West Point Route (Salt Lake City, 1962). 
25. Social Statistzcs of Cities, 2:15 (Baltimore), 57 (Alexandria), 31 (Washington), 54 
(Georgetown), 80 (Richmond), 66 (Norfolk), 76 (Portsmouth), 93 (Wilmington), 98 
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Essay on Sources 
This bibliographical essay is included for three purposes: to acquaint readers 
with the sources that have been most useful in pursuing the study of urban 
history, to provide ideas for further directions in research, and to provide 
guidelines for those who wish to extend their general knowledge of southern 
urban history. Only a representative portion of the vast number of materials 
consulted in the preparation of this book are listed here, primarily those that 
were most extensively drawn upon and cited. All sources are cited in full in the 
notes. 
Gathering the data used in writing this study took over a decade. Almost 
all the sources are traditional in nature: scholarly monographs, articles in 
professional journals, published federal documents, contemporary commen-
taries, unpublished materials, travel accounts, newspapers, and local histories. 
Given the broad nature of this study, it was impossible to gather data systemati-
cally. The contemporary article on the river passes into the Gulf of Mexico 
below New Orleans, "The Mouths of the Mississippi," DeBow's Review 17 ijuly 
1854):15-25, was found while I was doing research on an entirely different 
subject. The quotations on the New South from the Alexandria, Louisiana, 
Town Talk were furnished by a colleague. Material on federal attitudes toward 
the impact of disease in New Orleans came to light while I was doing research at 
the National Archives in Washington, D.C., on an unrelated project and using 
the records of the National Board of Health and the Marine Hospital Service. 
One of the many satisfying parts of research is when one unexpectably finds 
valuable material on a subject while working on an entirely different topic. This 
is bound to happen to the student of nineteenth-century southern urban 
history. Although scholars have never totally ignored the role of cities in the 
history of the South, they have not viewed them as a central theme in the 
section's development. Rich materials exist on southern urbanization, but they 
are spread through a wide variety of primary and secondary sources. A major 
need exists for a detailed and analytical bibliography of sources about the 
urban history of Dixie. 
The broad contours of city building in the South are readily discernible. 
Useful surveys that fit the southern picture into larger patterns are Bayrd Still, 
Urban America: A History with Documents (Boston, 1974), and Charles N. Glaab 
and A. Theodore Brown, rev. by Charles N. Glaab, A History of Urban America, 
2d ed. (New York, 1976). Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in the Wilderness: The First 
Century of Urban Growth in America (1938; rpr. New York, 1955), is a rich source 
on the origins of southern towns. General histories of the American South 
contain scattered information. Of particular value for the post-Reconstruction 
years is William B. Hesseltine and David L. Smiley, The South in American 
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History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960). This work has valuable insights on the 
relationship between national economic developments and northern penetra-
tion of the southern urban economy. E. Merton Coulter, The South during 
Reconstruction, 1865-1877, A History of the South, vol. 8 (Baton Rouge, 1947), 
contains a pioneering suggestive essay on southern urbanization in the 1870s. 
The few existing theoretical essays or anthologies dealing with the mean-
ing and significance of southern urban history are of excellent quality. David R. 
Goldfield, Cotton Fields and Skyscrapers: Southern City and Region, 1607-1980 
(Baton Rouge, 1982), attempts to develop a synthesis for the history of the 
urban South. His bold, stimulating, and provocative analysis stands as a 
starting point for studying city building in Dixie. A straightforward compila-
tion, Blaine A. Brownell and David R. Goldfield, eds., The City in Southern 
History: The Growth of Urban Civilization in the South, National University Pub-
lications Interdisciplinary Urban Series (Port Washington, N.Y., 1977), referred 
to hereinafter as The City in Southern History, contains several original scholarly 
essays. Two chapters of background value in this work are Carville Earle and 
Ronald Hoffman, "The Urban South: The First Two Centuries," and Brownell 
and Goldfield, "Pursuing the American Urban Dream: Cities in the Old 
South." Another essay, Howard N. Rabinowitz, "Continuity and Change: 
Southern Urban Development, 1860-1900," traces the growth of the urban 
network. Two pieces by Leonard P. Curry, "Urbanization and Urbanism in the 
Old South: A Comparative View," Journal of Southern History 40 (February 
1974):43-60, and a pamphlet, Urban Life in the Old South (St. Louis, 1976), 
conclude that the Old South had a significant urban dimension. T. Lynn Smith, 
"The Emergence of Cities," in Rupert B. Vance and Nicholas J. Demearth, eds., 
The Urban South (Chapel Hill, 1954), shows how the South steadily lost ground 
relative to the rest of the nation. Blaine Brownell argues that urbanization in the 
South differed from that in other parts of the country in "Urbanization in the 
South: A Unique Experience," Mississippi Quarterly 26 (Spring 1973):105-20. See 
also his book, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930 (Baton Rouge, 1975). 
David R. Goldfield, "The Urban South: A Regional Framework," American 
Historical Review 86 (December 1981):1009-34, takes a somewhat similar view, 
claiming that southern city building was "urbanization without cities." 
Students of nineteenth-century southern ubanization have not made suffi-
cient use of contemporary printed federal documents. Most of these are diffi-
cult to peruse because of antiquated methods of organization, small print, 
bureaucratic prose, and lack of indexes. Many depositories do not have com-
plete runs either in printed, photo, or machine form of the federal serial set, the 
state papers, or the census. Moreover, indexes of documents, such as McKee's 
Compilations, are vexing to employ and hard to find. Still, if used judiciously 
and with an element of caution in relying upon them as "official" sources, 
federal documents are of value in nineteenth-century urban research. 
A primary source of special importance is a remarkable survey, George E. 
Waring, Jr., comp., "The Southern and the Western States" and "The New 
England and the Middle States," Report on the Social Statistics of Cities, Tenth 
Census of the United States, 1880, vols. 9 and 10, pts. 1 and 2 (Washington, 
1886-87). At the time he directed the project, Waring was a member of the 
National Board of Health and one of the nation's leading experts on the 
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relationship between urban sanitation and public health. Thousands of indi-
viduals from all around the country, including historians, provided the infor-
mation that resulted in the Social Statistics of Cities. George W. Cable, the 
controversial author of The Creoles of Louisiana (New York, 1884), was the author 
of a fifty-four-page account of the history of New Orleans. Most of the contrib-
utors, however, were appointed or elected local officials. Although the vast 
number are anonymous, they included R. T. Scowden, the city engineer of 
Louisville, and Edward Fenner, vice-president of the Auxiliary Sanitary Asso-
ciation of New Orleans. 
Much of the material in the Social Statistics of Cities is in monographic rather 
than statistical form. There are few of the detailed numerical tables usually 
associated with census compilations. The "Tabulated Index of Cities and Sub-
jects" indicates the wide range of information included: cemeteries, climate, 
commerce and navigation, distance chart, drainage, financial condition, fire 
department, garbage, gas, history, infectious diseases, inspection, interments, 
location, manufactures, markets, monuments, municipal cleansing, parks, 
penal reformatory, charitable and healing institutions, places of amusement, 
police, population by decades, and by present division, public buildings, 
railroads, sanitary authority, schools and libraries (public), streets, topogra-
phy, tributary country, watercourses, harbors, etc., and waterworks. The data 
enable a modern researcher to obtain information that otherwise would be very 
difficult if not impossible to find. Most city governments, lacking storage 
capacity, throw out "housekeeping" records at frequent intervals, sometimes at 
the end of each fiscal year. Until recently few historical depositories have 
attempted to collect routine city records. The Social Statistics of Cities is a unique 
and invaluable source to all students of the American city of the late nineteenth 
century. The hundreds of pieces of information, ranging from the cost ($40,000) 
to build the city waterworks in Columbia, South Carolina, to the detail that the 
police in Chattanooga, Tennessee, carried clubs and pistols, provide the raw 
data that enable the historian to develop interpretations based on specific 
evidence. 
Information is included on 222 of the 228 cities in the United States that had 
populations of 10,000 or more in 1880. At least some data are included on all the 
major southern cities except Columbus, Georgia, and Cumberland, Maryland. 
Census experts had incorrectly projected that those two cities would have less 
than 10,000 inhabitants in 1880. Because of their regional importance in Flor-
ida, there are sections on Jacksonville and Pensacola, even though their popu-
lations in 1880 were under 8,000. Unfortunately, Waring kept custody of all the 
manuscript materials for the Social Statistics of Cities. Apparently, they have 
been destroyed, a great loss to researchers. 
The Tenth Census of the United States, 1880, was the most comprehensive 
compilation attempted up until that time, a response to congressional desire 
for a survey of the progress of the nation during its first hundred years. 
Statisticians presented persuasive arguments that the gathering of vast 
amounts of detailed material would enable scholars to use "aggregates," lead-
ing to a reinterpretation of the national experience and the role of the common 
people in building the nation. The twenty-four volumes in the census contain 
everything from material on projected model homes for workers in pater-
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nalistic communities to figures on cotton production in every county in the 
country. 
Several of the volumes are indispensable in studying southern cities in the 
Gilded Age. Vital statistics on blacks, natives, foreign-hom, females, males, 
and workers can be found throughout the Statistics of the Population of the United 
States, vol. 1 (Washington, 1883). Of special usefulness are Table IX, "Popula-
tion, as Native and Foreign-born, of Cities and Towns of 4,000 Inhabitants and 
Upward: 1880 and 1870," pp. 447-56; Table VI, "Population, by Race, of Cities 
and Towns of 4,000 Inhabitants and Upward: 1880 and 1870," pp. 416-25; Table 
XVI, "Foreign-hom Population of Fifty Principal Cities, Distributed According 
to Place of Birth, among the Various Foreign Countries: 1880," pp. 538-41; Table 
XV, "Native Population of Fifty Principal Cities Distributed According to States 
and Territories of Birth: 1880," pp. 536-37; Table XXXV, "Number of Persons in 
Fifty Principal Cities Engaged in Each Class of Occupation with Distinction of 
Age and Sex and of Nativity: 1880," p. 885. 
Other volumes cover a variety of essential subjects. There are tabulations 
on railroads and telephone companies in the Report on the Agencies of Transporta-
tion in the United States, Including the Statistics of Railroads, Steam Navigation, 
Canals, Telegraphs, and Telephones, vol. 4 (Washington, 1883): Table II, "Index to 
Physical Characteristics of Railroads," pp. 627-35; Table I, "General Financial 
Exhibit: 1880," pp. 18-23. Extensive industrial statistics can be found in the 
Report of the Manufactures of the United States, vol. 2 (Washington, 1883). An 
important register is Table VI, "Manufactures of 100 Principal Cities, by Totals: 
1880," pp. 379-80. Another Table VI in the same volume is "Manufactures of 100 
Principal Cities, by Specified Industries: 1880," pp. 384-443. There is a compila-
tion of police statistics in the Report on the Defective, Dependent, and Delinquent 
Classes of the Population of the United States, vol. 21 (Washington, 1888), Table 
CXXXVI, "Police Statistics for 1880 of Cities in the United States having 5,000 or 
more Inhabitants," pp. 566-74. Information on waterworks is in Walter G. 
Elliott, "Report on the Water-Supply of Certain Cities in the United States," 
Reports on the Water-Power of the United States, vol. 17, pt. 2 (Washington, 1887). 
Vital statistics on birth and death ratios are included in the Report on the 
Mortality and Vital Statistics of the United States, vol. 12 (Washington, 1886), Table 
LXIV, "Approximate Life Tables for Certain States and Cities," pp. 773-83. 
The tables of contents in the various census volumes are confusing. Fur-
thermore, out-of-date typefaces, difficult-to-use indexes, small print, and con-
fusing tabulations complicate the use of the documents. From more than 
twenty years of experience, I have found that working with any materials 
printed by the federal government in the late nineteenth century requires a 
high degree of patience and perseverance. 
Federal documents from the Eleventh Census of the United States were of 
great help in writing about southern cities in the Gilded Age. The Report on 
Statistics of Churches in the United States, vol. 9 (Washington, 1894), has the best 
available religious tabulations. (Attempts to take a religious census in 1880 
failed because of faulty methodology.) Table 1, "Summary of Denominations 
for 124 Cities, by Cities," p. 91, shows the number of organizations, church 
edifices, value of church property, and members. Two other tables give num-
bers of communicants by denominations: Table 7, "Communicants or Mem-
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bers in Cities having a Population of 100,000 to 500,000," pp. 98-99; Table 11, 
"Communicants or Members in Cities having a Population of 25,000 to 
100,000," pp. 112-15. These tables, which are in small type, with the statistics 
spread in long rows across two pages, are difficult to use, and it would have 
been helpful if the tables had been combined. Much easier to use are the 
comparative manufacturing statistics contained in Report on Manufacturing In-
dustries in the United States at the Eleventh Census, 1890, pts. 1 and 2 (Washington, 
1895). See also Compendium of the Eleventh Census, 1890, vol. 1, pt. 1 (Wash-
ington, 1892); and Population, vol. 1, pt. 2 (Washington, 1892). The Compendium 
Table 5, "Aggregate Population of Cities, Towns, Villages, and Bouroughs 
having 2,500 Inhabitants or more in 1890, with Population for 1880 and Increase 
during the Decade," pp. 442-452, is valuable. 
A variety of other federal documents contain helpful information. A de-
tailed source for educational statistics is the Report of the Secretary of the 
Interior, Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1880, vol. 3 (Washington, 1882). 
This compilation has educational statistics for important cities and material on 
educational programs and practices for both white and black schools, provided 
by local officials. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Annual Report of the 
National Board of Health, 1879, House Executive Document 10, 46th Cong., 2d 
sess., has valuable data on sanitary conditions. Basic to understanding the 
forces in the economy that enabled Baltimore to garner a significant portion of 
the post-Civil War grain trade, at the same time that New Orleans' relative 
share declined, is "The Grain Trade of the United States and Tables on the 
World's Wheat Supply and Trade," Bureau of Statistics, Department of the 
Treasury, Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finances, January, 1900, n.s., no. 7 
(Washington, 1900). Despite the limited scope of the title, this lengthy report 
has historical tables and a lengthy economic analysis on the evolution of the 
nineteenth-century American grain trade. A unique report, produced in the 
1850s to help Congress determine the advisability of a Canadian reciprocity 
treaty, includes considerable information on the southern cotton economy and 
New Orleans trade in particular. It is U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of Israel D. 
Andrews on the Trade and Commerce of the British North American Colonies, and upon 
the Trade of the Great Lakes and Rivers, Senate Executive Document 112, 32d 
Con g., 1st sess., Serial622. Andrews was a foreign service officer and e~:pert on 
internal and external trade patterns. See Gerald M. Gibson, "Israel DeWolf 
Andrews: Perceptive Bureaucrat" (M.A. thesis, University of Missouri-Kansas 
City, 1976). 
Some basic federal documents have been reproduced as National Archives 
and Record Service microfilm T publications. All existing manuscript popula-
tion schedules are available in this form. Unfortunately, many sheets are 
missing for Cumberland and Columbus, making it impossible to determine 
how many females lived in those towns in 1880. This information does not 
appear in the printed census. It is also vexing that the 1890 federal manuscript 
census schedules were destroyed in a fire. Fortunately, the printed volumes are 
sufficiently detailed to provide an overall view of the characteristics of the 
United States in 1890. 
Rich materials exist on the New South movement. Henry Grady stated his 
case in his valedictory, The New South (New York, 1890). A need remains for a 
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comprehensive biography of Grady. The best available at this time is Raymond 
Nixon, Henry Grady: Spokesman of the New South (New York, 1943). Henry 
Watterson, The Compromises of Life (New York, 1903), attempted to sum up his 
own career. The choice of a title reveals much about the man. Biographies of the 
Louisville editor include Isaac Marcos son, "Marse Henry": A Biography of Henry 
Watterson (New York, 1951); Joseph Wall, Henry Watterson: Reconstructed Rebel 
(New York, 1956). Walter Hines Page's career is admirably told in John Milton 
Cooper, Jr., Walter Hines Page: The Southerner as American, 1855-1918 (Chapel 
Hill, 1977). The importance of newspapers to the New South movement is 
shown in Thomas D. Clark, "The Country Newspaper: A Factor in Southern 
Opinion, 1865-1930," Journal of Southern History 14 (February 1948): 3-33. 
Of great importance in understanding the complex philosophical strains 
that led to the New South concept is Paul M. Gaston, The New South Creed: A 
Study in Southern Mythmaking (New York, 1970). It contains an excellent bibli-
ography. The basic work on the period in general is C. Vann Woodward, 
Origins of the New South, 1877-1913, A History of the South, vol. 9 (Baton Rouge, 
1951). Neither author viewed the men of the New South in the mainstream of 
American urban development. Both deplored what they saw as cynical at-
tempts to exploit the race issue and to persuade white southerners to adopt 
Yankee ways under the guise of progress. Gaston wrote, "Admirable in its 
vision, the New South creed had been manipulated through most of its history 
by men who served the region poorly, and the hold it gained over the American 
mind had obstructed more frequently than it had promoted achievement of its 
ideas" (p. 245). Woodward attacked the term itself. "If it were possible," he said, 
"to dispense with a phrase of such wide currency, I would not use the name 
'New South' except to designate an ill-defined group of Southerners .... 
Disinfected as much as possible, the term 'New South' will be used in the 
following pages without its slogan-like connotations" (p. ix-x). The duality 
about the value of cities that has permeated the southern experience has also 
bothered many southern historians. For a summary of the roots of the New 
South, see Sheldon Hackney, "Origins of the New South in Retrospect," Journal 
of Southern History 38 (May 1972):191-216. 
Several conceptual essays, interpretations, and compilations are of consid-
erable help in placing the urban South in perspective. Within a larger context, 
C. Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History (1960; rpr. Baton Rouge, 
1968), contains ten essays that selectively deal with the southern experience. Of 
special significance are the first two, "The Search for Southern Identity" and 
"The Historical Dimension." Twelve Southerners, I'll Take My Stand: The South 
and the Agrarian Tradition (New York, 1930), launched a classic attack on the 
trend toward industry in the South, ignoring the section's urban traditions. 
Carl N. Degler, Place over Time: The Continuity of Southern Distinctiveness (Baton 
Rouge, 1977), also discounted the South's urban antecedents. He wrote, "Or 
how can one generalize about the rise of industry and the spread of urbaniza-
tion in the last century without recognizing that those social developments 
were not, for the South, nineteenth-century phenomena?" (p. 127). An impor-
tant intellectual history, W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York, 1941), 
argued that the incessant needs of the "peculiar institution" gave rise to a 
philosophy of caste. Although V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation 
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(New York, 1949), concentrates on twentieth-century politics, it is essential 
reading. Other works of use include J. Isaac Copeland, ed., Democracy in the Old 
South and Other Essays by Fletcher Melvin Green (Nashville, 1969); Grady Me-
Whiney, Southerners and Other Americans (New York, 1973); Benjamin Burks 
Kendrick and Alex Mathews Arnett, The South Looks at Its Past (Chapel Hill, 
1935); William H. Nichols, Southern Tradition and Regional Progress (Chapel Hill, 
1960); Harriet Chappell Owsley, ed., The South: Old and New Frontiers: Selected 
Essays of Frank Lawrence Owsley (Athens, Ga., 1969); Henry Savage, Jr., Seeds of 
Time: The Background of Southern Thinking (New York, 1959); Donald Davidson, 
ed., Selected Essays and Other Writings of John Donald Wade (Athens, Ga., 1966); T. 
Harry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern Politics (Athens, Ga., 1961); 
Frank E. Vandiver, ed., The Idea of the South: Pursuit of a Central Theme (Chicago, 
1964); and Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., ed., The South and the Sectional Theme since 
Reconstruction (New York, 1967). Almost all these studies of the southern 
experience ignore urbanization as a factor in sectional development. 
Certain other works have valuable insights that relate, sometimes directly 
and at others indirectly, to the study of urbanization. Of fundamental impor-
tance in understanding regionalism is William Best Hesseltine, "Regions, 
Classes and Sections in American History," Journal of Land and Public Utilities 
Economics 1 (February 1944):35-44. An influential study that attempted to sum 
up the meaning of the South, W. T. Couch, ed., Culture in the South (Chapel Hill, 
1934), has a number of essays that touch upon urban and industrial concerns. 
One of the essays represents an early attempt, if not the first, to establish a 
framework for understanding the southern city. It is Edd Winfield Parks, 
"Southern Towns and Cities," 501-18. Park, an English professor, concluded 
that although southern cities were distinct from one another, an "amazing 
homogeneity of the people" set them apart from those in the North. A sug-
gestive summary, which views the New South movement as a limited attempt 
by a few individuals to sell out the South to make money, relates postbellum to 
antebellum concerns, demonstrating the continuity of southern history: Clem-
ent Eaton, The Waning of the Old South Civilization, 1860-lBBO's, Mercer Universi-
ty Lamar Memorial Lectures, No. 10 (Athens, Ga., 1968). One of the first efforts 
to establish a basis for analyzing the South touches throughout on urban 
subjects. It is Albert Bushnell Hart, The Southern South (New York, 1910). 
William Best Hesseltine, Confederate Leaders in the New South (1950; rpr. West-
port, Conn., 1970), shows how many war leaders moved easily into urban 
leadership positions. A number of the contributions to ArthurS. Link and 
Rembert W. Patrick, eds., Writing Southern History: Essays in Historiography in 
Honor of Fletcher M. Green (1965; rpr. Baton Rouge, 1967), include histo-
riographical essays that relate to urban themes. Especially valuable is Paul M. 
Gaston, "The 'New South,' " 316-36. Taken together, the many works that 
delineate a structure for the study of the South provide an excellent and 
intellectually exciting starting point for understanding the role of cities. 
The forces that affected the course of Dixie's urban network and the 
response by southern cities in the antebellum period are amplified in a number 
of studies. The story of an old land artery, which at one time loomed large in 
southern plans, is detailed in popular fashion in Philip D. Jordan, The National 
Road, American Travel Series (Indianapolis, n.d.). Robert Greehalgh Albion, 
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The Rise of New York Port [1815-1860] (New York, 1939), covers the decisions 
made in 1817 by New York entrepreneurs. The reaction of the city's rivals is 
analyzed in Julius Rubin, Canal or Railroad? Imitation and Innovation in the 
Response to the Erie Canal in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston, Transactions of the 
American Philosophical Society, n.s., vol. 51, pt. 3 (Philadelphia, 1961). Baltimore 
businessmen felt so threatened that they started a railroad to the West in 
advance of proven technology. The plans unfold in Edward Hungerford, The 
Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1827-1927, 2 vols. (New York, 1928). Two 
important works on Baltimore's internal improvement schemes are Milton 
Reizenstein, The Economic History of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, John 
Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Fifteenth Series, 
vols. 7-8 (Baltimore, 1897); James Livingood, The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade 
Rivalry, 1780-1860 (Harrisburg, 1947). An older book, Edward Ingle, Southern 
Sidelights: A Picture of Social and Economic Life in the South a Generation before the 
War (New York, 1896), discusses some of the geographical obstacles faced by 
the Atlantic ports. The strategies followed by the Virginia cities are discussed in 
David R. Goldfield, Urban Growth in the Age of Sectionalism: Virginia, 1847-1861 
(Baton Rouge, 1977). See also Thomas Armstrong, "Urban Vision in Virginia: A 
Comparative Study of Antebellum Fredericksburg, Lynchburg, and Saunton" 
(Ph.D. disseration, University of Virginia, 1974). David R. Goldfield, "Urban-
Rural Relations in the Old South: The Example of Virginia," Journal of Southern 
History 42 (February 1976): 146-68, stresses the mutual concerns of planters and 
merchants in the emerging commercial system. Background information can 
be found in David T. Gilchrist, ed., The Growth of the Seaport Towns, 1790-1825 
(Charlottesville, 1967). 
The impact of New York's rise on the South is analyzed in a standard work, 
PhilipS. Foner, Business and Slavery: The New York Merchants and the Irrepressible 
Conflict (Chapel Hill, 1941). Two ill-digested works are less satisfactory. They 
are by geographer Allan R. Pred, contributions to the Harvard Studies in Urban 
History, Urban Growth and Circulation of Information: The United States System of 
Cities, 1790-1840 (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), and Urban Growth and City-Systems 
in the United States, 1840-1860 (Cambridge, Mass., 1980). Pred uses mathe-
matical equations to draw conclusions about urban systems from data on such 
subjects as shipments of shoes from Boston to Charleston. Much remains to be 
done on antebellum economic relations between the South and the Northeast. 
The rise of the Midwest and the impact on southern hopes and aspirations 
is expanded upon in a number of sources. John G. Clark, The Grain Trade in the 
Old Northwest (Urbana, 1966), details the growth and mechanices of the trade. 
Charles N. Glaab and Lawrence H. Larsen, "Neenah-Menasha in the 1870's," 
Wisconsin Magazine of History 52 (Autumn 1968):19-34, has material on the 
westward movement of the grain industry. Early settlement patterns and the 
beginning of the shift of important cities from the South to Midwest are 
outlined in Richard Wade, The Urban Frontier: Pioneer Life in Early Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, Lexington, Louisville, and St. Louis (Chicago, 1959). Cincinnati's 
southern ties are dealt with in David Kelley Jackson, ed., American Studies in 
Honor of William Kenneth Boyd (1940; rpr. Freeport, N.Y., 1968). Basic to under-
standing the growth of an urban network in the Midwest is Wyatt Belcher, The 
Economic Rivalry between St. Louis and Chicago, 1850-1880 (New York, 1947). See 
200 Essay on Sources 
also J. Christopher Schnell, "Chicago versus St. Louis: A Reassessment of the 
Great Rivalry," Missouri Historical Review 71 (April1977):245-65; Lawrence H. 
Larsen, "Chicago's Midwest Rivals: Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Milwaukee," 
Chicago History: The Magazine of the Chicago Historical Society 5 (Fall1976): 141-51. 
A major work on the rise of sections remains Frederick Jackson Turner, The 
United States, 1830-1850: The Nation and Its Sections (1935; rpr. New York, 1962). 
Neil Primm, St. Louis: Lion of the Valley (Boulder, 1981), shows the shift of St. 
Louis from a southern to a midwestern city. Other studies of value are A. L. 
Kohlmeier, The Old Northwest as the Keystone of the Arch of the American Union 
(Bloomington, Ind., 1938); Henry C. Hubbart, The Older Middle West, 1840-1880 
(New York, 1936). Even so, much remains to be written on the economic, 
political, and social forces that led to the South's loss of the Midwest trade. 
More has been done on the response of New Orleans to the crisis in the 
upper Mississippi River Valley than on any other southern city. The Crescent 
City's early economic development is detailed in John C. Clark, New Orleans, 
1718-1812: An Economic History (Baton Rouge, 1970). Problems with the river 
route are analyzed by a number of scholars, including Robert M. Brown, "The 
Mississippi River as a Trade Route," Bulletin of the American Geographical Society 
of New York 38 (1906):347-54; R. B. Way, "The Commerce of the Lower Mississip-
pi in the Period 1830-1860," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Extra Number 
Guly 1920):57-68; Frank H. Dixon, A Traffic History of the Mississippi River System, 
National Waterways Commission, Doc. 11 (Washington, 1909); Walter M. 
Lowrey, "Navigational Problems at the Mouth of the Mississippi River, 
1698-1880" (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1956); Walter M. 
Lowrey, "The Engineers and the Mississippi," Louisiana History 5 (Summer 
1964):223-56. The reaction of New Orleans to its growing plight is surveyed in 
many accounts, including G. W. Stephens, "Some Aspects of Early Intersec-
tional Rivalry for the Commerce of the Upper Mississippi Valley," Washington 
University Studies 10 (1923):277-300; John G. Clark, "New Orleans and the 
River: A Study in Attitudes and Responses," Louisiana History 8 (Spring 
1967):117-36; Gary Bolding, "Change, Continuity, and Identity of a Southern 
City: New Orleans, 1850-1950," Louisiana Studies 14 (Summer 1975):161-78; 
James Cairns, "The Response of New Orleans to the Diversion of Trade from 
the Mississippi River, 1845-1860" (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1950); 
Erastus P. Puckett, "The Attempt of New Orleans to Meet the Crisis of Her 
Trade with the West," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Extra Number (Febru-
ary 1923):481-95. The poor port facilities in New Orleans were stressed in 
Walter Parker, "Facilities of the Port of New Orleans," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 86 (November 1919):188-98. 
The shift of community aspirations to a regional strategy has come under 
increasing investigation. Lawrence H. Larsen, "New Orleans and the River 
Trade: Reinterpreting the Role of the Business Community," Wisconsin Maga-
zine of History 61 (Winter 1977-78):112-24, emphasizes the impact of transporta-
tion costs. The basic monograph on the city's railroad strategy is MerlE. Reed, 
New Orleans and the Railroads: The Struggle for Commerical Empire, 1830-1860 
(Baton Rouge, 1966). Two other articles on the subject are Harry Howard Evans, 
"James Robb, Banker and Pioneer Builder of Ante-Bellum Louisiana," Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly 33 Ganuary 1940):170-258; James P. Baughman, "The Evolu-
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tion of Rail-Water Systems of Transportation in the Gulf Southeast, 1836-1890," 
Journal of Southern History 34 (August 1968):351-81. See also Ottis Clark Skipper, 
"J.D.B. DeBow, the Man," Journal of Southern History 10 (November 
1944):404-23. The characteristics of New Orleans and Louisiana leaders can be 
found in Robert W. Shugg, Origins of the Class Struggle in Louisiana: A Social 
History of White Farmers and Laborers during Slavery and After, 1840-1875 (1939; rpr. 
Baton Rouge, 1968). A broader study has valuable economic information: 
Arthur Harrison Cole, Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States, 1700-1861 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1938). The attempts of other southern towns to counter 
changed conditions in the Midwest constitute a fruitful area of research. 
Local histories of varying content and quality are available for all thirty of 
the southern cities that had 10,000 or more people in 1880. Most are long and 
poorly organized. The majority are "day-by-day" chronicles, without any 
analytical structure. Only the most indefatigable and resolute of readers have 
ever read one from end to end. In many instances the authors, untrained in 
historical methods, were enthusiastic amateurs or local leaders. The emphasis 
placed on events contains valuable insights on concerns at given points in 
community development. Later histories of the same town frequently draw 
directly and heavily on earlier ones, thus indicating a shift from promotional 
concerns to a need to document historical roots and so on. All the local histories 
produced after 1865 place great emphasis on the Civil War, which should give 
scholars interested in delineating new breaking points for southern history 
reason to pause. Usually, accompanying biographical volumes, sometimes 
called "mug books," have sketches ofthe lives ofleaders. In an era in which few 
newspapers printed obituaries, these biographies can be of immense value in 
piecing together the contours of a community power structure. If used correct-
ly, local histories are some of the most valuable sources available for urban 
research. They contain a wide variety of information on such subjects as 
population trends, social life, and economic developments that for the most 
part are unavailable elsewhere. Indeed, what they leave out-few contain data 
on the black community-illustrates attitudes and conditions. To sum up, the 
local histories dispute the assertion of some leading scholars that the South has 
little in the way of an urban past. 
Several of the local histories are old enough to qualify as primary sources. 
They include Baltimore: Past and Present, with Biographical Sketches of Its Represen-
tative Men . . . (Philadelphia, 1881 ); Charles Todd, The Story of Washington: The 
National Capital (New York, 1889); Benjamin Cassedy, The History of Louisville 
from Its Earliest Settlement till the Year 1852 (Louisville, 1852); De Saussure and J. 
L. Dawson, Census of the City of Charleston, for the Year 1848: Exhibiting the 
Condition and Prospects of the City, Illustrated by Many Statistical Details, prepared 
under the Authority of the City Council (Charleston, 1849); H. W. Burton, History of 
Norfolk, Virginia: A Review of Important Events and Incidents Which Occurred from 
1736 to 1877; Also a Record, Personal Reminiscences and Political, Economical, and 
Curious Facts (Norfolk, 1874); Samuel Mordecai, Virginia, Especially Richmond in 
By-gone Days, with a Glance at the Present, Being Reminiscences and Last Words of an 
Old Citizen, 2d ed. (Richmond, 1860); Margaret Couch Cabell, Sketches and 
Recollections of Lynchburg (Richmond, 1858); George Ranck, History of Lexington, 
Kentucky: Its Early Annals and Recent Progress, Including Biographical Sketches and 
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Personal Reminiscences of the Pioneer Settlers, Notices of Prominent Citizens, etc. etc. 
(Cincinnati, 1872); James Davis, The History of Memphis (Memphis, 1873); John 
Butler, Historical Record of Macon and Central Georgia (1879; rpr. Macon, 1950); 
Past, Present, and Future of Chattanooga, Tennessee, "The Industrial Center of the 
South": Its Superior Resources and Advantages, and the Inducements It Offers for 
Capital and Labor in Farming, Manufacturing, Mining, and Commerce (Chattanoo-
ga, 1885); Edward Clarke, Illustrated History of Atlanta, Containing Glances at Its 
Population, Business, Manufactures, Industries, Institutions ... and Advantages 
Generally, with Nearly One Hundred Illustrations, and a Lithographic Map of the City 
(Atlanta, 1878). Local libraries invariably have copies of books on their individ-
ual cities, but few depositories boast complete runs. Even then, they are 
frequently classified as reference books or as parts of special collections. Con-
sequently, to the vexation of scholars, they do not circulate. 
There are many local histories of more recent vintage. Representative 
examples include Charles Hirschfield, Baltimore, 1870-1900: Studies in Social 
History (Baltimore, 1941); Sherry Olson, Baltimore: The Building of an American 
City (Baltimore, 1980); William Stevens, Washington: the Cinderella City ... 
(New York, 1943); Isabella McMeekin, Louisville: The Gateway City (New York, 
1946); Lyle Saxon, Fabulous New Orleans, Louisiana . .. (Chicago, 1928); Harriet 
Leiding, Charleston: Historic and Romantic (Philadelphia, 1931); John P. Little, 
History of Richmond (Richmond, 1933); Marshall Butt, Portsmouth under Four 
Flags, 1752-1881 (Portsmouth, 1961); Nettie Voges, Old Alexandria: Where Amer-
ica's Past Is Present (McLean, Va., 1975); William Christian, Lynchburg and Its 
People (Lynchburg, 1935); Jesse Burt, Nashville: Its Life and Times (Nashville, 
1959); Ira Richards, Story of a Rivertown: Little Rock in the Nineteenth Century 
(Benton, Ark., 1969); Montgomery, City of Progress: Yesterday and Today 
(Montgomery, 1937); Etta Blanchard Worsley, Columbus on the Chattahoochee 
(Columbus, 1950); Helen Kohn Hennig, ed., Columbia: Capital City of South 
Carolina, 1786-1936 (Columbia, 1936); Zelia Armstrong, The History of Hamilton 
County and Chattanooga, Tennessee, 2 vols. (Chattanooga, 1931-40); Walter 
Cooper, Official History of Fulton County (Atlanta, 1934); Caldwell Delaney, The 
Story of Mobile (Mobile, 1953); Betsy Fancher, Savannah: A Renaissance of the Heart 
(Garden City, 1976). Every decade or so, an enthusiastic amateur brings the 
Mobile story, the Richmond story, or the Altanta story up to date. The con-
tinuing attempt to document the history of cities by their citizens has been an 
ongoing part of the American experience and of community building. 
There are far too few analytical urban biographies of southern cities. Those 
that exist are of high quality. Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Norfolk: Historic Southern 
Port, edited by Marvin Schlegel (1931; rpr. Durham, 1962), is one of the earliest 
studies of a city undertaken by a professional historian. Another pioneering 
effort is Gerald Capers, The Biography of a Rivertown: Memphis, its Heroic Age 
(Chapel Hill, 1939). Capers has excellent material on the destructive yellow 
fever epidemics of the 1870s. He concludes that they retarded the city's growth 
by several decades. Constance McLaughlin Green, Washington, vol. 1, Village 
and Capital, 1800-1878 (Princeton, 1962), and Washington, vol. 2, Capital City, 
1879-1950 (Princeton, 1963), explores the history of the nation's capital in 
thorough and readable fashion. Atlanta: A City of the Modern South, American 
Guide Series (1942; rpr. St. Clair Shores, Mich., 1973), draws together impor-
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tant aspects of Atlanta's history. So does New Orleans City Guide, American 
Guide Series (Boston, 1938); Washington: City and Capital, American Guide 
Series (Washington, 1937). Less successful is an attempt to do an analytical 
history of a city by a noted newspaper editor: Virginius Dabney, Richmond: The 
Story of a City (Garden City, 1976). 
A small number of books and articles delineate specific themes that indi-
cate something about urban development. An interpretive study, Harry M. 
Ward and Harold E. Greer, Jr., Richmond during the Revolution, 1775-83 (Charlot-
tesville, 1977), shows the impact of the Revolution on the city's future growth. 
Joy J. Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age (Baton Rouge, 1969), emphasizes 
political themes. A recent partial biography of Baltimore in antebellum times, 
Gary Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 1789-1861 (Chapel Hill, 1980), emphasizes 
the role of noneconomic forces in building the Monumental City. Two articles 
in the Georgia Historical Quarterly that place a medium-sized city in perspective 
during antebellum days are James H. Stone, "Economic Conditions in Macon, 
Georgia, in the 1830s," 54 (Summer 1970):209-25; and Bowling Gates, "Macon, 
Georgia, Inland Trading Center, 1826-1836," 55 (Fall 1971):365-77. Of special 
note are the essays," An American Museum Piece" (Louisville) and "The City 
of Perpetual Promise" (Birmingham), in George R. Leighton, Five Cities: The 
Story of Their Youth and Old Age (New York, 1939). His harsh appraisal of the 
motives of the business community, written against the backdrop of the Great 
Depression, represents an early attempt to escape from the chronological 
approach in writing about a city. Several decades later, there is a definite need 
for studies of southern cities that selectively study and draw conclusions about 
the main components of their development. 
More books have been written on southern cities in the Civil War than 
upon any other aspect of their histories. Many are autobiographical or "potboil-
ers," which emphasize the sensational and the role of individuals. A few are 
scholarly, many times overly technical. Typical are some of the books written 
about Vicksburg. Two accounts written by participants in the events are Mary 
Loughborough, My Cave Life in Vicksburg: With Letters of Trzal and Travml (Little 
Rock, 1882); and Osborn Oldroyd, A Soldier's Story of the Siege of Vicksburg 
(Springfield, Ill., 1885). A semischolarly popular account is Adolph Hoehling 
and the editors of Army Times, Vicksburg: 47 Days of Siege (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., 1969). A scholarly monograph that covers more than simply the siege is 
Peter Walker, Vicksburg: A People at War, 1860-1865 (Chapel Hill, 1960). Technical 
studies include John Milligan, Gunboats Down the Mississippi (Annapolis, 1965); 
William Everhart, Vicksburg National Park, Mississippi, National Park Service 
Historical Handbook Series no. 2 (Washington, 1954). Representative books on 
the Civil War experience in other cities include J. Winston Coleman, Lexington 
during the Civil War (Lexington, 1938); Catherine Copeland, Bravest Surrender: A 
Petersburg Patchwork (Richmond, 1961); Marvin Lucas, Sherman and the Burning 
of Columbia (College Station, 1976); Samuel Carter III, The Siege of Atlanta, 1864 
(New York, 1973); Noah Brooks, Washington in Lincoln's Time (New York, 1895); 
and Earl Schenck Miers, ed., When the World Ended: The Diary of Emma LeConte 
(New York, 1957), which is about Columbia. An account that places the occupa-
tion of a major southern city in perspective is Gerald M. Capers, Occupied City: 
New Orleans under the Federals, 1862-1865 (Lexington, Ky., 1965). Unlike many of 
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the studies of cities in the Civil War, two on Augusta emphasize the larger 
consequences: Florence Corley, Confederate City: Augusta, Georgia, 1860-1865 
(Columbia, 1960); Barry Fleming, Autobiography of a City in Arms: Augusta, 
Georgia, 1861-1865 (Augusta, 1975). So far, despite a plethora of books, no 
one has produced a synthesis on the southern city in the Civil War. The studies 
on Civil War cities point up the importance attached to the period. Unfor-
tunately, no similar body of material is available on a variety of the other areas 
fundamental to understanding the roots of southern urbanization in the Gilded 
Age. 
Histories of immigration that touch on urban subjects are few and far 
between. A few general studies, some very dated, have information that relates 
to the South. Some of these are Stephen Byrne, Irish Emigration to the United 
States: What It has Been, and What It Is (New York, 1873); Albert Faust, The German 
Element in the United States, 2 vols. (New York, 1912); Carl Wittke, We Who Built 
America: The Saga of the Immigrant (Cleveland, 1939); Stanley C. Johnson, A 
History of Emigration from the United Kingdom to North America, 1763-1912 (Lon-
don, 1913). Valuable general material can be found in Stephen Thernstrom, 
ed., Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups (Cambridge, Mass., 1980). A 
state study with good data on Baltimore Germans is Dieter Cunz, The Maryland 
Germans: A History (1948; rpr. Port Washington, N.Y., 1972). Two useful articles 
in the Louisiana Historical Quarterly on Germans are Robert T. Clark, "Recon-
struction and the New Orleans German Colony," 23 (April1940):501-24; and 
Bob Cyrus Rauchle, "The Political Life of the Germans in Memphis, 1848-1900," 
28 (Summer 1968):165-75. The basic study of the role of the Irish in a major city 
is Earl Niehaus, The Irish in New Orleans, 1800-1860 (Baton Rouge, 1965). Darrell 
Overdyke, The Know-Nothing Party in the South (Baton Rouge, 1950), illustrates 
the adverse reaction of southern nativists to immigrant groups. Fredrick Mar-
cel Spletstoser, "Back Door to the Land of Plenty: New Orleans as an Immigrant 
Port, 1820-1860," 2 vols. (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1978), 
covers the influx of immigrants into New Orleans and the diffusion of many of 
them throughout the Mississippi River Valley. The study of immigrant groups 
in southern cities and their impact on institutions remains a fertile field of 
investigation. 
The role of blacks in antebellum and postbellum cities has attracted in-
creasing attention. The pioneer study on urban slavery before the Civil War 
remains Richard Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820-1860 (New York, 
1964). Claudia Dale Golden, Urban Slavery in the American South, 1820-1860: A 
Quantitative History (Chicago, 1976), has detailed and complex data. Leonard P. 
Curry, The Free Black in Urban America, 1800-1850: The Shadow of the Dream 
(Chicago, 1981), contains valuable material on urban blacks in the upper South 
and Louisville in particular. RobertS. Starobin, Industrial Slavery in the Old South 
(New York, 1970), deals with an important but neglected subject. More has 
been done on urban free Negroes. Useful articles, all in the Journal of Negro 
History, include L. P. Jackson, "Free Negroes of Petersburg, Virginia," 12 Ouly 
1927):365-88; E. Horace Fitchett, "The Origin and Growth of the Free Negro 
Population of Charleston, South Carolina," 26 (October 1941):421-37; Dorothy 
Provine, "The Economic Position of Free Blacks in the District of Columbia," 58 
Oanuary 1973):61-72. See also Ira Berlin, Slaves without Masters: The Negro in the 
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Antebellum South (New York, 1974). A few studies touch on the Gilded Age. 
John W. Blassingame, Black New Orleans, 1860-1880 (Chicago, 1973); Constance 
M. Green, The Secret City: A History of Race Relations in the Nation's Capital 
(Princeton, 1967); and Robert E. Perdue, The Negro in Savannah, 1865-1900 (New 
York, 1973), show how blacks established stable communities after the Civil 
War. See also Dale Somers, "Black and White in New Orleans: A Survey of 
Urban Race Relations, 1865-1900," Journal of Southern History 40 (February 
1974):19-42. Unlike many other areas, a valuable synthesis covers major con-
cerns of urban blacks in the Gilded Age: Howard N. Rabinowitz, Race Relations 
in the Urban South, 1865-1890, History of Urban America Series (New York, 
1978). A well-researched study with a point of view, Lawrence J. Friedman, The 
White Savage: Racial Fantasies in the Postellum South (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 
1970), rasies provocative points about race relations. For a more balanced 
account see Howard N. Rabinowitz, "The Conflict between Blacks and the 
Police in the Urban South," Historian 34 (November 1976):62-76. A basic work is 
C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York, 1955). A case 
study that addressed important aspects of white racial concerns is Terry L. Seip, 
"Municipal Politics and the Negro: Baton Rouge, 1865-1900," in Mark T. Car-
leton, Perry H. Howard, and Joseph B. Parker, eds., Readings in Louisiana Politics 
(Baton Rouge, 1975), 242-66. More case studies are needed on black and white 
relationships in the postbellum urban South. 
Because of the nature of the subject, the impact of religious institutions on 
southern cities is a difficult area with which to deal. Ray Allen Billington, The 
Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism (New 
York, 1938), contains data on the reaction of certain southern sects to immi-
grants. Edwin McNeill Poteat, Jr., "Religion in the South," in Couch, ed., 
Culture in the South, 248-69, stresses the South's fundamentalist tenets. Hunter 
D. Farish, The Circuit Rider Dismounts: A Social History of Southern Methodism, 
1865-1900 (Richmond, 1938), and Rufus B. Spain, At Ease in Zion: Social History 
of the Southern Baptists, 1865-1900 (Nashville, 1967), have limited material on the 
transition of a frontier religion to urban values. Kenneth K. Bailey, "Southern 
White Protestants at the Turn of the Century," American Historical Review 68 
(April1963):618-35, is a helpful analysis. Charles Reagan Wilson, "The Religion 
of the Lost Cause: Ritual and Organization of the Southern Civic Religion, 
1865-1920," Journal of Southern History 46 (May 1980):219-38, contains valuable 
material that illustrates the link between the Confederacy and civic religion in 
the cities of the New South. Sympathetic assessments of religious organiza-
tions include W. W. Barnes, The Southern Baptist Convention, 1845-1953 (Nash-
ville, 1954); Paul N. Garber, The Methodists Are One People (Nashville, 1939); 
Carter Woodson, The History of the Negro Church (1921; rpr. Washington, 1945); 
and John M. Cromwell, "First Negro Churches in the District of Columbia," 
Journal of Negro History 7 Oanuary 1922):64-106. Various studies of a more 
general nature touch upon the Jewish religious experience. Among them are 
Isaac Fein, The Making of an American Jewish Community: The History of Baltimore 
Jewry from 1773 to 1920 (Philadelphia, 1971); Leonard Dinnerstein and Maury 
Dale Palsson, Jews in the South (Baton Rouge, 1973); Eli N. Evans, The Provincials: 
A Personal History of Jews in the South (New York, 1973); Myron Berman, Rich-
mond's Jewry: Shabbat to Shockoe, 1796-1976 (Charlottesville, 1979); Steven 
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Hertzberg, Strangers within the Gate City: The Jews of Altanta, 1845-1915 (Phila-
delphia, 1978). So far, scholars have barely touched the surface in studying the 
southern urban religious experience. 
Hardly any studies of note are available on urban education in the South in 
the Gilded Age. An older work, Edgar Knight, The Influence of Reconstruction on 
Education in the South (1913; rpr. New York, 1969}, has some useful background 
material. Howard N. Rabinowitz, "Half a Loaf: The Shift from White to Black 
Teachers in the Negro Schools of the Urban South, 1865-1890," Journal of 
Southern History 40 (November 1974):565-94, although limited in scope, deals 
with an important subject. Frederick Chambers, "Histories of Black Colleges 
and Universities," Journal of Negro History 57 (July 1972):270-75, is essentially a 
list. Horace H. Cunningham, "The Southern Mind since the Civil War," in Link 
and Patrick, Writing Southern History, 383-409, is a stimulating account. Chapter 
7, "Education," in Rabinowitz, Race Relations in the Urban South, has much 
useful material. In general, the educational experience has to be pieced to-
gether from a variety of secondary and primary sources. A scholar has yet to 
write a basic book on education and its philosophical relationship to the Lost 
Cause and the New South. 
Although much has been written about the South's rich cultural traditions, 
little of it touches directly upon the Gilded Age. Two books by Rollin G. 
Osterweis, Romanticism and Nationalism in the Old South (New Haven, 1949}, and 
The Myth of the Lost Cause, 1865-1900 (New York, 1973), place southern roman-
ticism in perspective. Sarah Sprott Morrow, "A Brief History of the Theater in 
Nashville," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 30 (Summer 1971):178-89, shows how 
during Reconstruction the legitimate theater declined, replaced by minstrel 
and variety shows. Herbert J. Doherty, Jr., "The Mind of the Antebellum 
South," in Link and Patrick, Writing Southern History, emphasizes the growing 
importance of cultural activities. Dale A. Somers, The Rise of Sports in New 
Orleans, 1850-1900 (Baton Rouge, 1972}, explores a neglected aspect of urban 
social history. For background data see F. Garvin Davenport, Cultural Life in 
Nashville on the Eve of the Civil War (Chapel Hill, 1941); Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., 
"Early New Orleans Society: A Reappraisal," Journal of Southern History 18 
(February 1952):20-36. No one has as yet tested in the South the provocative 
views on urban culture contained in Gunther Barth, City People: The Rise of 
Modern City Culture in Nineteenth-Century America (New York, 1980). Barth 
contends that such agencies as baseball teams, apartment houses, and depart-
ment stores were of crucial importance as urban value givers. 
Excellent but limited amounts of material are readily available on the 
South's contributions to city planning. The most comprehensive data, relating 
southern developments to national themes, can be found in a basic work, John 
W. Reps, The Making of Urban America (Princeton, 1965). Other studies by Reps 
that deal with southern planning themes are Town Planning in Frontier America 
(1965; rpr. Columbia, 1980); and Monumental Washington: The Planning and 
Development of the Capital Center (Princeton, 1967). An excellent study on the 
District of Columbia is Frederick Gutheim, Worthy of the Nation: The History of 
Planning for the National Capital (Washington, 1977). Albert Fein, Frederick Law 
Olmsted and the American Environmental Tradition (New York, 1972}, places the 
City Beautiful movement in a national context. Fundamental to any study of 
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urban planning is Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Trans-
formations, and Its Prospects (New York, 1961). 
Many works exist on various phases of southern urban architecture. Basic 
studies of architectual trends that place the South within the traditions of 
building in America include James Marston Fitch, American Building: The Forces 
That Shape It (1948; rpr. New York, 1977); Christopher Tunnard and Henry 
Hope Reed, American Skyline: The Growth and Form of Our Cities and Towns (New 
York, 1955); Vincent Scully, American Architecture and Urbanism (New York, 
1969); Thomas A. Tallmadge, The Story of Architecture in America (New York, 
1936); Talbot F. Hamlin, Greek Revival Architecture in America (New York, 1944). 
Most studies of individual southern cities are intended for popular audiences. 
Typical are the older William Casey, An Archetectural Monograph: Charleston 
Doorways, Entrance Motives from a South Carolina City, White Pine Series, vol. 14, 
monograph 81 (New York, 1928), and the newer Franklin Garrett, Yesterday's 
Atlanta, Seeman's Historic Cities Series, no. 8 (Miami, 1974). Of more scholarly 
quality are Everett B. Wilson, Early Southern Towns (South Brunswick, N.J., 
1967); James Bonner, "Plantation Architecture of the Lower South on the Eve of 
the Civil War," Journal of Southern History 11 (August 1945):370-88; and Henry 
Forman, Architecture of the Old South: The Medieval Style, 1585-1850 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1948). For characteristic studies of individual buildings see An Omnibus 
of the Capitol, House of Representatives, Doc. 412, 2d ed., 86th Cong., 2d sess. 
(Washington, 1959); Clayton B. Dekle, "The Tennessee State Capitol," Tennessee 
Historical Quarterly 25 (Fall 1966):213-38; Gilbert E. Govan, "The Chattanooga 
Union Station," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 29 (Winter 1970-71):327-78; and 
Keith L. Bryant, "Cathedrals, Castles, and Roman Baths: Railroad Station 
Architecture in the Urban South," Journal of Urban History 2 (February 
1976):195-230. Given the growing interest in architectural roots and the estab-
lishment in many cities of preservation agencies, the future bodes well for a 
steady stream of contributions documenting southern urban designs. An 
example is Eleanor Graham, ed., Nashville: A Short History and Selected Buildings 
(Nashville, 1974). 
A number of scholarly studies detail the roots of southern industrialism. 
Broadus Mitchell, William Gregg: Factory Master of the Old South (Chapel Hill, 
1928), and Fletcher M. Green, "Duff Green: Industrial Promoter," Journal of 
Southern History 2 (February 1936):29-42, draw succinct conclusions about two 
of the Old South's important exponents of industrialism. A number of sources 
make it clear that there was interest in the antebellum South in manufacturing. 
Among them are Herbert Collins, "The Idea of a Cotton Textile Industry in 
Ante-Bellum North Carolina, 1870-1900," North Carolina Historical Quarterly 34 
Guly 1927):358-92; Herbert Collins, "The Southern Industrial Gospel before 
1860," Journal of Southern History 12 (August 1946):383-402; RobertS. Cotterill, 
"The Old South to the New," Journal of Southern History 15 (February 1949):3-8; 
Diffee W. Standard and Richard Griffin, "The Cotton Textile Industry in Ante-
Bellum North Carolina," North Carolina Historical Review 34 (January 
1957):15-37; 34 (April1957):131-66; and Weymouth T. Jordan, Ante-Bellum Ala-
bama: Town and Country, Florida State University Studies, no. 27 (Tallahassee, 
1957). Problems with northern competition are discussed in Ernest M. Lander, 
Jr., "The Iron Industry in Ante-Bellum South Carolina," Journal of Southern 
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History 20 (August 1954):337-55, and Carrol H. Quenzel, "The Manufacture of 
Locomotives and Cars in Alexandria in the 1850s," Virginia Magazine of History 
and Biography 62 (April 1954):181-89. Norris Preyer, "Why Did Industrialism 
Lag in the Old South?" Georgia Historical Quarterly 55 (Fall1971):378-96, notes 
the fears expressed by some observers that the factory system threatened 
democratic institutions. Raymond L. Cohn, "Local Manufacturing in the Ante-
bellum South and Midwest," Business History Review 54 (Spring 1980):80-91, 
found many similarities between early midwestern and southern frontier 
manufacturing. Charles D. Dew, Iron maker for the Confederacy: Joseph R. Anderson 
and the Tredegar Iron Works (New Haven, 1966), is an outstanding business 
history. Broadus Mitchell, The Rise of Cotton Mills in the South, John Hopkins 
University Studies in Historical and Political Science, ser. 39, no. 2 (Baltimore, 
1921), traces the rise of an important industry. For promotional activities see 
Ethel M. Ames, The Story of Coal and Iron in Alabama (Birmingham, 1910), and 
Patrick J. Hearden, Independence and Empire: The New South's Cotton Mill Cam-
paign, 1865-1901 (DeKalb, Ill., 1982). Broadus Mitchell and George Mitchell, The 
Industrial Revolution in the South (Baltimore, 1930), concluded that industrializa-
tion threatened southern institutions. Chapter 5, "The Industrial Evolution," 
in Woodward, Orgins of the New South, 107-39, lucidly analyzes the rise of 
industry. No one as yet has written a general account of manufacturing in the 
South of the Gilded Age and its social impact. The appropriate census volumes 
remain the primary source of detailed information on industrial growth. 
There is a large body of literature on southern railroads. Eugene Alvarez, 
Travel on Southern Antebellum Railroads, 1828-1860 (University, Ala., 1974), is a 
well-written and fascinating excursion into practical aspects of social history. 
MerlE. Reed, New Orleans and the Railroads: The Struggle for Commercial Empire, 
1830-1860 (Baton Rouge, 1966), is fundamental to understanding New Orleans' 
railroad strategy. See also Marshall Gautreau, "The New Orleans, Opelousas 
and Great Western Railroad" (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1955). 
RobertS. Cotterill, "Southern Railroads, 1850-1860," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review 10 (March 1924):396-405, surveys the growth of the network in the 
decade in which railroading passed out of its formative years. John F. Stover, 
The Railroads of the South, 1865-1900: A Study in Finance and Control (Chapel Hill, 
1955), is the standard work on southern railroad policy. Stover shows the shift 
of control to outside interests. Maury Klein, The Great Richmond Terminal: A 
Study in Businessmen and Railroad Strategy (Charlottesville, 1970), traces the 
growth of a powerful railroad combination. Leonard P. Curry, Rail Routes South: 
Louisville's Fight for the Southern Market, 1865-1872 (Lexington, 1969), deals with 
a period crucial to Louisville's metropolitan aspirations. Richard Price, Georgia 
Railroads and the West Point Route (Salt Lake City, 1962), draws conclusions about 
the significance of an important east-west connecting link. A technical study 
on a very important subject is John Doster, "Trade Centers and Railroad Rates 
in Alabama, 1873-1885: The Cases of Greenville, Montgomery, and Opelika," 
Journal of Southern History 18 (May 1952):169-92. George Rogers Taylor and Irene 
D. Neu, The American Railroad Network (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), though 
national in scope, has valuable traffic information on the South. Although 
much of value has been done, more first-rate studies of railroad strategy are 
needed. No general study exists that relates the growth of the railroad network 
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to concerns of southern urbanization and nationalism. Herbert Wender, South-
ern Commercial Conventions, 1837-1859, Johns Hopkins University Studies in 
Historical and Political Science, series 48, no. 4 (Baltimore, 1930), makes clear 
that many antebellum statesmen considered railroads and cities of great impor-
tance to the rise of southern nationalism. 
Some southern railroads have been the subject of biographies. Several of 
the studies are of use in relationship to city building in the Gilded Age. These 
include Hungerford, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; John F. Stover, History of Illinois 
Central Railroad (New York, 1975); Maury Klein, History of the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad (New York, 1972); John L. Kers, The Louisville and Nashville: An 
Outline History (New York, 1933); Kincaid Herr, The Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad, 1850-1963 (Louisville, 1963); Jesse C Burt, Jr., "Four Decades of the 
Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway, 1873-1916," Tennessee Historical 
Quarterly 9 Oune 1950):99-132; and Samuel Derrick, Centennial History of South 
Carolina Railroad (Columbia, 1930). Unfortunately, few of these and other stud-
ies touch directly upon urbanization activities. Such information has to be 
ferreted out by researchers. 
The state of southern agriculture had a tremendous impact on city building 
in the postbellum South. Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch, One Kind of 
Freedom: The Economic Consequences of Emancipation (Cambridge, Eng., 1977), 
comprehensively describes and evaluates the problems faced by southern 
agrarians. John D. Hicks, The Populzst Revolt (Minneapolis, 1931), remains a 
useful summary. For surveys of Populist literature see Allen J. Going, "The 
Agrarian Revolt," in Link and Patrick, Writing Southern History, 362-82; Patrick 
E. McLear, "The Agrarian Revolt in the South: A Historiographical Essay," 
Louisiana Studies 12 (Summer 1973):443-63. An excellent biography of an agrar-
ian leader is C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York, 1938). 
Reactions at the state level are discussed in William J. Cooper, Jr., The Conserva-
tive Regime: South Carolina, 1877-1890 (Baltimore, 1968); William Ivy Hair, Bour-
bonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana Politics, 1877-1900 (Baton Rouge, 1961). 
Current concerns of those involved in a debate over Populism have not touched 
directly on urban themes. Representative are Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic 
Promise: The Populist Movement in America (New York, 1976); Robert C. McMath, 
Jr., Populist Vanguard: A History of the Southern Farmers' Alliance (Chapel Hill, 
1976); and Michael Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure: The Southern 
Farmers' Alliance and Cotton Tenancy, 1880-1890 (New York, 1976). A valuable 
addition to the literature of agrarian protest would be a study relating farmers' 
concerns to the capabilities of the banking sructure in the South. 
Too few students have written accounts relating to municipal concerns in 
southern cities. A variety of general studies have some value for the story in the 
South. For streets see Winston A. Walden, "Nineteenth Century Street Pave-
ments" (M.A. thesis, University of Missouri-Kansas City, 1967); Clay 
McShane, "Transforming the Use of Urban Space: A Look at the Revolution in 
Street Pavements, 1880-1924," Journal of Urban History 5 (May 1979):279-307; 
George A. Soper, Modern Methods of Street Cleaning (New York, 1909); Lawrence 
H. Larsen, "Nineteenth-Century Street Sanitation: A Study of Filth and Frus-
tration," Wisconsin Magazine of History 52 (Spring 1969):239-47; and Otto L. 
Bettmann, The Good Old Days-They Were Terrible (New York, 1974). Disposal 
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problems are dealt with in Martin V. Melossi, Garbage in the Cities: Refuse, 
Reform, and the Environment, 1880-1980 (College Station, Tex., 1981); Stanley K. 
Schultz and Clay McShane, "To Engineer the Metropolis: Sewers, Sanitation, 
and City Planning in Late-Nineteenth-Century America," Journal of American 
History 65 (September 1978):389-411; Joel A. Tarr, "The Separate vs. Combined 
Sewer Problem: A Case Study in Urban Technology Design Choice," Journal of 
Urban History 5 (May 1979):308-39; and Martin V. Melossi, ed., Pollution and 
Reform in American Cities, 1870-1930 (Austin, 1980). Nelson Blake, Water for the 
Cities: A History of the Water Supply Problem in the United States (Syracuse, 1956), is 
basic. Two books by Jon C. Teaford, The Municipal Revolution in America, 
1650-1825 (Chicago, 1975), and City and Suburb: The Political Fragmentation of 
Metropolitan America, 1850-1970 (Baltimore, 1979), show the technical evolution 
of city government. Howard N. Rabinowitz, "From Reconstruction to Redemp-
tion in the Urban South," Journal of Urban History 2 (February 1976):169-94, 
demonstrates how Democrats in several cities made only halfhearted attempts 
to capture black votes, leaving Republicans open to charges of being the 
"Negro party." General surveys of government include two old but still valu-
able studies: Charles Zueblin, American Municipal Progress (1902; rpr. New York, 
1916); and John Fairlie, Municipal Admministration (New York, 1901). Frank 
Rowsone, Jr., Trolley Car Treasury: A Century of American Streetcars, Horsecars, 
Cable Cars, Interurbans, and Trolleys (New York, 1956), has some useful informa-
tion. Raymond Fosdick, American Police Systems (New York, 1920), and James F. 
Richardson, Urban Police in the United States (Port Washington, N.Y., 1974), 
cover police systems. These representative studies give an indication of the 
general direction of municipal research. 
A small number of articles represent starting points for further research on 
southern municipal services. A pioneering piece on city taxes is J. David 
Griffin, "Savannah's City Income Tax," Georgia Historical Quarterly 50 (Sep-
tember 1969):173-76. John H. Ellis, "Memphis Sanitary Revolution, 
1880-1890," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 23 (March 1964):59-72, describes the 
Memphis reform program. Eugene J. Watts, "Property and Politics in Atlanta, 
1865-1903," Journal of Urban History 3 (May 1977):295-322, shows how city 
officials favored property interests. Two background pieces on fire protection 
are E. Merton Coulter, "The Great Savannah Fire of 1820," Georgia Historical 
Quarterly 23 (March 1939):1-27; and John B. Clark, Jr., "The Fire Problem in 
Kentucky, 1778-1865: A Case History of the Ante-Bellum South," Register of the 
Kentucky Historical Society 51 (April 1953):97-122. Richard H. Haunton, "Law 
and Order in Savannah, 1850-1860," Georgia Historical Quarterly 56 (Spring 
1972):1-24, provides a unique look at law enforcement problems in late ante-
bellum times. The condition of municipal systems is an important indication of 
urbanization. Great opportunities for significant case studies await scholars in 
this difficult-to-research area of investigation. The ground for the urban South 
in the Gilded Age has hardly been touched. 
Several thorough studies enrich the material that touches upon public 
health problems in the South. Richard J. Hopkins, "Public Health in Atlanta: 
The Formative Years, 1865-1879," Georgia Historical Quarterly 3 (September 
1969):287-304; John H. Ellis, "Business and Public Health in the Urban South 
during the Nineteenth Century: New Orleans, Memphis, and Atlanta," Bul-
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letin of the History of Medicine 44 (May-June 1970):197-212; and David R. Gold-
field, "The Business of Health Planning, Disease Prevention in the Old South," 
Journal of Southern History 42 (November 1976):557-70, all have valuable data 
relating health problems to larger themes. The serious visitations of yellow 
fever that inflicted New Orleans and the community response are dealt with in 
Donald Everett, "The New Orleans Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1853," Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly 33 (October 1950):380-405; JoAnn Corrigan, "Yellow Fever 
in New Orleans: Abstractions and Realities," Journal of Southern History 25 
(August 1959):339-55; and JoAnn Corrigan, "Privilege, Prejudice, and Strang-
ers' Disease in Nineteenth-Century New Orleans," Journal of Southern History 
36 (November 1970):568-78. More research and analysis are needed on the 
impact of disease upon southern urbanization, from both practical and the-
oretical standpoints. 
Few analytical studies have been done on urban entrepreneurs in the 
South in the Gilded Age. A starting point for those interested in community 
leaders is David C. Hammack, "Problems in the Historical Study of Power in 
the Cities and Towns of the United States, 1800-1960," Amencan Hzstorical 
Review 83 (April1978):323-49. William Best Hesseltine, Confederate Leaders in the 
New South (1950; rpr. Westport, Conn., 1970); Eugene J. Watts, The Social Bases of 
City Politics: Atlanta, 1865-1903 (Westport, 1978); Carl V. Harris, Political Power in 
Birmingham, 1871-1921 (Knoxville, 1977); and Robert J. Hopkins, "Status, Mobi-
lity, and Dimensions of Change in a Southern City: Atlanta, 1870-1910," in 
Kenneth T. Jackson and Stanley K. Schultz, eds., Cities in American History 
(New York, 1972), 216-31, have valuable data. Klein, Great Richmond Terminal, is 
essential readng. L. Tuffly Ellis, "The New Orleans Cotton Exchange: The 
Formative Years, 1871-1880," Journal of Southern History 38 (November 
1973):545-64, surveys an important institution. J. R. Killick, "The Transforma-
tion of Cotton Marketing in the Late Nineteenth Century: Alexander Sprunt 
and Son of Wilmington, N.C., 1866-1956," Business History Review 55 (Summer 
1981):143-69, is a model study of an innovative business activity. The great 
voids in southern business history are hard to justify, given the emphasis 
placed on promoting manufacturing and northern ties by the leaders of the 
New South movement. 
No history of a southern state has a central theme built around urbaniza-
tion, although some of the volumes of the bicentennial series published under 
the auspices of the American Association for State and Local History have 
information relating to urbanization. Louis B. Rubin, Jr., Virginia: A Bicentennial 
History (New York, 1977), contains data on local antebellum rivalries. Good 
material on blockade running in the Civil War and the start of cotton manufac-
turing can be found in WilliamS. Powell, North Carolina: A Bicentennial History 
(New York, 1977). Virginia Van der Vees Hamilton, Alabama: A Bicentennial 
History (New York, 1977) has significant information on early Montgomery. 
David L. Lewis, District of Columbia: A Bicentennial History (New York, 1976), is 
useful. All the state compilations done as part of the Works Project Administra-
tion's American Guide Series have valuable data on important cities and ur-
banization trends. Virginia: A Guide to the Old Dominion (New York, 1940), is 
especially good on Portsmouth, promotional rivalries, and the rise of the 
tobacco industry. Interesting facts about transportation and cities run through 
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Georgia: A Guide to Its Towns and Countryside (Athens, 1940). Antebellum urban 
transportation plans are surveyed in Maryland: A Guide to the Old Line State 
(New York, 1940). Mississippi: A Guide to the Magnolia State (New York, 1938) 
details early economic developments. Arkansas: A Guide to the State (New York, 
1941) studies educational patterns. Kentucky: A Guide to the Bluegrass State (New 
York, 1939) is a fine treatment of commercial growth. Thomas D. Clark, Ken-
tucky: Land of Contrast (New York, 1968), summarizes urban ethnic problems in 
Louisville. In general, the vast number of state histories published in the 
United States contain little material on the urbanization process. An unin-
formed reader would never know that the nation had cities. 
Some of the many available contemporary travel accounts helped to un-
derstand the urban components of the nineteenth-century South. Of special 
value is Edward King, The Great South, edited by W. Margruder Drake and 
Robert R. Jones (1879; rpr. Baton Rouge, 1972). King's "Great South" articles 
were published in Scribner's Monthly in 1873 and 1874. He made a comprehen-
sive examination of southern life, which stressed urban progress. The editors 
of The Great South conclude, "King's work was unquestionably the most thor-
ough treatment of the South since Frederick Law Olmsted's analysis of the 
slave states in the 1850s. It is manifestly impossible to preserve or embalm a 
people, a region, or an era of history, but Edward King, as had Olmsted before 
him, achieved the next best thing in presenting a remarkably sensitive and 
vivid picture of the American South in an important period of its history" (p. 
xxii). Frederick Law Olmsted, A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, with Remarks 
on Their Economy (New York, 1859), had observations on garbage removal 
practices in Norfolk. President Thomas Jefferson commented on Norfolk's 
prospects in an interview described in John Melish, Travels through the United 
States of America in the Years 1806 and 1807, and 1809, 1810, and 1811, Including an 
Account of Passages betwixt Amenca and Britain, and Travels through Various Parts of 
Great Britain, Ireland and Upper Canada, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1818). See also 
David Macrae, The Americans at Home, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1870). 
Many contemporary articles are of worth in considering the evolution of 
southern cities in relation to regional concerns. Some of the useful articles in 
DeBow's Review are Ellwood Fisher, "The North and the South," 7 (September 
1849):264; William M. Burwell, "Virginia Commercial Convention," 12 Ganu-
ary 1853):30; J.D. B. DeBow, "Contests for the Trade of the Mississippi Valley," 
3 (February 1847):98; Jesup W. Scott, "The Great West," 15 Guly 1853):51-53; 
George Fitzhugh, "Washington City and Its Characteristics," 24 (June 
1858):502-3; William M. Burwell, "The Commercial Future of the South," 30 
(February 1861):147; "Competition of the Gulf and Atlantic Ports," 24 Ganuary 
1858):47-48; "The Banks and Insurance Companies of New Orleans," 25 (No-
vember 1858):561; J. Childs, "Railroad Progress and the Mobile and Ohio 
Road," 12 (February 1852):203-4. Typical mid-nineteenth-century statements 
that emphasize the importance of geography in the construction of transporta-
tion systems can be found in the Western Journal. They are "The Natural Laws of 
Commerce," 1 (April1848):137-77; and" A System oflnternal Improvement for 
the West," 2 Ganuary 1849):1-8. "Mississippi Valley Railroad," Western Journal 
and Civilian 9 (November 1852):14, speculates on the location of the site of a 
possible great city along the lower Mississippi River. "Commercial Delusions--
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Speculations," American Review 71 (October 1845):341-57, is a participant's 
account of the frenzied activities that featured early speculation in the Midwest. 
Numerous articles in the Manufacturers Record stress the themes embodied in 
the New South creed. 
Certain other older items were of special use. Hinton Rowan Helper, The 
Impending Crisis of the South: How to Meet It (New York, 1857), usually thought of 
as the book that stimulated the slavery controversy, contributed to the debate 
over whether the South required a great commercial city. Albion Winegard 
Tourgee, A Fool's Errand (New York, 1880), is an entertaining but embittered 
semifictional account of southern life by a former carpetbagger. Insights on 
urban sanitation concerns are illustrated in "First Report of the Committee on 
Public Hygiene of the American Medical Association," Transactions of the Amer-
ican Medical Association, vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1849). For a typical promotional 
work see M. B. Hillyard, The New South: A Description of the Southern States, 
Noting Each State Separately, and Giving Their Distmctzve Features and Most Salient 
Characteristics (Baltimore, 1887). James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (New 
York, 1888), and Lincoln Steffens, Shame of the Cities (New York, 1904), though 
general in scope, are of use in understanding city government in the South. 
These and other accounts add richness to the materials needed to pursue the 
study of the urban South in the Gilded Age. 
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garbage, 121, 122-23, 124; waterworks, 
125, gas, 127; horse railroads, 128; 
police, 136, 137, 138, 139 
New Orleans, Opelousas and Great 
Northern Railway, 73 
New Orleans Crescent, 61 
New Orleans Drainage and Sewerage 
Company, 123 
New Orleans Times-Democrat, 87 
New Orleans Water Works Company, 125 
Newport, Kentucky: population, 26, 37, 
Index 
39, 151, 153; manufacturing, 82; 
location, 105; plat, 108; parks, 109; 
waste disposal, 124, 126; board of 
health, 130; pohce, 136 
Newport News, Vuginia, 159, 160, 161 
New South, The, 143 
Newton, Rev. John C. Calhoun, 51 
New York, 8, 145 
New York, New York: mentioned 1, 4, 5, 
6, 33, 61, 86; population statistics, 21, 
37, 39, 43, 48; exports, 68; grain trade 
76, 77; financed South, 79, 93; 
manufacturing, 81; persons per 
dwelling, 103; central park, 108; life 
expectancy, 132, 133; saloons, 139 
New York Central Railroad, 77 
New York Herald, 13 
New York Tribune, 11 
Nicholls, Francis T., 92 
Norfolk, Virginia: railroads, 7, 67; 
mentioned, 23, 86; harbor, 67; trade 
statistics, 68; manufacturing, 82; 
location, 104; plat, 108; parks, 109; 
theater, 113; streets, 118, 119; waste 
disposal, 121, 126; waterworks, 125; 
street hghts, 126; gas, 127; horse 
railroads, 128; fires, 133; police, 136, 
137, 138; population statistics, 150, 153, 
161 
North Carolina; population, 35, 144, 
railroads, 64; cotton, 89 
Oglethorpe, James, 107 
Ohio, 8, 99 
Ohio River 6, 7 
Olmsted, Frederick Law, 108, 109, 119 
Omaha, Nebraska, 33 
omnibuses, 129 
Oshkosh, Wisconsin, 136 
Otken, Charles, 79 
Owensboro, Kentucky, 159, 160 
Paducah, Kentucky, 157 
Page, Walter Hines, 11, 12, 34, 35 
Panic of 1837, 8, 69 
Panic of 1873, 65 
Panic of 1893, 159 
parks, 108-10 
Patrons of Husbandry, 147 
Peabody, George, 55 
Pennsylvania Railroad, 65 
Pensacola, Florida, 26, 154, 161 
Peoria, Illinois, 136, 144, 145 
Petersburg, Virginia: population 
statistics, 24, 37, 40, 150, 153; location, 
24, 104; manufacturing, 82, 90; plat, 
108; sidewalks, 118; liquid wastes, 125; 
gas, 127; fire department, 133, 134 
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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: population 
statistics, 37, 48; railroads, 65; trade, 
68, 77; manufacturing, 81; park, 110; 
prostitution, 139 
Pine Bluff, Arkansas, 159, 160 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 47, 145 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 30, 146 
police: general, 129, 135-36; salaries, 
136-37; uniforms, 137; shifts, 137-38; 
expenditures, 138; crime statistics, 
138-39 
population: of blacks, 35, 36, 37; 1880, 35, 
36; foreign born, 36, 37; general 
statistics, 144; growth of cities, 148, 
150-63 
Portsmouth, VIrgmia: mentioned, 23; 
railroads, 66; harbor, 67; location, 104; 
plat, 108; parks, 109; gas, 127; 
population statistics, 148, 153, 161 
Potomac River, 7 
Przce Current, 71 
prostitution, 139 
Purdue University, 58 
Quincy, Illinois, 97 
Racine, Wisconsin, 145 
railroads: strategy, 6, 8; technology, 61; in 
south, 62, 64, 65, 67, 72-73; northern, 
62, 65-66; gram shipping, 76; freight 
rates, 77 
Raleigh, North Carolina, 24, 157, 158 
Reagan, Ronald, 16 
religion, 51, 54 
Reminiscences of Basil W. Duke, C.S.A., 89 
Richardson, Henry Hobson, 112 
Richmond, Virgima: railroads, 7, 65, 66, 
67; population statistics, 24, 40, 44, 
148, 150, 153, 161; location, 24, 104, 
mentioned, 31; manufacturing, 81, 82, 
145; plat, 108, architecture, 111; 
theater, 113; street cleaning, 120; waste 
disposal, 124, 126; omnibuses, 129; 
fires, 133; prostitution, 139 
Richmond and Danville Railroad, 65 
Richmond and West Point Terminal 
Railway and Warehouse Company, 65 
Roanoke, Virgima, 157, 158 
Robb, James, 72, 73, 74 
Rockefeller, John D., 88 
Roman Catholics, 42, 52 
Roooevelt, Franklin D., 16 
Root, John Welborn, 112 
St. Louis, Missouri, 6, 8, 19, 37, 74, 75 
San Diego, California, 27, 143 
San Francisco, California, 33, 68, 99, 110, 
139 
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Savannah, Georgia: railroads, 8, 67; 
mentioned, 7, 23, 31, 68, 76; 
population statistics, 39, 150, 153, 161; 
trade statistics, 68; manufacturing, 82; 
urban design, 103, 106-07; location, 
104; parks, 109; streets, 118; waste 
disposal, 124, 126; gas, 127; 
omnibuses, 129; fire department, 133, 
134; police, 136, 137 
Savannah (steamship), 7 
Scott, Jesup, 9 
Scranton, Pennsylvania, 47 
Scrzbner's Monthly, 31 
Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad, 66 
Seattle, Washington, 27, 143 
segregation, 99-101 
Selma, Alabama, 27 
sewage, 121-25 
sewers, 123 
Shepherd, Alexander, 96-97 
Sherman, William T., 18, 64 
Shreveport, Louisiana, 27, 156 
sidewalks, 118 
Slater, John F., 55 
Smith, Captain John, 103 
South Carolina, 53, 64, 89 
Southern Alliance, 147 
Southern Pacific Railroad, 73 
Southern Railway Security, 65, 83 
Southern Railway System, 65 
South's Redemption from Poverty to 
Prosperity, The, 143 
Sparta Ishmaelite, 12 
Spartanburg, South Carolina, 159, 160 
Spencer, Herbert, 50 
Spokane, Washington, 157 
Sprunt, James, 90 
Standard Oil Company, 154 
Staunton, Virginia, 24 
streets: paving, 117-18, cleaning, 118-20 
Sullivan, Louis, 112 
Summers, E.H., 90 
Tacoma, Washington, 143, 157 
Tampa, Florida, 159, 160, 161 
telephones, 127-28 
Tennessee, 6, 54 
Texas, 20, 72 
textile mills, 25 
Thoreau, Henry David, 4 
Toledo, Ohio, 144 
Tompkins, Daniel Augustus, 51 
Tourg, William, 124 
Tourgee, Albion, 95 
Transylvania College, 89 
Troy Messenger, 12 
Tucker, George, 3 
Tweed, William Marcy, 95 
Umted States, 5, 47 
United States Naval Academy, 23 
urban design, 106-07 
Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 73 
Van Horn, Robert T., 13 
Vesey, Denmark, 39 
Index 
Vicksburg, Mississippi: population 
statistics, 27, 152, 154; taxes, 97; 
location, 105, 106; plat, 108; police, 137, 
138 
Vicksburg Daily Whzg, 4 
Virginia, 5, 7, 8, 64, 81, 112 
Virginia legislature, 7 
Walker, Gilbert C., 91 
Waring, George, Jr., 123, 131 
War of 1812, 5 
Washington, District of Columbia: canal, 
7; mentioned, 20, 67; population 
statistics, 23, 37, 39, 42, 44, 45, 49, 148, 
153, 161; railroads, 63, 65; government, 
94, 96; manufacturing, 81, 145; debt, 
97; location, 104; urban design, 106; 
parks, 110; architecture, 110-11, 112; 
dead animals, 120; waste disposal, 121, 
124; transportation, 128, 129; health, 
130, 132-33; fire department, 133, 135; 
police, 136, 138 
Washington College, 86 
waterworks, 125-26 
Watterson, Henry; mentioned, 11, 26; 
background, 12, race views, 14, 15; 
promoter, 16, 17, 87; on railroads, 67 
Weldon, North Carolina, 66 
Western Journal and Civilian, 62 
West Virginia, 66 
Wheeling, West Virginia, 6 
Williamsburg, Virgnia, 106, 113 
Wzllzams v. Mississippi, 146 
Wilmington, Delaware, 19 
Wilmington, North Carohna: mentioned, 
23, 31, 76; population, 37, 148, 152, 
161; trade statistics, 68; cotton, 89-90; 
location, 104; street cleaning, 120 
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, 63 
Winchester, Virginia, 24 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 159, 160 
Wisconsin, 8, 69, 99 
Youngstown, Ohio, 144 
Yorkville Enquirer, 12 
